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Abstract 
 
Ulrich Beck’s work, focusing on Europeanisation, presents one of the most 
usable – revolutionary – descriptions of the globalised world: he also shares the opinion 
that ‘understanding’ reality is, in and of itself, a revolutionary act. Reflexive modernity 
prompts us to reconsider the relation of the West-Balkan and Europeanisation. On the 
periphery of the EU, the West-Balkan states will only be able to regain their potential if 
the mostly economic integration also becomes a social one. All these efforts point us 
toward the renewal of democracy. Beck’s works contain fine arguments for the 
foundation of self-governance: for the mutual acceptance of a bottom-up and 
democratic procedural order. In Europe, diversity brings about not only a multitude of 
problems but also opportunities for their solution. The social success of Europeanisation 
partly depends on the revision of elements of ‘democracy’, as majority-principled 
decision making may lead to the automatic exclusion of minority communities. This 
cannot be envisioned without reinterpreting the role of communities on Europe’s 
periphery, including the relation between a nation state and its neighbours, and 
between a nation state and the EU as well. 
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We elaborate on the relationship of Beck’s ‘soft empire’ and peripheral states, 
considering the EU as a non-homogeneous and non-hegemonic empire. We also work 
on the socio-theoretical “critique” of the so-called ‘methodological nationalism’. The 
starting point of a new approach is that the main problem is not any nation-building 
program. In our view, the reasons for the recurring, persistent problems with the issues 
of a nation its state and neighbours are the majority-principled decision-making and 
regional segmentation, and the fixed nature of borders. The emerging Balkan 
phenomenon of “association with a delayed or cancelled accession process” requires a 
new approach. 
 
 
The West Balkan 
 
A main factor in 21st-century Serbian political processes (just as in the post-
Socialist region in general and thus in the West Balkan and Serbia) has been the 
attitude toward territorial retraction and toward the seceded regions. (The Albanian 
efforts of regional unity can be interpreted as the reverse side of this.) The South-Slavic 
civil wars that concluded the late 20th century had just the opposite result with regard 
to regionality that the Balkan wars had had in the beginning of the century. The region 
most commonly referred to as West-Balkan1 is ethnically much more homogeneous that 
it had been in the period of ‘regional unification’, but it is still one of the most complex 
ethno-political puzzle in Europe. In the era of economic globalization and its associated 
supra-national institution system, however, “traditional methods” cannot handle the 
challenges in the West-Balkan any more. 
Along with newer forms of integration and compatible with the so-called 
Europeanization, the centuries-old conflicts of the resident political actors (ethnical 
and/or territorial) need resolutions that are also acceptable for external actors. 
Establishing the new (: “democratic”) political institutions in the region also presents 
this duality: there is a need to develop solutions that are still acceptable for the 
country’s political scene and already satisfactory for the “observers” abroad. In the case 
                                                          
1 Another expression, Smanjeni Zapadni Balkan or Rest of the West-Balkan (“Restern-Balkan”) is 
used to collectively denote the countries in the region minus Croatia, i.e. non-EU states. (See 
Jović 2015, 133 p.) 
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of Serbia, this actually meant whether the false opposition of “Europe or Kosovo” can be 
transcended by any government coalition in a way that does not erase its own basis 
until the next elections. (In the meantime, the Albanian-dominated states of Albania 
and Kosovo have to give the impression that they are able to control their territorial 
aspirations, possessing the patience to wait for the right “historical moment”; without 
doubt, the long-term goal is the unification of Alban communities. Whether or not this 
happens within the EU as an empire or on the outer/inner rim, is practically of 
secondary concern.) As the last two Serbian nation-level elections in 2012 and in 2014 
prove, this was in fact achieved. (In addition, so far the Albanian aspirations have not 
outgrown the frames acceptable for big political actors).2 The basic situation has not 
changed since 2008 and is further complicated by the following: the ruling parties 
should3 demand de facto regional autonomy for the Serbs living in one block in the de 
jure unrecognised but autonomous Kosovo. What’s more, they had better support the 
autonomy efforts of the Serbian entity (Republika Srpska) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
should not isolate themselves from the pro-Russian communications demonstrated by 
certain social groups in Montenegro. These are rights and activities that the vox 
populis, taking the same minimums for granted, could not accept in the case of ethnic 
communities in Serbian territories. For them, Albanian, Bosinan or Hungarian regional 
autonomy is out of question. While the Serbian demands4, also prompted by 
international actors, face spontaneous and long-lasting disapproval from the Kosovars. 
At the same time, an (oppositional) party in Hungary is attacked for attempting to open 
an office on the Serbian parts of the Tisza region, but the Serbian governing party 
operates such offices with un-reflected self-evidence in the Serb-populated territories 
of Bosnia. Thus a characteristic West-Balkan context accompanies the enforcing role of 
external factors like the European Union, not only in the actual dimension of 
government actions, but in a similarly characteristic ideological-semantic dimension as 
                                                          
2 Both the problem of the inviolable Serbian sovereignty and of the provisional unification of 
Albanian ethnicities threaten with the emegrence of a less docile local elite. All major (local and 
global) actors are in favor of a domesticated handling of these problems.  
3 As an implicite national minimum. 
4 See the 2015 December 17 summary of the ECMI in Flensburg. The publication also includes a 
chronological synopsis of the stages of the process. See: 
http://us6.campaignarchive1.com/?u=0e3bc8a45806bf65531105c4b&id=5d29ca412c 
Downloaded: 2016.01.10 
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well. Depending on the case, these roles are not only overvalued, but re-evaluated. This 
neighbourhood- and minority-policy and its institutions could well be reinterpreted 
through Beck’s ‘soft empire’ theorem. (The essence of Beck’s views is that the EU 
generates a unique action space with specific asymmetries and options not only for its 
member states, but for its potential partners as well, regardless of their distance from 
actual accession.) 
 
 
The context of segmentation – normative democracy theory 
 
The starting point of the Western normative democracy theory is the so-called 
theory of communicative action by Jürgen Habermas, but its teleology seems to have 
its target in the post-national constellation (Habermas 2006). 
“Though sovereignty and the state’s power monopoly has remained formally 
intact, the increasing interdependence of the world’s societies weakens the premise 
that a national policy can overlap, even regionally and within the borders of the state, 
with the actual future of the society of the nation.” 
Jürgen Habermas 2006: The post-national constellation. L’Harmattan, Budapest 66 p. 
 This social theory is based on leftist ideology, glorifying equality and striving to 
transcend (neglect) national programs, has its ‘normative’ suggestions; tracing them 
leads one to a constitutional fetishism intending to recycle the political tradition of 
contract theories. Its own consent-principled expectations are based on the notion that 
the constitutional directives regulate everyone in their choosing of implemented 
political actions (for details, see Soós-Pap 2015). However, the citation also suggests 
that the importance priority of the problems differ for the central states (and the minds 
behind their solution theories) and for the post-Socialist (member or candidate) 
countries on the internal and external periphery. The former would address the 
challenges of economic globalization by setting up an action space realised on a 
supranational political level, and the framework for this could be a Beck-ian empire of 
the cosmopolitan Europe or a global state. The latter have tried to realise their nation-
building aspirations, all infeasible in the not so soft Soviet imperial conditions, through 
their own ‘restorative revolutions’ (: regime change, system transition). Internal 
relations are less and less homogeneous; for the former states, the task at hand is to 
establish a new primary majority, transcending the traditional concept of nation (willing 
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to live without shared past, culturally heterogeneous). But post-Socialist countries are 
striving to conclude a historically (before 1944) unfinished project of overlapping nation 
and state, in a 21st-century environment. It could be considered belated or even 
anachronistic from the centre, but it is not without validity. 
As opposed to this, the new generation (Axel Honneth, Jan-Werner Müller) of 
the Habermas school prefers the procedural order manifested in the so-called 
Copenhagen criteria (where it lacks the necessary socio-theoretical foundations, 
though). This is true for theory (Honneth: The Struggle for Recognition; Honneth 2010)5 
and practice as well (J-W. Müller: Verfassungpatriotismus; Müller 2010), but definitely 
true while establishing the extended political community of the EU. This is explained in 
the essay on Europe’s constitution by Habermas (see Habermas 2012, 135). However, 
the constitutional process of the EU is known to be stalled. Therefore, relations 
between the large social groups of EU citizens (nations, ethnicities and all ‘non-
dominant’ (minority) communities that have a commonly shared “attitude” or life-world 
to their environments) are regulated by member state-level constitutions and higher 
(but legally less enforceable and only indirectly effectual) human-right norms. 
 
 
Integration and the belated nation-building 
 
Normative social theories tend to devaluate exercises in nationalism, as not 
facilitating equality and consent. However, these are not a one-time excess of post-
Socialist social phenomena, but today they seem to be normal society-building practice. 
In all cases, the most striking political program among them is nation-building, or as 
Zoltán Kántor calls it: national re-institutionalisation. (see Kántor 2014, 49) Without 
regard to ideological preconceptions, this is a realistic view on nationalism that can 
adequately interpret the discussed phenomena. The multi-actor process gained a 
characteristic context, due to the regional integration efforts (factual or intended EU-
accession) from most post-Socialist countries, in spite of their former attitude of 
                                                          
5 During the process of nation building, non-dominant communities may face disadvantages; the 
socio-theoretical basis of their legal and moral efforts is provided in Honneth's work (Honneth 
2013). 
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segmentation. Thus the framework of interpretation must also be extended. As Kántor 
summarizes it: 
“The process of national re-institutionalization in the post-Communist period is 
to be examined with regard to state re-organization, minority self-organization, support 
from the home country, and EU influence. Nationalism should be analysed within the 
framework of the political actions of the four actors and the interactions of their 
policies, as a separate analysis of the actors can lead only to partial understanding.” 
Zoltán Kántor: The institutionalization of the nation in Hungary after the 
system transition. Budapest, Osiris, 2014, 51. 
It is also worth noting that there is a duality present in the successor states of 
the several national communities of declaredly equal status; the newly or again 
independent nation states assume the two extremities of re-institutionalization. Serbia, 
even with a past of civil war, is not so unwilling to have minority institutions (unless 
they have regionalisation aspects), while Slovakia, with much better transition ‘results’ 
by having peacefully seceded from the Czech Republic, is quite reluctant to establish 
any minority institutions (autonomous bodies and competences). However, Slovakia has 
been more exposed as a home country; the meeting of the Serbian and Slovakian prime 
ministers also involved discussion of the situation of the Slovakian minority in Serbia. 
Albanian territories were historically forced to develop separately; their integration 
goal, the vision of a future Great-Albania does not facilitate neighbour- and minority 
policies. Without a definite tendency, it can be stated that those successor states that 
had had ethnic institutions during the Socialist era are more willing to allocate 
resources for minority institutions; and states in a more advance stage of nation 
building (and operating with more stabilized state and nation boundaries) find it easier 
to achieve less problematic neighbourhood policies. (Even if relations have been shifting 
on a weekly basis, due to the refugee crisis and to the semantic and structural 
actualities that the admittance/restriction issue brought in – See Ördögh 2015).6  
                                                          
6 In his paper Ördögh highlights that Serbia's refugee policy also has serious challenges: the 
legal framework is not conform to EU-expectations and the design of system itself is 
substandard, in terms of capacity and skill of personnel (Ördögh 2015, p 181). There is a symbolic 
war of interpretations ongoing among the neighboring countries, largely restricteds to the filed 
of media. The mass appearance of refugees, the infrastructural and ideological unresolvability of 
the crisis opened a new chapter in self-interpretation. The international attention now makes it 
possible to re-position other symbolic offenses about the neighbors.  
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 The system transitions starting in 1989 meant similar processes for countries 
in the former Socialist block. In Serbia, this happened in two distinct phases.7 A major 
lesson of the period is that late Socialist relations and positions (advantages and 
disadvantages) could disintegrate in the course of months: how a state utilized its 
opportunities during the transition mattered much more than the starting conditions. 
Granted, there were historical differences stemming from cumulative causality and 
involving compulsory paths. One such difference is the internal conditions for restarting 
the nation state program. After 1989, these defined the scene of national and minority 
politics, the roles of home country and of primary majority; conflicts of neighbourhood 
politics can be traced back to such fears (territorial demands, dismissal of self-
autonomy efforts). 
 Therefore, though we would not have expected it a quarter of a century ago, 
Albanian and Serb nation-state efforts face very similar structural problems throughout 
the various successor states, fiercely defending their hard-earned independence and 
thus more sensitive to symbolic atrocities. Meanwhile, economic indicators of the 
involved two (or three, or five)8 countries converged rather to each other than to those 
of the aspired EU member states. The ‘international judgment’ on a given action (an 
atrocity of an act of heroism, depending on the interpretative context of the event) is 
also a function of how they interfere with the present interests of the big players. 
Thus, acts of a functionally similar status can have differing international 
careers in divergent interpretative contexts, ranging from near casus belli9 to being too 
low-key for major news agencies. An involved neighbouring state can, however, have its 
                                                          
7 Certain elements of the normal system transitions (party formation, pluralistic media, a limited 
economic transformation) were present in the first phase (the Milošević-regime) as well, but the 
second phase began on October 5, 2000, by institutional transformation. 
8 In addition to the Albanian-majority states of Albania and Kosovo, Macedonia also has a 
politically relevant Albanian minority. The Albanian communities in Serbia and Montenegro have 
regional/local significance. Serbs in Croatia, Montenegro and especially in Kosovo can be seen as 
politically relevant. They form a separate entity in Bosnia. (C.f. Reményi 2015, 13) 
9 This is no poetic exaggeration: refer to the Serbian and Croatian daily papers from 2015 
September for official and less official 'interpretations' of the measures that were taken in 
connection with the refugee crisis and each other.  
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media dominated by the same event for weeks or months: consider the drone “attack”10 
occurring at a European championship qualifying round with Serbia vs Albania playing. 
The international media treated it as a petty scandal soon to be forgotten, while it 
dictated the discourse space for long in Albania and Kosovo, but in Serbia alike. 
 
 
The influence of international actors 
 
Options for external actors were also significantly bolstered in the new, soft 
imperial conditions. As long as the struggle for autonomy was top priority, other 
perspectives and compulsions could be suppressed. But beside the shared goal of EU 
accession, the new international system of relations stresses temporary compromises 
with the efforts of competitor countries in the region. The whole EU accession process 
was designed as a process of reconciliation. However, a coerced reconciliation with the 
accession perspective in mind does not mean the disappearance of nation-building 
intentions, or that these would not result in symbolic clashes between states/nations. 
Beside the aforementioned football conflict, many other symbolic battles are fought by 
the region’s nations. Nowadays these remain within the scopes of their own media, and 
most do not transcend the scene of interpretative “wars”. 
The West-Balkan states are at different stages of the accession procedure, they 
have differing goals and very divergent perspectives. Their movements are further 
complicated by certain states competing for regional influence, compensating their 
recent or older losses of position and referring to cultural and religious origins and 
traditions. Both Russia and Turkey regard the region as a significant auxiliary stage of 
                                                          
10 On October 14, 2014, the Serbia-Albania EC-qualifier match in Belgrade was disrupted by a 
drone hovering above the field and sporting a flag of Greater Albania and Albanian national 
symbols. Both fans and players took offense, the flag was captured and the match was 
interrupted. There were allegations that the drone was controlled by Olsi Rama (the brother of 
Albanian president Edi Rama), who had immunity by his US passport. Along with two 
companions, he was apprehended and then released by Serbian police. (See 
http://www.naslovi.net/2014-10-15/b92/albanci-se-utrkuju-dron-je-nas/11976498, 
http://www.naslovi.net/2014-10-15/blic/ko-je-olsi-rama-covek-koji-je-zeleo-da-izazove-nerede-i-
krvoprolice/11972510.) The incident was interpreted in Serbian publicity as a symbolic violation 
of the territory of the Serbian state. 
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global politics.11 Even the otherwise apparently particular Serbian/Albanian intentions 
can be provided an international context, though their influence on local politics is 
today largely reduced to the symbolic gestures of occasional investments; both the 
Albanian and the Serbian parties prefer to maintain good relations with the European 
Union, to display an accession potential. Still, nation building is ongoing parallel to 
Europeanization, and the strongmen of the national elite working for European 
acceptance were regarded incompatible by the West a couple of decades ago; they have 
to seize opportunities to utilize cultural and religious connections for political gains. 
(This is true for Vučić and Tači as well: not only their pasts, their presents are also 
intertwined, just as the parallels of their paths from radicalism to consolidation are also 
perceptible.) 
As to the neighbour and minority policy of ‘those already within the empire’, 
experiences are ambiguous. After becoming a member, the legal situation of minorities 
quickly left the agenda, and is occasionally revisited as neighbour policies only. 
Membership aspirants (and those pursuing the program of the strong nation state, 
perhaps while maintaining a pretence of postponed accession plans) can prepare for 
more and more explicit requirements on the part of the empire. (Cf. Nakamara 2009, 
Samardžić 2009) At the same time, the imperial context has been quite successful in 
domesticating the verbal and symbolic clashes that are inevitably involved in nation 
building. These clashes are more for internal use only, and the opponents who almost 
seemed mortal enemies in their twenties are now real-politicians in responsible 
positions, calming tempers. At the same time, the individual states do not have a well 
detailed, definite neighbourhood policy (Cf. Tatalović 2015, 151-158) 
 
 
Concepts of space and power in the new millennium 
 
The turn of the millennium saw several authors discussing the unipolar world 
order and the consequent (postmodern) state of being ‘without history’. Partly to 
counterbalance and refine them, important works of social and spatial theory had been 
published by the mid-2010s. Based on these, I intend to sketch the options that define 
                                                          
11 The Jović-article has a separate chaper on the recent developments of these relations, see 
Jović 2015, 139-143 p.  
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the political freedom of the West-Balkan countries. But first, attention must be drawn 
to Niklas Luhmann’s work urging a sociological enlightenment, where space is 
highlighted as a medium of power. It is through space that the origin of all political 
phenomenon, the relation of power, becomes manifest. Power is a category of relations. 
It does not exist self-sufficiently. Discussing it makes sense only within the relation 
shaped by its existence/absence. And this relation is given shape by space (territory 
brought under the power): as the sand of the beach makes the track of feet visible, so is 
power itself made visible by territory.12 
 An important constituent part of a ruled area is its borders. For Luhmann, 
segmentation (definition of spatial boundaries of power, an inflexible and hard-to-
change construct, like a fixed state border) is the originator of many additional 
questions.13 The external environment, the powers on the outside of segmentation 
(them), the area under control, the internal system (us), actors (political agents) on the 
two poles of the power relation, all these and their ways14 of interaction create politics 
itself. A major characteristic of the controlled territory is that the system of power 
(politics) is usually unwilling to yield a part of the territory that is under its control. 
Territory loss always means capitulation for them, which undermines legitimacy and 
therefore results in the transformation of internal power relations. Losing control over a 
territory also involves the de-legitimation of the reigning power. And the other way 
around, power that is able to transcend the current segmentation relations gains 
further legitimacy as a result of its own territory-gaining/maintaining policies.15 The 
connection between the potential for maintaining power and territory gain/loss seems 
undisputable. 
                                                          
12 Of course, both the theoretical and practical power concepts involve non-spatial power 
institutions, but these (for example national councils in Serbia) are established to avoid the 
spatial restrictions on power. The intention is to create a power form that does not threaten the 
power over the nation state space through internal segmentation (regional autonomy). 
13 See Luhmann 2002, 58. 
14 Political theory has developed tools to present these issues, but Luhmann's stance is worth 
highlighting, as it also addresses the background of the phenomena. 
15 This was well demonstrated by the internal legitimacy of Milošević's system: despite the lost 
wars and the military/exploitation economy, they had a serious internal basis throughout Serbia 
even in the final days (after the NATO bombings). 
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However, history is apparently unwilling to end, and the unipolar world order 
seems to be unsustainable for ever or long. Among the visible scenarios of shaping 
political space, two concepts are discussed about imperial large regions, both having 
West-Balkan aspirations as well. One is that the whole territory of the West-Balkan 
joins the European Union (regarded by many as the only alternative). The other is a 
concept about the imperial border of the Eurasian megaregion, bolstered through 
Orthodoxy.16  The basis of the two concepts have their own characteristic ideas about 
spatial manifestation of the relations toward modernity. But while the Russian/Eurasian 
concept involves a plan that externally criticizes modernity, to be realised in a 
controversially followed imperial framework17, the worries about joining the European 
megaregion are internal in nature (their basis being reflexive and self-critical 
modernisation). The ideas of the latter consider the conceptual basis of imperiality to be 
radically changeable, thus so is the relation to a ruled territory. (The EU as an empire, 
claims Beck and Grande’s book18, is neither hegemonic nor homogeneous: hence it is 
‘soft’19). 
We have to note here that a concept of Eurasia to be unified by the Russian 
state appears as a necessity (as a description of an eventually occurring process whose 
only alternative is annihilation20). As opposed to this, joining the EU poses an outcome 
that is still influenced by many factors, with details blurred, and the temporal horizon of 
its realization is uncertain, but not unforeseeable. 
The involved West-Balkan countries (the Russian narrative does not explain 
what roles would countries with non-Orthodox majority receive, trapped within the 
                                                          
16 A main ideologist is Alexandr Dugin (Kiss 2013, Szilágyi 2015), but Srðan Perišić also discusses 
the cultural and real-political aspects of the concept. C.f. Osnove ruske geopolitike (Foundations 
of the Russian geopolitics; PERIŠIĆ 20015, 25-61. p.). 
17 See DUGIN 2004a; 2004b; 2008; 2013. 
18 Beck's works often include a critical re-assessment of modernity. Here we highlight 
Cosmopolitan Europe, co-authored with Edgar Grande and explicating on the EU as a singular 
imperial construct. C.f. the historical analysis of sovereignty: BECK–GRANDE 2007, 99. p 
19 Soft is a 'total' adjective here and a future characteristic of the empire to come, not to be 
confused with the soft political methods of international relations (as opposed to military 
actions).  
20 C.f. the sections on Russian interference on Ukrainian territories in  DUGIN 2013, 42-44. p.; 
PERIŠIĆ 2015, 287. p. 
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natural boundaries of this civilizational megaregion)21 would take a peripheral status in 
both scenarios, with all the included disadvantages (anomalies in development level)22 
and advantages (mobility due to lower degree of integration)23. 
Even for a description operating with negative (soft) attributes, imperiality 
establishes its structure on elements of differing status. Spatial distance is paired with 
cultural distance/otherness. This is completely the opposite of the currently ‘official’ 
unipolarity-based imperial doctrine, according to which the global society needs to be 
constituted of homogeneous (sharing the same operational principles) elements. These 
are composed of essentially equivalent variants of capitalist economy and democratic 
decision making24. 
 
 
West-Balkan countries trapped between commitment expectations 
 
In the middle of the second decade of the new millennium, none of the issues 
that are crucial for the West-Balkan countries are concluded for good.25 Neither 
ethnical or state boundaries, nor the possibility of categorization along influence zones 
could be seen as completed. Only Crotia’s EU accession brought apparently irreversible 
changes that will enforce some self-control from the parties, when it comes to claims 
about Croatia.26 The situation is better described as “un-solidified solutions” than as 
                                                          
21 Perišić comments that the Balkan is explicitly included in the influence zones of the new 
Russian geopolitical doctrine; see PERIŠIĆ 2015, 246-248.). 
22 Or the fact that that Russia is relatively far away. The lack of territorial continuity is a 
vulnerable point in the theorems intending to bond Slavic-Orthodox West-Balkan states to 
Russia, unlike the commitment policies of adjacent authoriter leaders (see CIS, Lukashenko and 
Belorussia). A West-Balkan state can only achieve a status of 'observer' regarding the 
institutionalization of the Eurasia-concept.  
23 At the West-Balkan research workshop in Graz, this is referred to as the so-called Turkish 
scenario, 'advancement without accession'. 
24 Luhmannn uses the neutral term 'majority-principled'. 
25 In other words, they seem re-openable, when the situation demands. 
26 Croatia's territorial aspirations are not settled and there is no consistent neighborhood policy 
to speak of, either. C.f. Hrvatska politika prema državama Zapadnog Balkana nakon članstva u 
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“frozen conflicts”. No party has it in its interest today to spark a conflict of similar 
intensity to the civil wars of the late 20th century. Nevertheless, the following West-
Balkan issues are still open present day: 
- state situation of Kosovo 
- formal/institutional unity of Serbian districts in Kosovo 
- interrelations of Bosnian entities 
- relation of the entities with their origin countries 
- Macedonia’s official name usage 
- the level of autonomy (/secession) of the Albanian-majority parts of 
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro 
- the issue of the Sanjak, located in two distinct countries today 
- the state situation of Montenegro and the divergent ethnic identities 
These topics need to be treated as provisionally accessible problems by the 
current elite, because the declared and supposedly conclusive acceptance of the status 
quo would erode the legitimacy of their own rule. This gesture would abandon control 
over these now international, politically addressable issues, whose re-emergence could 
shift power relations within the new states, even on the short run. Suggesting a future 
re-settlement of the issues, they also let their own options and mobilisation potential 
untapped. If consolidation processes progress slower than hoped, they will have the 
means for the re-legitimization of their rule, even considering their gradually eroding 
action potential.27 
There is an obvious and powerful pressure from the international entities active 
in the region. However, the governing parties in 2000-2008, origination from the 
Democratic Opposition in Serbia (DOS), cannot forfeit the Southern province of Kosovo. 
(not for their own ideological/value basis, but such a symbolic act would soon render 
them a dwarf party28) The various party formations organized by veterans of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Evropskoj Uniji - Attitude of Croatian politics to West-Balkan countries after the EU accession. 
TATALOVIĆ 2015, 151-155.). 
27 The whole region has to face challenges of political and social transformation and the 
resulting crises. The relative un-consolidatedness of the newly or again autonomous states is 
manifest in the frequency of early elections.  
28 In 2012, president Tadić also experimented with early elections, which fits in the tendency. 
(However, the Democratic party had made a strategic mistake earlier, when they formed a 
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Kosovar liberation battles are also unable to allow for the institutional separation 
(regional autonomy/’un-secession) attempts of the formally taken, but never really 
ruled northern, Serbian territories.29 Global players also acknowledged the complexity of 
the situation. This is why Realpolitik can have an advantage in the West-Balkan, during 
the implementation of the expectations from the centre. 
 
 
New opportunists 
 
The present situation is thus an intriguing ground for regional powers (ex-
empire) redefining themselves today, such as Russia or Turkey. Cultural bonds 
(Orthodoxy, ‘Slavic psyche’) and century-old imperial presence, and the Islamic regional 
mosaic left behind by the receding empire has never actually lost sight of this 
periphery. In a period of newer uncertainties, the time came30 when much influence 
could be gained from a small investment. The aforementioned internal controversies of 
the issue also enabled Russia to find partners among the Orthodox Yugoslavian 
successor states. This is partly instead of Romania, committed to both the USA and the 
EU, and instead of Bulgaria, now a geo-economic partner coerced by certain actions and 
values expected by the new centres. Compared with the mobilised capital, all this seems 
to be carried out with a fairly good return rate. 
 The efforts defining Russian-Serb relations in the new millennium are in many 
aspects different from those in the past. Russia inherited key positions in international 
organizations from the USSR, and in the last fifteen years Serbia has expected Russia 
to take a favourable stance for them (e.g. a veto in the UN Security Council) in the 
emerging unresolved/unresolvable issues. Russia, as part of its ‘geopolitics of resources’ 
strategy31, strove to shape its economic footholds in the Balkan. In other words, the 
Russian party just had to not counter the Serbian expectations, for relatively cheap 
                                                                                                                                                    
coalition with the Serbian Socialist party of Slobodan Milošević – again, for the sake of 
remaining in power.) 
29 See Opportunity?/UDRUŽENJE/ZAJEDNICA VEĆINSKI SRPSKIH OPŠTINA: OBAVEZA ILI 
PRILIKA? ECMI: Kosovo Communities Issues Monitor, Flensburg, 2015, 4. p. 
30 In his article, Dejan Jović commits a separate chapter for the phenomenon, subtitled 'The 
effects of Russia's and Turkey's growing power', see: JOVIĆ 2015, 139-143. p.). 
31 PERISIĆ 2015, 165-169. p. 
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economic advantages. However, neither party has been able to accomplish the 
maximum of their intentions. Serbia was disappointed by Russia not really inhibiting 
the international process of Kosovo’s recognition. (Whether Russia was unable or 
unwilling is a matter of interpretations.32) Each ruling Serbian government actively 
anticipated and counterbalanced this intention: national gas company NIS went into 
Russian majority ownership well under its price, which the Serbian media33 and 
opposition keeps thematising. This Russian move was to be an organic part of the 
planned South Stream gas pipeline, later abandoned due to Western pressure. Thus the 
Serbian expectations of the collectable transit fees and 2000 new jobs failed, never 
settling the balance against the Russian benefits.34 
The contrary strategy of opposing Russian efforts does not seem to be surely 
profitable, either, as the case of Montenegro shows. Having Orthodox and Russophile 
traditions itself, the republic gained independence in 2006 and was committed toward 
Western orientation on the 2016 national elections.35 Russia- and Serbia-friendlies 
remained in opposition, but NATO membership and the emphasised siding with the 
EU/USA will not solve the country’s everyday problems. One-third of its domestic 
product comes from tourism, with just Serbia and Russia being the two major source 
states in terms of number of guest nights.36 Most of Montenegro’s foreign trade and its 
foreign-originated capital investment are from these two countries as well.37 The new 
Montenegrin cabinet will have much to do to reconcile economic interests and symbolic 
allegiance. 
                                                          
32 Ibid, 136-141. p 
33Seehttps://insajder.net/sr/sajt/bezogranicenja/2400/and  
https://insajder.net/sr/sajt/bezogranicenja/2468/Rusko-srpski-posao-veka-drugi-deo.htm , 
downloaded: 2017.01.09. 
34 PERIŠIĆ 2015, 172-175. p 
35 Prime minister Đukanović's party had the relative majority, but he himself was removed from 
power. C.f. the eelction results at : 
http://www.dik.co.me/izbori%202016/Konacni%20rezultati.pdf, downloaded: 2016.11.20. 
36 27.8% from Serbia and 26.5% from Russia in 2015, see the Montenegrin office of statistics: 
http://www.monstat.org/cg/. Downloaded on 2016.11.20. 
37 According to 2013 data, 27% of the investments come from Serbia and another 10% from 
Russia. see the Montenegrin office of statistics: http://www.monstat.org/cg/. Downloaded on 
2016.11.20. 
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The third West-Balkan country involved in Orthodoxy is Macedonia, whose 
Eurasian allegiance is rather hindered by the fact that they could only minimally get 
Russian support to their now international problems. They also continue an 
unresolvable debate on name usage with the Orthodox, but not Slavic, Greece. (In this 
regard, the EU-member Greece is also in the mentioned Balkanic dilemma: they can’t 
forfeit rights to the name without risking internal hazards.) Macedonia has become 
infamous for being a European mediator of the Russian propaganda machinery: most of 
the Russian-controlled fake news sites are based here. However, the Macedonian 
political elite is well aware that Western orientation is perceived as exaggerated by the 
Slavic-Orthodox majority, and this can be counter-productive. It proved true in the 
recent Bulgarian elections; like a pendulum that tends to swing to the other extreme 
and facilitate Russophile powers. 
 
 
The geopolitical framework of regional initiatives 
 
Bottom-up regionalism in the West Balkan invariably faces suspicions of ethnic 
secessionism. The independence of Kosovo is a warning example for power elites. 
Similar situations are avoided whenever possible, but they need to support any parallel 
efforts on their own brethren’s part within the borders of another country. They just 
cannot afford not to help their fights for recognition. Politics does not necessarily 
require consistency. This is why such constellations seem often un-modellable for the 
external viewer. 
Áron Léphaft counts with several options of ethnically-based regional 
autonomy in his discussion of the emerging anomalies.38 As the new states and those 
with a distinct (pre-Yugoslavian) past are small in area, and as their historical 
developments took place within the same megaregion, bottom-up regional initiatives 
can only involve ethno-regional efforts. One exception is the northern Serbian province 
of Voyvodina. The region was not always part of the Serbian state, and was populated 
by South Slavs as a consequence (refugee waves and relocation projects) of the 17th 
century military endeavours in the collision zone of the declining Ottoman Sultanate 
and the expanding Habsburg empire. Vienna had its interest in the formation of a sort 
                                                          
38 Léphaft 2014. 
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of border buffer region, and in a partial and delayed restoration of the Hungarian 
Crown’s jurisdiction; this was achieved between 1690 and 1867. However, the resulting 
territory developed a demographic and economic structure different from both the 
Balkans and the Habsburg realms, when at the Paris peace treaties in 1918 it was 
decided that Voyvodina went to the Serb-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom and then to 
Yugoslavia. One-third of the population was South Slavic at that time. Slavic majority 
was brought on by the modernization/colonization processes in the Yugoslavian period 
and the relocations that followed WW2. During the era of the second Yugoslavia (1945-
1989), the multi-ethnical character of the region was emphasised, in accordance with 
Socialist ideology. The population movements accompanying the civil wars around the 
turn of the millennium increased the homogeneity of the province that has a strong 
(two-third) Serbian majority today39, with once state-founder ethnicities like Croatians 
and Montenegrins in minority. During a period of three centuries (from 1690 to 2000 – 
two centuries of which did not see any West-Balkan concepts of state or nations 
shaping the development of the region), an ethos emerged here that is in many aspects 
different from those in central and southern Serbia, one that is suitable for bottom-up 
initiatives. However, this does not mean an ethnically based regional autonomy 
(attainable in theory only for the Hungarian local majority in northern Bácska and along 
the Tisza river), but a regionalism founded on economic and cultural “separate 
development”. 
The issue of Voyvodina is secondary to other problems in the West Balkan. 
Though the ethnical emancipation of minorities and the regional emancipation of the 
majority has been ignored in favour of efforts to reinforce central state power40, the 
solution is not hopeless. The key factor to bring change is found outside the Balkan. 
In the process toward the EU, Serbia had to formally enable the 
formation/consolidation of the institutions that regained attention, due to the 
accession criteria. The explicit thematization of regional development and minority 
                                                          
39 In the last census in 2011, 66.67% was the proportiton of Serbs. Source: Republički zavod za 
statistiku, http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Public/ReportResultView.aspx?rptId=1210; 
downloaded on 2017.01.11. 
40 The de facto autonomy of the province was supported rather from the opposition, even by the 
Western-oriented parties. Trapped within false parallels like Kosovo-Voyvodina, they did not do 
much for its realization. The influence and support of regional parties is too small to change the 
historically established situation. 
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rights (in the so-called Chapter 23) will eventually prevail over the Orthodox/Unitarian 
legal notion that only the central government can have jurisdiction throughout Serbia.41 
These issues can actually be solved through institutional solutions that are acceptable 
for the European Union and also maintain Serbian regional unity (as a fundamental and 
indispensable tenet), so they are not impossible to settle. The solution to both seem to 
be within reach.42 
However, the question whether Serbia can be called a consolidated democracy 
is still open. It is certain that the question is hard to answer regarding the whole West 
Balkan, actually. The 2017 paper by Tibor Ördögh, Serbia as a Consolidated Democracy 
addresses this issue. The institutional checkpoints he examines (including constitution, 
cabinet, party system and political culture) present that the process is not fully 
concluded, but it is neither much different from what can be expected in the region: the 
required institutions exist, though they do not operate with truly good efficiency. The 
author highlights a deficit, the media’ disproportionate power in influencing political 
will, that has also become suspicious in allegedly consolidated Western democracies. A 
slow increase of the democracy index (from the 66. to the 65. rank, see Ördögh 2017, 
36.) can be perceived as an achievement. But there is a most recent trend of closing in 
on the Western model; this emerged due to the fact that more and more consolidated 
democracies question the legitimacy of the political elites, with the media as a primary 
factor in the legitimacy deficit.  It can be seen as disturbing news for everyone, but the 
West Balkan region can hardly be blamed for its emergence. 
 
 
                                                          
41 C.f.: PAP–BOZSÓ 2014; SARNYAI–PAP 2015 
42 Regarding minority rights, there are forms invented in the early 2000s that are not 
accompanied by territorial consequences. This is how the system of personal autonomy and of 
national councils could be established. Jursidiction debates are ongoing, but they must be solved 
and consitutionalized to continue the EU-accession negotiations. (see Pap 2014, 95-99). 
Voyvodina has always been a politico-technical question. Now that national parties also 
managed to set up their bases, it is no longer unsolvable. (Until recently, the 'democratic 
opposition' was able to use the province as a fall-back area.) The emergent solutions of ethnical 
autonomy without regionality and regionalism based on formal rights do pose problems withtin 
the state, but these are not in the scope of international relations. 
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Abstract 
 
The paper focuses on the foreign policy making and choices of a small and 
weak state, i.e. the Republic of Macedonia. The article revolves around a set of 
questions defining the smallness and weakness of small states in the international 
relations. Then it proceeds to analyze foreign policy choices and decisions of the 
Macedonian state since 1991. The basic hypothesis is that not only smallness is 
important but also the weakness of a state. Quasi-protectorates in the post-Yugoslav 
region can hardly afford any independent foreign policy goals and means. The link 
between the internal (in)stability and external interventions (international state-
building) determines an overwhelming dependency syndrome, which predestines the 
affiliation of these states to the West. The rhetoric of the advancement of the New East 
(newly empowered Russia and China) serve only as a factor of fear that strengthens the 
grip of the Western alliances and organizations.      
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1. Introduction: Small States in the Multipolar Global Context  
 
The conventional wisdom in international relations reads: the size (of a state) 
matters a lot. Behavior of states is determined by their military capabilities, economic 
power, size of territory and population, natural resources, etc. Up to recently small 
states have been seen as negligible in the larger context of great power politics. The 
only exception of this rule used to be the conglomerate of small states under the 
umbrella of Non-Alignment Movement during the Cold war period: they did not have 
power comparable to that of the West and the East but still managed to make influence 
within the United Nations.  
It is believed that the fundamental changes of international system since the 
end of the Cold war have had strong implications for small state foreign policy (Hey 
2003, p. 1). Unlike in the past, they have earned more visibility and even more abilities 
to take the advantage of their membership in various international organizations (such 
as EU, NATO, etc.). With no military blocks and rival superpowers to misuse them as 
pawns in a global competitions, they are supposed to benefit from the new international 
constellation. Indeed in recent years there have been a number of small states taking 
on an increasingly active role on the global stage. In these regard, there are two 
different opinions: some authors believe that changes in the international system have 
given present day Lilliputians new avenues to try to influence others and take on a 
foreign policy profile above their diminutive stature. According to this opinion, allegedly, 
they have a choice to pursue a foreign policy beyond what previous international 
constellations limit them to. The increased role of international organizations in the 
international system is seen as a crucial factor for this new role of small states. 
However, there are substantial variations among small states’ foreign policy, which in 
some cases may be even outsized. The advocates of the other standpoint argue that 
behind the declaratory changes of power in the international system, the reality check 
shows that small states have fewer policy options now than at the height of the Cold 
War. For instance, the poor ones are being caught between the economic powers and 
institutions and their economic/fiscal demands and structural reforms on one hand, and 
the socio-economic expectations of their own citizens, on the other. Many of them have 
set the integration with Western structures as the most important strategic foreign 
policy goals – hanging to a pipe-dream that it would bring them social welfare and 
security. The wealthier ones, which are already well-integrated in the Western 
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associations, also feel sandwiched due to the expansion of power of these integrations 
and try to find way to keep their relative influence from within.   
The starting point of any analysis of small state foreign policy begins with 
search for a definition: what makes a state “small”? There is a vast number of 
definitions in the literature that emphasize one or another dimension. Pace (2000, 107) 
claims that despite of decades of study, no satisfactory definition has been found. Baehr 
(1975: 459) goes further arguing that due to definitional problems, the concept of 
smallness is useless as an analytical tool. According to him, definitions can be clear and 
unambiguous but arbitrary at the same time; more sophisticated definitions are also 
more ambiguous and difficult to apply to concrete cases. However, Hey (2003, 2) 
believes that no strict definition is necessary either to employ “smallness” as an 
analytical device or to glean findings about foreign policy behavior from it. 
What is unanimous among the scholars is the conclusion that small states 
make up the vast majority of the international system. Of the 191 UN member-states it 
is estimated that no more than two dozen would assuredly fall outside this category 
(Neumann and Gstohl 2006, 3). The first wave of newly independent states during the 
1960’s gave rise to a debate on how to define a small state; the second wave followed 
the collapse of socialist federations. The most common classification is based on an 
objective criteria, such as population, geographic area and economic capacity. (Crowards 
2002, 143). Small states are also defined by their position within the international 
system. For instance, Vital (1971) argues that a small state is ‘small’ in relation to a 
greater power it is interacting with. According to Keohane (1969), small states are those 
that are “system ineffectual,” that is they are unable to influence the international 
system. 
The attribute of “smallness” has been indeed applied to so many different 
states, and not all of them are to be seen as vulnerable or insignificant in the 
international arena. The objective parameters do not always give a full picture of the 
position and role of a small state. For instance, one could hardly argue that Israel and 
Switzerland could easily fit in the category of small states; the same applies to Austria, 
Belgium, or even Luxembourg (all member-states of the EU). Advocates of the concept 
rather than a definition of small state emphasize that the concept of a small state is 
based on the idea of perceptions. A state is small if its people and institutions perceive 
it as a small, or if other states’ peoples and institutions perceive it as a small. 
Perceptions matter – that is a bottom-line conclusion of scholars who stress that 
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psychological dimension should go together with objective criterion by which to define 
smallness (Rothstein 1968, Keohane 1969). Small state usually recognizes that it 
cannot obtain security by its own capabilities, i.e. it have to rely on others. In the 
traditional academic thought, “small” in the context of foreign and security policy 
meant that such a state was perceived as no danger to neighboring states (Goetschel 
Laurent 1998, 13). That a state is deemed small not by any objective definition but by 
its perceived role in the international hierarchy, or even significance in preserving or 
imposing certain balance of power in the international system. The most recent case is 
Montenegro’s joining NATO, and the interpretation that tiny state is not tiny anymore 
because of its impact on the US-Russia relations (Snider 2017). Due to the complexity 
of modern world, researchers are quite often left to follow the hunch “I know what is a 
small state when I see it”, thus combining all relevant criteria in the current 
circumstances. 
Small and/or weak states have always been enforced to invent foreign policy 
variations in order to survive and/or to protect their vital national interests. In 70-ties 
Vital (1971) elaborated that small states would rather seek out multilateral 
organizations and alliances to ensure their security and achieve foreign policy goals. He 
also believed that they would usually have limited foreign policy objectives and would 
engage in a relatively low number of international activities. Unlike him, East (1973) 
concluded that small states were more likely to get involved in international affairs, 
especially when the national stakes were high and high-risk action had become 
necessary. Katzenstein (1985) gave a different dimension to the issue by pointing out 
how the small European states outperformed their larger neighbors in policy flexibility 
and creativity in order to compensate for the lack of military and other capabilities. 
In spite of the conventional truth that small size and weakness curtail foreign 
policy options and goals, many scholars also note that there are important exceptions 
to this rule. For instance, geography, importance to great powers, level development, 
internal stability, etc. are all factors that affect a small state’s foreign policy behavior. 
Singer (1972) points out “attractive power” (importance to other countries) which small 
states could exploit in order to enhance their foreign policy success. 
Research of small state foreign policy since the end of the Cold War displays 
two serious weaknesses: there are too few comparative empirical studies which impedes 
any serious theory building, and second – in the view of the dominant neorealist 
paradigm, small states are given subordinate status within political science, because 
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the “big players” take the most scholarly attention due to their power to shape the 
international system (Hey 2003, 5). In sum, the available scholarly literature lacks a 
paradigm that may guide researchers to generate comparable and cumulative 
conclusions on small state foreign policy.  
Having all this in mind, this case study has a limited ambition to examine 
foreign policy options and behavior of a specific Lilliputian state in South East Europe, 
not only in light of the changeable international system, but also with regard to the 
international state-building policies and internal instability. 
  
 
2. What Makes the Republic of Macedonia “Small” and/or “Weak”?  
 
The analytical framework for this research is the Rosenau’s one (1966). The 
“father of comparative foreign policy” suggests a number of explanatory factors. 
According to him, foreign policy behavior vary according to three traits, such as: the 
size, the level of development, and the political system of a state. The factors are 
organized according to five levels of analysis: international system, role (bureaucratic 
actors), government (relationship among government actors), society (public opinion, 
national culture, etc.) and individual (state leadership). For purpose of this preliminary 
research we collapse role, government and society into one – state level. In spite of the 
new international environment, Rosenau’s questions still ring true: to what degree are 
small states manipulated by the international system and the actions of the more 
powerful actors? In this article, we shall try to give answers to a set of questions 
concerning the Macedonian foreign policy behavior and options since 1991. At the 
system level analysis we shall focus on evidence about state security as an important 
factor in the state’s foreign policy making and choices as well as to the influence of 
external (regional and global) actors and constellations. At the state level analysis, we 
shall seek evidence about domestic factors’ influence on foreign policy. At the individual 
level we shall analyze leaders’ decision-making authority and personal influence on 
foreign policy. 
Smallness of the Republic of Macedonia is self-evident if one is to use objective 
parameters: the size of territory, population, GDP, natural resources, etc. What may not 
be visible at first sight is that Macedonia is not only a small country but she has been 
getting weaker since onset of its independence (Vankovska 2002; Krastev 2002). The 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
36 
independence came at the critical moment for the international system: bipolarity had 
just become past but expected peace dividend proved just a pipe-dream. The global 
transformation - where the old was gone but the new had not arrived yet – was 
ambiguous to say the least. On one hand, it offered chances for many newly established 
small states to gain independence, while on the other hand security risks had become 
very high due to the precarious collapse of multinational federations and interethnic 
upheaval. At first sight, it seemed that Macedonia’s smallness and (military, political 
and economic) weakness did not interfere with its becoming a new international actor. 
Some scholars stick to this conclusion, pointing out that during Yugoslavia’s collapse 
the small states such as Slovenia and Macedonia remained relatively safe and 
invulnerable in contrast to bigger states such as Croatia and Bosnia (Hey 2003, 8-9). 
This point of view, however, disregards Macedonia’s vulnerability and the way she got 
UN membership. Under unprincipled pressure by Greece and then European 
Community, the new small state had to accept unprecedented conditions inflicted on 
her by the UN Security Council (i.e. great powers) with regard to its constitutional name 
(Janev 1999). As the years would soon prove, it was a turning point that made the 
Macedonian state not only small but also weak both in terms of international relations 
and domestic politics (Vankovska 2010).  
State security has always been an important factor in foreign policy making and 
choices of the Republic of Macedonia. However, one should deconstruct the meaning of 
state security concept in order to understand Macedonia’s concerns. For that purpose, 
we propose Bary Buzan’s (2008) broader framework of security, and particularly the 
concept of societal security. For instance, Macedonia’s insistence on joining NATO has 
much more to do with (national/ethnic) identity than with military or other security 
concerns. Naumovski (2013) is right arguing that the “name issue” has been a corner-
stone of the Macedonian non-typical foreign policy: this paramount problem has been 
following the Macedonian state since the onset, i.e. seeking UN membership and 
international recognition in general. It contributed to disregarding all other diplomatic 
and foreign policy actions. Identity (of the Macedonian nation) has been also deeply 
embedded in the diplomatic relations with the neigbors.  
According to Koneska (2014), the Macedonian foreign policy since 1991 has been 
focused onto two sets of objectives – one relating to the country’s sovereignty and 
security, the other concerning its belonging to various international and regional 
organizations, in particular NATO and EU. One could also argue that it is hard to 
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distinguish one objective from another for belonging to NATO and EU is seen as the 
ultimate way to achieve and secure the country’s sovereignty and state security. 
Furthermore, NATO and EU are much more than usual foreign policy goals - they are 
tightly related to the internal state of affairs, including interethnic peace and stability.43 
To make things worse, these international organizations are generally perceived in a 
non-dialectical way, as something static and ideal in spite of the crisis and dramatic 
changes of the constellations of the international relations. Official visits paid to any 
non-Western country have been a rarity in the Macedonian foreign policy. This situation 
has slightly changed with the VMRO-DPMNE led government (i.e. since 2006): due to 
economic reasons diplomats and political representatives have launched an “offensive” 
and “road-shows” all around the globe. The main goal has been an increase of direct 
foreign investments and other economic enterprises that would have a positive impact 
on economic growth. A part of the quest has been building closer ties with Russia in the 
energy sector through an inclusion in the South Stream gas pipeline to transport 
natural gas to Macedonia.44 
The society deeply divided along ethnic/religious/language lines sees NATO 
(and EU for the same reason) as a glue to keep society together. However, the other 
identity problem related to the name issue (dispute with Greece, and indirectly with 
NATO and EU) prevents the country from reaching the goal, and intensifies further 
internal divisions. No wonder some Albanian politicians get often claim that “Albanians 
                                                          
43 For two opposing views see: Bekim Nuhija, New Balkan Politics, 2013, no. 13, 142-153, available 
at: http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/item/The-impact-of-postponed-accession-of-Republic-
of-Macedonia-in-the-Euro-Atlantic-structures-to-the-inter-ethnic-relations#.U7jsx5SSy3K. And: 
Biljana Vankovska, The EU integration as a security discourse: the curious case of the Republic 
of Macedonia, Heinrich Böll Stiftung magazine for south-eastern Europe - Agenda. 2011. no. 5, 5-
7, available at: http://www.hr.boell.org/downloads/Agenda_5_Engl.pdf . 
44 South Stream is a project for construction a gas pipeline running under the Black Sea to 
Southern and Central Europe that has been carried by Russian company Gazprom. In July 2013 
the Russian and Macedonian governments signed the Agreement of Cooperation in building a 
special branch for gas supplies to Macedonia. See: “South Stream construction to create 
conditions for developing gasification and gas-fired power generation in Macedonia”. The South 
Stream project official website, 4 September 2013, available at: http://www.south-
stream.info/en/press/news/news-item/south-stream-construction-to-create-conditions-for-
developing-gasification-and-gas-fired-power-gener/.   
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[from Macedonia] will join NATO with or without the Macedonians”. For many 
Macedonian citizens, membership in NATO and EU is a matter of survival of the state in 
face of internal insecurities. Macedonia has no confidence in her internal stability but 
she perceives lack of external certainty too. Thus foreign policy is mostly focused on 
state survival both from internal and external threats. Due to the inertia of the unipolar 
moment (i.e. domination of West, and particularly of the US in the region of former 
Yugoslavia), the state has accepted TINA principle – There Is No Alternative [to NATO, 
EU, close relationship and compliance to Washington and Brussels]. This course has not 
only limited foreign policy choices but also curtails any internal (expert or public) 
debate on foreign policy variations. Hence the emergence of the multipolar 
international system as well as the shadows of the Second Cold War has had no serious 
impact on Macedonia’s foreign policy. 
     When it comes to state level analysis, the basic premise is that Macedonia is a 
rather autistic state (Maull 2017). The patterns of foreign policy behavior in the period 
1991-2017 are persistently either too weak or too disruptive to realize the collective 
interests of that state and its people adequately and sustainably. Autism results also 
from the specific political dysfunctions or weaknesses as well as from the emotionally 
charged politics (be it with regard to the name issue and identity (for the Macedonians) 
or with fatalistic notion of belonging to NATO and EU as a matter of survival or ethnic 
unity (for the Albanians). It may also be seen as an expression of paralysis that results 
from excessive international involvement both in domestic and foreign policy tactics in 
policy- and decision-making. 
Since 1991 it has been manifesting difficulties to react to and communicate 
with others. Having been a successor-state of an influential non-aligned state 
(Yugoslavia), it seems that Macedonia did not exploit any foreign policy experience or 
knowledge from the past (i.e. Non-Alignment Movement, NAM)45. Instead it has grown 
into a self-centered state, exclusively focused on (if not obsessed with) NATO and EU 
integration and almost unaware of any other global developments. The accession to 
NATO and the EU has strongly determined all foreign policy activities for more than 20 
years. The only exception, or better a short ‘excursion’ into world politics, was the so-
                                                          
45 Currently, all former Yugoslav republics except Macedonia and Slovenia enjoy an observer 
status with the NAM. 
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called Taiwan episode (Tubilewicz 2004).46 On the Macedonian side the motivation was 
economic (and lucrative for a small group of politicians) but the effects were very 
harmful especially with regard to national security. If anything, the political elites 
learned that they had no capacity to play on an international scale without serious 
consequences, and that the great powers (such as China) should not be irritated.  
The intensification of the international state-building efforts since the armed 
conflict of 2001 has led to another extreme - i.e. to a dependency syndrome both in 
domestic and foreign affairs. The so-called international community (mainly EU and US 
ambassadors and other officials) represent a third party in any internal stand-off. For 
instance, the EU mediators helped the political parties reconcile over the parliamentary 
crisis of 24 December 2012. Quite indicatively, among other issues, the so-called 1 
March Agreement required “a Memorandum of Understanding affirming the cross-party 
consensus on, and commitment to, the country’s strategic objective of EU and Atlantic 
integration” (Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
2013). Even it is true that there has been a long-term party consensus over NATO and 
EU, according to the Constitution the citizens will eventually have a final say on a 
national referendum.  
Upon independence, understandably capacity building in the field of foreign 
policy was one of the greatest challenges for the Macedonian elites. However, it took 16 
years to regulate the domain and to enact the first Law on Foreign Affairs. The 
statistics shows that Macedonia has established a vast network of consulates and 
embassies – far wider than it can financially and otherwise sustain. Foreign policy 
consensus (over NATO and EU membership) has been probably the only matter that 
brings different political and ethnic actors together. Yet as in other domains, 
partitocrazia (Siljanovska-Davkova 2016) has entered foreign policy to such a degree 
that diplomatic posts serve merely as rewards for obedient and not necessarily 
competent party soldiers. The foreign policy goals have not had priority in any of the 
coalition governments (usually made by a Macedonian and an Albanian political party). 
From institutional point of view, one should stress that foreign policy is almost 
                                                          
46 In early 1999 the Macedonian government recognized the Republic of China (ROC) hoping that 
Taipei’s generosity would resolve its economic problems. China, one of the first great powers 
that had recognized Macedonian independence after 1991, reacted in a predictable manner: 
Beijing suspended diplomatic ties with Skopje and vetoed the decision on extension of the UN 
preventive mission on the eve of NATO intervention in Kosovo. 
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exclusive domain of the executive branch – i.e. government (foreign minister and the 
prime minister) and president of the Republic. According to some authors, the very fact 
that two bearers of executive power have foreign policy competencies gives the political 
system a semi-presidential form. Analysis of the constitutional arrangement yet shows 
that the government is a primary actor while the president in the parliamentary system 
has rather ceremonial and not a decisive role in foreign policy domain. In practice 
however Macedonia witnessed different influences depending on the charisma, 
experience and ambitions of the key-players.  
The failure to get invitation for full NATO membership at the Bucharest 
Summit, have become a significant turning point both for the Macedonian internal and 
foreign policy. The national disillusionment has given the leading politicians free hand, 
which was mainly used for internal identity policy building and raising nationalism. The 
project known as Skopje 2014 is the best indicator for this dramatic change. 
Furthermore, the budgets of the Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry have been 
downsized continuously. For instance, in the period 2010-2012 the latter’s budget went 
down by 50% (Dokmanovic 2013, 57). Some domestic authors (Ilik 2013, 108) identify 
Eurodefetism in the public opinion, and even fear of ‘change of the course’ from EU to 
BRICS. Similarly, Koneska (2014, 103) speaks of recent dilution of the party consensus 
on foreign policy objectives due to the center-right VMRO-DPMNE (Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National 
Unity) increasing arguing against unconditional commitment to membership in NATO 
and EU if the country is enforced to compromise over the constitutional name in order 
to start accession negotiations. However, officially not a single political actor even less 
the government has ever developed a different path in foreign policy. 
So far, the political elites have faced a tough choice between the Western allies 
only twice, and both times the decision was in favor of the US rather than the EU. The 
ratification of the bilateral agreement with the United States, granting US citizens’ 
immunity from prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC) was the first 
instance of disregard of Brussels. The second example relates to Macedonia’s decision 
to join the “Alliance of the Willing” in Iraq. Practically, Macedonia had placed herself 
among the states of so-called “new Europe”. In both cases there was a shadow of doubt 
if the consent of the Macedonian leadership was voluntary; on the other hand, the 
public opinion was clearly against these two government’s decisions. In general, the 
public opinion is quite impotent and irrelevant for any policy- or decision-making effort 
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unless it concerns NATO and EU integration. The levels of public support are carefully 
measured and interpreted as all-national consensus. In a few cases when it dropped 
below  90 percent there was a slight sense of panic and a fear of (alleged) Euro-
scepticism. In other words, bottom-up popular input is of importance only with regard 
to a limited number of foreign policy issues.  
Foreign policy approach offers a specific view, by breaking apart the monolithic 
view of a nation-state as unitary actor. The focus on the people and units that comprise 
the Macedonian state shed the light on divergences in terms of motives and values of 
the internal actors involved in foreign policy making. Under the surface of unity, the 
insightful analysis may differentiate certain variations depending on the actions 
undertaken by entities with mandate involving international affairs. The practice proves 
that despite the first impression, one could hardly speak of a coherent “Macedonian 
foreign policy”. Furthermore, one could hardly speak of Macedonia’s “national interest” 
due to the divergent interests of various internal players. Hence fragmentation 
dominates over consolidation of Macedonia’s foreign policy. For instance, it has been a 
practice for ethnic leaders (be they politicians or intellectuals) to lobby and run a 
foreign policy of their own, regardless that general national interest. In the heart of the 
dispute is for instance the “name issue” that has substantially different meaning for 
ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians living in the state. While the Macedonians 
hold hard line positions in terms of preservation of state name, the ethnic Albanians 
from Macedonia have overtly proposed accepting compromise in direct quasi-diplomatic 
offensives in Athens, Washington DC or Brussels.  
At individual level, the starting premise is that although international system 
may constrain the activities of human actors, still human will may has major influence 
in sharping foreign policy of a state, or even world affairs (Hudson and Vore 1995, 210). 
This line of analysis is the best to be followed through the role of each president of the 
Republic in the foreign policy understanding and realization. For instance, the first 
Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov dominated both internal and foreign policy of the 
young state. He was an old and well-experienced politician with a much higher 
international profile than anybody else in the newly established elite. He was practically 
the only negotiator in most of the international affairs that the young state had to deal 
with. His authority had a strong impact on the understanding of the foreign policy and 
its realization. Koneska (2014, 102) argues that it was because of his traditional views 
on international politics that foreign policy was focused primarily on state security, 
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while membership in international organizations was seen not as a normative 
imperative but rather as an instrument for protection of a small state’s interests and 
existence. According to some analysts, things have changed since he left the position 
when the public discourse turned towards the narrative of Europeanization and values 
as a primary motivation for Macedonia’s integration in the Western international 
organizations. Actually it was the internal conflict and post-conflict peace-building that 
welcomed the EU and NATO as mediator and state-builder with dominant influence on 
foreign policy rather than constitutional shift towards power-sharing model in 2001. At 
first sight president Trajkovski was not of a same caliber as Gligorov but it appeared 
that he had quite close relationship with the US administration. His political career 
skyrocketed in 1999 when he dared sharply respond to foreign journalists who attacked 
Macedonia’s treatment of Kosovo refugees. Having been known as a “one statement 
man”, Trajkovski became an obvious choice for the presidential candidate of VMRO-
DPMNE in the coming elections. In 2001 he became a principled actor of the internal 
crisis due to the great international support he received. He allegedly authored so-
called “Trajkovski’s peace plan” although the public was aware that the idea had been 
internationally drafted and imposed. However, Trajkovski served as a spokesperson who 
actually announced and later on signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement. He was well-
respected as a man of peace and faith (due to his deep religious affiliation), and even 
more after his tragic death in a plane accident. From a rather marginal political figure 
with not much political and foreign experience, he grew up into a main player. It 
became clear when in December 2000 the public heard that Trajkovski obliged himself 
and wrote a letter of commitment to President W. Bush that Macedonia would support 
any Iraqi military intervention disregarding the Parliament and the Government which 
are constitutionally entitled to do so.  The next president, Crvenkovski kept a low profile 
in the international relations and was merely focused on developing regional 
cooperation. The current president Ivanov has been marginalized both by the dominant 
Prime Minister Gruevski, and by the Western power centers, expect when he was 
needed to undertake unpleasant and ‘dirty’ jobs in the domestic politics and with regard 
to the migrant crisis.   
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3. Conclusion: Macedonia on the Frontline of Geopolitical Divisions 
 
The first foreign minister of independent Macedonia Denko Maleski (2013) 
argues that “in the third decade of our independence, Macedonia needs a new foreign 
policy”. However, he not only fails to render what would be the newness of that foreign 
policy but there is not even a clear answer if Macedonia had ever had an old foreign 
policy (that should be abandoned). In our opinion the right and legitimate question 
reads: is a semi-protectorate (due to the excessive state-building building process run 
by the international actors) able to create and run a foreign policy according to its 
national interests? Or more precisely: does such a state need a foreign policy of its own 
at all? Based on the literature on power one should question if Macedonia is a ‘small 
power’, meaning that the state has weak military capability, or in Rothstein’s terms, a 
state that recognize that it must rely on others for its security (Rothstein 1968, 29). 
The bizarre fact with Macedonia is that she is a weak state, both militarily and 
economically, but she has been seeking to exert influence over larger nations (primarily 
her neighbors, and European states) through strategic location and participation in 
military alliances (be they informal US-led coalitions or NATO endeavors). But intensive 
and relatively strong participation in Afghanistan and Iraq, a costly and hazardous 
venture, especially for a small country with limited resources, have not resulted in 
country’s admission to NATO and EU. Involvement in peace and military operations 
stems from the belief of policy-makers that such activities promote the country’s 
national interests by enhancing its influence in key international fora such as NATO or 
US-led operations. This is why researchers should focus on the perspective of 
dependency and vulnerability, not power. As far as Macedonia is concerned, one should 
keep in mind the slogan: the smaller the state, the less independent in reality. While 
claiming to be bearer of (nominal) independence, in the international arena Macedonia 
is nothing but a client of powerful states, even at expense of its national interests 
and/or the international norms and international law. On the other hand, Macedonia is 
an example of so-called autistic foreign policy, blind association with interests of 
external powers in hope she will eventually benefit from that, and complete inability to 
formulate and implement foreign policy choices due to the disastrous internal politics 
that make her an object rather than a subject in international arena. 
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Abstract 
 
Western Balkan thesis remains particularly popular in the circles of 
international politics, according to which it is necessary to emphasize the traditional 
situation in the countries in Southeast Europe focusing on Balkan nucleus with its 
immediate neighborhood. Hence, the elaboration contained herein is moving along two 
axes: first, an attempt is made for rational analysis of the question “Whether the 
Western Balkan countries have already established a system that takes care of 
resolving open issues and problems without using force and based on model of regional 
security community?” The second line of analysis refers to the experiences of the 
Western Balkan countries for security cooperation among them in the wider context of 
security and political relations in the entire Western Balkans region. 
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Introduction                                 
 
‘South East Europe’ (SEE) is usually used to emphasize the traditional situation 
of the countries in the SEE region focusing on the Balkan core with its near 
neighbourhood. In the paper, we will use the ‘Western Balkans’(WB) which the EU has 
coined for practical reasons to encompass Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 
Croatia, Macedonia, Kosovo47, Montenegro and Serbia. Except Albania, they were all part 
of former SFR Yugoslavia. In the aftermath of war the new WB countries firstly had to 
address the consequences of war and approach the reconciliation and peace building 
process, instead of embarking directly on the path of democratic and economic 
development. Yet, growing economic, political, security and cultural inter-dependence 
impacts the autonomy and functional capacities of states, and the on-going processes. 
Security complexity in the WB has been growing in the last 25 years due to the 
unfinished processes and unresolved issues based on political, socio-economic and 
ethno-national elements. Their interconnectedness, interplay, and mutually reinforcing 
impact is coupled with the fact that not all of the requirements for stability have been 
set so far. This results in the security framework which is becoming increasingly 
complex and aggravated thus challenging the functioning of the whole region and the 
prosperity of the entire continent.  
Applying the regional approach, it is noteworthy that regionalism was a 
constant feature of the global security and economic architecture since WW2. Thus, 
regional security and regional cooperation are among the most important preconditions 
for peace and prosperity in the WB.48 Regional dimension will thus be given due 
attention as it deals with how security is clustered in a geographical region. As the 
security of each state in the region interacts with the security of others, this shows the 
intense security interdependence within a region49 and thus points to the importance of 
regional cooperation.    
The goal of our paper is twofold:  first we will briefly address the topic from the 
academic perspective and try to answer the following research question:  HAVE THE 
                                                          
47 Kosovo is not a member of the UN, hence the addition 'Under the UN SC Resolution 1244’. 
48 Ejdus, Filip (2011) Towards the Western Balkans Security Community 2.0. Analysis Faculty of 
Political Science, Belgrade. 
49 Buzan, Barry and Ole, Weaver (2003): Regions and Power. 
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COUNTRIES OF WESTERN BALKANS ALREADY ESTABLISHED A SYSTEM that ensures 
the solving of open issues and problems without the use of force, based on the model of 
regional security community, as defined by Karl Deutsch?  Second, we will address the 
topic from more practical aspect and, therefore, present the experiences of the WB 
countries of security cooperation between them in the broader context of security and 
political relations in the whole Western Balkan region. Hence, this paper offers a 
theoretical approach to the analysis of the Western Balkans. The authors will continue 
researching this issue through case studies e.g. Macedonia etc.     
 The scientific research of security paradigm at regional, national, international 
and global levels, during the last decade increasing attention has been paid to the 
regional security.  The region has gained importance as a referential unit of analysis for 
security relations in the world. It comprises security activities and needs „beyond 
national state and below international system‟. The region thus differs from both 
global and national level of international community, as it represents a smaller unit 
than international system, and is more than just a sum of national units. In view of  
such a specific position of region in the international system, regional security is not 
analysed only as regional, but also as complex interaction between regions and other 
units at international and global level. In the framework of regional stability the region 
thus represents potential for the realization of national-security interest.  
 
 
New Security Architecture in the Western Balkans 
 
The end of the Cold War brought about a culmination of geostrategic, 
geopolitical, and geo-economic changes in international environment, which 
transformed the existing international security »architecture«. Geopolitical 
transformations in central, eastern, and south-eastern Europe involved a dramatic turn 
of events triggered by the secession of former SFRJ. A diversified heritage of the 
Yugoslav war, based on the disruption of reciprocal contacts between states in the area, 
has left a difficult burden to the WB countries, which negatively impacts on their 
regional security cooperation. The consequences are largely seen in the stability of the 
region, in regional security, and indicate a difficult reestablishment of stable security 
relations between the WB countries. 
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The wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia came as a surprise to both the 
population of this area and the entire international community which struggled for a 
concrete solution to this conflict. »The war in the south-east Europe warned entire 
Europe of the necessity to establish new European models for the implementation of 
certain forms of common foreign and security policy, and questioned the framework of 
most important European values that served as foundation for the stability, welfare, 
political legitimacy, and moral authority of the West from the end of the second world 
war until today« (Ghebali and Sauerwein 1995, 179).  
The establishment of political relations between the states of Western Balkans 
in the nineties was severely hampered by numerous armed clashes. Diplomatic relations 
between individual states of the region were established in the immediate aftermath of 
Yugoslav disintegration, while diplomatic relations between states engaged in war 
conflict took a while and were established later. Multilateral forums and the pressure of 
international community were of great importance for the development of political 
operation. In the aftermath of war conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia, 
political cooperation between the states was made difficult due to many open 
questions. To  name just a few: establishment of state borders, the action of BIH 
brought before the International Court of Justice against Serbia and Montenegro for 
genocide and aggression, the unsolved question of Kosovo, and the question of 
adequate protection of minority rights and the rights of refugees, etc.  
Regional cooperation is of utmost importance for political stability, security, 
and economic development of WB states. Regional stability and security is key to 
economic development. Through the prism of economic aspect, regional cooperation is 
of substantial importance for increased welfare and economic growth. With regard to 
the security dimension, regional cooperation contributes to the solving of key security 
challenges in the region, since many urgent issues, such as organized crime, corruption, 
illegal migrations etc., can only be efficiently tackled with A cross-border approach 
(European Commission, 2005).  
The arguments just mentioned emphasize the key role of international support 
in re-establishment of cooperative relations between countries in the context of the 
development of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans.  In recent years the main 
achievements in the field of cooperative relations among WB states have been the 
strengthening of functional and intersectoral cooperation, improvement of multilateral 
political relations, and improvement of bilateral political relations, although the latter 
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constantly oscillate (Minić 2013, 34-35). Obstacles, such as economic and financial crisis, 
open questions in the region, fragmentation, lack of coordination, insufficient 
institutional capacity, and uneven development in various areas of cooperation, are still 
present in the process of advancement of regional cooperation in WB (Minić 2013, 35). 
The political will of key actors in individual regions, in particular their commitment and 
readiness to search for joint solutions to problems common to this area, belong to the 
main challenges for future development and promotion of regional cooperation. This 
kind of political willingness must be backed up and supported by adequate institutional, 
human, and financial capacities.  The main problem, therefore, is located inside the 
political subsystem of individual states and in their intergovernmental harmonisation.  
Today WB are faced with the challenge of new integration in the framework of 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes. Problems that burden the WB and 
present an obstacle to the EU and NATO accession (besides the aforementioned ones) 
are also ethnic tensions, territorial disputes, migrations, corruption, and organized 
crime.  
Based on the analysis of two transformation processes of WB states, namely a) 
state-building and democratization, and b) accession to Euro-Atlantic integration, we 
can conclude that in the period after 2000, the WB states have made important 
progress towards internal political, economic, societal, and military stability, which 
ensures (with the help by the EU and NATO) also peace in the region. Croatia has 
become a member of the EU and NATO. During accession negotiations its legislation 
was harmonized with the European Acquis, and progress was made in the prosecution 
of economic crime and the protection of human rights. Macedonia and Serbia are 
candidate countries for EU membership and BIH, Montenegro, and Kosovo aspire to the 
same. Moreover, Albania has already become a NATO member state, while in June 2017 
Montenegro will become a full-fledged member state. 
Relations between Croatia, BIH, and Serbia have been gradually improving. 
Initial talks and diplomatic contacts have started between Serbia and the newly formed 
state of Kosovo. Bilateral relations between Croatia and Macedonia are very good, and 
the state of the rule of law, respect of human rights, and minority rights has been 
improving. Law enforcement authorities in the WB have increased their participation in 
the curbing of international crime. It is thus possible to say that the existing 
cooperation of WB states has had positive impact on regional security cooperation. 
However, the answer to our research question, namely whether the WB countries have 
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already established a system that provides for the solving of open questions and 
problems on the basis of security community model and without the use of force, has to 
be negative. As can be seen already from a superficial analysis of the situation, 
reciprocal cooperation of WB states has not been developed to the level where we could 
confirm the existence of the regional security community as defined by Karl Deutsch 
and other international security scholars (e.g. Adler, Barnett, Atina, and others). 
Therefore, the following common elements of the regional security community 
theoretical model are singled out. Namely: 
- The highest level of security cooperation is institutionalised 
- The absence of conflict behaviour or provision of high level of peace and 
security 
- Security relates to all areas of human existence in the society, not only to the 
military  
- Security is formed in response to various internal and external interactions of 
entities in the region 
- A sense of community and common identity in the region is created. 
In the case of WB, it is difficult to speak of the creation of a regional security 
community according to the given criteria, since the endeavours of countries in the 
region are mostly invested in the EU and NATO membership, and not in the 
establishment of their own regional security organization. EU and NATO, which operate 
in a much broader political and territorial context, already have great impact on the WB 
states. There seems to be some overlapping or strong impact of transregional security 
organization. It is thus possible that a real security community (as for example the 
Nordic or Euro-Atlantic) will not be developed in the WB region, for there will be no 
need for it. 
 
 
Western Balkan Region: GEOGRAPHY AND PLAYERS 
 
Let us now turn to the second part of our analysis, where we will consider some 
practical aspects of current security situation in WB and implications for future 
development of regional security cooperation. 
There is a well-known saying “tell me where you are from and I will tell you what your 
problems are”.  
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Geography to a large extend determines policy. Looking at the map, the region 
of WB is both blessed and cursed by being at the crossroads of trade and influences 
coming from all directions. Living in this transit region brings us multiple advantages as 
well as more than our fair share of security challenges.  
In the context of the current geopolitical situation the Balkans is still used as a 
playground for big powers. From the East, Moscow continues to try to exert its 
influence through its grip on the energy sector and through historical alliances with 
Orthodox nations. From the West, in particular from its most influential capital Berlin, 
conditional carrot is being offered in the form of Euro-Atlantic integrations. For Berlin, 
this is about bringing the region closer to the EU and, eventually, to EU membership, 
bringing long-term stability to the Western Balkans, and, of course, ensuring German 
economic interests in this part of Europe. 
In 2013, Serbia signed a military cooperation agreement with Russia. And in 
October 2014, much to Berlin’s chagrin, Serbia rolled out the red carpet for Putin, with 
president Nikolić awarding him the country’s highest order. Russia has also long been a 
staunch supporter of the Republika Srpska, and there are rumours that Moscow is 
inquiring about a possibility to establish a navy base in Montenegro. On the other hand, 
a few years ago we saw our heads of government being summoned to Berlin on a short 
notice to discuss Euro-Atlantic perspectives of the WB and various (mostly 
infrastructure) projects which could be financed from the EU budget.  
However, a few years ago EU has a lot of pressing issues (and Russia even 
more), hence the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has put the 
Western Balkans way down on his agenda. 
The WB is seen as one of the European regions most vulnerable to Islamic 
terrorism, due to its transit character and radicalisation of minor parts of Muslim 
populations. Experts note that the region may play a secondary role in terrorist plans, 
as a transit point for terrorists, and a place for rest and recuperation. Moreover, they 
agree that the region's persisting problems continue to make it vulnerable to terrorist 
groups in the future. We should also be aware of the issue of so-called foreign fighters 
returning from the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa). 
Last but certainly not least is the issue of organized crime. Each of the 
Western Balkans states is faced with security threats of trans-national nature, such as 
organized crime, arms, drugs and human trafficking, corruption, illegal migration, 
money laundering. These activities are facilitated by poor law enforcement and 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
54 
insufficient prevention through joint regional efforts. The necessary measures to tackle 
these threats are in place but they are not always implemented. This is due to the 
weakened state institutions, political and criminal interests and the lack of human and 
financial resources. Advancement in the fight against organized crime, political 
extremism and radical structures is crucial in order for the Balkans to achieve long 
term security and stability. 
 
 
ASSESSMENT OF DEFENCE COOPERATION AMONG WB COUNTRIES TO 
DATE 
 
When discussing defence cooperation in the Western Balkans, we will try to 
answer a couple of questions. The first (one) addresses the current state of Western 
Balkans in the area of security cooperation.   
Since even before the end of armed conflicts of the 1990s, we have acquired 
quite a few frameworks for regional defence cooperation: South-Eastern Europe 
Defence Ministerial (SEDM), Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation 
Assistance Centre (RACVIAC), South-Eastern Europe Clearinghouse (SEEC), South-
Eastern European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), Adriatic Charter (A-5). When Slovenia 
tried to rationalize some of these initiatives in September 2013, we managed to create 
one more defence cooperation framework called Comprehensive Regional Ministerial 
(CRM).  
In a decade and a half since the last large scale conflict in the region we have 
had plenty of meetings on various levels, exchange views and best practices. At first, 
these meetings were important simply because they did take place and were seen as a 
trust building measure by third countries that (partly) financed these initiatives.  
However, despite the needs and external financial and moral support for 
regional security cooperation in the Western Balkans, real progress is lacking. To some 
extent the reason is that regional security cooperation was perceived as a means to an 
end, as a transitional tool to facilitate Euro-Atlantic integrations of each state in the 
region. Governments were committed only by declaration, with few resources and 
experts provided, and few practical measures undertaken between any two high-level 
meetings.  
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More or less the same can be said for bilateral cooperation in the WB Region. 
We do not venture further than briefings about national (lack of) defence capability 
development, ways and sideways of defence reforms. 
Few concrete defence cooperation programmes, such as Balkan Medical Task 
Force, take numerous meetings and many years to emerge from the drawing board. And 
even then, the creation of task force is painfully slow and it may take many more years 
before it becomes operational, let alone deployed in operation. To be fair, we also have 
to mention successful Croatian initiative for A-5 cooperation in military police school in 
Kabul. 
After so many mostly wasted years it is high time for us to move forward under 
our own steam. 
To sum up, we are definitely not lacking tools for regional defence cooperation. 
What we are lacking is political will and public support to give substance to our security 
cooperation.  
 
 
A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH                                     
 
The next questions to be asked are the following: Which are the most pressing 
security threats WB Region is facing? How can we address them together? Can we get 
both public and political support to devise regional response and implement it? 
First of all, security is a much broader term than defence. The security 
challenges our region is facing are by no means only military in nature. On the contrary, 
in fact, I believe that there is only a remote possibility of a large scale military conflict 
in the foreseeable future.  
What we could therefore suggest is a kind of bottom-up approach. Given our 
complex history, defence cooperation may be a non-starter. We should instead focus on 
those areas of cooperation where we have already made substantial headway in the 
past. Even without foreign encouragement. Enhanced cooperation between police forces 
of WB countries is the first obvious choice. Disaster protection/mitigation and rescue is 
the second one. The first carries less political connotations, the second none 
whatsoever. We do much better when politics is not involved. Mutual benefits for all 
parties concerned are obvious, hence public and political support should be 
forthcoming. These two suggested field of cooperation could prove to be excellent 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
56 
confidence builders. From there we should proceed to defence cooperation on a step-
by-step basis.  
One of the most pressing security threats to the Balkans is emerging from the 
side effects of conflicts and failing states in the Middle East and Northern Africa: 
refugees fleeing to Europe, increase in drugs, arms and human trafficking. Many of 
refugees and smuggling routes are leading through the Balkans. Minimizing security 
threats emanating from these illegal activities is clearly in our common interest.  
Although natural and man-made disasters do not come to most experts’ minds 
when talking about security challenges,  they may turn out to be the most convenient 
ice breakers in the Western Balkans security cooperation. Due to climate change, which 
makes our weather ever more unpredictable and extreme. The number and scale of 
climate-related disasters is unfortunately likely to increase. Our region is prone to 
floods, landslides, heavy snowfall, forest fires, and in some areas, ought. And what is 
more natural than helping your neighbour in need? This is not only the right thing to 
do, it also creates gratitude, a deep bond and, as a result, trust. In our view, enhanced 
cooperation in strengthening disaster preparedness and facilitating disaster relief will 
also pay political dividends. Furthermore, it might be a game changer in the culture of 
post 1990s cooperation in the Western Balkans. Slovenians were touched by suffering 
inflicted upon Serbian population in the 2014 floods and overwhelmed by genuine 
gratitude that our help generated. 
The most obvious security challenges are ethnical tensions that seem to be 
rather swept under the carpet than extinguished. There are many unresolved issues 
that can be used by internal or external actors in the current regional and broader 
geopolitical situation. We do not foresee this could result in major conflicts, but even 
minor incidents (for example the Infamous football match in Belgrade) can have 
unforeseen consequences. We think these challenges should not be viewed as security 
but as political issues. The solution can only be a political one. However, it can be 
addressed indirectly by enhancing cooperation on other security related issues, such as 
fighting against organized crime and helping each other in disaster relief efforts. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
To conclude, our goal for, let us say, the year 2025, should be excellent 
cooperation in disaster relief & rescue and good police and law enforcement 
cooperation. These efforts will significantly contribute not only to a safer environment 
for our populations but also to the enhancement of trust, which is an essential 
precondition for any meaningful defence cooperation. One could firmly believe that the 
hardest nut, that is, the unresolved issues emanating from ethnical tensions, will be 
cracked by political means on the basis of bottom up security cooperation.  
One cannot be sure about the exact year that this goal will be reached, some 
issues need a longer time to mature properly here in the Balkans. However, the lessons 
learned of our analysis prove that the countries of the WB can work together. 
We need to learn again to work together, not because this is suggested or even 
demanded by preachers of the Euro-Atlantic integrations gospel, but because we will be 
safer and better off if we overcome the troubled past and provide our children and 
grandchildren with a good example of how security cooperation is well worth it while.  
In particular, preservation of peace and stability, regional cooperation and EU 
membership should be common strategic goal for all the countries in the Western 
Balkans. Finally, one can conclude that despite the worrisome voices and statements 
coming from the WB from time to time, indicating that we are facing political obstacles, 
tensions, and blockades, efforts should be made for them to be overcome successfully 
and to work hard towards realization of all the activities that will be pacing the road of 
the WB countries towards the EU. WB countries should strongly step along that track, 
concentrating on reforms and adoption of European values.  Maybe it is high time for 
the region to rely less on the EU mediation and the WB countries to work harder 
together coping with challenges in the region and the European path. 
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 Abstract 
 
After the intra-state wars and conflicts in the Balkans region, insecurities caused 
by weak states still constitute an important concern for stability of the region. Therefore, 
international community has engaged in some attempts for rebuilding of weak states 
through state-building efforts in order to prevent the spill-over effects of insecurities 
originated from them. Because, security issues such as arms, drugs and human 
trafficking, organized crime, corruption, immigration and refugee problems in the 
Western Balkans threaten the democracy, the rule of law, human rights, political 
stability and the economic progress within the region. Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo as the weak states of the region suffer from deficits in 
legitimacy, capacity and provision of public goods. That’s why, they are unable to 
implement effective development policies for its citizens’ basic needs in terms human 
security. In this paper, it is aimed to analyse the relationship between state-building 
process and its security implications in the Western Balkans. Conceptually, state-building 
refers to the set of actions undertaken by international actors to strengthen the 
capacity, legitimacy and the institutions of the state where these have seriously been 
eroded or are missing. The state-building processes of the weak states in the region are 
closely related to the European integration process of the region. Although there are 
ongoing efforts in all these countries to reform institutional capacity of the state in 
accordance to European standards, it can be conluded that these reforms are, at best, 
only mildly effective. That’s why, the paper argues that real success of the state-
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building efforts in the region depends on the embracement of these efforts by the 
people. 
 
Keywords: Weak State, State-Building, Security Issues, Western Balkans 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 The nation-states are regarded to have sovereign control over their territories 
and are taken to be juridical equals in the arena of international affairs. However, in 
terms of concept of weak state introduced by Barry Buzan, empirical sovereignty of the 
state is questioned by several actors inside of it, especially in respect of the idea of the 
state. Therefore, national identity and institutional structure of the state can be 
questioned by the significant part of the society. In this respect, one of the most crucial 
objective of post-conflict era is to build an inclusive state structures and political 
identities in order to eliminate the root causes of the conflict. Given the importance of 
weak states for regional and international security and stability, when international 
community attempts to involve for rebuilding of these states, as a top-down approach, 
state-building is mostly privileged in terms of consolidating of institutions of the state. 
But probably as the most crucial reason of being a weak state, nation-building aspect is 
neglected intentionally or unintentionally. In this respect, it is claimed that post-
conflict peace-building process should aim at addressing the root causes of the conflict 
and restoring the political, economic and social infrastructure in a post-conflict society 
to establish governance, the rule of law, as well as social and economic justice (Dursun-
Özkanca, 2010: 437).  
 Insecurities of weak states have a spill-over effect. These insecurities include 
the threat of violent transfers of power, insurgency, seccession, rebellion, terrorism, 
weapons proliferation, organized crime, warlordism, refugee flows, mass migration, 
regional instability and ultimately, state collapse and anarchy (Patrick, 2006: 1). These 
threats are making impossible to put sharp dividing lines between internal and external 
security because of their spill-over effects (Ağır, 2014: 11). Therefore, effects of these 
threats on regional stability and security show that the repercussions of them will not 
just be felt locally. When states lose control of some of their territories, it raises 
security concerns for a given state and its neighbors. Regionally, they can spill 
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instability well past their borders and create a conflict dynamic affecting neighboring 
countries. 
 After the end of the Cold War, weak states have become a common concern in 
post-conflict situations such as in the former Yugoslavia. For the moment wars were 
over in the Balkans region, but insecurities caused by weak states constitute an 
important concern for stability and security of the region (Ağır, 2014: 2). Indeed, the 
non-traditional security issues in the Balkans threaten the democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and the stability and the economic progress within the region, even with 
an impact beyond the Balkans. In this process, drugs and human trafficking, terrorism, 
corruption, money laundering and the proliferation of small arms endanger overall 
security predicaments.  
 The paper argues that there is a strong correlation between the weak state and 
security issues, and the main challenge to stability in the Balkans comes from the 
presence of a chain of weak states in the region. Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo can be classified as weak states (Ağır, 2012: 1). Likewise, 
Fragile States Index 2016 which is conducted according to some criteria such as uneven 
economic development, poverty, state legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule 
of law and security apparatus shows BiH on rank 88, Macedonia on rank 111 and Albania 
on rank 124 (Fund for Peace, 2016). While statehood problem of these countries limit 
their ability to provide security, goods and services to their citizens, this problem 
cannot be addressed only at the institutional level but must be tackled at the social 
and individual level as well.  
 
 
 A Brief Outlook to Non-Traditional Security Issues of the Balkans 
 
 The states which especially emerged from the former Yugoslavia’s ruins have 
been suffering from non-traditional security issues such immigration and refugee 
problems, terrorism, arms, drugs and human trafficking, and spread of organized crime 
and corruption. It can be comprehended that a great number of security threats 
emanate from the non-traditional security issues when it is examined the security 
strategy documents of the states in the region (See, Palinkasev, 2007: 73-80; Hroni and 
Qazimi, 2007: 58).  Instead of traditional security threats such as inter-state wars, 
security agendas and conceptions of the countries in the region are mostly focused on 
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the non-traditional security issues (Ağır, 2012: 2). In addition to the collapse of 
communism, politically and economically ill-managed liberalization process and the 
number of conflicts and wars in the region (Ağır, 2012: 1), the weak state phenomenon 
in the Balkans region underpins these security issues that constitute a threat to 
individuals, communities and also state itself (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 384). In this 
respect, weak states of the Balkans can slow down the democratization process in the 
region and promote reproduction of instability and insecurity. Because, there is a direct 
causality between the absence and/or lack of state functions and the likelihood of 
return to violence in post-conflict environment (Ağır, 2012).  
The spread of the organized crime is certainly one of the most significant 
security risks in the Western Balkans. Because, the organized crime has fed instability 
in the countries of the region and hindered their transition to more representative 
political and economic systems, thereby slowing their integration into the world 
political economy (Levitsky, 2003: 235). The transition from communist rule to 
democracy, wars on the Balkans region in 1990s with their economic blockades and war 
economies, and the presence of weak states in the post-war context provided a 
favourable environment for networks of organized crime to bloom (Stojarova, 2012: 91). 
In this environment, through exploiting chaos, insecurity, lack of proper organization 
and nonexistence of the rule of law, the organized crime groups have established their 
strongholds in the region and created links with high-ranked political officials and parts 
of the military establishments (Vukadinonic, 1999: 13). Organized crime groups attached 
to political elites in the various states in the region constitute crucial threats to their 
economic transformation, democratization and the process of integration into Euro-
Atlantic structures. It is claimed that organized crime is still often linked with (persons 
in) state institutions because of the nature of the weak states in the Balkans (Benedek, 
2010: 10).  
According to one senior UNMIK official, “When we talk of organised crime in 
Kosovo, we are very much dealing with politicians, [and] ministers” (United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008). Under these conditions, the fight against organized 
crime faces many problems such as the reluctance of local organs to deal with the 
criminal structures and involvement by the elite in illegal activities (Ağır, 2012: 5; Ağır, 
2014: 13). In terms of Macedonia, it has completed its reforms as regards the judicial 
system and the public administration, and has made progress since becoming a 
candidate country of the EU in 2005. Accordingly, some progress has been made in the 
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fight against trafficking of human beings, money laundering and organised crime (EU 
Commission, 2014). However, the capacity to fight organised crime remains hampered 
by the operational and institutional shortcomings. When it is considered for BiH, 
organised crime that consist mainly of drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings and 
financial crime remains a serious concern. BiH has started to fight against organised 
crime, trafficking in human beings and terrorism, but sustained efforts over the long 
term remain necessary (EU Commission, 2007). Therefore, organised crime networks 
continue to operate throughout BiH and have a negative impact on political structures 
and the economy (EU Commission, 2011).  
 As another important security issue, the corruption which is deeply rooted in 
the region naturally involves the political elites and state institutions. This phenomenon 
is regarded as a threat for four reasons: 1) because the reform of political institutions is 
greatly dependent on anti-corruption measures; 2) because the establishment of a 
healthy market economy is impossible without curbing corruption; 3) because a formal 
acceptance of anti-corruption measures without their implementation is not sufficient 
to qualify countries in the region for the European integration; 4) because without 
adopting anti-corruption laws in line with European standards, it is impossible to adapt 
to EU regulations (Gazdag et. al., 2007: 17). The Corruption Perception Index of 
Transparency International shows Albania and BiH equally on rank 83, Macedonia on 
rank 90 and Kosovo on rank 95 (Transparency International, 2016). 
 Corruption is still widespread and remains a major problem for weak states of 
the region. This is due to insufficient legislative and implementing measures and a lack 
of determination and the weakness of the judicial system. Indeed, the principles of 
transparency and accountability are not yet fully applied. Therefore, more concrete 
results need to be seen in practice, both in terms of reduction and deterrence of 
corruption (EU Commission, 2014). Because, although the legal frameworks for fighting 
corruption have largely been in place, implementation of existing legislation have been 
insufficient in weak states of the region (See, EU Commission, 2016b; EU Commission, 
2011). In this respect, corruption continues to negatively impact all spheres of life, 
economic development and the rule of law. 
 Under the intra-state war conditions, in the name of ethnic homogenisation 
large numbers of persons are displaced within their own country, while others are more 
or less forced to flee to neighbouring countries (ethnic migration) or to seek asylum 
elsewhere (refugees). Thus, displacement became a serious issue in the Western 
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Balkans after millions of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) were littered 
across the region (the majority in BiH, Kosovo, and Serbia) as a result of the wars in the 
1990s, the 2001 internal strife in Macedonia, and the numerous conflicts in Kosovo in 
the 2000s. In response to this situation, international agreements like Dayton Accords 
and the UN resolutions like Security Council Resolution 1244 on Kosovo emphasized the 
return of all refugees and displaced persons and protection and promotion of human 
rights of them. In spite of efforts for solving human displacement, according to the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of January 2009 there 
were 132,071 refugees and 352,905 IDPs remaining in the Western Balkans (Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2010).  
 Connected to demographic security of the region, human-trafficking is another 
non-traditional security issue. The destruction of social fabric caused by the conflicts in 
the region, coupled with massive migrations, and the economic collapse, worked 
together to create fertile ground for dealers in human beings. Balkans region is 
simultaneously the source, the transit route, and the destination for the trafficking of 
human beings. It is estimated that 120,000 victims of human trafficking or more are 
coming to the EU through and from the Balkans each year (United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, 2008). Illegal immigrants also form a natural setting not only for the 
spread of organized criminal groups but also of terrorist organisations (Moustakis, 
2004: 149).  
 Moreover, due to the civil war conditions in the Middle East, the influx of 
people transiting along the Western Balkan route has increased rapidly in recent years. 
For example, in the period from September to November 2015, a total of 428 597 
people were registered as transiting Macedonia. Between January 2016 and March 
2016, 89 628 foreign nationals -majority of them from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq- 
were registered in the country (EU Commission, 2016c). Likewise, statistics show an 
increasing trend of people coming to BiH from the high-migratory-risk countries. In 
2015 the number was 293 943 individuals, compared with 230 974 in 2014 and 209 490 
in 2013, mostly from Turkey and Albania but also from China, India and Afghanistan (EU 
Commission, 2016a). 
 Another serious security problem that affect the weak states of the regions is 
terrorism and radicalisation. For example, Kosovo has been affected by the phenomenon 
of foreign terrorist fighters and radicalisation tendency. Because, 300 nationals are 
reported as active fighters in conflict zones in the Middle East. However, the numbers 
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are decreasing and since September 2015 there have been no new reported cases (EU 
Commission, 2016b) due to the stepping up efforts in the fight against terrorism. As 
well as the law on foreign terrorist fighters, it also adopted a strategy and action plan 
on prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation that may lead to terrorism (EU 
Commission, 2016b). In terms of Macedonia, some progress can be reported in the fight 
against terrorism. The country became a member of the counterterrorism initiative of 
the Council of Europe. The Council for the Fight against Money-Laundering and 
Financing of Terrorism was established as an inter-ministerial body to improve inter-
institutional cooperation (EU Commission, 2012).  
 Post-conflict situations are often characterized by weak states, which still need 
to consolidate themselves and to reform the police and the judiciary in order to make 
sure that these are operating in the interest of the citizens (Benedek, 2010: 3). In this 
context, security sector reform is of crucial importance, because in post-conflict 
situations the security sector is often linked with organized crime and therefore rather 
a threat to citizens than a provider of protection. Security sector reform includes the 
process of transforming or establishing new security institutions, including, the army, 
police, judiciary, border services and intelligence agencies. The goal is to create a 
functioning democratic state and society in which the citizens are able to live without 
fear, whose human rights and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed and whose 
property rights are protected. The army, police, intelligence agencies and other security 
sector agencies engaging in widespread abuses, organized crime and corruption became 
frequent cases in the countries of Balkans in the last decades. And also, they became 
obstacles in the strengthening of the governance structures in the government and in 
the improvement of the security situation, contributing to the increase of the instability 
and insecurity in the region. Although there are now ongoing efforts in all former 
Yugoslav republics to reform structures of security sector in accordance to European 
standards, most observers agree that these reforms are, at best, only mildly effective 
(Anastasijevic, 2006). 
 
 
 Corelations of State-Building and Nation-Building in the Western Balkans 
 
 The demand for external interventions to stabilise failing states or rebuild 
failed ones is quite large, and resources available for these efforts are rather limited. 
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But it is not only lack of resources which constrains the effectiveness of the 
international community, it is also the lack of knowledge of which approaches to the 
stabilization of fragile states work and which instruments are best suited to perform 
this task (Ottoway and Mair, 2004: 1). The UN is becoming involved in state-building 
projects without any clear institutional guidelines or political consensus. This has given 
rise to uncertainty of mandate in ongoing UN operations, as well as the potential for 
establishing precedents that may confuse the normative framework within which future 
operations take place. 
 It is argued that the best way to avoid state failure is to prevent it, and the 
best way to prevent it is to support broad-based economic growth. According to the 
World Bank, low-income countries are about 15 times more susceptible to internal 
conflict than countries in the OECD (Eizenstat et. al., 2005: 140). So, necessity of linking 
security and development has become a policy mantra, and there are vigorous calls for 
integrating security and development perspectives and policies (Tschirgi, 2006: 41). But 
development model for weak states could partly overcome the existing problems. 
Because the prerequisite for sustainable peace and security in weak states requires 
democratic government, respect for human and collective rights and satisfaction of the 
population’s basic needs. Thus, socio-political cohesion within a unit can be achieved, 
and as a consequence of the fact that members may share common norms and values 
and have a relatively high attachment to institutions which are perceived to be 
legitimate.  
The institutional approach to state-building refers to the set of actions 
undertaken by national and/or international actors to reform and strengthen the 
capacity, legitimacy and the institutions of the state (Fritz and Alina, 2007: 13). Thus a 
state-building model prioritises ‘institutionalisation’ with a view to legitimizing public 
power within a given territory. The key goals of state-building include “provision of 
security, establishment of the rule of law, effective delivery of basic goods and services 
through functional formal state institutions, and generation of political legitimacy for 
the (new) set of state institutions being built” (Fritz and Alina, 2007: 13). However, as 
Kalevi Holsti has highlighted, while institutionalization and the instrumental capacities 
of statehood are important: ‘it is in the realm of ideas and sentiment that the fate of 
states is primarily determined’ (Holsti, 1996: 84). This conception emphasizes a very 
different conception of the state adopted by institutionalists.  
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Due to the importance of the state-society relations for the success of state-
building processes, international community should focus more on understanding socio-
political contexts, how local societies relate to the state and how historical and cultural 
factors shape public perceptions. Because, a consolidation of the state and its 
institutions must emanate from the very bottom of society and must be supported by 
society as a whole. In other words, development of legitimate and effective states 
cannot be imposed from outside but rather emerges from internal negotiations, as a 
bottom-up endeavor. Indeed, constituting a state is not necessarily the only way of 
achieving security. Therefore, in addition to developing viable domestic institutions with 
international support, international intervention should encourage bottom-up initiatives 
aimed at re-establishing economic and social ties across different communities (Belloni, 
2007: 6). The knowledge of the local context and a bottom-up approach are crucial to 
increasing the chances of success for international engagements. 
In this context, operations that aim to transform the weak states should 
consider not only state-building efforts, but also nation-building ones. Because, 
rebuilding a state after conflict is about restoring the people’s trust and confidence in 
governance systems and the rule of law and rebuilding relationships at all levels. These 
processes are all critical to the consolidation of peace and security in post-conflict 
situations. When they are neglected, the threat of conflict re-emerging is very real. In 
this context, instead of concentrating efforts of post-conflict reconstruction primarily 
on state institutions and the recreation of a state monopoly of force, an integrative 
model that bring together the humanitarian and societal needs of people, should be 
given priority in post-conflict reconstruction process. However, it should be emphasized 
that nation-building seems impossible to contemplate without a secure environment 
having been established in the first place. Therefore, the processes of state-building 
and nation-building can be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. 
 The common response to disorder within states is the regaining and 
maintaining control, rather than addressing root causes. So, peace-building should 
involve an effort to eliminate the root causes of conflict, to promote the security of the 
individual, societal groups, and the state. “Ultimately, peace-building aims at building 
human security, a concept which includes democratic governance, human rights, rule of 
law, sustainable development and equitable access to resources” (Barnett and Zürcher, 
2009: 26). But also there should not be any fear among sub-national groups that 
peace-building efforts of international community undermine their power at local level 
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and increase the state’s control over the periphery (Barnett and Zürcher, 2009: 24). 
Because, it should be stated that all causes of insecurity within weak states is related 
to the process of state-making and its corollary nation-building.  
 Analysts use terms such as “nation-building” and “state-building” to describe 
the phenomenon of international intervention in weak states (Belloni, 2007: 97). So, it 
seems necessary to make an attempt at conceptual clarification. Although the two 
concepts are closely related, state-building focuses primarily on public institutions -the 
machinery of the state, from courts and legislatures to laws and bureaucrats- whereas 
nation-building refers to the strengthening of a national collective identity, including its 
sense of national distinctiveness and unity (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 15). There can be a 
highly effective state apparatus that contributes nothing to the emergence of a sense 
of nationhood. So, international interventions to build the capacity of state institutions 
have to be complemented by actions that take into account the roles of perceptions 
and expectations, of bottom-up consultations and of the degree to which populations 
feel represented by public institutions. Consequently, this paper argues that while 
international community has largely focused on state-building, stability requires a 
deeper process of nation-building. Because, social and cognitive processes of creating a 
common national identity during post-conflict reconstruction are paramount. 
 The term of nation-building implies that this political activity is essentially 
about either creating a nation out of some other forms of community, or making a 
national identity stronger. Reconfiguring the national identity involves attempting to 
make it more modern, or less ethnic (Norman, 2004: 84). In this respect, processes of 
state-building and nation-building cannot be accomplished in the case of absence of 
common idea of the state among citizens. Because of low level socio-political cohesion, 
the population is divided along ethnic, cultural, religious and social lines, thereby there 
would be no consensus within society on political and social organization of a state. In 
this case, nationalism will contain the seeds of new tensions affecting national 
minorities (Guibernau, 1996: 141). Because national integration project mostly involves 
the assimilation of ethnic groups into a single homogeneous cultural system. Thus, a 
nation-building process can be conceived as a security threat by ethnic minorities. In 
this respect, trying to build institutions without linking them to shared values and 
inclusive notions of citizenship and political community can result in the persistence of 
divisions. 
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 Conclusion 
 
 Given weak states have lack of institutional capacities and socio-political 
cohesion, they would suffer from deficits in legitimacy, capacity, provision of public 
goods and inclusiveness. Therefore, they can cause important security threats such as 
terorism, organized crime, refugee flows, mass migration and regional instability (Ağır, 
2014: 21). Indeed, the weak states of the region play an important role in the security 
puzzle of the Western Balkans. In recent years, there has been positive developments in 
terms of institutional capacity for addressing the above-mentioned non-traditional 
security issues in the weaks states of the region. However, much remains to be done to 
strenghten the rule of law, intensify the struggle against organized crime and 
corruption and ensure the proper functioning of state institutions in the region. 
 It should be stated that the strenghtening of weak states in the region is 
dependent on the success of state-building proccesses which are closely related to the 
European integration proccess. But most of the threats targeting the physical integrity 
and dignity of human beings are locally produced and unique to the region. So, it is 
argued that a bottom-up approach which would provide participation of civil society in 
agenda-making process rather than setting up a human security agenda in Brussels is 
necessary (Ovalı, 2009: 177). So, the priorities of the international community should be 
in line with the needs of individuals and social groups in the region. Accordingly, state-
building process should not be seen as only a ‘technical’ process of creating new state 
institutions or strenghtening existing ones. Because, functioning institutions depend 
not only on formal design, but also on the social context within which these institutions 
operate. Formal institutions need to be rooted in society; otherwise they risk becoming 
useless or being captured by private or patrimonial interests (Troncota, 2011: 72-73). 
 Given the ethno-national divisions still define the character of the political 
dispensations in these countries, it is a necessity to constitute an inclusive political and 
social structures for all segments of the society. In this direction, creation of civic 
political identities with the help of international community seems crucial for 
transperancy and accountability of the state institutions. Thus, socio-political cohesion 
and legitimacy of the weak states of the region can be strenghtened. Accordingly, 
efficiency of the state as the provider of security needs for individuals, social groups 
and state actor itself will be empowered in order to overcome non-traditional security 
issues.  
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Abstract 
 
In Croatia, the mission, set of goals and general issues of crisis management 
are still not completely, and to a sufficient extent, defined by appropriate legal 
solutions, regulations and strategic documents. Therefore, access to this vital area of 
safety issues is still divided to certain areas depending on the type of crisis or threat. 
The necessity of establishing a comprehensive and unified system to manage crises was 
recognized over fifteen years ago, and a series of discussions has been held on the 
issue, as well as the issue of developing the concept of a crisis management system. 
Despite these efforts, there have been no significant results. The issue was approached 
in 2004. by passing the Law on Protection and Rescue and the establishment of the 
State Protection and Rescue Administration (DUZS), and again in 2005. by passing a 
new Civil Protection Law. However, the civil protection system covers only a part of an 
integrated crisis management system at the national level, such as protection and 
rescue, disaster and major accident management. The normative framework of the 
Republic of Croatia, even after Croatia entered the EU and adopted it's acquis 
communautaire, is marked by the lack of comprehensive solutions regarding the 
definition of national crises and the establishment of a crisis management system. 
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Therefore, this paper analyzes the existing normative framework of crisis management 
in the Republic of Croatia, as well as its functionality with a focus on the system of civil 
protection. 
 
Key words: Crisis management, normative framework, civil protection system. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the Republic of Croatia, there have been numerous papers, which 
conceptually and contextually deal with the term crisis, as well as the architecture of 
crisis management. Various literary publications contain the appropriate categorization, 
descriptions and explanations of the term crisis. There is, however, no clear and 
unambiguous definition of the concept of crisis management. This is the result of a lack 
of an integrated crisis management system in the Republic of Croatia. In various 
documents that can be found in the Central Catalog of Official Documents of the 
Republic of Croatia, the term crisis appears in 174 valid legal regulations, however, 
these mentions are mainly related to specific areas of expertise50. 
The normative framework of the Republic of Croatia is marked with a lack of 
integral and complete solutions concerning determining national crises as well as 
establishing a crisis management system, even after Croatia entered the European 
Union and adopted its acquis communautaire. 
The first qualitative step in introducing and defining the concept of crisis in its 
own normative regulations was made by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of 
Croatia, and with its membership in international organizations, other state authorities 
have gradually started introducing the concept of crisis in their field of work and 
everyday vocabulary. 
The term crisis management, as well as all of its semantic derivatives appear 
less and less frequently in the legal regulations of the Republic of Croatia. Even when 
they are mentioned, they are referred to as being sector-oriented, as well as the term 
crisis. 
                                                          
50 Registry of legal regulations is available at http://www.digured.hr/. Access January 22nd, 2017. 
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Numerous strategic documents in the Republic of Croatia interpret in different 
ways what should be an integrated crisis management system, depending on the period 
of their passing. These documents are consolidated in noticing the absence of such a 
system and connecting its establishment with the civil protection system. The concept 
of crisis management is conceptually linked to the development of a civil protection 
system in 2002, as an organizational framework for disaster prevention and remedying 
the aftermath of natural and technological disasters, as well as destruction caused by 
war. However, in the absence of better solutions, it is most often connected with the 
above mentioned. Tatalović S., Grizold A. and Cvrtila V. (2008) believe that an attempt 
to resolve the issue of the lack of an integrated crisis management system was the 
founding of the State Protection and Rescue Administration (DUZS) on January 1st, 
2005. DUZS was established in order to avoid the overlapping jurisdiction of various 
sate-owned defense and rescue bodies, as well as coordinating their activities in the 
event of an accident or disaster. Despite this, the expected results have not been 
achieved to date. Therefore, the concept of an integrated crisis management system 
has still not been defined. Although several proposals were presented, the competent 
state bodies have not yet reached a consensus. In the National Strategy on Chemical 
Safety (Narodne Novine 143/08), the DUZS is described as an integrating system at the 
national level. It is also described as “...the foundation for the structure of crisis 
management in local and regional authorities.” utilizing its regional protection and 
rescue offices.  
DUZS is the only central body of state administration founded with the aim of 
dealing with the crises and eliminating disaster consequences. Since its founding, it has 
been proposing potential solutions and crisis management models, which are being 
included in the public hearings of central government bodies. These solutions and 
models are, however, halted at these hearings. The main reasons for this are the 
unpreparedness of such proposals from the highest level of government, the 
unwillingness to effect change in the state administration system and the inadequate 
number of involved entities willing to prepare solutions and models of crisis 
management.  
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The role of DUZS is extremely important and unavoidable in all phases of crisis 
management51. DUZS is the administrative and inspection authority responsible for the 
civil protection system as well as the fire brigades, in charge of communication and co-
ordination through the 112 Centers, international co-operation, training and education 
of personnel required for the needs of a crisis management system, critical 
infrastructure and state intervention firefighting units and civil protection52. It is also 
developing the concept of Zoning Warehouses and is the responsible body for 
coordinating search and rescue operations in the event of aircraft crashes on land and 
inland waterways on the territory the Republic of Croatia, and so on. (Toth, I., Trut, D., 
Èemerin, D. and Vitas P., 2007). 
Over time, the trend of legislators' attempts to design and propose crisis 
management framework is noticed. One of these attempts is going one-step further and 
mentions the existence of a "national crisis management system53". Observed in the 
context of the response to the threats of possible consequences of the use of weapons 
of mass destruction, it was stated that "for the management of crisis situations, the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia provides central management, planning, 
supervision and coordination of the crisis management system", suggesting that Croatia 
still has a crisis management system. This depends, though, on different points of view 
and is questionable how to look at the above mentioned from different discourses. 
It is undisputed that the Government of the Republic of Croatia, as the highest 
executive body, is responsible for the establishment of a crisis management system. It 
                                                          
51 The Law on the Civil Protection System stipulated the powers, obligations, rights and duties of 
the central state authority in the civil protection system but did not establish its name and 
status in the state administration system. However, the provisions of Article 36 of the Law on 
Organization and Scope of Ministries and Other Central Government Bodies (Narodne Novine 
93/16 and 104/16) established that it is the central state administration body of the State 
Protection and Rescue Administration. 
52 and even in the recovery phase where it assumes the initial coordinator's role, before the 
relevant sectors fully assume their responsibilities. 
53 Eg. in the National Strategy for Prevention and Countering Terrorism (Narodne Novine 
139/08) and the Action Plan for the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism (Narodne Novine 
136/12) as well as the National Strategy and the Action Plan to Suppress the Spread of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (passed on January 10th 2013, at the 71st session of the Government of the 
Republic of Croatia)  
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has, however, too many managerial functions and is hierarchically too far removed from 
the field to deal with crisis management systematically, timely and without 
interruption. For this, a developed system and a specialized body is required, which will 
refer to the above mentioned as its daily job. Such a body would collect and analyze all 
relevant information on all potential crises of national interest and would prepare draft 
decisions for the Government of the Republic of Croatia, all the while having the power 
to make the most important executive decisions independently. It is a fact that many 
other countries are faced with an identical challenge (Toth, I., 2015). 
The Republic of Croatia has the necessary components for a crisis management 
system, different solutions for different crises, as well as a developed crisis 
management infrastructure. There is, however, no integrated system or central crisis 
management body for the entire spectrum of crises. For the time being, despite all the 
aggravating circumstances, DUZS is the body most often associated with dealing with 
crises and crisis management. 
 
 
Legal basis for establishing crisis management 
 
Although an integrated system of managing crises and crisis management is 
not explicitly conceptualized and regulated in Croatian legislation, the lack of 
experience is compensated by using the available solutions established by the 
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and the provisions of various laws, regulations 
and documents54. Fundamental civil rights, government organizations as well as mutual 
                                                          
54 Eg. in the Civil Protection Law, the Critical Infrastructure Act, the Environmental Protection 
Act, the Radiological and Nuclear Safety Act, the Law on Protection against Natural Disasters, 
the Water Act, the Disaster Recovery Law in the Vukovar-Srijem County, Law On the Croatian 
Mountain Rescue Service, the Law on Fire Protection, the Firefighting, the Law on Defense, the 
Law on Participation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia, the Police, Civil Protection 
and Civil Servants and Employees in Peacekeeping Operations and Other Activities Abroad, the 
Coastal Law The Republic of Croatia, the Law on Health Care, the Law on the Transportation of 
Hazardous Goods, the Non-ionizing Radiation Act, the Law on Humanitarian Demining. Also, 
relevant documents for the study of crisis management in Croatia are Estimation of the Republic 
of Croatia's threat of natural and technical-technological disasters and major accidents, 
Protection and rescue plan for the territory of the Republic of Croatia, various other regulations, 
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powers and competencies are defined by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia 
(Narodne Novine 41/2001). Article 135 of the Constitution stipulates that local self-
government units carry out local-level tasks that directly address the needs of citizens... 
“And enter the domain of crisis management and civil protection55 in a direct and 
indirect manner. The above-mentioned provision puts civil protection into the 
jurisdiction of local authorities, which is essential for the development of a crisis 
management system in the Republic of Croatia. The provisions of the Constitution show 
that the organizational model for the protection of citizens begins to be built at the 
level of local authorities. Civil protection is an area of activity that brings together and 
complements all the participants, normative solutions, citizen protection measures and 
the active role of citizens themselves in the system of prevention, preparedness and 
response to crises, as well as the elimination of the consequences of major accidents 
and disasters (Toth, I., 2015). 
There is a multitude of laws and regulations that partially regulate procedures 
in various crisis situations. The basic legal act regulating crisis management is the Civil 
Protection Act (Narodne Novine 82/15). It regulates the institutional structure, rights 
and responsibilities of all participants, procedures, as well as the management of the 
civil protection system. The Civil Protection Act, however, in its provisions, does not 
describe the term crisis or crisis management, nor does it individually define them. 
Furthermore, it provides for the establishment of a civil protection headquarters at the 
national level, as well as at the level of local (regional) authorities. The Civil Protection 
headquarters of the Republic of Croatia is established and managed by the Government 
of the Republic of Croatia. In the area of the local (regional) authorities, the 
management of said regional and local authorities falls to chiefs, mayors, governors and 
the executive authorities. 
                                                                                                                                                    
the acquis communautaire of the European Union implemented in Croatian legislation, bilateral 
intergovernmental agreements and obligations of the Republic of Croatia taken from 
membership in various international organizations. 
55"... and in particular relating to housing and development, spatial and urban planning, 
communal services, childcare, social welfare, primary health care, education and primary 
education, culture, physical culture and sports, technical culture, consumer protection, 
protection and improvement of the natural environment, fire protection and civil protection" 
(Article 135 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia) 
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According to the Plan, procedures and measures of protection and rescue are 
readiness, alertness, mobilization and growth of operational forces, as well as protection 
and rescue measures. 
The purpose of the plans is removing critical occurrences of importance for the 
operation of the protection and rescue system. This is achieved through synergy and 
joint action of the governing and administrative parts of the system and operational 
forces. The plans provide for levels and stages of readiness, ways of reacting in 
individual phases, the state of logistic capacity, and other important provisions for 
effective protection and rescue of human lives, material goods and the environment in 
disasters and major accidents. 
The Protection and Rescue Plan for the Republic of Croatia defines DUZS as 
the central body in all procedures and measures of protection and rescue. DUZS issues 
instructions and recommendations to all participants in the protection and rescue 
system, and has the obligation to alert and inform the public. The DUZS Director has 
the ability to make standard operating procedures (SOPs) and has direct command of 
the operational protection and rescue forces. The area of critical infrastructure, an 
important crisis management factor in the Republic of Croatia, has not been fully 
developed nor does it conform to the requirements of the European Union and NATO. 
The Republic of Croatia will have to progressively and methodologically differentiate 
certain areas of crisis management in order to be compatible with the solutions of the 
above-mentioned associations and partner countries in these organizations. An example 
of this is the obligation to identify, determine and protect critical infrastructures and 
disaster risk assessment, as well as the introduction of measures and activities from the 
NATO Handbook on Crisis Management in Croatian Legislation. The implementation of 
the above-mentioned standards in the Republic of Croatia started in 2013 by passing 
the Critical Infrastructure Act (Narodne Novine 56/13). 
This Act regulates national and European critical infrastructure, national 
critical infrastructure sectors, critical infrastructure management, risk analysis, 
owner/manager security plans, the critical infrastructure security coordinator, sensitive 
and classified data handling, and oversight over the implementation of the Act. The 
Republic of Croatia has taken on the obligation to identify European critical 
infrastructures on the territory of the Republic of Croatia from other members of the 
Union and it has the power to determine the critical infrastructure of interest for the 
Republic of Croatia on the territory of other Union members. It has established the 
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legal basis and platform for the interdepartmental cooperation process in identifying, 
defining and protecting critical national infrastructures, as well as co-operation with 
neighboring countries and the European Union bodies in determining and protecting 
critical infrastructure on the territory of the Republic of Croatia and other countries 
(Toth, I., 2015) 
Using the above mentioned law, the Government of the Republic of Croatia has 
given DUZS the important role and responsibility to, in cooperation with responsible 
central governing bodies whose scope the individual critical infrastructures belongs to, 
regularly monitor and assess the threats and propose operational and other measures 
to assess the critical level and the need for the proposed measures for the management 
and protection of critical infrastructures. DUZS is designated as a means and 
distributor of information exchange and coordination of activities related to the 
European Critical Infrastructures with other Member States and European Union 
bodies. Given that the Republic of Croatia, as a member of the European Union has an 
obligation to evaluate risk and submit risk data to the European Commission, the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia entrusts the above-mentioned task to DUZS. 
This indicates that the Government has designated DUZS the central body of civil 
protection and crisis management system of the Republic of Croatia. 
Croatia's membership in NATO imposes an obligation to accept and implement 
NATO's Crisis Response System (NATO Crisis Response System), which has been fully 
developed, taking into account different NATO concepts, capabilities and arrangements. 
This system is described in the NATO's Crisis Response System Manual (NATO Crisis 
Response System Manual). The system is designed to ensure uniform treatment 
between NATO headquarters, strategic commands and member states. The Manual 
provides measures for managing and responding to crises. As all NATO members are 
required to fully participate in the crisis response system and apply crisis responses 
from the above mentioned Manual, all States also have a duty to align national crisis 
response systems with the NATO system to achieve compatibility with principles and 
procedures described in the Manual. The process works by NATO headquarters 
announcing a single measure or more measures to respond to the crisis. It is the 
obligation of each Member State to notify NATO on whether or not it has been able to 
implement the measure declared wholly or partially. The decision on the 
implementation of the measure is always proclaimed by the Government of the Republic 
of Croatia. 
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Operational dimension 
 
The effectiveness of the civil protection, safety and rescue system of the 
population, material and technical resources, environment, critical infrastructure and all 
socially acceptable resources of valuable protection and rescue is visible in the 
readiness and abilities of each individual member of the crisis management system and 
the system as a whole in the implementation of measures and activities involving 
prevention, readiness, reaction and recovery in cases of extraordinary events. The 
readiness and ability of the crisis management system in Croatia is monitored through 
the following: 
− Readiness and effectiveness of the participants and operational forces of the 
civil protection system 
− Principles of activation 
− Chain of command and coordination 
− Development of skills and abilities 
− Communication connections for management in crisis situations 
The civil protection system consists of the participants and operational forces 
of the civil protection system. The Participants are the Government of the Republic of 
Croatia, the DUZS as the central state administration body responsible for Civil 
Protection, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia, the police and the executive 
and representative local (regional) Authorities. The operational forces consist of the 
Civil Protection Headquarters at the local, regional and national level, the operational 
forces of the fire brigade, the Croatian Red Cross, the Croatian mountain rescue service, 
civil protection units and commissioners, the site coordinators and legal persons in the 
civil protection system. Their relations are determined by the aforementioned acts. 
The general principles on which the civil protection system is based are 
humanity, prohibition of discrimination, subsidiarity, solidarity and continuity of action. 
In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, decisions and measures are made and 
implemented by engaging all available resources of the local (regional) authorities that 
is hit by a major accident or disaster. This is derived from the provisions stipulated by 
the Constitution, the Law on Local and Regional Authorities, the Law on the Civil 
Protection System and the provisions of various other laws. This principle ensures that 
the local incident remains within the limits of local governance and resolution. 
According to the principle of solidarity, if objective circumstances exceed these limits 
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and resources, additional assistance is provided to the affected local (regional) 
authority. Other local and competent regional authorities are required to provide 
assistance as a high-level administrative-territorial political entity. If an incident 
escalates beyond the local (regional) authorities' capabilities, the Government is also 
required to provide assistance. According to the principle of continuity of action, the 
system and operational protection and rescue forces continue to carry out regular 
missions in major accidents and disasters. 
 
Figure 1: General principles of operation of the CP system in the Republic of Croatia 
 
Although these principles are universal and practically applicable, there are 
examples in Croatia that show that they are not being applied. In the past few years, 
the most notable examples of this have been flood situations. The local levels did not 
make use of all their available resources, but at an early stage demanded assistance 
from the state level, thus bypassing the level of regional authorities. This often required 
the involvement of the Croatian Armed Forces as a strategic state resource without 
utilizing all civilian resources, from the local (regional) to the state level. This indicated 
a lack of understanding of how the system functions, traditional (but not always 
correct) confidence in the speed and efficiency of the Republic of Croatis's Armed 
Forces response units, and the efforts of the local community save their own resources. 
On the other hand, some threats and challenges are identified as too large and 
too great a risk for these principles to apply, and for the system to be activated and 
start to operate from a lower to a higher level. In these cases, coordination and 
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leadership from the state level to the local level is required. An example of this are the 
dangers of nuclear, chemical and biological threats to which the state alone has certain 
capabilities of prevention, alertness and response. 
 
Figure 1: Organization of the State Protection and Rescue Administration 
 
 
 
Source material: DUZS (2015), author's processing. 
 
The Chain of Command and coordination is formally established and regulated 
by the Constitution, strategic and planning documents, laws and subordinate acts and 
mutual cooperation protocols. Establishing conditions and clear guidelines for 
managing the crisis management system is the responsibility of the Government of the 
Republic of Croatia. The Government's role in such situations is crucial in providing 
official statements and informing the population (which it may delegate to the DUZS 
Director), in deciding whether or not to provide or receive international assistance, 
declare a disaster, introduce extraordinary measures to eliminate the consequences of a 
disaster, introduce readiness at a strategic level, securing funds in the state budget for 
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the material renewal of readiness for protection and rescue forces within state 
commodity inventories, response and implementation of long-term protection and 
rescue measures (Kešetović, Ž., Toth, I., 2012; Kešetović, Ž., Korajlić, N., Toth I., 2013;). 
In emergency situations, DUZS acts as a coordinator between civil protection 
participants, while in major accidents and disasters it manages the operational forces 
and coordinates the activities of other participants in civil protection activities, 
disatributes information in a timely manner, monitors the implementation of prescribed 
measures and activities in civil protection as well as conducts mobilization for the 
needs of the crisis management system. DUZS manages the Civil Protection 
headquarters of the Republic of Croatia (SCZ RH) until a state of disaster is declared. 
The Government of the Republic of Croatia pragmatically decides how it will 
fulfill its obligations and which tools and capabilities it will utilize, depending on the 
potential crisis situation or the crisis that has occurred. An example of such an action is 
the establishment of the crisis headquarters. One of the few central state authorities 
taking advantage of this possibility and actively benefiting from it is the Ministry 
responsible for healthcare. The Crisis Headquarters is activated and operates in health 
crisis situations, as well as during complex inter-agency responses to crisis situations. 
In inter-agency co-operation, the role of the civil protection headquarters 
established in each territorial unit of the Republic of Croatia is paramount. They 
represent expert, operational and coordinating bodies that serve as support to decision-
makers at the local, regional and state level - the mayor, governer, chief and director of 
the DUZS. Each territorial unit establishes its own headquarters according to its needs, 
while the Civilian Protection Headquarters of the Republic of Croatia is established by 
the Government by appointing civil protection heads from central government bodies 
and the system of important operations forces. The headquarters function as 
coordinators, play a role in the exchange of information between the participants of a 
crisis event, represent a forum for the exchange of opinions and prepare draft decisions. 
The development of the capabilities of each individual system member is of 
paramount importance for the efficiency of crisis management systems and the 
development of universal standards, exercises, education and training. DUZS organizes 
and anually conducts a large number of such cross-sectoral activities on a national and 
local level. Communication interconnection contributes significantly to the response 
rate, duration of overall activities, coordination between system participants and 
citizens, as well as the protection and rescue of citizens and their property, material 
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and cultural goods, the environment and critical infrastructures. 112 centers and the 
State Protection and Rescue Center have this role in all complex incidents and crises in 
the Republic of Croatia. They are the organizational part of the DUZS and support all 
the participants of the crisis management system. 112 Centers play an indispensable 
role in early warning and public alert systems, as well as international coordination in 
all types of natural, anthropogenic and complex crisis situations that are addressed by 
the analyzed crisis management system. Proper managing in crisis situations is the 
crown of the entire crisis management system and all its components. The Protection 
and Rescue Plan for the Republic of Croatia provides for a framework for action in the 
following phases: warning, readiness, mobilization and growth of operational forces, 
protection and rescue measures. The principles of action within these phases apply to 
most of the natural, anthropogenic and complex dangers adressed by the crisis 
management system as we know it in Croatia. Since the basic principle of crisis 
management is that a crisis event determines organization and response, the 
Protection and Rescue Plan for the territory of the Republic of Croatia also recognizes 
events that require an increase in forces and a different approach than those common 
models. 
The first measure in the system is early warning (we would add prediction as a 
pre-warning phase) wherever possible in a timely manner. For most natural hazards 
(with the exception of earthquakes) early warnings are possible and consequently the 
most effective measure in protecting the population, material and cultural goods. 
Concurrently, this measure is also the least expensive way of preparing to deal with the 
consequences of extraordinary events. There are different early warning systems in the 
Republic of Croatia that use emergency services, local (regional) authorities, legal 
entities and state authorities with special powers and responsibilities such as DUZS. 
The most important national and international systems are used by DUZS to activate 
the crisis management system, but also to alert the population to potential dangers. 
A successful reaction primarily by emergency services, and then crisis 
management systems is conditioned by timely and quality information about an 
emergency event. The role of citizens and legal persons is extremely important in the 
aforementioned. Every citizen of the Republic of Croatia is required to report that there 
is a possibility of an incident or that an incident is underway. Legal persons using 
hazardous substances are required to establish warning systems within their own 
facilities, as well as those for alerting the local population. Timely information about the 
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extraordinary event and the quick and efficient response of emergency services create 
the conditions for keeping a local incident at a local level. DUZS monitors these 
incidents, collects and analyzes data and information, ensures communication between 
necessary emergency services, collects feedback, records events, and compiles reports. 
At this stage, DUZS evaluates all the information gathered and decides whether the 
responses of emergency services to the relevent incident should be kept at the local 
level or it is necessary to activate individual participants and operational forces of civil 
protection depending on the type and magnitude of the crisis event (Toth, I., 2015). 
If DUZS assesses that a local incident might escalate or has already escalated, 
it will raise its monitoring level through its regional office for protection and rescue and 
will initiate the introduction of readiness for parts of the necessary system participants 
(units of local authorities and operational forces), as well as their own organizational 
units (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Territorial layout of the DUZS organizing units 
 
 
 
Source material: (DUZUS, 2016) 
 
Depending on the type of extraordinary event, DUZS has two procedures at it's 
disposal. The first one - informs citizens through regular communication systems - by 
područni ured ZiS (20)
zonsko skladište (4)
DVIP (4 odjela)
DIP CZ (4 odjela)
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publishing information on their web site and by informing the media, primarily radio 
and television. The second one - uses the public alert system in affected areas. 
Readiness, mobilization, and growth of civilian operational forces are a part of the 
active preparations to prevent an incident or to remedy the consequences if an incident, 
if it is already underway. If the incident has escalated outside the boundaries of a legal 
entity's facility, if it is no longer a local incident and has surpassed the ability of local 
emergency services to deal with it successfully, and presents a potentially greater risk 
to life, health and property, the crisis management system is activated and the 
participants and operational forces needed to solve the crisis are activated. In 
accordance with the Protection and Rescue Plan for the territory of the Republic of 
Croatia, the DUZS Director has the responsibility and the ability to directly command 
the operational forces of civil protection, using the Catalogue of Capability of 
operational forces and civil protection participants with a review of total rescue 
capacity, divided by activities of civil protection interest in the Republic of Croatia. Even 
though there is a possibility of direct command within the crisis management system, 
inter-agency activities are increasingly using the term co-ordination, since the system 
has been established in a way that all participants are aware of their competencies and 
responsibilities so that it is not necessary to command them, but to coordinate their 
actions. The DUZS Director decides on the activation of the civil protection 
headquarters of the Republic of Croatia and the mobilization of all operational forces of 
civil protection of the Republic of Croatia. If necessary, DUZS will propose to the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia whether it needs to send or receive international 
assistance. In the event that an incident may cause unwanted consequences on a large 
scale, the Government of the Republic of Croatia, upon the proposal of the DUZS 
Director, declares a state of disaster. The Government of the Republic of Croatia takes 
command of the civil protection system in disasters, and the Prime Minister of the 
Republic of Croatia or, on their behalf, a member of the Government or the head of the 
civil protection headquarters of the Republic of Croatia (DUZS Director) takes over the 
work of the civil protection headquarters of the Republic of Croatia. 
International aspects 
There are numerous initiatives and areas of international cooperation on this 
mater, in which the Republic of Croatia is involved, from bilateral and regional 
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cooperation56 to membership in international organizations and initiatives57. In the 
observed crisis management area, it is necessary to regulate co-operation between the 
contracting parties in the area of prevention, alertness, response and removal of 
disaster consequences. International civil protection cooperation agreements concluded 
and ratified in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia form an 
integral part of the legal order of the Republic of Croatia and, by law, superceed all 
other laws. The Croatian Parliament has ratified 12 bilateral mutual assistance 
agreements in the event of disasters and major accidents while three more agreements 
are being ratified. Bilateral co-operation also takes place with other countries through 
various specialized programmes (Toth, I., Cemerin, D. and Vitas, P. 2011). The core areas 
of cooperation covered by bilateral, regional and worldwide international cooperation 
include: planning and implementation of preventive measures to protect against floods, 
earthquakes, fire, navigation accidents, radiological hazards and industrial and other 
civilizational accidents; mutual sharing of information on the dangers, emergence and 
disaster consequences; mutual assistance in protection, rescue efforts and removing 
consequences of a disaster; co-operation in education and training of civil protection 
participants, fire-fighters and other members of rescue teams, as well as protection and 
rescue specialists, and organization and implementation of joint exercises for protection 
and rescue; exchange of scientific and technical data relevant to disaster protection; 
cooperation in the development and production of rescue equipment. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The legal basis for the crisis management system in Croatia is formal 
legislation, with the umbrella law on the system of civil protection58, and more relevant 
laws that regulate the specific areas of risk and danger. What is noticed in analyzing 
                                                          
56 Eg. Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative for Southeast Europe and the South 
European council for Civilian-Military Planning in Urgent Situations. 
57 Croatia is a very active member of the UN Disaster Risk Reduction office, the Open Partial 
Prevention accord, Protection and Assistance in case of major natural and technological 
disasters of the European Council; Civil Emergency Planning Committee for NATO Emergency 
Situations, the Mechanism of Civil Protection of the European Community. 
58 The entire crisis management area is actually impossible to encompass with a single law, but 
there is a need for laws that will ensure integrated crisis management. 
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the crisis management system in Croatia is an all-hazard approach and certain 
terminological confusion regarding the basic concept of crisis, crisis situation and 
related concepts. The terms crisis, crisis situation, accident, major accident and other 
normative terms are often very differently stipulated in various laws (eg. in the areas of 
civil protection, environmental protection, critical infrastructure, fire protection ...). Also, 
in most official documents, other general terms such as "disaster", "accident/major 
accident" or "emergency situation" are used, while the term "crisis" is often used more 
as a concept in the context of crisis management. Likewise, the criteria for an 
emergency situation to be deemed a crisis situation are very differently interpreted, 
which is linked to different degrees of formalization and legal consequences, such as 
relinquishing operational powers to a higher level of authority, approving special powers 
or restricting certain civil liberties. Regardless of the type and scope of the crisis, no 
derogation from the political order is envisaged in the Republic of Croatia.  
It can be concluded that Croatia is prepared to handle emergency and crisis 
situations with legally-regulated ways and methods of organizing the work and 
activities of the civil protection system, which are the primary responsibility of the 
Government. Croatia, in addition to well-developed international cooperation in the area 
of crisis management and civil protection, has also developed bilateral cooperation and 
signed bilateral cooperation agreements with all its neighbors. 
In a world where change and new risks are the only constants and crisis 
management systems must constantly change, adjust to change and improve, along 
with their normative legal framework, changing and constantly aligning norms in the 
area of crisis management are more or less a feature of Croatia as well. 
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Abstract 
 
Cold war never ended. After the collapse of the SSSR, the former Soviet republics 
of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were annexed by NATO. Also, former communist states 
Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia were annexed by NATO. 
According to the conclusion of the NATO summit in Warsaw, it was noted that Georgia, 
Ukraine and Macedonia are the future countries that should join to the Alliance. 
Through NATO, the United States continued to implement Spykman theory, according 
to which "Who controls the Rimland rules (Heartland) Eurasia, who rules Heartland 
controls the destinies of the world".Balkan region for its geostrategic position, its mixed 
multi-ethnical structure, is one out of the three regions in Rimland that there have 
been disagreements continuously along ethnic and religious ground, the nationalism 
and conflicts often developed into mass bloodshed.The other two regions with similar 
characteristics are the Middle East and Asian Balkans (countries of Central Asia). It has 
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not been disputed the fact that tendency of the imperialist forces is through conflict to 
dominate and control these crossroads. With controls of these three regions US will 
rules economic development of Heartland. Tendency of the Balkans region is to 
preserve peace and stability and to minimize the crises that can grow into wars.For this 
purpose, it is necessary to ensure security cooperation, mutual respect and tolerance, 
as well as economic development. 
If we take into account “South Stream” agreement that signed between Balkans 
countries and Russia from one side and Chinese Silk Road (speed train line between 
Athens-Skopje-Belgrade and Budapest)then we can expect that the Balkans could again 
be destabilized through the old initial caps such as ethnic nationalism, various 
revolutions, unstable governments and so on.What will be new risks, threats and 
challenges for the Balkan region in recent tectonic shifts in the international political 
scene, will be the main subject of this paper. 
 
Key words: Balkans, security, threats, risks, Rimland, Cold War 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The turmoil and the tectonic shifts on the international political scene have 
increased the activity of the Balkan volcano. The transition period from hegemony to 
multipolar order transforms the Balkan region into a chessboard on which the big kings 
(centers of power) tactically maneuver to conquer zones of influence and 
interest(Zakaria, 2008).According to its geostrategic position, its mixed and 
metastasized multiethnicity, the Balkan region represents one of three regions on this 
planet in which there is constant ethnic and religious friction, nationalism and conflicts 
which frequently turn into mass bloodshed. The two other regions with similar 
characteristics are the Middle East and the Asiatic Balkans (countries of Central 
Asia)(Brezezinski, 2016). 
The Balkans, said Winston Churchill, “Produce more history than they can 
consume”(Tharoor, 2012).From a historical perspective, no Balkan alliance has lasted 
more than one use. The constant clashes of the big centers of power and the shifting of 
their aspirations also reflect a regrouping of the Balkan geopolitical constellation. 
Although the West is usually pragmatic in leaving the solution of the problems to the 
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leading politicians, Balkan people are responsible for their future embracing everything 
foreign as positive, and everything Balkan as negative. This constellation, together with 
the poor perception of democracy, coexistence in a multiethnic frame, made a negative 
perception and connotation of the term “Balkans”.  
The revision of Balkan history is the principle reason for the intervention of the 
big centers of power. Their egoistic right, as alleged foreign and “neutral” factors, to 
decide the future of the region in favor of peace and democracy is a cause for internal 
divisions, spreading of hatred and intolerance, and rising nationalism, making the region 
a source of instability and a security problem. 
The Balkans has directly affected by many developments in the world, 
especially due to its geographical location. Throughout history, the safety of the 
Balkans has always been in risk. Firstly, the developments and war in the Middle East 
have been threatening the Balkans security. In other words particularly, the 
participation of foreign warriors in the IS terrorist organization more than other 
religious oriented organisations and the involvement of some Balkan citizens to IS 
creates a risk to the Balkans, who have a serious Muslim population. Moreover, the 
immigration that occurred as a result of the war in the Middle East and the EU's 
closed-door policy has begun to create a refugee problem in the Balkans. For the 
Balkan states, which have not been members of the EU, and have economical problems, 
refugees could be become a serious risk. Finally, the threat of ethnic nationalism, which 
always threatens the security of the Balkans and always stands at a sensitive point and 
reminds itself at certain intervals, has begun to come into view again. In this context, in 
this study the vulnerability of the stability and security of the Balkan states, which had 
been supposed to have stabilized until now, will be examined within the framework of 
new security risks. 
 
 
2. THE BALKANS – PART OF RIMLAND 
 
According to Mackinder, “Who rules Central and Eastern Europe commands the 
Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island personified by Eurasia. 
Who rules Eurasia commands the World(Mackinder, 1904). 
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Picture 1: Rimland and Heartland 
 
After the end of World War II, Mackinder’s theory was modified by the 
American political scientist, Nicholas Spykman. According toSpykman, the strip of 
coastal land that encircles Eurasia (called Rimland) is more important than the central 
Asian zone (Heartland) for the control of the Eurasian continent. The concept of 
Rimland was divided into three sections: 
- Control of the European coast land; 
- Control of the Arabian-Middle East desert land; and 
- Control of the Asiatic monsoon land. 
Control of these regions implies control of the sea routes that lead 
from/towards Eurasia. From an economic aspect, the control of ports and sea routes 
implies control of the economic development of Eurasia. And according toSpykman, 
“Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia. Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of 
the world”(Melton, n.d.). 
Although the dissolution of the Soviet Union heralded the end of the Cold War, 
NATO’s subsequent moves proved the opposite. In a period when Russia was on its 
knees, several former Soviet Republics joined NATO (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia). In 
Southern Europe, NATO’s expansion continued with the accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia also became member states. And, at 
the Warsaw Summit, NATO recognized three aspiring members: Georgia, Ukraine, and 
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Macedonia(Erdem, 2010). Thereby, USA through its NATO instrument should control the 
eastern borders of Russia, or as Halford Mackinder calls it “Heartland”. 
Following that theory, Balkan region is de facto part of Rimland and part of 
Europe. Much of the Balkan countries are absorbed into the European Union and NATO. 
At this periodBalkan region is a battleground on which the major centers of power (USA 
- politically and Russia and China - economically) will impose their influence.But our 
opinion is that the Balkan region should focus on Europe and the European Union. On 
the other hand, in the new strategic document of the European Union, the Global 
Strategy for the EU in the area of common and foreign policy, Balkan regions took 
strategic importance. In this case, the EU should show more agility and determination 
in terms of strategic interests, primarily for its internal stability and security.For this 
purpose, a stable Balkans means a stable Europe. The European Union should directly 
involve its impact on the democratization processes and the provision of stable 
governments (EU, 2016). 
 
 
3. CONTEMPORARY INFLUENCE AND STRATEGIES OF BIG POWERS 
 
Throughout history, Balkan geography has always been the focus of great 
powers. Especially ethnic and religious diversity in this region has become one of the 
most important tools that can be used to disrupt the stability of the region. The 
Balkans, which remained between the two poles during the Cold War period, had not 
reached a stable post-Cold War era, and had a difficult time in ethnic and religious 
conflicts. Especially in the period of Yugoslavia's disintegration, beside the EU, which 
could not show its expected activity and power, and adding Russia, which was dealing 
with internal confusion, resulted as USA had serious effects on the region. In addition 
to corruption and constant political instability problems, the Balkan region has always 
been the chessboard of great powers. On the other hand there is rising power, China, 
who has seen the Balkan territory as an important economic market sometimes make 
economic alliances with Russia for gaining advantage. So, today Balkan geography is 
always important for Russia, China, EU and USA.  
Because of its close historical and cultural ties with Balkan States, Russia has 
always used its influence in that region (Strafor Worldview, 2015). There is two main 
reason for Russian continues influence in the region. First one is against Western 
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influence in Balkans, despite the Cold War was finish years ago. The Second one has 
been the implementing of the energy strategies of Russia. In recent years, for 
increasing Russian influence in region again Putin started to awake Russian and 
Serbianpan-Slavic link between Orthodox Christian cousins in the Balkans.Using this 
historical or cultural influence, it is also easier for Russia to use the region to realize its 
economic strategies. 
Although the West invested to Balkans for over years, Russia has also had 
several regional energy assets and hold several outstanding loans to Balkan 
governments increased its influence (Strafor Worldview, 2015). Balkan geography has 
been seen as an alternative route to Ukraine, especially in the relocation of Russian gas 
to Europe. After crises with Ukraine, Russia started to search new routes for its gas 
market in Europe. In this search, Turkey came out to the stage and after the long-
standing surging relations, Turkish Stream project signed between Turkey and Russia in 
October 2016, which could be defined as the transferring of Russian gas to Europe via 
the Black Sea and Turkey's territories. Thus, Russia has both able to make gas transfers 
easily, and become one step closer to the European market that it has always aimed to 
be a part of it. 
 
 
Picture 2: Turkish Gas Stream Map (SigmaLive, 2015). 
 
A similar situation to the economic objectives of Russia is valid for China, one 
of the rising powers.Because of the recent increase in production and economic 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
99 
developments China has to be find a new market for itself beyond Asia. The European 
market, where production costs are high, has become an important market for China, 
which can keep costs down in every sense.China has achieved its plan to reach the 
European market both by railroad and by seaway with the new silk road project. 
 
 
Picture 3: New Silk Road (Newage, 2017) 
 
China’s One-Belt-One-Road (OBOR) initiative is the most ambitious 
infrastructure project for the region.OBORincludes immense network of planned 
highways, railways, energy grids and port facilities that will create economic corridors 
between 65 countries in Asia, Africa and Europe(Capri, 2017).Starting in 2013, the 
initiative aims to create new trade routes, lines and jobs to connect China with Asia, 
Europe and Transition Economies better and more effectively through 5 Routes.The 
carrying out of the initiative began in 2015. However, the application of this project to 
cover all the targeted countries will be possible in the long run.If the project can be 
fully implemented as intended, many countries and regions will benefit from it.This 
project focuses on surface transportation as railway and highway connecting China to 
Europe via Central Asia and Russia.It is aimed at linking China with West Asia via 
Central Asia, and linking China with South East Asia through South Asia and India.The 
goals of maritime transport are to link China with the Indian Ocean to Europe and to 
link China with the South Pacific Ocean (Hong Kong-China).Outside of China, this 
initiative will been speed up the flow of trade and created new markets and jobs by 
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lowering shipping costs for all relevant countries. It will also contribute to the 
development of emerging countries.This initiative will also be make an additional 
contribution to the increase in the amount transported.The connection of the Indian 
Ocean and Suez Canal with China's sea route to Piraeus Port59 (Greece) will create a 
new alternative to the Antwerp Port of Belgium, the Hamburg Port of Germany, and the 
Port of Rotterdam of the Netherlands. Thus, a 10-day savings will be provided for 
transportation from China to East and Central Europe. Invested Projects in China's 
OBOR Framework in Europe are capacity increase and improvement of Piraeus port, 
Hungarian-Serbia speed rail line, China-Spain freight railway (Kaptan Haber, 2017). 
In the Balkans, Piraeus port link with Central Europe and Germany. Turkey and 
Cyprus, respectively, are part of the Silk Road’s overland and maritime approaches to 
Greece. The Balkans, Turkey, and Cyprus all welcome investment from and trade with 
China, and China’s economic relations with all the Balkan countries are increasing.Also 
economic relations are mainly approached on a bilateral basis, the CEEC 16+1 (CEEC 
16+1, 2017) platform provides an extra way for China–Balkans cooperation. In the short 
term, it’s expected that the geopolitical influence of China in Southeast Europe and 
Turkey will probably remain limited thanEU, USA and Russia but in the longer run, 
China may develop into a more significant geopolitical actor in the region(Putten & 
Ham, 2016). 
On the other hand, Balkan territory is always important for Western world. 
European governments have two major goals in the Balkans: to maintain stability in the 
western part of the region and to minimize Russian influence. For over ten years 
western Balkans because of the EU membership has been left under the supervision of 
the union.For supporting stability, the EU has used considerable amounts of resources 
for bringing reform and economic development to the region (Strafor Worldview, 2015). 
However, the other non-EU Balkan countries Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and 
Macedonia have little economic and political progress. 
Together with the unexpected consequences of the Syrian civil war, beside stability, the 
most important perception of the EU towards the Balkans-especially non-EU Balkan 
countries- in recent years is related with the refugee crisis. 
                                                          
59 Greece's largest port Piraeus, near capital Athens, was privatized and sold to China's Cosco 
Group Limited in 2016. 
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Countries in the Western Balkans have been on the forefront of international migrant 
crisis since May 2015. In this “Balkan migration route”, there are thousands of displaced 
persons have mostly arrived from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, fleeing war. European 
Union has used its financial assistance and expertise however the largest brunt of the 
crisis fell on the shoulders of Serbia and Macedonia and also Turkey, last stops before 
the Schengen area. When the arrival of refugees in Hungary (first EU member along the 
route), they requested asylum, and were accommodated in exiting refugee centres. 
People migrating to the EU are categorised as either: an asylum-seeker, a refugee, a 
beneficiary of subsidiary protection, an irregular immigrant or a legal immigrant. 
According toFrontexdata, both the number of illegal border crossings and loss of life on 
the Western Balkans route has seen a tragic increase in 2016(Frontex, 2017). De facto 
closure of the Western Balkan route in March 2016 left thousands stranded in Serbia 
and Macedonia and its expected that these numbers are triple during this year. It is 
difficult to assess for Western Balkan countries would cope with the situation without 
any assistance.There is some amount of financial assistance in the framework of 
Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Europe (RMRP) covering Turkey, 
Southern Europe, Western Balkans however, it will not been enough especially if the 
situation will be continue in Middle East (European Western Balkans, 2017). 
Discussions are underway on what will happen to refugee policy in Europe, 
while some governments are urged to take strict measures in this regard. Austrian 
Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz argued that they need to establish refugee centers 
outside the European Union (EU) borders in March 2017. According toKurz, "We need 
refugee centers to work with the UN refugee commission outside the EU," and that the 
centers are not important where they are, and that they would be used to protect and 
repatriate people who are "illegally" entering Europe. Kurz suggested establishing 
Egypt, Georgia and the Western Balkans for refugee centers, and the Mediterranean 
route should be closed to "illegal immigrants" (AB Haber, 2017) . 
It is seen that the biggest and negative effect of the closed-door policy, that 
the EU implements in the period after the Syrian civil war is in the Balkan geography. 
Already in this geography where different ethnic and religious groups have come 
together throughout history, there is a risk that such kind of immigration movements 
and immigrants who must to be stay in that region, in some way can be changed 
demographic structure of the region. Such a demographic change could create new 
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crises in the Balkans. However, it should be taken into consideration by the EU that the 
Balkans are no longer in a position to endure a new dispute. 
The relationship of the USA with the Balkans is based on different bases. For 
the United States, the Balkans are not backyards like the EU, but should not be 
surprised by the presence of the United States in every region historically Russia wants 
to influence. TheUSA has been involved in the internal politics of the Balkans by NATO 
in the aftermath of the Bosnian war and the conflict in Kosovo in the 1990s. In addition, 
there has been new NATO members after cold war, who were the supporters of Soviet 
Union in previous.The most important aim of the US on the Balkan territories is to 
minimize the economic and cultural Russian influence in the region. Because, as 
mentioned above, the European market is very important for both Russia and China, 
which is a rising power, and the Balkan’s is defined as the gateway of Russia and China 
to Europe.An economically strengthened Russia means Russia, which has more say in 
international politics.Even if the Cold War is over, the opposition between the United 
States and Russia today continues through some new geographies, such as the Syrian 
civil war. 
It is obvious that the US, which has held the title of being the only superpower 
for many years after the Cold War, will take different measures against the new rising 
powers and will not give up easily.On the other hand, however, it should be taken into 
consideration that this influence on the Balkans could be made through the Western 
alliance, and also leave the region primarily to the larger states of the EU, rather than 
directly influencing it. An increase the Russian influence in the Balkans, jeopardize 
Britain’s position as the leading anti-Russian European power and make a joint British 
and French soft power strategy in the former Yugoslav republics more likely (Ademovic, 
2016). 
In this context, it could be said that for both geostrategic, cultural and 
economic reasons, Russia has never lost interest in the Balkans. The most important 
economic goal of Russia and China is to enter the European market and for that reason 
the Balkan Gate is very important for them. It is also important to bear in mind that 
Russia and China have good relations with Middle Eastern politics. But it is impossible 
to imagine that the accounts on the Balkan geography are over. Because, throughout 
history, it is necessary not to forget the existence of "Western" forces who want to have 
dominion over this region. 
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4. WHY IS AN UNSTABLE REGION NECESSARY – LESSON LEARNED/NOT 
LEARNED FORM YUGOSLAVIA? 
 
To answer the question of who needs an unstable Balkans we will consider the 
story of Yugoslavia. From a European success story after World War II, the breakup of 
Yugoslavia was a process that suddenly turned into an experiment (pilot project) which 
subsequently will be applied in other regions of the world. 
In order to restrain and stop the aggressive Germany, the great Western 
powers, France and Great Britain, laid the foundations of Yugoslavia according to the 
provisions of the Corfu Declaration. Occupying the former territories of the Austro-
Hungarian and Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia united all South Slavs in one country. 
United in one country, South Slavs won’t be an easy prey for the imperialist goals which 
use the divide and conquer strategy. In its Constitutional order, Yugoslavia greatly 
resembled Great Britain.  
With the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement, Yugoslavia became an 
important actor on the international scene. The purpose of this movement is to ensure 
the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned 
countries in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and 
all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, hegemony as well as 
against great power and bloc politics60(World Review, 2013). This movement advocated 
an independent development of the states, rejecting any kind of foreign influence and 
interference. This strategy of the Non-Aligned Movement wasn’t favourable to the Great 
powers’ strategy of ideological wars by absorbing the weak states. To that end, this 
movement should have been dissolved and Yugoslavia divided, in order to weaken the 
individual states and subsequently absorb them under the ideology of the Great powers. 
In fact, that was just one reason. 
On the other hand, the rate of economic growth and development of 
Yugoslavia, especially after World War II, put her on the high 24th place in the ranking 
of world economies. If we compare this data to the report for 2015, Montenegro is 
                                                          
60 In a speech given during the Havana Declaration of 1979, Fidel Castro said. For detailed 
information please;  
<http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/6th_Summit_FD_Havana_Declaration
_1979_Whole.pdf> 
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ranked 149th, Macedonia130th, Bosnia and Herzegovina 112th, Serbia 87th, Slovenia 81st, 
and Croatia 76th(World Bank, 2015). In that time the state had a dominant share in all 
joint-stock companies, an unimaginable thing for Western democracy. Therefore, the 
state had a complete control over the companies, and transferring capital out of the 
country was impossible. Exploitation of natural resources by foreign companies was also 
forbidden. To that end, the breakup of Yugoslavia into smaller states with weaker 
economies should enable:  
- The states to be incapable of independent development (need for 
interdependence, globalization, and democracy); 
- The collapsed economies and natural resources to be available to the big 
multinational companies and financial institutions; 
- Impoverishment of the population; 
- Literate and fit for work people to be forced to work for minimum wage. 
- Closing of factories from all economic and industrial spheres in order to 
neutralize their competition to the Western corporations. 
All above mentioned facts were also conditions that opened the door to foreign 
capital and to the takeover of the large factories by Western corporations. Naturally, for 
all this to happen Yugoslavia must be dissolved. 
From a security point of view, the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia represented a perpetuation of the imperialist powers’ strategy, above all 
NATO and the EU, for absorbing the dissolved states as a counterweight to the Russian 
power bloc. Slovenia and Croatia are already member states of NATO and the EU, 
Montenegro will become a part of NATO this year and should start accession 
negotiations with the EU. From a security perspective the goal is simple, neutralizing 
Russia’s influence over these countries. In the meantime, the parliamentary elections 
held in Montenegro were also a referendum for determining the future direction of this 
country, the EU, NATO, or Russia. 
On the other hand, by its strategic position, the Balkans is the main crossroads 
between Europe and the Near East in both directions. Undoubtedly, the tendency of 
imperialistic powers is to dominate and control these crossroads. Worthy of note is the 
so-called “Diagonal road”, composed of Vienna-Belgrade-Skopje-Sophia-Istanbul. This 
road is an overland route towards the Orient for Europe, a gateway towards Europe for 
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the near and Middle East. Consequently, the power that dominates will have the 
greatest benefit. 
 
 
5. THE SPREAD OF NATIONALISM INSTEAD OF DEMOCRACY AND 
PROSPERITY 
 
The building of strong national identity within the frames of good 
interneighbor and interethnic relations is nothing more than rubbing the lamp from 
which the genie of war impatiently waits to come out. And the venomous memory of the 
wars from the 1990’s is an additional spark that could light the fuse. 
More than 25 years after the breakup of the federation and the division into 
blocs, the Western Balkan countries still have the capacity to follow retrograde policy 
instead of integrative. Talking about federalization and separatist ideas as substitutes 
for prosperity and democracy, better life, employment and economic development, 
serves as a powerful tool for spreading fear and keeping people under control. 
Macedonian folk dance “three steps forward, two steps back” is an embodiment of 
Balkan politics in the last few years. When things start to get better, such as 
employment, economic and consumption growth, the development of social policy etc., 
politicians always remind people that these achievements are thanks to the patriots 
and ultranationalists whose politics led to this situation. This situation is an impetus 
and a basis for presenting an election program that should bring about a good result, 
i.e. a victory on the next elections or referenda.  
However, it is obvious that corruption, crime, poor economic results, as well as 
poverty could be easily forgotten by fueling nationalist and interethnic passions, looking 
for foreign enemies, keeping people in constant fear of new interneighbor and 
interethnic conflict. 
Although it looked like a Star Wars plot, the arms race between Croatia and 
Serbia served as fodder for media close to the leading parties in both countries and was 
used for intensifying national rhetoric and making political points, in order to spark a 
verbal war between Belgrade and Zagreb in which there was a witch-hunt for spies on 
both sides that subsided after the referendum in RepublikaSrpska. While this 
referendum was denounced and declared illegitimate by the United States and the EU, 
including neighboring Croatia, it was not denounced by the Republic of Serbia. We must 
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mention here the incident with the Serbian train emblazoned with nationalist graffiti 
which was heading to KosovskaMitrovica. Such provocation further worsened the frail 
relations between Belgrade and Pristina. All these events resulted with rising 
nationalism before the Serbian elections that produced a change, i.e. the current prime 
minister became a new president.  
Secret services and mercenaries, threatened national identity, federalization, 
threats from neighboring countries, protests “For” and “Against” putting religious 
symbols and erecting national monuments, as well as making public threats and calls 
for lynching of “traitors” are pretexts for creating political crisis, and represent a perfect 
recipe for an unstable country in which nationalism is the main course for the 
impoverished people. In the case of the Republic of Macedonia there was a situation in 
which neighboring countries Albania and Kosovo directly interfered in the domestic 
policy of the country. The creation of the so-called “Tirana platform” by the Albanian 
prime minister and the four Albanian political parties in Macedonia, during an election 
process in Albania, may only bring political points to the current prime minister of 
Albania, but will not resolve the political crisis in Macedonia. This platform fueled the 
nationalist aspirations in Macedonia. Although the referendum in RepublikaSrpska was 
condemned by the United States and the EU, the platform and the meddling of 
neighboring countries in the domestic affairs of Macedonia were not, which reveals the 
double standards on the international scene. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The transition from hegemony to multipolar order was announced in 2007 
during the Munich conference when Russia liberated from the yoke of the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund, was launched as an important player on the 
geopolitical stage. Russian intervention in Syria marked the global American hegemony 
era and the beginning of preparations for the construction of a new multipolar world. 
According to its geostrategic position, its mixed and metastasized 
multiethnicity, the Balkan region represents most neuralgic geographical point on the 
planet where the most geopolitical interests collide in one place. The turmoil and the 
tectonic shifts on the international political scene have increased the activity of the 
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Balkan volcano. Seen geographically, the Balkans is part of an area called Rimlend. 
Domination and control of that area means greater control of Heartland - ie Russia. 
Rise of Russia and the establishment of significant relations with Balkan 
countries, while building economic, energy, political and civilizational interests and 
influences are key elements for her return on the big stage. The impact on the Balkans 
through stirring up old conflicts on religious and ethnic basis will cause a serious 
impact to Russia's interests for Balkans and for its strategic connection with the 
European subcontinent. From that aspect, Macedonia and Serbia are very important for 
Russia. According to the geographical positions of these two countries, they are located 
in the central part of the Balkans. One of the main drawbacks is access to the open 
seas. These two countries are the Balkan Heartlend (Milevski T. & Sharevski M., 2014). 
The states that surround Balkan Heartland are Balkan Rimlend. Balkan Rimlend 
consists of NATO members: Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and 
Romania. Together with Hungary as a NATO member, Balkan Heartland is completely 
surrounded by anti-Russian influence. Any instability in the Balkan Heartland will cause 
impact on Russia. But here we must not forget China, which also has economic 
interests in the Balkans, including the areas of Heartland and Rimlend. China has a new 
economic - development policy geared towards Europe. Any instability in the Balkan 
Heartland will cause impact on her economic plans. As we know, China logistic supports 
Russian intervention in Syria. This means that China will continue to help Russia on the 
Balkans. The core of the Heartland occupies the triangle Shar Planina Mountain – 
Skopska Crna Gora Mountain, Pristina and Presevo. It is the geographical core of the 
Balkan Heartland which binds currently Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo and has the 
potential to affect the entire Balkans. Considering the events that took place the last 
two or three years in the Balkans, the building of strong national identity within the 
frames of good interneighbor and interethnic relations is nothing more than rubbing 
the lamp from which the genie of war impatiently waits to come out. 
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Abstract 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall symbolically represents the end of the bipolar world 
order. That moment marked the beginning of a new era in international relations. 
Change at the top of the pyramid of world power, in fact, is the change of social, 
political and economic environment in global terms. Positive expectations related to the 
end of the Cold War were let down. There exists an escalation of instability in the areas, 
which are on the borderline of conflict of interest of former large rivals. The intention to 
dominate on a global scale has led to the activation of hotspots in the neuralgic 
geopolitical areas. The new practice has been promoted and introduced in the former 
Yugoslavia. Today's situation shows a total fiasco of the so called transitional model in 
most of the states formed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The economic and 
the political reality is a paradigmatic image of a failing transition model and the 
unfulfilled expectations of the Cold War. 
In this paper, a comparison of the economic situation in the countries of former 
Yugoslavia in the eve of its dissolution as well as of the current situation is made 
through multivariate analysis, based on current economic indicators. The current status 
of the quality of life of citizens living in the countries formed on the territory of the 
former common state is analyzed based on the concept of human security settings and 
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by its dimensions and indicators. Results of the analysis show that the basis of the 
current issues is the poor economic situation resulting from the applied model of 
economic transition from socialism to capitalism. 
 
Keywords: Cold War, the Berlin Wall, Transition, Human Security 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Post Cold War period is a significant disappointment in many respects 
compared to expectations of the majority of the people in the world. The effects of the 
processes of transition in the territory of the former socialist countries compromise 
democracy and capitalism as the ideals of which people behind the Iron Curtain 
dreamed.61 Particularly painful were experiences of the people who lived in the former 
Yugoslavia. The inability of local rulers to solve the economic problems that Yugoslavia 
was facing over the years caused discontent among the population. In order to maintain 
their position of party oligarchy, they diverted public attention from real problems and 
personal incapacity by pointing a finger at the members of other nations or republics. 
Social discontent was being instrumentalized and transformed into the worst forms of 
chauvinism which resulted in breaking of the common state. From today's perspective, 
we can say that the former Yugoslavia is a perfect example to prove the justification of 
the existence of the concept of human security. All seven dimensions of the concept 
had a negative trend in the movement of status indicators. Poor local conditions were 
additionally stressed by the negative impact of foreign factors. The unfortunate set of 
circumstances led to internal conflicts and implosion which is explained in different 
ways, but the fact is that the middle-age generations still have the feeling that their 
life in the former joint state was better than the life they live today. 
In what follows, we will try to confirm (or dispute) the thesis that the quality of 
life in the former state community was better than it is today in independent mini 
states arisen from the rubble of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY or 
Former Yugoslavia). 
                                                          
61 According to the EBRD research for 2010, commitment to democracy in most transition 
countries has declined (EBRD, 2011: 22). 
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Concept of Human Security as Analythical Framework 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Istern 
military and political Bloc is a turning point in international relations. The institutional 
control mechanisms, established under the preasure of ideological alternative existence 
are rendered disfunctional and a restrictive factor to doing business activities. 
Renouncing the concept of welfare state and a retrograde approach to resolving the 
problems of systemic crisis of capitalism has its manifestation in the territory of the 
former socialist (communist) countries, too. The Pamflet on the End of History (Francis, 
1992) gets its economic counterpart: the neo-liberal (neo-conservative) transition model 
whose promoter is Jeffrey Sachs62. The effects of the reforms implemented in the 
territory of the former Soviet Union are best described by the phrase: economic 
genocide (Bohlen, 1992). The coupling of former apparatchiks and representatives of big 
capital from the West leads to the collapse of institutions and their instrumentalization 
for the purpose of interests for maximizing the Transnational corporations (TNCs) profit. 
In the Report for 1994, having noted the negative trends of the effects of the 
Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2004) in transition countries the expert UNDP63 
team promotes the concept of human security, which evaluates the security of 
individuals in relation to the quality of their lives (UNDP, 1994). Certainly, there were 
previous cases in history of the state and its institutions working against the interests 
of its citizens, but the specificity of the transitional period is the high incidence of the 
phenomenon, or the number of people covered by this negative practice. Particularly 
important is the fact that the so-called transition and the perestroika before it are 
inspired by the wish to attain all of those positive effects of the free market and 
democratic political system of which the people behind the Iron Curtain dreamed. 
The basic idea, presented in the Washington Consensus, which is 
operationalized through Jeffrey Sachs's transition model is banning state institutions 
from economic and public spheres. Privatization in all areas, not just state (socially) 
owned economic assets, but also the education system, health care and municipal 
services. Having noticed the cataclysmic consequences of their own model, the very 
                                                          
62 Jeffrey David Sachs, economic advisor to many politicians in different states through the years 
of transition (Poland, Slovenia, Russia, Estonia). http://jeffsachs.org/about/ 
63 United Nations Development Program http://www.undp.org/ 
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creators of the Washington consensus soften their initial position and switch to a less 
radical model expressed through the so-called New Washington Consensus, which does 
not insist on full privatization of education and health systems, and municipal services 
(Stiglitz, 2004). The consequences of the period of so-called primitive accumulation of 
capital in the transition countries have a bad effect on living conditions of the majority 
population. Given that the process is managed through mechanisms of institutions of 
national states it turns out that the citizens as the biggest victims of the transition are 
completely subjected to the mercy of predatory capitalism that has seized the 
opportunity and set out to conquer the previously inaccessible area. 
The authors of the report have realized that the carriers of negative practice 
are very powerful, so much so that an individual country cannot deal with the imposed  
practice by itself. The idea is to point out the problem and initiate an international 
framework that could confront it on the basis of specific indicators. Opting for a seven-
dimensional matrix whose elements are based on indicators of the quality of life of 
citizens, the authors of the report attempt to objectify the parameters to the existing 
status on the basis of which they can take the appropriate corrective action. In the 
aforementioned UNDP report the analysis of the state of security of citizens through 
the following seven dimensions (UNDP, 1994: 24-25) is proposed: 
1. Economic security, 
2. Food security 
3. Health security, 
4. Environmental security, 
5. Personal security, 
6. Community security and 
7. Political security. 
As can be seen from the structure of dimensions it is about aspects of life of 
citizens whose quality depends exactly on status indicators within each of the 
dimensions. Here an apropriate question can be asked: why the accent is on security 
and not on the quality of life. Our personal impression about it is that by securitization 
the authors wanted to pinpoint the gravity of the problem. In the previous bipolar world 
the concept of security had a magical power to mobilize resources and draw attention 
to specific issues. Viewed from this historical distance, it seems to us that the good 
intention of the authors of the Report on the UNDP development in 1994 is not fully 
realized in practice. The positive thing is pointing out the problem, which appears with 
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the globalization of economic flows, because after 1989, the world literally becomes the 
global capitalist battleground of large TNCs. Under the pressure of organization 
rationalization and goods and capital flows facilitation, the disempowered State is 
losing its main levers of power to control and influence the course of events. The 
inability of governments to create an environment in accordance with the needs of the 
local population leads to the absurd situation in which the citizens are less and less 
interested in participating in political processes and the political processes are 
increasingly used to shape the system in accordance with the needs of TNCs. 
Economic security is not without reason, the first on the list of dimensions on 
which the security of citizens depends because the actual state in other dimensions 
depends on economic conditions. Certainly there is a feedback loop that the situation in 
other areas affects the level of economic security. The level of economic standard 
affects the quality of food, living conditions, the effectiveness of the system of medical 
care, environmental conditions, the level of crime, the efficiency of institutions, level of 
corruption, system stability and interest of citizens to participate in the political life of 
the community. 
The situation in the former Yugoslavia could be used as a textbook example of 
a real practical value that the concept of human security has. Based on the situation 
and concrete indicators with the use of an early warning system in the territory of that 
country the alert lights would have lit up in at least 4 of the 7 listed areas. Economic 
indicators had a negative trend in a long period, the political system was showing 
serious signs of dysfunction, the security of individuals and communities in one part of 
the territory (Kosovo and Metohija) was completely undermined and such a situation 
was spreading to the rest of the country. We can open a discussion on whether the 
problem of dysfunctional political system led to the economic crisis or the economic 
crisis enlarged the shortcomings of the system, however it seems to us that it is 
irrelevant from this perspective; far more important is the fact that the accumulation of 
several factors contributed to the known outcome of events. 
 
 
A short overview of the possible causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia 
 
There are many causes that contributed to the disintegration of multinational 
and multi-confessional community composed of six federal units. Perhaps the most 
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comprehensive display of disintegration causes can be found in the journal Philosophy 
and Society, the issue on the subject: theoretical assumptions of understanding the 
breakup of Yugoslavia, in which prominent authors who were contemporaries of the 
process gave their view of chain of events (IFD, 1994). Of course, each author puts 
emphasis to their area of professional engagement, but a thin red line that connects 
most of the works emphasizes the economic aspects of the weak federal structure that 
contributed to intensifying hostility between the federal units. If we apply the concept 
of human security as an analytical framework for understanding the process, we come 
to the conclusion that, as we have already said, the economic situation is the result of 
poor conditions in other areas (dimensions) of human security. 
Galtung, a Scandinavian author who knows well the state of affairs in the 
former SFRY presents some interesting observations about the political situation in this 
country: the political class, which was in power for about forty-five years managed to 
implement the program of reconstruction and development and to achieve impressive 
results. However, the maximum reached within the set political and economic model 
was followed by stagnation due to rigidity and inability to adapt to new conditions. 
During the seventies, and especially during the eighties, after Tito's death, deficiencies 
of the system come to the fore. Those deficiencies are not removed because of 
ideological reasons. Systemic deficiencies are manifested in the political sphere through 
the established vast bureaucratic apparatus (doubling the structures on the federal and 
republic level) that fails at being functional, which leads to the economic slump. The 
complex internal situation is further complicated by changes of the set of international 
circumstances: primarily a jump in interest rates in the international financial market 
that turns cheap loans into a heavy burden for the faltering economy, but also the fact 
that the country is losing the role of a buffer zone between the East and West, which 
has allowed Yugoslavia a privileged position in its relationships with major powers 
(Galtung, 1994: 25-28). 
Political monopoly of the Communist Party without an alternative program 
does not allow for corrective mechanisms but further deepens the already existing 
crisis. Instead of solving economic problems and stabilizing the situation, incompetent 
party structures strengthen their shaken position by turning to nationalism. By 
definition, multinational federations, are unstable formations. In the case of former 
Yugoslavia, that moment is further emphasized by the historical burden of past events 
and experiences of the Second World War. Many of the problems arising during the 
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formation of a common state, especially during the great world conflict were not solved 
but only pushed under the carpet and covered with the glaze of brotherhood and unity 
of all nations and nationalities who lived in former Yugoslavia. This concept produced 
positive results in the period of prosperity of the common state but along with the first 
signs of economic stagnation the first nationalistic outbursts in Croatia and Serbia 
begin, ending with an all-embracing suspicion of everyone with respect to anyone. 
In addition to economic and political dimensions of human security, negative 
trends also appear in other spheres relating to the quality of life of citizens in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia. The continuing drop of real wages leads to a 
deterioration of economic standards but also to a declining efficiency of the system 
institutions, which reflects in the quality of food, level of health care, personal security 
and community security. Although the quality of life of most citizens of Yugoslavia is 
better than in the neighboring countries, dissatisfaction is growing with the fact that 
the parameters, by which citizens evaluate their position in the system, are dropping. In 
addition to internal defects, the pressure applied by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), which imposes restrictive models to the purpose of paying off foreign debt, is a 
very important factor for the negative trends. Instead of an improvement of the 
situation and changes for the better in the economic structure, the authorities opt for 
the reduction of consumption and imports in order to provide funds for the repayment 
of external debt. Stagnation of wages as a result of reduced investments and imports of 
raw materials additionaly complicates the already complex situation. Like many times 
before, the conditions imposed by the IMF produce negative effects in practice, and in 
this context we can say that this organization gives its contribution to the dissolution 
of the SFRY (Chossudovsky, 1998: 243-263; Woodward, 1995). 
International position of Yugoslavia is changing drastically with the warming of 
relations between the US and the Soviet Union (or Russia). A country that had 
significant privileges in the treatment by the great powers in times of the Cold War 
because of its geopolitical position, loses its former geopolitical significance after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. Due to the change in the overall situation the then US 
administration was no longer willing to engage resources in the earlier scope to the 
purpose of monitoring events in former Yugoslavia. The structure of people in the 
administration who are not qualified enough to understand the implications of the 
upcoming process of disintegration also changes. On the other hand, the Soviet Union 
(and later Russia) has problems of its own. In these circumstances, the countries that 
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have emerged as new protagonists on the international geopolitical scene (united 
Germany and Hungary) see the opportunity to strengthen their influence in the Balkan 
Peninsula. Steps are made to stimulate the disintegration process through political 
support given to republics that want to leave the community (there were concrete steps 
towards arming the separatist forces in Croatia). 
Interior institutions of the SFRY are unable to provide an adequate response in 
the existing circumstances. Stipe Mesic, Head of the Collective Pesidency as the 
Croatian representative at the time of the dissolution, boasts of his role in crushing the 
country he chairs. Unity of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia as the only political 
organization of federal character is broken because of the struggle of republic 
structures for better positioning in the new set of circumstances. Republic structures 
take more care of their own positions by approaching the nationalist movements than 
of the reform of the system in relation to the new circumstances. One of the moments 
that seem incomprehensible from the perspective of democratic and institutional 
achievements is the announcement of multiparty elections without passing laws on 
party organization. This fact has enabled an active participation of the HDZ (Croatian 
Democratic Union - the party that gathered separatist-minded members of the Croatian 
nation) and SDA (Party of Democratic Action - the party that gathered nationalist-
oriented Muslim). In their programs,these two parties openly promote breaking of the 
state and unitary BiH as the goals of their political activities. 
Having been left without a supreme commander (Presidency) the Yugoslav 
People's Army as the armed force which constitutionally have the role (and obligation) 
to preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country is not able to change 
anything. Instead of carrying out its constitutional role, generals travel to Moscow and 
Washington seeking a solution and support for the action, which they do not get. Due 
to such set of circumstances, the breakdown occurs that has claimed thousands of lives, 
and devastated the economy and infrastructure. 
 
 
Comparison of current economic indicators with the situation on the eve 
of the dissolution 
 
The process of disintegration of Yugoslavia, as we have seen, is caused by many 
factors. Our consideration in this paper is restricted to the economic parameters. The 
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justification for this approach lies in the fact that the economic crisis has triggered the 
process of disintegration. While the economic situation was favorable, nationalism was 
sporadic but with the deepening of economic crisis national tensions gain strength. In 
addition, there is not enough space to deal more with the historical circumstances of 
the formation of a common state of southern Slavs and the roots of animosity between 
the nations that made up this country. 
As a result of frequent borrowing on international financial market and taking 
cheap loans after the first oil crisis the Yugoslav economy enters a debt spiral. The rise 
of interest rates on loans drawn from abroad together with an increase in oil prices and 
a reduction in foreign demand is the beginning of the ongoing economic crisis, which 
lasts until the breakup of Yugoslavia (Stojanović, 1989: 103-104). 
Statistical figures in Table 1 show that due to the discontinuity of the 
development and disintegration of the single economic space the situation is far worse 
in relation to the lost potential products of economies that continued to operate 
independently. A fully justified objection can be made regarding the approach, taking 
into consideration the further trend of tightening the economic crisis, but the answer 
would be that from today's perspective, we cannot predict a possible different scenario. 
Arguably a possible missed course of events could be a successful economic reform. 
With adequate support from international financial institutions the course of history 
could be altered in the Balkan Peninsula.64 The scenario that actually took place 
definitely is not a favorable solution and it is far from optimal. 
A short analysis of the data in Table 1 may give an insight into the current 
situation in the former unified economic entity. Because of the comparability of data, 
the year 2005 is taken as the base and in relation to it the calculation of data from 
1990 and 2015 is made. Comparing the cumulative GDP in 2015 (for all economies 
incurred in the territory of former Yugoslavia) with the Yugoslav GDP from 1990, we can 
see that a 27% growth was achieved in this period. Republic of Serbia is in the most 
disadvantaged position as it has not yet managed to reach the GDP achieved in the 
year prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia (down 20% i.e. the realized GDP in 2015 makes 
80% of the one in 1990). Slovenia did best of all new economies but it already had the 
best economic indicators in the former common state (a 59% growth). 
                                                          
64 According to estimates of the then experts a financial injection of $ 10 billion was sufficient 
for the consolidation of the former economic situation. 
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Table 1. Selected macroeconomic indicators of the economies incurred in the territory of 
former Yugoslavia in prices from 2005 
 
GDP (mil. USD 
at constant 
2005 prices) 
GDP p/c 
External debt 
stocks, total 
in mil.USD 
2005 prices* 
Total population 
in 
thousands*** 
Serbia (Kosovo 
and Metohija 
excluded) 
1990. 38.104 4.825  7.897 
2015. 30.492 
4.298 24.970 7.094 
Administrative 
District Kosovo 
and Metohija 
1990. 6.315 3.185  1.983 
2015. 5.531 3.148 1.750 1.757 
Croatia 
1990. 42.544 9.081  4.685 
2015. 45.377 10.702 41.230** 4.240 
Slovenija 
1990. 25.452 13.032  1.953 
2015. 40.478 19.583 41.370** 2.067 
BiH 
1990. 12.870 2.850  4.516 
2015. 13.770 3.614 10.440 3,810 
Montenegro 
1990. 2.636 4.093  644 
2015. 3.119 4.892 2.160 626 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
1990. 5.750 2.698  2.131 
2015. 8.587 4.132 5.630 2.078 
Total 
1990. 123.672 5.194 24.760 23.809 
2015. 157.354 7.908 125.800 17.866 
Sources:  
- The United Nations Statistics Division, The National Accounts Main Aggregates Database 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/selCountry.asp 
* - Data for 1990. External Debt Statistics: Historical Data 1998 Resource Flows, Debt Stocks 
and Debt Service: Apports de ressources, encours et service de la dette, OECD Publishing, Dec 6, 
1999, p.205. 
- For the rest World Bank, International Debt Statistics.External debt stocks, total (DOD, current 
US$) http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.DOD.DECT.CD?view=chart 
**- CIA World fact book, estimation for 2015: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/hr.html 
- CIA World fact book, estimation for 2015: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/si.html 
*** Data for population: The Federal Statistical Office (1991): Yugoslav Statistical Yearbook 1991. 
Beograd: The Federal Statistical Office and Savremena Administracija. 
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Data from Table 2 tells us that the decline in economic activity in the territory 
observed is also evident in relation to the countries of Western Europe. In the reporting 
period, Germany records a GDP growth of 43%, while Greece as a country with 
approximate economic profile as the former Yugoslavia achieves GDP growth of 24%. 
The external debt of the SFRY in 1990 amounts to USD 24.8 billion, while the sum of 
debts of the individual states incurred in the territory of the former common state for 
2015 amounts to 125.8 billion US dollars at the prices in 2005 (an increase of 408%) . 
We notice the very negative trend of stagnation of GDP and a multiple increase in 
foreign debt. Poor living conditions influence the departure of many citizens from the 
territory of the country of origin and unfavorable living conditions lead to a reduction in 
the birth rate so that there is a negative trend regarding the number of the total 
population. The total population of 2015 has decreased by nearly 6 million (reduction of 
25%) relative to the 1990. The only country which records a growth of population is 
Slovenia (5.84%), which can be attributed to its better economic situation compared to 
the other countries in the former common space. Slovenia has managed to maintain the 
population, including the arrival of foreign nationals who are relocating to the area of 
Slovenia regarding this as an opportunity to improve the quality of their and their 
family lives. In the observed period, Germany increases the number of its population 
2.19% and Greece 8%. 
 
Table 2. Selected indicators for Germany and Greece 
  
GDP at constant mil. 
USD 2005 prices 
Per Capita GDP Population 
GER 
1990 2.286.945 22,353 78.958.237 
2015 3.291.225 41,686 80.688.545 
GRE 
1990 160.923 9,662 10.131.737 
2015 198.913 17,788 10.954.617 
Source: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/selCountry.asp 
 
From Table 3 we can see how the parameters by which we can assess the 
stability in an area generally follow (they are in correlation with the data about it) GDP. 
All the parameters show that Slovenia is in the best position: the lowest unemployment 
rate, the least social stratification and the highest life expectancy. Only the data on the 
percentage of the population below the poverty line are less favorable compared to the 
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same parameter for Serbia. From today's perspective, we can say that the starting 
position allowed Slovenia to pass through a transition vortex with less damage. 
Focusing on self-interest and relatively successful secession without war and economic 
damage enabled Slovenia to follow the developed countries by economic parameters. 
Macedonia together with BiH is most disadvantaged in relation to the number of 
unemployed, the value of GINI index and the population below the poverty line. In 
terms of population below the poverty line, BiH is in a more favorable position 
compared only with Kosovo and Metohija. When it comes to the Corruption Perceptions 
Index only Slovenia is significantly separated from the other countries of the former 
Yugoslavia with an index of 61; for all other countries index values range from 36 to 49. 
 
Table 3: Selected parameters indicative of the social stability 
 
Unemployment 
rate (2016) 
Distribution 
of family 
income - 
Gini index 
(2012) 
Life 
expectancy 
(year 2014) 
CPI 
2016* 
Population 
below 
poverty 
line (%) 
(2014) 
Serbia 18.9 38.7 (2014) 76 42 9.2 (2013) 
Administrative 
District Kosovo 
and Metohija 
35.3(2014) 29.4 (2012) 71 36 30 
Croatia  15.8 32,5 (2012) 77 49 19.5 
Slovenija  11.6 23.7 (2012) 81 61 13.5 (2012) 
BiH  43.2 (2015) 36.2 (2007) 76 39 17.2 (2011) 
Montenegro  18.5 (2014) 26.2 (2013) 76 45 8.6 (2013) 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
 24.9 43.6 (2013) 75 37 30.4 (2011) 
Source: - CIA (2017) World fact book. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook (visited on 15.04.2017) 
*-Transparency International (2017) Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. 
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 (visited on 
20.04.2017). 
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Human Development Index65 created by the UNDP is the closest to the 
presentation of the situation in relation to the elements of the concept of human 
security. 
 
Picture 1. Human Development Index and its components 
 
Source: UNDP (2017) Human Development Reports. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-
development-index-hdi (visited on 20.04.2017). 
 
From Table 4 we can see the index values for all the republics (now 
independent states) of the former Yugoslavia. The data show a certain degree of 
correlation between the achieved GDP p/c and the parameters based on which the 
UNDP evaluates the quality of life during the formation of HDI. Slovenia is again in the 
best position by all parameters, followed by Croatia, and other countries. The only 
deviations is evident in the parameter values for Macedonia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro, which may be explained by the minimal 
differences in the previous period, but also by the current processes in the territory of 
these states. 
  
                                                          
65 Human Development Index (HDI) was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities 
should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth 
alone. The HDI can also be used to question national policy choices, asking how two countries 
with the same level of GNI per capita can end up with different human development outcomes 
(UNDP, 2017). 
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Table 4. Human Development Index and its components (2015 years) 
HDI 
rank 
Country 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
Life 
expectancy at 
birth 
Expected 
years of 
schooling 
Mean 
years of 
schooling 
Gross 
national 
income 
(GNI) per 
capita 
(2011 
PPP $) 
25 Slovenia 0,890 80,6 17,3 12,1 28.664 
45 Croatia 0,827 77,5 15,3 11,2 20.291 
48 Montenegro 0,807 76,4 15,1 11,3 15.410 
66 Serbia 0,776 75,0 14,4 10,8 12.202 
81 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
0,750 76,6 14,2 9,0 10.091 
82 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
0,748 75,5 12,9 9,4 12.405 
 
Sources: UNDP (2017) Human Development Reports. Human Development Index and its 
components http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI (visited on 20.04.2017). 
 
In this context it is interesting to compare the values of HDI for Yugoslavia in 
1970 and 1985. At the beginning of the period of economic stangnation, HDI value for 
the SFRY is 0.757. Although the value of economic indicators stagnated permanently, 
HDI grows until 1985, when it reaches its maximum of 0,917 (UNDP, 1991: 97). The 
conclusion is that despite the economic crisis, the quality of life of citizens improves, 
which can be partly explained by the increase in external debt. However, current data 
show that although the common debt of all countries far exceeds the level of 
indebtedness of the former country, HDI values for all countries are at a lower level 
than in 1985. According to the UNDP, Yugoslav HDI was in 1990 and 0.893 and by this 
indicator Yugoslavia is ranked 34 of 160 countries ranked at that time (UNDP, 1991: 15-
16). Today, with the exception of Slovenia, which records some progress, all other 
countries have fallen on the list of the ranked by the value of HDI.  
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Conclusion 
 
Previous analysis confirms the initial assumption that the quality of life for 
citizens living the territory of former Yugoslavia is worse than it was at the time of the 
breakup of that country. The recorded growth of GDP p/c is more the result of the 
growth of external debt rather than of the improved economic performance. In addition 
to debt growth at the level of newly formed states, a certain increase in social 
differences was also recorded, which indicates the potential for instability because of 
social tensions. 
HDI together with a proper analysis of the political situation, indicators of 
environmental conditions and level of criminal activity would give a more accurate 
picture of the situation in the observed area. This holistic approach requires much more 
space, so we take this oportunity to point only to the fact that the high level of CPI is 
the indicator that warns of further possible complications in the analyzed area. 
Corruption as a systemic problem does not help to change the situation for the better, 
but on the contrary, further deepens the current problems. 
The role of international factors must be taken into account in the analysis of 
the current situation in the same way as it provides a part of the explanation for the 
historical dimension of the analysis. In addition to  the former East - West conflict, 
some new actors have appeared meanwhile such as the Islamic factor, but also China, 
which as a global power is expressing interest in the area of the Balkan Peninsula as a 
significant access road to its goods to the EU market. Further course of the current 
situation will depend on the ability of local elites to recognize the common interest of 
the people living in the Balkans and their resilience to the instrumentalization as the 
function of realization of geopolitical (geo-economic) factors interests. In addition to 
raising economic performance, integrative connecting of economies in this area on the 
basis of common economic interests could contribute to stabilizing the existing 
situation. 
The fact that thousands of highly educated young people66 have left the 
Balkans is discouraging because of the fact that it has greatly reduced the capacity to 
                                                          
66 Most comprehensive material on migrations related to the Balkan Peninsula can be found in 
the proceedings: Goran Penev, ed. (2011): Migracije, krize i ratni sukobi na Balkanu s kraja 20. 
veka, Društvo demografa Srbije / DémoBalk. Beograd. 
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overcome the crisis. Departure of the most vital part of the population further 
complicates the situation because it reduces the chances of timely coming out of the 
crisis and overcoming the conditions that have led to it. Bearing in mind the current 
economic situation, the trend of the departure of highly educated personnel and the 
continuation of the practice of attracting foreign investments on the basis of cheap 
labor or various benefits to foreign investors can be expected to continue, which further 
complicates the local conditions. Getting out of the vicious circle is not possible without 
the help of developed countries. However, given the current crisis of the global system 
and the problems that the developed countries are being faced with for almost a 
decade, it will be difficult to get significant help. The only likely solution that remains is 
the option of reliance on one's own powers and resources rather than those of others 
along with curtailing the predatory appetite of big business. 
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Abstract 
 
Zenith of migrant crisis, arising as a result of the war in Syria and political 
turmoil in some Asian and African countries, took place in the year of 2015 testing the 
readiness and diplomatic relations of countries in the so-called "Balkan route" - the 
shortest transit corridor to migrants shelters in the EU. In terms of the migrant crisis, 
each country responded to the new circumstances in accordance with available 
capacities and interests. Preparedness and response to migrant crisis reflected the 
degree of Balkan states national security resilience, their ability to respond adequately  
to the changed circumstances in the security environment and to return to the normal 
state of functioning in the shortest time without compromising vital functions of the 
system. The sudden influx of migrants within a short period of time created the need 
for flexible and pragmatic responses of "Balkan route" states with the aim of prompt 
transit of migrants to final destinations in the EU. Subsequent unilateral actions of 
individual countries and the establishment of an agreement between Turkey and the EU 
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have led to the closure of "Balkan route" and generated progressive growth of migrants 
smuggling as well as using of alternative transit axes. 
 
Key words: migrant crisis, “Balkan route”, preparedness, response, resilience. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Term "migration" has etymological roots in the Latin language (migration, 
migrare -wandering, roaming). United Nations defined migrations as the activity of 
"crossing state or administrative borders for a specific period of time by the refugees, 
internally displaced people and economic migrants" (UNESCO - Themes - Migration, 
1998). Inability to achieve fundamental rights, graphically illustrated in the initial parts 
of the Maslow hierarchy (pyramid) of human needs (Maslow Lewis, 1987), represents 
primary motivator for migrations. 
Activating of the so-called "Balkan route" - transit corridor from Greece 
through Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia which leads migrants to the desired 
destinations in the EU- was the result of a sudden influx of migrants in 2015 from civil 
war-torn Syria in 2015 and economic migrants who have left their home countries in 
Asia and Africa due to existential threats. The flow of a large number of people in a 
short period of time through aforementioned transit corridor generated political, 
humanitarian and security problems in Balkan countries who were instructed to 
cooperate, despite a constant influence of the burden of the past. Complex security 
situation in Balkan states during migrant crisis required implementation of pragmatic 
and flexible answers. Preparedness and response of each of these 'Balkan route' 
countries depended on the political and economic stability of individual countries as 
well as on the assistance in the form of information and material aid they received from 
other countries and organizations. 
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Figure 1.: "Balkan route" and alternative routes for transit of migrants (Deutsche Welle, 2015); 
 
National security strategies of the Balkan states as "documents that define 
objectives of security policies, means and methods for the realization of national 
security interests and objectives" (Keković, 2009: 89) define migratory movements in 
various ways, placing them in the corpus of international and regional security risks and 
threats. The concept of resilience67is implicitly mentioned in the security strategies of 
the Balkan states through the state's ability to apply preventive measures and 
strengthen national security system capable of a timely response, continuous 
functioning and maintaining vital functions and identities in the case of existing 
threats. Balkan countries that adapted functioning of the national security system to 
new circumstances and took advantage of them to improve the situation of national 
                                                          
67The term "resilience" is taken from the Technical Sciences whose researchers  used it in the 
context of a resistance material which can withstand the external pressures and continue to 
perform its function and keep identity without permanent modifications of the structure 
(system). 
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security can be characterized as countries that possessed characteristics of antifragility 
(Taleb, 2012). 
State authorities and non-governmental organizations in several "Balkan route" 
countries reacted to the sudden influx of migrants in accordance with their capacities 
and interests. The data used in this paper were collected by analyzing publicly available 
documentation and through a questionnaire created for experts from the "Balkan 
Route" countries who were directly or indirectly engaged in the solving of migrant crisis. 
The authors of this paperwork presented indicators of resilience of transit countries for 
migrants on their way to final destinations in the EU: 
• Institutional and organizational readiness of individual countries before the 
crisis outbreak in 2015; 
• Reactions of state bodies and the high-ranking officials during the crisis; 
• Changes in the legislation of the state affected by the crisis - the adoption of 
new laws, changes to    existing normative acts; 
•The involvement of security forces in dealing with the crisis –border police, the 
army and special units; 
• Providing humanitarian and medical assistance at border checkpoints; 
transport of migrants; 
• The reactions of citizens to migrants in transit; 
• Reactions of the state structures to the pressures of EU officials; 
• Institutional, informational and technical cooperation among "Balkan Route" 
countries; 
• Recovery process of each country after “Balkan route” closure and response 
capacity improvement; 
 
 
Greece - "Balkan route" entry point 
 
During the year of 2015 and the first quarter of 2016 Greece, as the first 
country in the "Balkan route" corridor became the focus of public attention for several 
reasons. In the process of economic recovery from devastating effects of the global 
economic crisis, this EU country faced numerous problems due to the sudden influx of 
migrants and their transit to other Balkan countries. 
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Institutional and organizational readiness of Greece to the sudden influx of 
migrants was not at the highest level due to the long process of recovery from the 
economic crisis as well as the lack of assistance from other countries and organizations 
in which Greece has had decades-long membership.  The sudden influx of migrants who 
were trying to reach the eastern Greek islands from Turkish coast has led to the deaths 
of large numbers of people (UNHCR Report, 2015). Sharp reactions of Prime Minister 
Alexis Tsipras were results of the negligence of Turkish government and the 
unreadiness of Greek authorities (Coast Guard at first place) to the new situation due to 
a lack of logistical support from the EU (Squires, 2015). Bitterness of Greek authorities 
was the effect of lack of support from neighboring countries and EU institutions. This 
attitude dominated in all public appearances of high-ranked government officials during 
migrant crisis. 
Political turmoil in the zenith of the migrant crisis led to dissolving of Greek 
parliament and the announcement of parliamentary elections in August 2015. The 
internal political dynamics and the election campaign conducted in the moments of the 
greatest humanitarian crisis since World War II has blocked legislative initiatives and 
amendments to normative acts with the aim of alleviating the effects of the migrant 
crisis. The law on the deportation of refugees and their return to the coast of Turkey 
was adopted in April 2016 as part of an agreement reached between top officials in 
Berlin and Ankara in March 2016 (European Commission, 2016). 
Additional engagement of  Greek police and special units on the eastern islands 
(such as Kos, Lesbos, etc.) was caused by increased demand for the establishment of 
public order after a large number of incidents provoked by the dissatisfied migrants due 
to the slow process of registration and distribution of meals (Konstatinidis, 2015). 
Humanitarian organizations significantly contributed to calming the situation 
(Papathanasiou, 2015) by providing assistance to migrants in the form of medical care 
and meals. Nongovernment organizations made transit of migrants through the 
territory of Greece bearable within the limits of fulfilling basic human needs on daily 
basis. Increased presence of security forces and thousands of migrants arriving daily in 
the Greek islands have led to dissatisfaction and solicitude of the local population for 
several reasons. Income from tourism as one of the strongest economic sectors of the 
country in the process of recovery from the economic crisis was decreased due to 
unwillingness of many tourists to spend their vacation in the islands which were 
geographically suitable for transfer of migrants from Turkey to Greek coast. Also, local 
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residents were concerned about their own physical safety and health due to the 
potential risk of spreading diseases because of inadequate hygiene conditions in 
refugee camps (Haga, 2016). 
During migrant crisis, senior Greek government officials met state officials of 
other "Balkan route" states and senior officials of EU at summits organized for adopting 
measures and plans for migrant crisis dismissal. Appeals of Greek authorities for 
humanitarian aid delivery to refugees who were coming in significant number on daily 
basis to the Greek island coast provided the sum of several hundred million € of aid 
(European Parliament Briefing, 2015). Instead of stronger support and assistance from 
EU institutions, Greek authorities were faced with threats of suspension from Schengen 
zone because of the inadequate control of the external EU borders (BBC, 2015). 
Incidents at the border crossings and the eastern Greek islands as well as the 
deficit of human and material resources were the reasons for the accusations directed 
to neighboring countries, especially to Turkey and Macedonia. Closure of "Balkan route" 
led to easing of tensions between Greece and its neighbors. 
Migrant crisis recovery process in Greece has taken place simultaneously in 
terms of recovery from the economic crisis and the implementation of painful reforms 
of the tax and pension system, and therefore it is difficult to isolate indicators of 
migrants transit consequences in this country. Immediately after "Balkan route" closure, 
Greek authorities have directed attention to the recovery of tourism in the eastern 
Greek islands that were damaged due to migrant crisis (in the context of the recovery 
of local economy and undermined reputation) and to the implementation of the 
agreement between EU and Turkey that implies deportation of refugees to Turkish 
territory. Also, Greek authorities have made some improvements regarding 
accommodation conditions, acceleration of the examination of the international 
protection beneficiaries and applicants in the labour market (Skleparis, 2017). 
Surprisingly, tourism on eastern Greek islands bounced back after migrant crisis and 
brought more tourists to the islands in the years following the crisis (Morris, 2016). 
 
Preparedness and response of the Republic of Macedonia to the migrant 
crisis 
 
The creators of the Concept of national security and defense of the Republic of 
Macedonia pointed out that "the roots of instability in the region are in political 
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extremism, extreme nationalism, religious and racial intolerance, which in combination 
with weak state institutions and the lack of rule of law can generate a high level of risk 
and danger" (The concept of national security and defense of the Republic of 
Macedonia, 2003). Migrations of population, especially illegal, are listed in the corps of 
security risks and dangers that come from the environment and can adversely affect 
national security of the Republic of Macedonia. 
Migrant crisis befell the Republic of Macedonia in moments of political crisis 
and the escalation of inter-ethnic tensions. Fragile democratic institutions in this 
former Yugoslav republic were severely tested by a large flow of migrants during crisis. 
Absence of cooperation and coordination of government bodies in the period before the 
crisis  had an impact on the level of readiness institutions of the sudden influx of 
migrants (Kosevaliska, Tusevski, 2015). Budget restrictions and insufficient quantity of 
humanitarian aid for migrants in transit were the root cause of Macedonian officials 
deprecation during 2015. In August 2015 Macedonian authorities declared emergency 
situation in and initiated an amendment to the Law on asylum (VOA, 2015) with the aim 
of facilitating migrants  movement to the border with the Republic of Serbia and 
prevention of humanitarian crisis (the Guardian, 2015). 
Initial phases of migrants transit through the Republic of Macedonia were 
significant in the light of additional engagement of border police and experts from the 
Crisis Management Center (Gallagher, 2016). Increasing number of transiting migrants 
during the summer of 2015 gave an impulse for decision made by the President of the 
Republic of Macedonia on the additional engagement of army forces at the border 
crossing points (Papadopoulou, 2015). Both numerous  non-governmental organizations 
and citizens who organized themselves and provided support and care for migrants in 
transit by donating food and medical supplies got positive public reaction. 
Perennial problems and tensions between Greece and Macedonia have 
influenced the level of cooperation and coordination between security services of 
mentioned countries during migrant crisis. Greece as a country multidecadal 
membership in NATO and the EU did not provide enough help to Macedonian security 
services (BBC, 2016). Cooperation with the authorities of the Republic of Serbia is 
assessed as positive and constructive by the Macedonian public, while relations with 
Brussels have been strained due to pressure from the EU regarding the structure of 
internal political turmoil and attitudes of governing structures (Herczog, 2016). During 
the crisis, Macedonian officials had several meetings with EU officials in Brussels. 
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Valletta Summit gathered representatives of many European and African countries in 
order to discuss migrant crisis, but it was held without the presence of Macedonian 
officials (Valletta Summit on Migration 2015). 
Closing of the "Balkan route" made Macedonian authorities faced with the 
problem of taking care of the refugees who are currently living on Macedonian territory. 
“Second-in- chain” position within “Balkan route” corridor made Republic of 
Macedonia and its government an important partner in migrant crisis resolution,   
highlighting the role of the ruling elite’s position. Cooperation of EU officials with 
“VMRO-DPMNE” representatives weakened the opposition and civil society, which led 
this country into deeper structural problems. 
 
 
Resilience of the Republic of Serbia in the context of the migrant crisis 
 
The Republic of Serbia as one of several countries on the transit corridor 
shared the burden with neighbouring countries regarding migrant crisis. The National 
Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia recognizes migration as one out of 
numerous transnational challenges, risks and threats that may endanger national 
security (National security strategy of Republic Serbia, 2009). 
In 2012 Serbian parliament adopted the Law on Migration (Law on Migration, 
2012) which puts in charge Commissariat for Refugees and Migration to perform 
professional and other tasks related to the migration issues. This law emphasizes  the 
role of Commissariat for Refugees and Migration to perform tasks related to: 
determining, proposing and taking measures for the integration of people who are, in 
accordance with the Law on Asylum (Asylum Act, 2007), entitled to asylum; identifying, 
proposing and taking measures for the reintegration of returnees under readmission 
agreements; improving the living conditions of IDPs while in displacement; proposing a 
program to develop a system of measures for families of foreigners who are illegally 
staying on the territory of the Republic of Serbia and proposing programs to support 
the voluntary return of foreigners who are illegally staying on the territory of the 
Republic of Serbia to their country of origin. Commissariat performs tasks related to: 
the collection, compilation and analysis of data and indicators for migration 
management; reporting on immigration and emigration; the development and regular 
updating of the migration profile of the Republic of Serbia; establishment of a unified 
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system for collecting, organizing and sharing data; establishing cooperation with the 
members of the European Migration Network; education and training of people engaged 
in activities relevant to migration management, ensuring the availability of information 
relevant to migration issues, as well as other duties specified by the Law. In June 2015 
Serbian government established an Inter-ministerial working group for migrations 
under jurisdiction of Minister of labour, veterans and social rights. In July of the same 
year, Collection center for Refugees was opened in Presevo, as the first point for 
providing help to refugees in transit. 
The Response Plan of the Serbian Government was adopted during the period 
of a sudden influx of migrants in September 2015 (Response Plan of the Government of 
RS to the sudden influx of migrants, 2015). As part of the Plan, certain activities and 
measures were adopted regarding institutions and organizations and their activities in 
the case of a massive transit of migrants. UNHCR and the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) presented Annual plan of responses to refugee and migrant crisis in 
Serbia (Annual plan responses to refugee and migrant crisis in Serbia, UNHCR, 2015) in 
January 2017. The aforementioned plan is a part of the regional response which includes 
Serbia, Turkey, Greece and Macedonia. 
In the early stages of the migrant crisis during the first half of 2015 the 
Government of the Republic of Serbia had an extensive experience towards migrants, 
following civilization and European norms and standards in terms of free movement of 
people, relying on the views of Germany's official policy, which advocated a liberal 
attitude and opening the borders to all migrants. The turnout has been created as a 
result of restrictive migration policy of neighboring countries, notably Hungary and 
Croatia, which increasingly began to pursue their national interests in terms of the 
migrant crisis, which led to the closure of their borders for the mobility of migrants 
(The Guardian, 2015). Increasing number of migrants in Serbia has resulted in the lack 
of sufficient resources for providing support to those people (Sputnik news, 2015). 
Before the outbreak of the crisis, Serbia has had extensive experience with 
providing help to refugees and internally displaced people and in this context 
institutional and organizational readiness was at a high level. A significant contribution 
to mitigating the effects of the migrant crisis in the Republic of Serbia was made by a 
number of non-governmental organizations, the Red Cross, UNHCR and groups of 
citizens who have voluntarily donated aid in the form of food, clothing and medical 
material. During 2015, one of the first civilian  organizations that organized help for 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
138 
refugees was "Miksalište" (Beta agency, 2015), providing assistance in the form of 
clothing, food, water and medical supplies at locations where gathering of a large 
number of migrants was recorded. During 2015, as a partner of the UNHCR, Info Center 
started to work in Belgrade, providing help with information as well as translator 
services (Ljubisavljević, 2015). Considering the transiting nature of migrants crisis, not a 
single incident was recorded between local population and refugees in Serbia 
(Spasojević, 2015). 
Cooperation with neighboring countries has existed during the migrant crisis, 
but was not at the optimum level. Organized smuggling groups of migrants and closing 
of Hungarian border for transit of migrants have placed additional burden the Balkan 
states that had already been fighting with effects of migration crisis. Meetings of senior 
government officials with counterparts from neighboring countries took place mainly 
during the summit of leaders of the countries of the region with EU officials. Meetings 
of Balkan officials at the ministerial level were organized with the aim of calming 
tensions following the incidents and resolving situations that occurred in the context of 
the migrant crisis, threatening to endanger economic relations and the exchange of 
goods between countries (Beta, 2015). 
The Ministry of Labor, employment, social and veterans' rights of the 
Government of the Republic of Serbia, in cooperation with the Commissariat for 
Refugees and Migration of the Republic of Serbia, UNHCR and NGOs, organized 
conferences and panels in order to gather eminent experts and discuss the experiences 
acquired at the field  during the crisis, providing the impulse for starting institutional 
process of identifying lessons learned during the migrant crisis (Conference "Challenges 
of the refugee crisis -learned lessons" Conclusions and recommendations, 2016). 
Isolated incidents that happened in previous years in local communities (e.g. Banja 
Koviljaca “Asylum Protection Center” and in Subotica) were also a reason for civil 
society initiatives and recommendations directed towards government institutions 
(Migrants are not a threat but they are a security challenge for Subotica, 2017). 
After the closure of the "Balkan route", joint patrols of Serbian army and police 
forces that were engaged to prevent illegal crossings of state border, thwarted smuggle 
attempts of more than 20 000 migrants by  2017 (Press Release of Joint forces of the 
army and police of the Republic of Serbia, 2017). 
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The Republic of Croatia in terms of migrant crisis 
 
Creators of Croatian National security strategy recognized illegal migrations as 
one out of many asymmetrical security challenges, risks and threats (Croatian National 
security strategy, 2002). Migrant crisis in Croatia was marked by attempts of ruling 
structures to convince the public that the country is not the final destination of 
migrants and that a transit corridor for migrants transit from the Republic of Serbia will 
be directed towards Hungary. Also,as an integral part of Government’s successful crisis 
communication strategy,the Croatian public was assured that in the case of migrant 
crisis outbreak, civil protection system which proved to be effective during the floods in 
Eastern Slavonia will be activated (Hina, 2014). 
The Government of the Republic of Croatia made decision in July 2015 to 
establish Headquarters for Coordination of Activities with executive power in respect of 
all activities related to the receipt and transit migrants through the country. By the end 
of migrant crisis, Headquarters analyzed events and made strategic decisions and 
guidelines for all relevant actors activities. The most significant changes to the existing 
legislation were related to the amendments to the Law on State Border Control and the 
Law on Defense by which the Croatian Government has created a legal foundation for 
the Croatian armed forces to assist the border police. Although laws were amended, to 
the activation of the armed forces to assist the police never happened. Government's 
decision that has attracted great attention of the public was temporary employment of 
local unemployed population in the activities that were related to some form of 
assistance to migrants in the municipalities where they stayed during transit. In this 
way Government successfully used migrant crisis and temporarily decreased 
unemployment in local communities. 
All activities of state and a non-state sector, domestic and international civil 
organizations in humanitarian embodiment have been coordinated and synchronized 
with each other. Headquarters for coordination of activities was established by the 
Government and it was making strategic guidelines for activities in the migrant crisis, 
while the operational headquarters made up of all government forces involved in the 
intervention, was deciding upon operational activities of all the forces engaged. 
Reactions of Croatian citizens at the beginning of the migrant crisis were 
divided, with emphasis on the increasing the number of citizens who supported 
assistance to migrants. During the migrant crisis, there have been no security incidents 
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during the transport of migrants or in transit camps. The Republic of Croatia did not 
allow migrants to move freely through the national territory, they have been accepted 
at the border, registered, provided with medical, psychological and other humanitarian 
aid and transported to the border with Slovenia. 
Croatian police exchanged information with neighboring countries on daily 
bases. The blockade of Bajakovo border crossing point due to non-compliant policy of 
the Republic of Serbia regarding transport of migrants to certain border points was 
terminated without lasting consequences for relations between the two countries (Beta, 
2015). The strategic decision of the Croatian Government to ban the free movement and 
retention of migrants has had a key role in the protection of national security during 
the migrant crisis. Efficient civil protection system gave additional contribution in 
dealing with the migrant crisis (Information on the state system of civil protection, 
2015). 
 
 
Preparedness and response of the Republic of Slovenia to the migrant 
crisis 
 
Economic and political stability of Republic of Slovenia was confirmed by 
gaining membership status in the EU and NATO. Relatively high institutional and 
organizational readiness for migratory wave is the result of longstanding process of 
building democratic institutions, rule of law and the harmonization of the national 
security system with EU and NATO. 
The strategy of national security of the Republic of Slovenia (Resolution on the 
National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010) identified illegal migration 
as a form of threat to the national security in the context of global sources of threats 
and risks. The creators of the Strategy claim that "the pressure of migrating from the 
direction of Southeast Europe is conditioned by socio-economic factors and the security 
situation at the above mentioned as well as on a global basis. Mass migration in the 
future may generate security threats and threaten the health of the nation "(Resolution 
on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia, 2010).In this way, 
Slovenian policymakers made a relation between illegal migrations and potential health 
crises. 
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After closing of the Hungarian border, the Republic of Slovenia has been faced 
with a massive influx of migrants who use the territory of the country as a transit 
corridor to Austria and Germany (Pusterla, 2015). Slovenian lawmakers did not foresee 
the involvement of the army in the field of civil protection during emergencies which 
caused an overload and the deficit in the number of police officers deployed during the 
initial phases of migrant crisis.After the meeting of the National Security Council in 
October 2015, a decision was made on hiring Armed forces in assisting the police forces 
was made (BBC, 2015). 
The UNHCR and the Red Cross were permanently present at border crossings 
and checkpoints, helping the authorities to register people with special needs and 
provide them with additional humanitarian aid. Assists that listed organizations and 
individual citizens provided to migrants in transit were not sufficiently covered in the 
media because of a negative attitude of the public towards immigrants who were 
considered to be a threat to national security (Green Journal, 2017). 
Good organization of the security services and non-governmental sectors in the 
management of migrants in transit caused the absence of significant pressures from EU 
institutions. European Commission donated dozens of millions of euros for the 
construction of additional accommodation and as an aid for security services (UNHCR 
Europe's refugee emergency response update # 10, November 2015). Cooperation of the 
Republic of Slovenia with neighboring countries was solid except for bilateral tensions 
with the Republic of Croatia on the occasion of transit of 25 000 migrants in a period of 
a few days in October 2015 (SLOGA, 2015). That situation forced officials of Croatia and 
Slovenia to seek the help of police forces of other EU member states. 
A few months after critical attitude towards the construction of the wall in the 
Hungarian-Serbian border, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia has applied 
identical measures to protect the Schengen area and to prevent the creation of 
"stoppage" in the movement of migrants to Austria. The Republic of Slovenia, a 
politically stable and geographically smallest state of "Balkan route", did not have major 
consequences due to migrant crisis, unlike Greece which, after signing of the "EU-
Ankara" contract was faced with the disposal of tens of thousands of migrants detained 
on the border with the Republic of Macedonia. 
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Conclusion 
 
Resilience of individual Balkan countries in the context of the migrant crisis in 
2015 is a complex phenomenon made up of a large number of factors that in different 
ways contributed to their preparedness and response to migratory wave. Migrant crisis 
tested the institutional and organizational readiness of individual countries of "Balkan 
route" and their fragile bilateral relations burdened with the past. 
Because of the dealing with the consequences of the global economic crisis and 
its position as the first country in the Schengen area for migrants, the Hellenic Republic 
has brought an exceptionally heavy burden during the migrant crisis. Unsatisfactory 
level of cooperation with Turkish and Macedonian authorities has further aggravated 
the efforts of the Greek authorities to register migrants and transport them to the exit 
border checkpoints. Closing of "Balkan route" corridor has created a problem with the 
disposal of tens of thousands of migrants who remained "trapped" on the Greek-
Macedonian border. The Republic Macedonia and the Republic of Serbia, despite a 
satisfactory level of security services cooperation and help provided by international 
and non-governmental organizations, faced a lack of resources to care for a large 
number of migrants who spent a transit period in those countries. The Republic of 
Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia showed a high degree of organization and 
preparedness migrants during the crisis, according to the collected data. Despite 
sporadic misunderstanding due to non-compliance at the bilateral level, those countries 
managed prompt reactions involving competent services to provide necessary 
humanitarian assistance and efficient transportation of migrants to the end "Balkan 
route". 
"Balkan route" was officially closed by signing the "EU-Ankara" contract in 
March 2016. That agreement led to the weakening of previous migratory pressures 
towards Balkan countries, creating potential for organized crime activities in the form 
of smuggling migrants through alternative transit corridors. 
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Abstract 
 
The number of international migrants reached 244 million in 2015, including 
almost 20 million refugees. This number was further increased with the onset of the 
“Migrant Crisis” with a huge number of people abandoning conflict-torn countries of 
Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya etc. Taking into account that serious problems related to 
human migrations have existed throughout history, in the previous decades various 
models have been developed for the analysis of this field. The most common models 
have been the Lee Model and the Gravity Model. The Lee model applies so-called push-
pull factors for the analysis of decisions for migrating, whereas the Gravity model of 
migration is derived from the Newton’s Law of Gravity, and is used to predict the 
degree of interaction between two spatial models. The Gravity model of migration is 
based upon the idea that the increase in interregional differences in socio-economic 
values between locations of migration origin and destination may induce increased flow 
between them, whilst the increase in distance between two locations may cause the 
tendency of migration to decrease. Both models, among many others, are used mainly 
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for explanation of migration decision making and the migration management policies. 
The existing migration models based on System Dynamics (SD) are generally related to 
data analysis, policy making and migration management. The paper presents an SD 
model that analyses migrant/refugee flow, taking into account the following 
parameters: political decisions of the countries on migrant routes (political 
intervention), socio-economic factors, porosity of state borders, criminal activities, 
public opinion, health, climate and environmental conditions etc. The model was built 
and simulations performed using the Vensim modeling tool, the results of which may be 
used for prediction purposes, creation migration management scenarios, as well as for 
the risk and resilience assessment of the migrant routes.    
 
Keywords: migration model, system dynamics, simulation model, risk 
assessment, resilience. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The series of “Spring” events throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa 
has triggered the movement of vast number of refugees and migrants from those areas 
to Europe. Europe is currently witnessing a mixed-migration phenomenon, in which 
economic migrants and asylum seekers travel together and these groups overlap. This 
phenomenon is further exacerbated by the inconsistent methods with which asylum 
applications are often processed across the EU.  (Park, 2015)  
Despite of the size of this human and humanitarian tragedy, it is more of a 
constant, rather than an isolated occurrence throughout the history. The world history 
is a history of migrations. From prehistory and early antiquity until now, virtually there 
has not been even a brief period without tribes, clans, classes, families and individuals 
moving from a place to place, either escaping from dangers and hardships, or searching 
for better life. Some of those migrations have been caused by political, some by 
economic, and some by environmental changes. Paleo-Indian hunters entered the 
American continent at least twenty thousand years ago, whilst Indo-Europeans 
colonized Europe, Western and Southern Asia from Central-Asian steppes by the early 
second millennium BC, Bible tells of Judean exodus and Babylonian captivity. The 
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middle of the first millennium AD in European history is even called the Migration 
Period when the “barbarians” broke into Roman Empire. And the list goes on.      
Fast forward to the modern age. Hunger, plague, discovery of the “New World”, 
and the “invention” of the doctrine of the Total War caused many people to leave their 
households.  In the XX century, the largest migration waves were observed during and 
in the aftermath of two world wars. As there was a steep increase in the world 
population, total numbers of refugees, migrants and internally displaced persons also 
increased. For instance, at the close of World War II there were an estimated 30 million 
refugees and displaced persons on the European continent, some dislodged by the war 
and others by the redrawing of Europe's boundaries. Furthermore, the emergence of 
newly independent states in Africa and Asia during the post-war years generated a new 
global refugee phenomenon. This process was accompanied by population exchanges, 
most severely in India and Pakistan, and by a succession of internal wars and violent 
conflicts. After the ebb during 70’s and early 80’s there was a significant flow during 
the late 80’s and 90’s due to the breakup of the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact and the 
wars in Yugoslavia.  (Weiner, 1996) This prompted some authors to describe the XX 
century as the century of migrations.  
However, the same authors could not even suppose the extent this 
phenomenon would reach in the first half of the second decade of the 21st century. 
(Ninković, Kešetović, 2016) The wave of demonstrations and protests, riots and civil 
wars known as The Arab Spring (Arabic: الربيع العربي‎, ar-rabīˁ al-ˁarabī) and 
escalation of Syrian crisis in 2011 were trigger events for a great migrant flow from the 
Middle East and Africa towards Europe that intensified in 2014 and reached almost 
unimaginable dimensions during 2015. In fact, the 2013 United Nations projected 
number of migrants was largely surpassed in 2015, accompanied with equally high 
growth rate. Only two years ago, it was assumed that the total number of migrants on 
the global level would reach a maximum of 237 million, which represents a drastic 
increase in comparison with the year 1990, when the total number of migrants 
amounted to “only” 154 million (Simeunovic, 2015). Every attempt to quantify the 
number of migrants can give only a momentary and shaky figure that may be outdated 
after several days. 
A significant number of migrants cross the borders illegally. According to data 
gathered by FRONTEX in 2014, detections of illegal border-crossing reached a new 
record, with more than 280.000 attempts. The unprecedented number of migrants 
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illegally crossing the external borders has roots in the fighting in Syria that has 
resulted in the worst refugee crisis since the Second World War. Indeed, most of the 
detections at the borders concerned migrants from Syria, who later applied for asylum 
within the EU. Most migrants were detected in the Central Mediterranean area, where 
detections totalled over 170.000. On the Eastern Mediterranean route detections 
totalled over 50.800. Towards the end of 2014, detections sharply increased at the 
Hungarian land border with Serbia, making the Western Balkan route (with 43.357 
detections) the third most important irregular migration route towards the EU 
(FRONTEX, 2015).  
Saying that the current migrant crisis is affecting the Western Balkans would 
be an understatement. One of the most used ways towards rich countries of the West 
goes via Balkan Peninsula – Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia. There are 
also other routes, from Northern Africa across the Mediterranean Sea to Spain or Sicily, 
through ex-Soviet republics etc. In addition, there is a constant influx of migrants from 
Mexico and Central American countries into USA, from South-East Asia to Australia, to 
mention just a few.  
Despite their large numbers in historically and geographically various settings, 
all migrations show similar traits which enables creation of migration models and 
simulations. In our paper we will first present several most important approaches to 
migration modeling, in particular gravity and Lee’s push-pull model. In the second part 
of the paper we will explain how systems theory in general, and system dynamics in 
particular can be used in migration modeling. Finally we will present the results of the 
simulation and draw conclusions from it.    
 
 
2. Migration models 
 
Human migration is one of the few truly interdisciplinary fields of research of 
social processes which has widespread consequences for both individuals and the 
society. Human migrations can be considered as demographic, economic, ethnologic, 
geographic, political, psychological or social process. One of the first attempts to 
formalize the study of migration processes was done by the English geographer Ernest 
Ravenstein. Ravenstein's idea was that the principal factors of migration, though not 
the only cause of migration, are economic. As pointed by him, bad or oppressive laws, 
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heavy taxation, an unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings, and even 
compulsion (slave trade, transportation) produce flows of migrants. Ravenstein's basic 
laws, subsequently amended by additional laws derived from his work, serve as the 
starting point for virtually all mathematical models of migration processes. (Ravenstein, 
1885) 
Lee (1966) revised Ravenstein’s XIX century laws on migration and proposed a 
new analytical framework for migration. In his view, the decision to migrate is 
determined by the following factors: factors associated with the area of origin; factors 
associated with the area of destination; so-called intervening obstacles (such as 
distance, physical barriers, immigration laws, and so on); and personal factors. 
A breakthrough in mathematical modeling of migration dates back to the 
1930s, which led to the appearance of different micro and macro models. A significant 
contribution to the development of migration modeling in the 20th century was made 
by the improvement of the mathematical methods used in demography, first of all – 
econometrics.  
 
2.1. Classification of migration models 
 
A mathematical model of migration is a simplified description of real migration 
processes, where all the crucial links between the real "participants" of spatial 
movements – migrants and factors of migration – are expressed mathematically. As a 
social-economic process; migration modeling can be applied to both, macro and micro 
levels. Given the same object of research – population – these two approaches differ in 
the subject and the goals of research. (Aleshkovski & Iontsev, 2005) 
The macro approach studies the patterns of migration of the whole population 
or certain social groups (for example, seniors, population in working-age period, ethnic 
groups, etc.) within a framework of a given territory and is based on either census data 
or current statistics. Characteristics of the origin and destination regions (such as 
climate, income, unemployment, etc.) are used as input variables for macro models of 
migration, migration processes indicators (such as migration increase, etc.) – as output 
variables. The core ultimate goals of application of migration modeling at macro level 
are: migration processes analysis, migration indicators forecast and simulation of 
migration process development using the analysis of possible changes in emigration 
under different scenarios of economic growth in the emigration countries. 
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The micro approach focuses on the migration behavior of individuals (families, 
households) and intends to explain the decision-making process by potential migrants 
to remain in a current residence or to migrate to another one. As input variables micro 
models use both the characteristics of the origin and destination regions and the 
characteristics of individuals involved in migration processes. Output variables can 
describe migration behavior of a representative individual or, as in the case of macro 
models, aggregate indicators of migration processes. The core ultimate goals of 
application of migration modeling at micro level are: analysis of the decision-making 
process by potential migrant and analysis of the individuals selection process between 
alternatives. 
Despite the fact that macro and micro approaches to modeling have 
traditionally evolved independently from each other, actual migration flows are always 
the result of a combination of decisions made by individuals. According to the 
underlying basics and the mathematical methods used, micro and macro models of 
migration can be classified into several categories. 
According to the modeling approach migration models can be characterized as 
deterministic and stochastic models. A model is classified as deterministic, if the result 
of any system change can be predicted unambiguously. Stochastic models, on the other 
hand, provide several output values given the same input value, whereas some 
likelihood values correspond to all the attainable outcomes, in order to reduce the 
uncertainty. 
According to the time period migration models can be classified as static or 
dynamic. Static models refer to the state of migration processes at a particular point in 
time, whereas dynamic models consider the interaction between the variables in time. 
Dynamic models are mainly used for the purposes of migration processes forecasting. 
Chronologically, the interaction models, or the models of spatial interaction 
came first. They are based on the idea of analogy of the processes undergoing within 
physic and social systems and, correspondingly, the idea of the methodological unity. 
The conclusion can be drawn that the population is comparable to a simple system of 
elementary particles, whose existence and motion follow the rules similar to physical, 
and the society is a vast mechanism, where migration and concentration of people-
molecules proceed as the result of the implementation of the "gravity forces" between 
aggregate groups of people, i.e. the distance of motion rises as the size of the group 
goes up, and falls in case the distance between two groups increases. 
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Mi Mj 
dij 
With respect to peculiarities of the migration modeling, interaction models can 
be classified into gravity models, intervening opportunities models and models based on 
the general theory of movement. 
The other important types of Macro models are Migration Factors Models (Pull-
Push Migration Models) and Markov Chain Migration Models, as well as  Migration 
Processes Diffusion Migration Models and Human Capital Models of` Migration 
pertaining to the subset of Micro models. 
Now, we will take a more detailed look at the main types of Macro migration 
models - Gravity and Lee models. 
2.2. Gravity models of migration 
The majority of the interaction models belongs to gravity models of migration. 
These models consider spatial mobility of population in analogy with Isaac Newton's 
Law of Gravitation (1687) as interaction between two territorial units (i.e. countries, 
regions, etc.) (see Figure 1). 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Scheme of spatial interaction of two territorial units within the gravity model of 
migration 
 
This "law" says that migration between two regions i and j is directly 
proportional to the product of population sizes of these regions and inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between them. Hence classical gravity model 
is a special case of migration interaction model where population: of regions of origin 
and destination of migrants are used as the masses of interacting bodies. 
Advantages of models of this type include, first of all, relative simplicity of 
developing and availability of statistical data for all level of analysis (inter-state, 
interregional migration, etc.). 
The gravity model is a popular mathematical model used to predict the 
interaction between two or more places. In geography it has been used to simulate a 
variety of flow patterns, such as traffic and mail flows, telephone calls, and migration. 
Essentially, the gravity model can be used to account for any interaction or flow that is 
expected to move from one place to another. This idea has generated many 
mathematical manipulations of the model. 
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The original gravity model is based on Newton's law of gravitation, expressed 
as: 
Gij = G ∗ (Mi ∗ Mj / dij2) 
 
where Gij is the gravitational bond between objects i and j, G is the 
gravitational constant, Mi and Mj are measures of the attractiveness of masses i and j, 
and dij
2 the square of the distance between objects i and j. (Sink, 2010) The theoretical 
principle of the gravity model is twofold: (1) the degree of interaction is directly 
proportional to the size of the masses and (2) the degree of interaction is indirectly 
proportional to the distance that separates them. For the use in gravitational migration 
model, the denominator in the formula has the form of dijb, in which b is the friction of 
distance. Larger values of b indicate that the interaction between i and j declines more 
rapidly with increased distance. 
Generally, three types of gravity model have evolved since the original 
formulation: (1) origin-specific, (2) destination-specific, and (3) network or potential 
models. The basic gravity model formulation is the foundation of origin-and destination-
specific models. Commonly, origin-specific models are used to predict flows from one 
place of origin to several destinations. With destination-specific models, flows are 
predicted from several origins to one destination. The gravity model was later 
reformulated to account for a network of interactions between places. These are known 
as potential models. Results of the potential model show the position of each place 
relative to all other places. Often, the results are illustrated spatially with a potential 
surface map. 
Most criticism of the gravity model has concerned its use as a predictive tool. 
Some note that the model is not based on observation and therefore cannot be 
substantiated scientifically. Others believe that the model is biased toward existing 
spatial patterns and that this will perpetuate the status quo. 
 
2.3. Lee’s model of migration 
 
For the motivations for migration we can consider how relationship between 
two points (origin and destination) is affected by push factors  and pull factors . Push 
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factors exist at the point of origin and act to trigger emigration; these include the lack 
of economic opportunities, religious or political persecution, hazardous environmental 
conditions, and so on. Pull factors exist at the destination and include the availability of 
jobs, religious or political freedom, and the perception of a relatively benign 
environment. Pushes and pulls are complementary — that is, migration can only occur if 
the reason to emigrate (the push) is remedied by the corresponding pull at an 
attainable destination.  
Figure 2. summarizes Lee's (1966), push-pull theory in graphic form. It shows 
possible migration between a place of origin and a place of destination, with positive 
and negative signs signify pull and push factors, respectively. Flows take place between 
two places, but there are intervening obstacles to these spatial movements. Although 
these obstacles are represented by "mountain" shapes, the obstacles need not be 
limited to physical barriers. Restrictive immigration laws, for example, can present a 
formidable barrier to prospective migrants. Note that both the origin and destination 
have attributes - pushes and pulls, reflecting the reality that any migrant must consider 
both the positives of staying and the negatives of moving, as well as their converses. 
The logic of the push-pull theory is that if the plusses (pulls) at the destination 
outweigh the plusses of staying at the origin, as shown below, then migration is likely 
to occur. 
 
Figure 2. Lee's Push-Pull Theory 
 
The flow of migrants between two places may not totally develop if intervening 
obstacles  exist between them. The intervening obstacles refer to any barriers to spatial 
interactions, in this case physical, economic, cultural or political impediments to 
migration. The number of migrants is directly proportional to the number of 
opportunities at a given place and inversely proportional to the number of intervening 
obstacles. Therefore, the volume of migration from one place to another is associated 
not only with the distance between places and number of people in the two places, but 
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also with the number of opportunities or obstacles between each place. This is 
especially true in labor migration.  
 
 
3. Migration systems theory 
 
Unlike transitional models that focus on how broader processes of development 
affects migration, migration systems theory draws a two-way, reciprocal and dynamic 
link between migration and development, and therefore seems particularly relevant for 
elaborating a theoretical framework, which puts migration in a broader development 
perspective. 
Migration systems theory (de Haas, 2008), defines a migration system as a set 
of places linked by flows and counterflows of people, goods, services, and information, 
which tend to facilitate further exchange, including migration, between the places. 
Borrowing from general systems theory it is focused on the role of information flows 
and feedback mechanisms in shaping migration systems. This theory stresses the 
importance of feedback mechanisms, through which information about the migrants’ 
reception and progress at the destination is transmitted back to the place of origin. 
Migration systems theories primarily focus on the factors that cause, shape, 
and perpetuate migration. In particular migration systems theory is useful in describing 
and modeling processes of spatial geographical structuring of migration patterns, and, 
as a spatiotemporal model, it can be well integrated within the dynamic transitional 
models of migration-development interconnections. Taken together, they help to 
understand how migration evolves over time - and changes in its nature, magnitude, 
destinations, and selectivity - and is reciprocally linked to the broader process of 
development. This theoretical perspective is fundamentally conflicting with and superior 
to static and a-historical push-pull, neo-classical and structuralist approaches, which all 
draw on the – erroneous – sedentary notion that migration and development are 
substitutes rather than complements. 
 
3.1 System dynamics migration models 
 
System Dynamics (SD) was invented in mid 1950s by Jay Forrester of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to improve the ability to understand 
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complex systems. (Forrester, 1961) At the beginning it was mainly used in business 
practice. In the following years, other science disciplines than business management 
got interested and nowadays, SD is applied in the field of environmental and political 
science, economics, medicine, engineering and development amongst others. By framing 
the underlying structure of a complex system, System Dynamics is supposed to 
reproduce the observed behaviour. 
System dynamics enables joint analysis of the migration phenomenon in the 
location/country of its origin, with the location/country of its destination. The SD 
approach allows analyzing the migratory phenomenon by integrating in the same 
analysis a set of quantitative and qualitative variables that influence and determine this 
phenomenon. This approach also allows studying the migration phenomenon from the 
perspective of the complex systems. (Chávez et al, 2011)  
System Dynamics is defined as a "computer simulation of continuous, non-
linear feedback systems, emphasizing an endogenous point of view". 
The main concepts of SD are feedback thinking, which can be reinforcing or 
counteracting, the distinction between stocks and flows, being responsible for delays in 
the system, and the endogenous point of view -necessary for shifting loop dominance 
and the inclusion of non-linearities. 
The feedback concept is central to the SD approach. It means that there is a 
closed causal chain, a closed loop of mutual cause-and-effect, so that an effect 
perpetuates until it influences back to its initial cause, after having passed one or any 
number of variables before. A feedback loop can be positive or negative. Positive loops 
tend to reinforce or amplify whatever is happening in the system. Negative loops 
counteract and oppose change, so they are also termed as balancing or counteracting 
loops.  
The second crucial concept refers to the important status of stocks and flows, 
Figure 3. As soon as SD models are used for simulation it needs to be identified 
whether a variable is a stock or a flow variable. Stock variables are accumulations and 
indicate the status of the system through time, whereas flows represent the rate of 
change: they increase or decrease a stock over some time interval, being either inflows 
or outflows. A stock can only be changed and thereby managed by a flow. 
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Figure 3. Stock and flow SD elements 
 
The model developed for this paper aims at representing the causes and 
consequences of emigration from origin to destination countries, embedding them in 
the broader development context with the purpose of exploring the inherent feedback 
relationship of migration and development on a macro-level, as well as the behaviour of 
the system by means of simulations.  
 
 
4. SD migration/refugee flow model 
 
In this paper we consider population migration models constructed on the 
basis of different class of spatial epidemics models. The temporal-spatial migration 
models are obtained by adding classical spatial homogeneous epidemics terms into 
migration models; they have the form of nonlinear differential-integral equations. They 
describe the evolution of the density of a system of population living in a particular 
spatial domain. The above also means that dynamical behavior of a population system 
with migration is very complex. 
Namely, individuals in this population system can move from one location to 
the other with a rate (v) determined by characteristics of their departure and arrival 
locations and other non-spatial factors. There are two categories of variables: 
endogenous and exogenous. Endogenous are spatial/security factors, whereas 
socio/economic, psychological and other relevant factors pertain to exogenous 
variables. (Simonović & Ahmad, 2010) 
The migration rate function (v) determines to a great extent the dynamical 
behavior of the population system. The SD migration/refugee flow model can be 
generally based on: 
 
Migration_rate(v)=f(socio/economic factors, spatial characteristics)  (1) 
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For the development of SD model we first consider the migration SI model, 
which is obtained by adding migration terms into the classical SI epidemic model. 
Further, we considered the migration models obtained on the basis of more complex 
epidemic models: SIS, SIR, SEIR and MSEIRS. For detailed analysis and development of 
the complex migration model we adopted the MSEIRS model (Hethcote, 2005), as well 
as its broadened version MSEIRWS model [Maternally derived immunity – Susceptible –
Exposed – Infected - Recovered - Waned (low immunity) - Susceptible] (Goeyvaerts et 
al, 2011), Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. - MSEIRWS epidemics model 
 
On the basis of the epidemics model, the analogue migration SVTFMRV [Safe – 
Vulnerable – Threatened – Migration Flow – Migrated – Readmitted (no asylum) – 
Vulnerable] was developed, Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. SVTFMRV migration model 
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In Figure 5, the I and O blocks, represent inflow and outflow of illegal migrants. 
Besides that, those blocks may be used for connection with other migration models 
from different spatial locations. In that way it is possible to form a network migration 
model that represents migration flows at a broader geographic area.   
As we have already mentioned, migration models have the form of very 
complex nonlinear differential-integral equations, which are possible to represent as a 
mathematical model. However, for the realization of the computer simulation SD 
migration/refugee flow model we used the Vensim simulation software that primarily 
supports continuous simulation - system dynamics.  This software tool enables direct 
formation of simulation model on the basis of Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) that aids in 
visualizing how different variables are interrelated in the system. Moreover, on the CLD 
basis a simulation model is developed, which is further used for the analysis and 
simulation of migration flow processes. This way a formation of a complex mathematical 
model can be avoided, taking into account that Vensim, on the CLD basis, internally 
realizes all mathematical relations of the model and forms a situational model.   
Figure 6. represents Vensim simulation SD migration/refugee flow model. 
 
 
Figure 6. SD migration/refugee flow model 
 
In Figure 6, the variables rv, rs, mr, ma, vmo, vim  - represent the constants 
that define the dynamics of certain processes – stocks, as well as their mutual 
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interaction. These values are defined on the basis of statistic and experience data, as 
well as through experiments during testing and adjusting of the model.   
The meaning of other variables in the model - alpha, beta, gamma, delta, 
epsilon, lambda, is represented in the following table: 
 
Table 1. Description of variables in the model 
variable Description 
alpha  transmission rate from Vulnerable to Threatened 
beta transmission rate from Vulnerable to Flow 
gamma transmission rate from Flow to Migrated 
delta rate of changing of Migrated 
epsilon transmission rate from Threatened to Flow 
lambda rate of changing of Safe 
 
The values of these variables are defined on the basis of statistic and 
experience data. In addition, the data and factors obtained from other migration 
models, such as various gravity, push-pull and other models. Those variables can be 
time-varying and represent aggregate values obtained on the basis of differing external 
parameters that define temporal and dynamic characteristics of stock variables in the 
model. Hence, for instance, the variable epsilon (transmission rate from Threatened to 
Flow), can be represented as, based on the expression (1): 
 
epsilon = e1∗[internal_factors] + e2∗[external_factors] + +e3∗[psychological_factors]    
(2) 
 
in which weighting factors e1, e2, and e3 are defined on the basis of statistic and 
experience data. Furthermore, the factors in the expression (2), can be, for instance, 
represented in the following manner:  
 
internal_ factors = a1[∗risk_assessment] + a2[∗social_factors] + 
+a3[econom∗ic_factors] 
(3) 
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external_ factors = b1∗[security_factors] + b2∗[spatial_factors] + +b3∗[refugee_factors] 
(4) 
 
psychological_ factors = c1∗[population_factors] + c2∗[danger_recognition]+ + 
c3∗[evacuation_decision] 
(5) 
 
All factors in the expressions 2, 3 and 4 can be further decomposed into other 
elements. Thus, for example, the factor evacuation_decision in expression (5) can be 
represented as: 
 
evacuation_decision = d1∗[situation_acceptance] + d2∗[experience_factor]+ 
+d3*[support_ factor] 
(6) 
 
It should be stressed that all these factors and their components can be time-
varying. The identification of these factors is a complex process and depends on the 
concrete application of the simulation model, expert knowledge in the migration 
modeling and accessible statistic and other data.   
Similarly, as showcased in expressions 2, 3 and 4, other variables from Table 1. 
can be defined.  
 
4.1. Results of simulation   
 
As we have previously mentioned, for the realization of the computer 
simulation SD migration/refugee flow model we used the Vensim simulation software 
modeling tool that supports continuous simulation and system dynamics. This software 
tool enables direct simulation of the model on the basis of Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) 
that aids in visualizing how different variables are interrelated in the system. Due to 
the limited space in the paper, we have not represented the CLD.  
By performing multiple simulations and parameter calibrating in the model we 
may obtain various data on migration processes and flows, in local or wider areas. The 
data analysis can provide insight in certain migration activities, and the analyzed data 
can be used for prognostic or decision making purposes.     
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In this paper, we limited ourselves on representing model response for two 
stock variables, Migrated and Readmitted, (Figure 7) and for two flow variables vm 
(migrated) and vr (readm itted), (Figure 8). 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Model response for stock variables Migrated and Readmitted 
 
Figure 8. Model response for flow variables vm (migrated) and vr (readmitted). 
 
In a similar way the model response for all other model variables, as well as 
their combinations, can be represented, which we had to omit here due to the limited 
space. 
This is a pilot model, in the early stage of development. The development of 
complete and concrete SD migration models is a complex and time-consuming task that 
would require engagement of a multidisciplinary team of experts. For instance, in the 
early stage of the model development, the data about the Balkan Route presented in 
the first section of the paper, may be taken into account, until the access to the raw 
data and expert opinions is secured.  
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5. Conclusion  
 
Mass migrations have been a constant throughout the human history. 
However, due to the globalization and developments in technology, especially in 
transport their frequency and volume intensified in the recent decades. The attempts 
to represent the migrations through models have been existent ever since XIX 
century, but there is a lack of models that would include time-varying state of the 
system in which the migrations occur.  
In this paper we proposed the method of System Dynamics (stock and flow 
diagram) for creation of dynamic model of migrations. We designated our model as 
SVTFMRV named after the stocks in the model: Secured, Vulnerabled, Threatened, 
Flow, Migrated, Readmitted and Vulnerabled. The model is derived from an existing 
epidemics and infection model, and is analogous with the MSEIRWS epidemics model. 
Therefore, SVTFMRV model can serve as the basis for concrete scenarios applicable on, 
for instance, the Balkan Route. Besides that, this model may be used for connection 
with other similar migration models from different spatial locations. In that way it 
would be possible to form a network migration model that would represent migration 
flows at a broader geographic area.    
The model that we offer is of conceptual nature. This is a pilot model, in the 
early stage of development, as the development of complete and concrete SD 
migration models is a complex and time-consuming task that would require 
engagement of a multidisciplinary team of experts. The model was built and 
simulations performed using the Vensim software modeling tool, the results of which 
may be used for prediction purposes, creation migration management scenarios, as 
well as for the risk and resilience assessment of the migrant routes.  
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Abstract 
 
During the refugee/migrant crisis in 2015 and 2016, through the Balkan 
countries from Turkey to Western Europe has passed more than 800.000 refugees and 
migrants. A relatively small number of them requested asylum protection in the 
countries of the Balkans, generally they all had the intention to come as quickly as 
possible to Western Europe. In fact, gaps between the large number of migrants and 
refugees, uncertainty of time (until when the route will be opened for massive passage), 
limited transport and accommodation capacities in all parts of route, limited 
humanitarian and security assumptions and different approaches towards this 
challenge, resulted in a political crisis between individual Balkan countries. 
Paradoxically, despite they were aware that refugees and migrants do not want to stay 
in their countries, at the beginning of the crisis the Balkan countries very badly 
cooperated, and some of them even confronted each other in some areas. As the crisis 
extended, slowly the cooperation between countries increased, although by the end of 
the crisis has not reached a satisfactory level of collaboration needed between the 
neighboring countries which lean on each other and depend on each other treatment. 
Under the assumption that crisis between countries was inevitable, it should be one of 
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organizational nature – which is the best way to help refugees and migrants in transit 
with clear implementation of necessary and available security measures that could be 
carried out – and not political character. Due to the real need of improving future 
cooperation between the Balkan countries, under the reasonable assumption of 
reopening the route for massive migration (either to Western Europe or the return of 
those who will not be able to stay and will be returned through same route), it is 
necessary to analyze the recent experiences and suggest ways and models of better 
cooperation in the future. The main focus of this research is the analysis of political 
processes and decisions, applied models of cooperation and detection of unused 
opportunities, all that with the aim of articulating these results in the form of 
recommendations for a wide range of actors involved at all levels of emergency 
management - whether in the refugee/migrant crisis or another potential crisis in the 
Balkans. 
 
Key words: The Balkans, Refugee crisis, Lessons Identified, Way forward 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The migrant crisis which has during 2015 and 2016 shook the Europe, the 
European Union and most European countries (whether they are members of the 
European Union or not), showed and revealed many cracks, incomplete and/or partially 
completed political, security, humanitarian, social, organizational processes and their 
cons activities. To migrant crisis preceded a series of events and smaller crises that 
were supposed to warn and prepare responsible, and they all the rest, for major large 
scale crisis which will thoroughly shake up all institutions, processes and the actors 
involved. The above did not happen and all the key decision makers were taken aback 
with the volume of events and reacted reactive – from the representatives of the 
executive authority in European Union administration, most powerful members of EU as 
countries that should have more experience with migration then other because they are 
most common countries of destination for large number of refugees and migrants to 
countries on the transit route that due to its geo-strategic position found themselves in 
the corridor of mass migration.  
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So far in the academic and professional literature there are quality descriptions 
of the main factual indicators of migrant crisis 2015 and 2016 in terms of push and pull 
factors influencing the permanent migration and in this case the specific of mass 
migrations; relations between migrants and refugees, in this regard – mixed migration 
flows; on the conflict in Syria and Iraq, from where the largest number of refugees 
originated; figures on migration and refugee movements; of an open invitation of 
Germany for refugees; and disorientation of the European Union in the crisis. Therefore, 
we won’t be focusing on mentioned domains which have so far been very well analyzed 
and described, yet scope of our interest is on much less researched organizational 
readiness and mutual cooperation between the states (Mikac and Dragović, 2017; 
Smajić, 2017; Tatalović and Jakešević, 2016; Mamić, Mikac and Dragović, 2016). 
The special interest of this research in a broader perspective represents the 
region of Southeast Europe, the time frame of observation is 2015 and 2016, while the 
narrower perspective are the specific countries in the so-called Balkan Route, which are 
due to its geo-strategic position placed on the way of mass migrant movements from 
southeast to west Europe. We have observed and analyzed the situation in the following 
countries: Republic of Turkey, Greece, Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Serbia, 
Hungary, Republic of Croatia and Republic of Slovenia. It should be emphasized, that 
the Southeast Europe territory is wider geographic term then the Balkans, where in 
both cases a number of countries (beside these which are mentioned) are included. We 
have decided to observe above listed countries because they were more prominently 
exposed to major mass migration movements and there were political and other forms 
of mutual controversy. Likewise, so-called Balkan Route has long been known as two-
way smuggling route through which from the East to the West predominantly were 
smuggled drugs, people and weapons, and in the reverse direction – cars, synthetic 
drugs and other value goods. In a specific crisis which is observed, mass migration of 
migrants and refugees is linked with the traditional smuggling route regardless of the 
partial correlation with the original smuggling route.  
Until the outbreak of migrant crisis 2015, Republic of Turkey has taken several 
million refugees mainly from Syria, Greece up to that point was the destination for a 
large number of African and Asian refugees and migrants who from there tried to move 
on to Western Europe. Republic of Macedonia has found itself on the way and in the 
unusual situation of pressure by entering and passing a large number of uncontrolled 
migrants from the European Union and the Schengen area. In Republic of Serbia there 
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was massively entering of migrants and refugees from Macedonia and to a lesser extent 
from Bulgaria. After Serbia, next transit country was Hungary and after setting the wire 
along the border with Serbia, migrants were routed through Republic of Croatia and 
continuously through Republic of Slovenia to Western Europe.  
The starting point of the research is the claim that at the beginning of the 
crisis, observed countries very badly cooperated, and some of them even confronted 
each other in some areas despite they were aware that refugees and migrants do not 
want to stay in their countries. As the crisis extended, slowly the cooperation between 
countries increased, although by the end of the crisis has not reached a satisfactory 
level of collaboration needed between the neighboring countries which lean on each 
other and depend on each other treatment. From subjected, we are setting main 
hypothesis of research which says that under the assumption that crisis between 
countries was inevitable, it should be one of organizational nature – which is the best 
way to help refugees and migrants in transit with clear implementation of necessary 
and available security measures that could be carried out – and not political character. 
Humanitarian approach towards migrants in transit is not questionable nor security 
perspective that needs to be included in the protection of its own citizens as well as the 
migrants themselves. The focus of the research is the internal organizational aspect of 
countries and cooperation between them on the Balkan route where no one asked if 
they want, can and have the capacity and ability to receive and at a certain time in 
transit to take care of a large number of migrants and refugees. 
Due to the real need of improving future cooperation between the Southeast 
Europe countries, under the reasonable assumption of reopening the route for massive 
migration (either to Western Europe or the return of those who will not be able to stay 
and will be returned through same route), it is necessary to analyze the recent 
experiences and suggest ways and models of better cooperation in the future. The main 
focus of this research is the analysis of political processes and decisions, applied models 
of cooperation and detection of unused opportunities, all that with the aim of 
articulating these results in the form of recommendations for a wide range of actors 
involved at all levels of crisis management – whether in the refugee/migrant crisis or 
another potential crisis in the Southeast Europe. For this purpose, we conducted an 
analysis of public policy of countries on the Balkan Route, interviewed scientists from 
those countries through unified questionnaire and interviews with individuals directly 
involved in the migrant crisis. The entire analysis process will be implemented through 
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the concept of crisis management and its four phases – prevention, preparedness, 
response and recovery.  
 
 
2. Prevention and preparedness within countries on the Balkans route for 
the upcoming migration crisis 
 
The prevention represents measures and intent of completely avoiding the 
potential negative impacts that are being undertaken in advance and in this case the 
activities that should reduce the negative impact of mass migration. The stated is 
including: identification and analysis of the risk of mass migration, analysis of 
consequences, risk assessment and action plans, scenarios and risk management 
measures. Preparedness is related to crisis response planning as well as the state of 
readiness of operational forces for action.  Exemplary these are: prepared action plans, 
trained scenarios for crisis situations, readiness of operational forces for reaction, linked 
early warning services with other competent services, well established exchange of 
information and clear coordination between public institutions, civil society and local 
self-government. 
Key questions of interest to consider in this part of analysis are: What were the 
political stands of the government and the opposition on the challenge of mass 
migration at the beginning of the crisis? What are the most important political 
processes and decisions that took place before and during the refugee/migrant crisis in 
2015 and 2016? How was assess the institutional and organizational readiness of the 
country to accept the mass migrations before the outbreak of crisis? Were there any 
existing pre-crisis planning documents for a specific event? If not, were they made ad 
hoc?  
Political stands of the Government and the opposition on the challenge of mass 
migration at the beginning of the crisis 2015 were almost identical in all surveyed 
countries in a way that in the countries which approached to the issue primarily from 
the humanitarian aspect there was less disagreement with the opposition toward the 
measures to be taken, while with the primarily security perspective approach there was 
greater differences in opposition approach to the challenges. For example, in the 
Macedonia the attitude of the Government and the opposition on the challenges of the 
massive refugee and migrant crisis were largely identical and uniform. Even in some 
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period when was registered the highest intensity of refugee/migrant flow, the 
Government functioned in an expanded format with ministers from the opposition 
(Interior, Labor and Welfare). In Hungary from the very beginning of the crisis, the 
Hungarian government claimed that the massive influx of migrants is a significant 
threat to both Hungary and the Europe. This security-based approach persisted 
afterwards as well. The opposition was somewhat divided regarding the migration crisis. 
In the beginning, the left-wing opposition (including the Hungarian Socialist Party and 
the Democratic Coalition) communicated that there was not any migration crisis at all. 
The right-wing radical Jobbik, demanded more radical measures to address irregular 
migration. In the Republic of Croatia, the opposition of the right center and the 
President of the country elected from the party (which was then opposition party) have 
strongly criticized the approach of the governing, seeking a much stronger stance on 
the issue and the deployment of the Armed Forces to the border for stopping the 
migration wave. Occasionally, there were official disputes with the Republic of Serbia 
about the ways and models of accepting mass migrations from its territory. It is an 
interesting fact that in Republic of Serbia there is a shift of activities regarding 
migrants and refugees emerged as consequence of Hungary and Croatia reaction, 
countries on the route where there is no longer the situation that the general 
complaints towards neighboring countries are directed to those countries from which 
migrants and refugees are coming, but to those in which they are going on their way to 
Western Europe.  
Under the pressure of the arose situation, all countries on the route have made 
some significant political processes and decisions. Every country has made 
harmonization of national legislation on the status of refugees and rights for asylum, 
and amendments to the Laws on Foreigners and the Protection of the state border. 
Thereby, countries closely cooperated with the European Commission. They established 
the reception and transit centers with the necessary infrastructure providing 
registration, adequate humanitarian and medical assistance. The coordination 
mechanisms were also established same as interaction between government 
institutions, humanitarian and international organizations and non-governmental 
organizations. In the Turkey, after the certain time, governing AKP party (Justice and 
Development Party) has changed “open door policy” approach due to the security 
reasons and Government has tightened the border controls. In the Greece, there was a 
major overhaul of legislation framework. The Greece has taken numerous measures on 
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acceptance and registration, created Reception service, mobile Units and Centers, 
executive structure of National Strategic Reference Framework, and certain agreements 
have been signed with specialized EU agencies (European Commission, 2015). Assembly 
of Republic of Macedonia declared an emergency crisis on the part of the territory of 
the Republic of Macedonia, in the areas of southern and northern borders. The stated 
condition was in force from 19 August 2015 till 30 June 2016 continuously (Kekenovski, 
2016). Some countries like Macedonia, Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia provided a formal 
legal basis for the deployment of forces and capabilities of the Army of the Republic 
Macedonia to support the Police forces and civilian Crisis Management capacities. Some 
of them have used these measures to greater while some to smaller extent. The 
countries on the route which were in ability have done the following: improved border 
management, started the relocation programme, restarted return programmes and 
created adequate reception capacity. Some countries, like the Hungary, inducted the 
new “border procedure” prescribing the mandatory submission of asylum application in 
the so-called “transit zones”, which are in compliance with EU legislation. In addition, 
the “safe third country” concept was introduced, including Greece, Macedonia and 
Serbia as countries to where rejected asylum-seekers can be sent back without 
exposing them to any threat. Simultaneously, the illegal crossing of the border fence 
became subject to the Criminal Code as criminal offence, punishable by actual or 
suspended imprisonment up to 10 years. At the beginning of this observed period, the 
countries were dedicated to the consolidation of their legal regulations and the 
establishment of new internal mechanisms and less attention was paid to cooperation 
with neighbors. 
Institutional and organizational readiness of the countries to accept the mass 
migrations before the outbreak of crisis was at various stages of organization. Some 
countries like Turkey have already established the internal mechanisms because of the 
proximity of the crisis point. In the context of increasing number of refugees since April 
2011, Directorate General of Migration Management was established as a body of 
Ministry of Internal Affairs on April 2013. Until the establishment of Directorate General 
of Migration Management, the problem was addressed by Directorate General of Police 
Forces (Ministry of Interior, 2015). In the Greece, there is the establishment of Ministry 
of Migration Policy. In the Macedonia, Crisis Management Center had a leading role in 
coordinating all activities in the refugee/migrant crisis. In the Serbia, the Commissariat 
for Refugees and Migrations conducted expert and other tasks related to migration 
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management. In the Croatia, the Government of the Republic of Croatia on 17 
September 2015 adopted a Decision on the establishment of a Committee for 
coordination of activities regarding the arrival of the migrants in Republic of Croatia. 
This Committee was given executive powers concerning activities of the acceptance and 
transfer of refugees/migrants through the Republic of Croatia. The main institution 
named for the implementation of all operational requirements was the Ministry of 
Interior. It is important to point out that countries in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia (Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia) because of the wars waged in the 1990s 
have historical experiences with refugee crises and a certain level of institutional 
memory, some organizational capabilities and faster adjustment possibilities from other 
countries on the Balkan route. In the Hungary, due to the unprecedented mass influx of 
2015, the institutional framework had to undergo massive changes in order to be 
adequate for the management of irregular mass migration. The planning of these 
measures had to be fast, efficient as well as lawful. As a result of these changes, 
Hungary became capable of protecting its own and the Schengen external border. In 
case of Hungary, from all of the analyzed countries, there is the most evident approach 
based on the security aspect of protecting their sovereignty. 
Pre-crisis planning documents for a mass migration event are important 
because they determine the organizational structure, mechanisms, and procedures in 
preparation and afterward in reaction to the situation. In the Turkey were established 
and implemented policies and strategies related to migration and ensured coordination 
between the related agencies and organizations in these matters (Ministry of Interior, 
2015). The Greece had national plans for related events, but 2015 and 2016 events far 
exceeded them. The Macedonia did not have such plans but they were immediately 
prepared in 2015 and are applied consistently. The Republic of Serbia Governments 
response plan for sudden inflow of migrants was adopted in September 2015. Within 
the Plan, there was determined activities and measures of the institutions and 
organizations that will be undertaken in the case of mass transit of migrants (The 
Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2015). The Hungary had a migration strategy for 
the period 2014–2020 adopted before the outbreak of the crisis, laying down the basic 
principles, goals and characteristics of the Hungarian asylum and migration policy (The 
Government of Hungary, 2013). This strategy served as a platform for the required 
activities in the observed period. Interestingly, while the Strategy was the basic starting 
point for the Hungary, Croatia's migration policy as a key document in this area has just 
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ceased to be valid in 2015 (it was adopted for the period 2013-2015). Additionally, 
Croatia did not have any plans for a specific event, although some preparatory internal 
procedures had been drafted, but was relying on the action plans of the Civil Protection 
System, which proved to be very successful one year earlier with dealing with 
consequences of catastrophic floods. Such a situation is somewhat worrisome because 
it was a different kind of an event and with that, different necessary response 
procedures to the crisis. In Republic of Slovenia there was some preparations done by 
the government, and some exercises of the Civil Protection. The preparations were 
made for the asylum seekers, not for the people in transition. When it became clear 
that Slovenia was only a transition territory the organization of work and processes 
changed. A decision to use the national earthquake plan to cope with the refugee and 
migrant crisis was adopted. The documents show that there was a so called contingency 
plan adopted in June 2015. However, the flow of the migrants was a surprise, because 
the government was not prepared for the transition of the migrants (the plan contains 
the solutions regarding the settlements of the migrants in Slovenia) and also not 
prepared for the number of the incoming people (Torkar, 2016).  
All observed countries have made significant steps and political measures in 
response to massive arrival and transit of refugees/migrants, but it is noticeable how in 
all countries in the first period of the crisis, there were important problems in terms of 
institutional and organizational readiness. The countries were not ready to manage the 
enormous number of flows (Torkar, 2016; Kekenovski, 2016). From that, the general 
conclusion is that their prevention and preparedness measures and mechanisms were 
not at the required level for this specific event. After a short time, from an 
organizational and institutional aspect, situation has stabilized in the certain extent 
within each country, with the great effort of all involved resources, and the transit of 
migrants and refugees further towards Western Europe was enabled.   
 
 
3. Crisis Response: Cooperation and Coordination with Neighboring 
Countries 
 
The reaction represents timely provision of services during and immediately 
after the crisis to save lives and reduce negative impacts. The quality response is aimed 
at reducing the likelihood of cascading effects and new crises. This is possible to 
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achieve with effective operational activity of Emergency Services and Crisis Teams, 
mobilization of equipment and personnel, essential staff type activities, timely 
enforcement of inclusive decisions, inclusion and coordination of all domestic and 
international relevant institutions. 
Key questions of interest in this segment of research are: Which body was 
responsible for the coordination and management of the crisis? Which main national 
and international associates were involved in the implementation of crisis 
management? What were the main challenges in country? What were the main 
challenges of cooperation with neighboring countries? How was assess the cooperation 
with neighboring countries and at which levels it took place? 
In most analyzed countries, the main coordinating body was the Ministry of the 
Interior (Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia), or component within the ministry (Turkey). In 
the Macedonia, according to Crisis Management Law, the Crisis Management Center 
has main responsibilities for coordination and implementation of recommendation and 
decision done by Steering Committee and Assessment group (Governmental body in the 
crisis management system). In the Serbia, the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration 
is the main body for refugees/migrants crisis management. In the Greece, that is the 
Ministry of Migration Policy.  
It can be highlighted how the structure of migrants and refugees changed 
during the crisis itself in relation to the period before it occurred. In Greece, from 
January 2015 until 4 January 2016, 859,508 third country nationals have entered the 
Greek territory. While in 2013 and 2014 the main country of origin was Afghanistan, in 
2015 it was Syria. Another significant change was the increase in the number of families 
and unaccompanied minors seeking asylum (European Commission, 2015).  
Within each country, state-level cooperation has been established with all 
relevant and necessary bodies as well as with local and regional self-government. 
Likewise, beyond the level of authorities, contact and cooperation with international and 
intergovernmental organizations in the field of migration and asylum, such as: 
organizations like the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, International Organization 
for Migration, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Centre for 
Migration Policy Development. Significant activities were undertaken also with relevant 
European Agencies, like: European Asylum Support Office, European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency (FRONTEX). Apart from the authorities, the non-governmental 
organizations are also crucial actors, who often fill in the niches in the system.  
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In this section, it is necessary to highlight the following activities of individual 
countries. In 2016, Turkey decided to build a separating wall on its border with Syria. 
With launching of Operation Euphrates Shield on 24 August 2016, Turkish Armed 
Forces has engaged in fight against ISIL in the northern Syria. Thus, it is aimed to 
provide both security needs of Turkey against terrorist penetrations into the country 
and de facto safety region for refugees in Syria’s territory. As the lack of cooperation, 
some countries have decided for measures such as setting up a wire fence on the 
border (which has made the Hungary fully towards Serbia and Croatia, Slovenia partially 
towards Croatia as well as Macedonia towards Greece). It is interesting how some 
international organizations, for example, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Started 
developing their own plans for action on the crisis in Serbia and as part of a broader 
perspective, i.e. planning a regional response which in addition to Serbia, includes 
Turkey, Greece and Macedonia (UNHCR, 2017). Such an initiative is understandable and 
necessary, but also something that all countries on the Balkans route should undertake 
in that period by themselves.  
The challenges differed from country to country, but the main common feature 
is that there was not enough cooperation and trust between the neighboring countries 
– every one of them was primary protecting their own national interests. The specifics 
of challenges also depended on the context of each crisis situation and they changed 
over time. In view of one's own challenges and the relation with neighboring countries, 
it is necessary to understand the challenges with which countries has additionally 
encountered. Turkey and Greece felt the greatest pressure. The specificity of Turkey is 
her geographical position and its long borders with Syria and Iraq, black holes in the 
northern parts of Syria and spill-over effects of Syrian civil war same as terrorism and 
terrorist actions like ISIS and Al-Qaeda which no other country on Balkan route 
encountered. Also, social disorder in the southern provinces of Turkey due to their 
demographically multicultural social structure, economic burden in terms of hosting 
more than 3 million refugees, same as enormous spreading of organized crime such as 
human, arms and drug trafficking. For Turkey, Greece and all other countries, the 
important question was social and political reactions of citizens to refugees and 
migrants, preservation of public order, public security, and protection of the local 
population, their properties, and the protection of security (humanitarian,) medical and 
other for migrants and refugees, as well as environmental protection. For the Greece, in 
addition to all above stated, as a special problem has been highlighted emigration of 
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young and highly educated Greeks. In Serbia worrying were incidents between refugees 
of different ethnic backgrounds, some of whom have had a deadly outcome. For 
Slovenia, besides the above mentioned, there was a specific holding of protests against 
the Government's official policy. The Hungarian Government clearly committed itself to 
a security-based approach at the very beginning of the crisis, claiming that irregular 
migration must be stopped in order to ensure the security of the Hungarian and 
European citizens and borders. For all countries, it was common the issue with number 
of incomers which has surpassed their capacity for acceptance and management and it 
was constantly presenting the challenge (problem) of insufficient cooperation with the 
governments and services of neighboring countries same as lack of police personnel 
and personnel in other services because they could not use all of their resources on an 
existing crisis. 
Main challenges of cooperation with neighboring countries were significantly 
expressed at the beginning of the crisis. In some cases, as between Croatia and Serbia, 
they have led to the blockade and official closure of the main road border crossing for 
commercial freight traffic. Hungary has retained the train composition of Croatian 
Railways that carried migrants and refugees from Croatia to Hungary. There were no 
sufficient and effective institutional mechanisms between Turkey and its neighboring 
countries in terms of refugees and migrants. And also, Turkey has crucial political 
problems with Iran, Syria and Iraq as the refugee and migrant producer countries. 
Moreover, looking from Turkey perspective, Greece and Bulgaria as the neighboring 
countries of Turkey have objections for sharing refugee/migrant burdens. The Greece 
had its own challenges with Turkey from which migrants and refugees arrived, as well as 
with Macedonia, which was the next on the refugees/migrants route. Macedonia had 
major challenges with coordination and exchange of information and data on 
refugees/migrants transit, their composition, vulnerable groups and security 
intelligence information. Similar was related with countries in the continuation of the 
route: Serbia, Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia. From Hungary's perspective relationship 
with its neighboring countries shows a varying picture. With Serbia, the relationship – 
apart from minor tensions – has been basically harmonica. This is reflected in the fact 
that Serbia accepted the system of the fence and transit zones. However, major 
tensions and conflicts arose between Hungary and Croatia, just as the case was 
between Hungary and Austria. The problems with these countries originated from their 
totally different standpoint on migration, as well as from uncertainties in the 
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application of international and EU regulations and standards (e.g. Dublin Regulation) 
in force. The Republic of Croatia wanted to secure one entry point to the country and to 
transport migrants and refugees to the Hungarian and Slovenian borders with 
maximum efficiency and speed with their own resources, wanting to avoid (by all means) 
a congestion of this route and redirection of the migrant wave from Serbia to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and from there to Croatia – which then would not be able to 
effectively manage the migratory wave and potentially the Greek scenario would 
happen. For all countries, the main challenges were coordination and cooperation with 
the neighboring countries, but as the crisis progressed, the countries were forced to 
better cooperate.  
Cooperation with neighboring countries was of a crucial importance for transit 
of migrants and refugees from Turkey to Western Europe. Despite all the common 
challenges, individual countries have achieved a very limited cooperation. The crucial for 
relations between the countries on the Balkan route and what has defined them, are 
activities between the European Union and Turkey. In March 2016, EU and Turkish 
leaders agreed on a statement to tackle irregular migration following the massive influx 
of migrants into the EU. From 20 March 2016, all new irregular migrants arriving on the 
Greek islands will be returned to Turkey if they do not apply for asylum or if their claim 
is rejected. For every Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian 
will be resettled in the EU. The EU-Turkey statement builds on the EU-Turkey joint 
action plan, which was adopted in November 2015, to increase coordination on 
migration management. The action plan aims to tackle the refugee crisis created by the 
situation in Syria (European Council and Council of the European Union, 2016). The 
Greek relationship with Turkey was based on the above-mentioned activities and 
procedures agreed upon by the European Union, but it was partially followed. 
Cooperation with Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria was predominantly effective. The 
Macedonian perspective is similar and it is accentuated how co-operation was relatively 
good on all issues, with some problems at the beginning of the crisis, that during the 
crisis have been reduced, and the cooperation was improved. The same situation was 
both in terms of cooperation between Serbia and Croatia, Croatia and Slovenia. 
Mostly, cooperation with neighboring countries existed but was not at an 
optimal level. Since the initial cooperation which was at a low level, as time has passed, 
cooperation has improved. To that contributed the initiatives that came from the 
European Union and through which the meetings of EU representatives with countries 
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officials from the analyzed countries took place. The meetings were organized with the 
aim of calming the tension after the incidents and resolving the situations which 
happened in the context of the migration crisis. In addition, the countries on the Balkan 
route have independently organized and conducted meetings. Obviously, all mentioned 
initiatives and processes had reactive approach.  
 
 
4. Identified and lessons learned as part of post-crisis recovery process 
 
Recovery from the crisis lasts until the system, society and institutions return 
to pre-crisis conditions (if it is possible). We differentiate short and long-term recovery, 
depending on the consequences that are caused by the mass migrations and how 
permanent they are. As a segment of special interest within the recovery phase, stands 
out the process of identified and subsequently learned lessons as extremely important 
for learning from immediate experience, creating institutional memory, avoiding 
repetition of learned mistakes, better responsiveness in similar cases, reducing resource 
consumption, and standardization needs. 
Key questions for this section are: Is there an institutional process of identified 
lessons and lessons learned in crisis situations? If there is, whether it was used after 
the crisis for the purpose of event analysis? After end of crisis, which recommendations 
were isolated for better organization within the country for this type of crisis in the 
future? Which recommendations are abstracted for improving cooperation with 
neighboring countries in this type of crises? 
The institutional process of identified and lessons learned in each analyzed 
country is understood in a partially or completely different way. The Turkey has 
established The Council for Coordination of Fight Against Irregular Migrations, as an 
institutional body and integral part of Directorate General of Migration Management. 
The Council has and still is conducting numerous activities in the process of identified 
and learned lessons (Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, 
2016). Meanwhile, in the Greece, policies and actions (at all levels) are still based on ad-
hoc decisions and assessment of the situation. There is no systematic procedure to 
build upon lessons learned that exists currently. In Macedonia, some lessons have been 
identified and incorporated into standard operating procedures and thus became 
lessons learned. In Serbia, the Ministry of Labor, Employment, Veteran and Social 
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Policy, in cooperation with the Commission for Refugees and Migrations of the Republic 
of Serbia, UNHCR and the NGO sector, organized conferences and panels where 
eminent experts discussed the (field) experiences gained during the crisis, with the aim 
of giving impulse to start the institutional process of identifying the lessons learned 
during the migration crisis. Similar activities were also undertaken in Republic of 
Slovenia (The Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 2017). In this research, for 
Hungary was not found any form of institutional processes of identified and learned 
lessons but many new regulations were adopted in the last two years which has 
improved the readiness and capability of Hungary to react to crisis situations – that 
means such process exists, although during the research we have not obtained it. 
Regarding the Republic of Croatia, the process of identified and subsequently learned 
lessons, does not exist at the level of the system or the country, but it is institutionally 
implemented by certain organizations, and there is no information exchange on how to 
react more effectively in similar situations in the future.  
After each crisis (and also during), it is necessary to draw up recommendations 
that will enable more successful proceeding (dealing) of all involved in the crisis 
management process. In Turkey and Greece, it is obvious how the crisis has not been 
over yet. There is no further recommendation for better organization within the both 
countries. Turkey and Greece has already tried to cope with the crisis through newly 
established and/or operationalized institutions and mechanisms. For Macedonia, we 
have not gained any cognition on certain recommendations that can be used to 
improvement for the future. Serbia's recommendations for a better organization are 
made and listed in the Government of the Republic of Serbia Response Plan (with 
additional amendments) in case of sudden inflow of migrants as well as within the 
UNHCR Regional Plan and the International Migration Organization plans. In Hungary, 
the focus is on resolving the crisis beyond the borders of Europe and is considered how 
it is clear that the irregular migration wave must be stopped outside the territory of the 
EU. This way it becomes possible to prevent the massive entry of economic migrants 
into Europe. In this regard, the idea of hotspots to be set up in Libya can become part 
of the solution. Besides, the system of transit zones proved to be an effective tool in 
managing the crisis situation, also enabling the authorities to allocate their resources 
much more efficiently. There have also been some changes in legislation of Republic of 
Slovenia. As in the previous step, Croatia did not do as much as it could and/or was 
expected from the process of making recommendations for action in similar situations.  
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Cooperation between neighboring countries is of crucial importance for 
effective preparation and response to major events that have cross-border influence. 
Only the successful cooperation in events such as large migrant transit reduces stress, 
costs, and political tensions. It is extremely important to identify in which areas and 
how cooperation can be improved. Regarding Turkish experiences, it is emphasized that 
it is recommended that institutionalized cooperation with neighboring and partner 
countries and international institutions should be established and existing ones should 
be improved. The responsibilities for meeting the basic humanitarian needs of 
refugees/migrants should be shared by the international community, since 
refugee/migrant flow is not felt locally, and can easily transform into a regional and 
international problem. It is important to highlight Macedonia's quality proposal 
regarding continuing and deepening the cooperation with neighboring countries and 
facilitating unique database for registration of refugees and migrants. In Republic of 
Serbia, authorities and the civilian sector agree that international cooperation is a main 
prerequisite for resolving the refugee/migrant crisis. Data exchange and intensifying 
cooperation between security services are key factors for improving cooperation with 
neighboring countries. Hungary suggested a 10-point action plan for the migration 
crisis in April 2016 (Schengen 2.0). The measures included therein aim to give full effect 
of existing EU and Schengen legislation (Schengen Border Code) related to the control 
of external border, to make compulsory registration of biometric identification data of 
all persons crossing the external border, to modify the Common European Asylum 
System, to organize the asylum procedures outside the EU, to conclude and enforce 
agreement on readmission and return of the migrants, as well as to consider the 
answers to demographic and labor market challenges and matter of sovereign decisions 
of the EU member countries. These measures can be divided into protective measures 
such as the tightening of border control, a measure that many European countries have 
been calling to since the beginning of the migration crisis. There are also preventive 
measures such as the application for asylum outside the EU. The reform of the 
Schengen system and the interests shared by the member countries offer the chance 
for a closer, more harmonic and more balanced cooperation between each member 
country of the EU. Other surveyed countries had general observations on how to work 
better with neighboring countries.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
Refugee/migrant crisis in 2015 and 2016 has shown a different level of 
countries readiness on the Balkans Route in facing major complexed challenge where it 
was necessary to provide support to people in transit as long as an open call from 
Western Europe was in force and thereby to protect their own interests. This crisis has 
put all the observed countries front of the challenge and they were not asked whether 
they want or can handle it, they were involved for the reason of their geostrategic 
position. The functions of effective crisis management are precisely the one that are 
needed to anticipate major events, as much as possible preventively react to them and 
to response most appropriate in given circumstances. In the observed case, apart from 
internal organization and procedures within each country, cooperation with neighboring 
countries was also crucial.  
The analysis of refugee/migrant crisis in 2015 and 2016 indicates the 
justification of this research and the chosen approach. Turkey and Greece were under 
the pressure from a large number of refugees and migrants, years before the outbreak 
of the observed crisis, whole time having their own crisis of a similar nature, related to 
settling and providing humanitarian aid to a large number of migrants and refugees. 
There is an impression that other countries primarily anticipated that the European 
Union would be more engaged in preventing the expansion of the crisis. Since that did 
not happen and in parallel there was a call for migrants and refugees to come to 
Western Europe (primarily Germany), analyzed countries found themselves in a 
situation where they did not prepared the necessary preventive measures so they had 
an ad hoc reaction. At the beginning of the crisis, cooperation between Balkan Route 
countries did not exist at all, or in some cases was at a very low level, so among them 
appeared political crises, instead of common preparation and focus to have an 
agreement how to approach to this challenge. This has confirmed the initial hypothesis 
which says that under the assumption that crisis between countries was inevitable; it 
should be one of organizational nature – which is the best way to help refugees and 
migrants in transit with clear implementation of necessary and available security 
measures that could be carried out – and not political character.  
The research results shows that basically most of the countries on the Balkan 
Route reacted retroactively and not preventively in relation to the size of the challenges 
they faced. Also, it was corroborating that no country had at all times established 
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sufficient capacity to provide assistance and support to migrants and displaced persons 
movement. Regardless there was the real premise of passing a large number of people, 
the procedures and plans were developed in the later phase without the possibility of 
checking their functionality. The reaction was different from country to country 
depending on the approach to the challenge. The particular interest in this observation 
is related to the mutual cooperation between the countries, because none of them 
could solve total or individual challenges on the Balkans Route. In this part of the 
analysis, it was found that from the initial distrust cooperation has improved and 
reached a certain level of minimum eligibility to meet many aspects of the crisis. There 
are also examples of searching substantive solutions in this crisis. 
The Balkans Route is currently closed for mass transit of migrants and 
refugees, but individuals and smaller groups of people are still trying to pass through. 
Upon the crisis is terminated it is a basic need to make a breakdown to determine the 
manner and appropriateness of  procedures and to see what is possible to do better, so 
in similar situations and with less invested resources we could be prompt and more 
efficient. The research found that each country understands and perceive process of 
identified and learned lessons in a different way. From those who have changed and 
established new organizational units and procedures to those who has complete 
inactivity in this area.  
This research has shown the complexity of dealing with challenges that are not 
common or expected, reached a certain aspects of dealing with a refugee/migrant crisis 
from the perspective of crisis management with the primary focus on the need for 
cooperation between the states in solving the common challenge/situation. It is 
necessary to continue with this kind of researches because it is more than obvious we 
will be increasingly exposed to refugee/migrant crises such as one of 2015 and 2016. 
 
 
References 
 
1. European Commission (2015) Cuontry Factssheet: Greece 2015, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/country-
factsheets/12_greece_country_factsheet_2015.pdf (visited on 13.04.2017). 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
187 
2. European Council and Council of the European Union (2016) EU-Turkey 
statement, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-
pressures/countries-origin-transit/eu-turkey-statement/ (visited on 
10.03.2017). 
3. Kekenovski, J. (2016) REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND REFUGEE CRISIS - 
between the hammer and the anvil, 
http://www.uklo.edu.mk/filemanager/HORIZONTI%202017/Horizonti%20serija
%20A%20volume%2019/1.%20Republic%20of%20Macedonia%20and%20refug
ee%20crisis%20-%20between%20the%20hammer%20ans%20the%20anvil-
%20Jove%20Kekenovski.pdf, (visited on 12.03.2017). 
4. Mamić, Krešimir; Mikac, Robert; Dragović, Filip (2016) „Migration Crisis – 
Humanitarian Issue or Possible Threat to European Security: Misuse of the 
Migration Crisis for the Extremist Infiltration” in Comprehensive Approach to 
Counter Radicalism and Extremism – Future Challenges for Counter Terrorism 
Process / Čaleta, Denis; Shemella (editors). Ljubljana: Ministry of Defense 
Republic of Slovenia, Slovenia; Center for Civil-Military Relations, Monterey, 
USA, page 63-74 
5. Mikac, Robert; Dragović, Filip (2017) „Masovne migracije: izazovi, posljedice i 
put naprijed“ // Forum for Security Studies. Year 1, No 1, page 130-152 
6. Ministry of Interior Republic of Turkey (2015) Directorate General for Migration 
Management web page, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/the-directorate-general-
of-migration-management_911_925 (visited on 21.03.2017). 
7. Ministry Of Interior Directorate General Of Migration Management (2016) 
Agency news, http://www.goc.gov.tr/main/En_3 (visited on 11.04.2017). 
8. The Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2017) Prednostne naloge v letu 
2017, http://www.vlada.si/teme_in_projekti/prednostne_naloge_2017/ (visited 
on 12.04.2017). 
9. The Government of the Republic of Srbia (2015) Plan reagovanja u slučaju 
povečanog priliva migranata, 
http://www.minrzs.gov.rs/files/doc/migranti/Plan%20Vlade0001.pdf (visited 
on 11.04.2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
188 
10. Torkar, Domen (2016) „Migrantski val v Sloveniji - vloga sistema zaščite in 
reševanja“ Revija Ujma, no 30/2016, 
http://www.sos112.si/slo/page.php?src=/ujma/article_2016.html, (visited on 
21.03.2017). 
11. Smajić, Mirza (2017) „Sigurnosni aspekti migracijske krize: između humanosti i 
oblikovanja novih „umjetnih“ manjina“ // Forum for Security Studies. Year 1, No 
1, page 153-167 
12. Tatalović, Siniša; Jakešević, Ružica (2016) „Migracijska kriza u Europi i 
Hrvatskoj: politike integracije migranata“ in Urušavanje ili slom demokratije? / 
Vujačić, Ilija; Vranić, Bojan (editors). Beograd : Udruženje za političke nauke 
Srbije i Univerzitet u Beogradu – Fakultet političkih nauka, page 183-200 
13. The Government of Hungary (2013) Migration Strategy 2014-2020. 
http://belugyialapok.hu/alapok/sites/default/files/Migration%20Strategy%20
Hungary.pdf (visited on 16.04.2017). 
14. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (2017) Regionalni plan za reagovanje na 
izbjegličku i migrantsku krizu, 
http://www.unhcr.rs/media/docs/2017/januar/RMRPSerbiaSRP.pdf (visited on 
28.03.2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
189 
325.254.4-022.326.5:343.9 
 
THE CRIMINAL LAW RESPONSE TO THE MIGRANT AND 
REFUGEE CRISIS 
 
Nikola Tupanceski, PhD,  
Faculty of Law, Institute for Criminal Law  
E-mail: tupanceski@yahoo.com 
 
Aleksandra Deanoska, PhD,  
Faculty of Law, Institute for Criminal Law  
E-mail: aleksandra.deanoska@gmail.com 
 
 
Abstract 
 
As the subject of elaboration in this paper, the authors refer to the 
phenomenon of migration – phenomenon that always raised special interest in scientific 
circles, but recent years is particularly topical and actual question. Migration may be 
reviewed in a form of several manifestations like: voluntary (mainly economic) and 
forced migration caused by persecution, armed conflicts, war or other factors. The issue 
of refugees, asylum seekers and internal displaced persons is also particularly 
addressed and it is a special challenge from phenomenological aspect. 
The authors also elaborate the international corpus of human rights 
instruments for the protection of migrants and refugees, starting from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Status of Refugees, the 
Convention on migrations in abusive conditions and the promotion of equal 
opportunities and treatment to migrant workers, International Convention for the 
protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families, the 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational organized Crime etc. 
As a result of the international efforts in respect of the protection of the rights 
of refugees and migrants, and especially taking into consideration the migrant and 
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refugee  wave that took place globally, but also in the Republic of Macedonia as 
transiting country recent years, special attention is paid to the issue of the Criminal 
Law response. 
In this sense, the incriminations of the Criminal Code are elaborated: Art. 418b, 
smuggling of migrants art.418-v, organizing a group and instigating the perpetration of 
such offences, art. 418-d, abuse of the visa-free regime with the member states of the 
European Union and of the Schengen Agreement, as well as the criminal offenses of the 
Law on foreigners. Authors also give reviews to the Law on asylum and temporary 
protection and general review of our legislation with the aim to provide elaboration on 
the question whether the criminal law response is appropriate. 
   
 Keywords: migration, migrant, smuggling of migrants, illegal immigration 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The migration and refugee issues are tremendously actual the recent years.  
Migration is not a new phenomenon; in fact it is old as humanity itself. Unlike the 
ancient period when it was perceived as an inherent segment of Greek colonization and 
Roman expansion, in recent history (18-19 century) it is transformed as the forced 
relocation of slaves from West Africa to America, and today again, the migration 
phenomenon, retaining and intensifying the continued negative context, has an 
extremely serious impact in shaping the world, thereby manifesting its complex social, 
cultural, political and legal level. 
In this respect, in the theory and in the international documents we can find 
the basic classification of this phenomenon. Its political connotation prevails over it 
numerical value (Koser, 2007). Unlike voluntary, which mostly deals with economic 
migrants, forced migration is connected to reasons different from those of “a better 
existence” – such as the conflicts, persecution or environmental factors. In this context 
particular attention should be paid on the organized nature of this form of criminal 
activity. The migration factors are different, mainly known as push or pull factors (Bales, 
1999, also see O’Connel, 2001). 
With the beginning of the “Arab Spring” in late 2010, the international scene is 
particularly actualized with the immigrant issue of refugees, asylum seekers and 
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internally displaced persons. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) from 2014, the number of these people in the world exceeds 50 
million. 
In this regard, in the recent period there is a tendency to restrict the use of 
the term “illegal immigration” to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking. 
Argumentum a fortiori, there are claims for abandoning of the term “illegal immigrant” 
and instead use the terms “irregular” or “undocumented” immigrant. 
 
 
2. The international human rights instruments on migration issues 
 
Given the fact that the immigration phenomenon may pose a serious threat to 
internal state security, public policy, public health and international relations between 
states, the statement that “illegal immigration” is a problem of global importance is not 
even slightly exaggerating! From there arise the efforts of the international community 
to prevent illegal cross-border movement, namely to find ways for its prevention. 
The international rules for the protection of migrants in the modern sense of 
the word, may be recorded as early as 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
which defines the right “to leave the country.” Otherwise, the huge number of 
international documents regulating this matter specifically implies the prevention and 
repression of crime associated with “illegal immigration”. For example, the Convention 
on the Status of Refugees of 1951, in Art. 31 contains a prohibition that contracting 
states impose penalties on refugees who come from a territory where their life or 
freedom is threatened for illegal entry or residence, provided that they apply without 
delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or stay. From this 
point of view, very important is the prohibition on their expulsion or return provided for 
in Art. 33, according to which any contracting state shall not expel or return a refugee 
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would 
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion. 
The Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the 
Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers of 1975, places 
an obligation on member states to adopt all necessary measures to prevent the secret 
movements of migrants for employment and illegal employment of migrants, and 
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against the organizers of illicit or clandestine movements of migrants for employment 
by departure, arrival or transit its territory, and against those who employ workers who 
have immigrated in illegal conditions. Provided that resided legally in the territory for 
the purposes of employment, the migrant worker shall not be deemed to be illegal or 
irregular in situation by the mere fact of losing his job, which in itself means the 
withdrawal of his authorization of residence or, as case may be, work permit. 
Accordingly, he shall enjoy equal treatment with the citizens, particularly in terms of 
guarantees of security of employment, the provision of alternative employment, work 
and retraining. 
The International Convention for the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families of 1990 provides that states shall cooperate 
when necessary to adopt measures for proper return of migrant workers and members 
of their families in the country of origin when they decide to return or upon expiry of 
their residence or employment permit or when they have illegal status in the country of 
employment (Art. 67). In the next article of the Convention is proclaimed the obligation 
to member states, including the state of transit, to cooperate to prevent and eliminate 
illegal or irregular movements and employment of migrant workers with irregular 
status. Measures taken for this purpose under the jurisdiction of each country 
concerned should include: appropriate measures against the dissemination of 
misleading information on emigration and immigration; measures to detect and 
eradicate illegal and unreported movement of migrant workers and members of their 
families and to impose effective sanctions on persons, groups or entities which 
organize, conduct or assist with the development and implementation of such 
movements and measures to impose effective sanctions on persons, groups or entities 
which use violence, threats or intimidation against migrant workers and members of 
their families who have illegal status. States of employment shall take all adequate and 
effective measures to eliminate employment of migrant workers in their territory who 
have illegal status, including where appropriate, sanctions on employers of such 
workers.  
The most important document that explicitly deals with the issue of “illegal 
immigration” is the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(Palermo Convention) of 2000. It should be particularly noted that it operates and 
defines the term “smuggling of migrants” and “illegal entry”. Under this Protocol, the 
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term “smuggling of migrants” means providing illegal entry i.e. crossing borders without 
respecting the necessary requirements for legal entry into a country of a person in a 
Member State where that person is not a citizen or resident in order directly or 
indirectly to obtain financial or other material benefit . 
Although the Protocol establishes an obligation for each state party to 
criminalize acts of smuggling of migrants; acts committed for the purpose of enabling 
the smuggling of migrants; manufacture, procurement, having or providing false travel 
or identity document; and by enabling the person without citizenship or permanent 
resident to remain in the respective country without fulfilling the necessary conditions 
for staying in the country or other illegal means; this protocol clearly establishes that 
migrants who were subject to such actions will not be subjected to criminal prosecution. 
Furthermore, the Protocol provides that any attempt to commit any of the foregoing 
acts and complicity, organizing or directing others to commit such acts should be 
punishable. As aggravating circumstances should be considered the endangering or the 
possibility to endanger the lives or safety of the migrants and those who undertake 
inhuman or degrading treatment, including exploitation of such migrants. 
In order to prevent and suppress the smuggling of migrants by sea, the 
Protocol provides for an obligation for Member States to cooperate to the greatest 
extent possible, including the exchange of relevant data in accordance with the 
international maritime law, and stipulates adequate measures that States should 
undertake. Furthermore, without affecting the international rules on free flow of people, 
state parties, to the greatest extent possible, should reinforce that border control is 
needed to prevent and detect the smuggling of migrants, and to adopt legislative or 
other appropriate measures for, as far as possible, to prevent the use of vehicles that 
run commercial carriers, to commit the offenses subject to the Protocol. 
 
 
3. The Criminal legislation in respect of “illegal immigration” in Macedonia 
 
As international basis in designing the legal framework for the incriminations 
related to “illegal immigration”, most European countries have taken directions from 
the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and UN documents from 
2010, Model law against smuggling of migrants. In this context, it should be pointed 
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out that the latter act, in the second chapter titled “Basic offenses” explicitly talks 
about the ontology of incriminations associated with this form of criminality. 
Republic of Macedonia, especially taking into account Article 6 of the Protocol, 
which established basic criteria for criminalization of unlawful activities related to the 
smuggling of migrants, provides a set of incriminations that regulate the criminal 
context of this matter, namely, in two different laws (the Criminal Code of Macedonia 
and the Law on Foreigners) there are several provisions. 
In that context, chapter thirty four of the Criminal Code of the Republic of 
Macedonia, entitled “Crimes against humanity and international law” covers three 
provisions relevant to this area: Art. 418-b “smuggling of migrants”, Article 418-c 
“organizing a group and inciting the perpetration of acts of trafficking, trafficking in 
children and smuggling of migrants” and Article 418-e “abuse of the visa regime with 
the countries of the Union and the Schengen agreement”. 
When it comes to incriminations of this kind (legal description of the 
incrimination being with open character), in general, the object of protection is complex: 
on one hand, it covers the fundamental freedoms and rights of migrants, and on the 
other, the international regime on legal flow of migrants from one country to another. 
Not all legislators from different countries have approach similar or analogous as the 
Macedonian one. Some systematize these offences in the chapter on criminal offenses 
against public order – such as Serbia, Croatia, (Turkoviċ, Novoselec, 2013). Alluding to 
the conclusion that the primary object of protection is the public order, which in 
extensive sense identifies with the social or legal organization, the general security of 
citizens, the feeling of peace and unthreatened individual and common good. This 
determination once again verifies the complex character of the protected legal good, 
and that is the reason why these incriminations represent conglomerate of several 
subgroups focused on closer objects of protection. 
The main incrimination is defined in Article 418 –b of the CCM titled 
“smuggling of migrants” and with its six paragraphs, it fully corresponds to the 
directions provided by Article 6 of the Protocol. Imprisonment of at least four years is 
prescribed for whom by force or serious threat that will attack the life or body, deceit, 
greed, abuse of position or using of the powerlessness of other illegally transfers 
migrants through the state border, and that produces, purchases or owns fake passport 
with such intention. Taking into account the quality of injustice provided in both 
sequences of this paragraph, we believe that one should not put a sign of “equality” 
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between them in terms of punishment for the reason the second is just a predicate 
action regarding the realization of the criminal purpose. Of course, we have to keep in 
mind the overall penal policy relating to counterfeiting (official) documents. When it 
comes to the degree of harmonization with Article 6 of the Protocol, the Republic of 
Macedonia, unlike other countries, has fully provided for acceptance of all forms of 
execution. 
“Illegal transfer” means the entry or exit of migrants in and from the country 
without the prescribed formalities for crossing the state border, border crossings or 
outside (if migrants are hidden in a vehicle outside the border crossing, if transmitted 
by wild roads through the border line). Passive subject of the offense is one or more 
migrants, which shall include persons who pass through the territory of another country 
in order to stay in the country (because of work, engaging in crime and other illegal 
activities, etc.). The action is completed with the transfer of one or more migrants 
across the state border. Subjective part of the crime contains intention or awareness 
that by force is made the transfer of persons that are about to acquire a status of 
migrants (Камбовски, 2011). 
Mitigated form of the offence is contained in paragraph 2 and it consists of the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, buying, selling, harboring or receipt of migrants. 
This form is punishable by imprisonment of one to five years. The action aims that the 
victim makes such a decision (recruitment) or to be taken after the decision has 
adopted or has been bought, sold, sheltered or accepted by the offender, who also 
assumed his consent. 
Severe forms (paragraphs 3 to 5) are tied to several qualifying circumstances, 
endangering the life or health of migrant, treatment of migrant particularly degrading 
or cruelly, preventing migrant to use the rights granted by international law in 
perpetration of the offences; the crime against a minor and committing the crime by an 
official in performing his duty. The penalty is imprisonment for at least eight years, 
unless the perpetrator official in performing his duty, in which case the penalty is at 
least ten years. 
The last paragraph of the provision (paragraph 6) provides for mandatory 
confiscation of objects and vehicles as objects of the crime (Article 100-a). 
The analysis of the incrimination of Article 418-b shows that mostly it is 
compatible with the international standards. However, certain remarks can be pointed 
out. In this regard, we can comment the prescribed penalties. At least four years of 
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imprisonment are prescribed for the basic form of the act, or at least eight or at least 
ten years for qualified forms – it seems that the severity of the lawmakers is draconian. 
Comparative experiences show that usually the basic offense sentence ranges up to 
three or five years while for qualified forms to five or ten years. Since the ultimate goal 
of the perpetrators of this criminal act is mostly financial gain, perhaps it would be part 
of the criminal policy fine to be prescribed and also confiscation of property and 
proceeds (Камбовски, Тупанчески, 2011). 
Complementary to the previous provision is Article 418-c, which is about 
organizing a group and inciting the perpetration of acts of trafficking, trafficking in 
children and smuggling of migrants. This provision represents a special type of the 
offense criminal association (art.394). Imprisonment for at least eight years is 
prescribed for those who organized group, gang or other association for the execution 
of several crimes including the crime of smuggling migrants. Subject to this 
incrimination (paragraph 2) is a member of the group, gang or other association, and it 
is punishable by imprisonment of at least one year. 
In Paragraph 3 is provided obligatory exemption from punishment of a member 
of the association in case of effective regret. Especially is incriminated (paragraph 4) 
the calling, encouraging or supporting the commission of these offenses. It is about 
forms of creation or strengthening of other, unspecified persons, the decision to commit 
the offenses, which does not incite any particular case: if the offender instigates 
another, or certain group of people, the pursuit of a particular case, it is punishable as 
an incitement. Supporting is a form of psychological assistance or encouragement of 
undetermined number of people to perform. 
The set of the three provisions in the Criminal Code of Macedonia is completed 
with the provision of Art. 418-d: Abuse on visa-free regime with the Member States of 
the European Union and the Schengen Agreement which is actually a reflection of the 
visa regime that the Republic of Macedonia has established with the Member States. 
The offence is perpetrated the one who recruits, encourages, organizes, harbors or 
transports persons in a Member State of the European Union and the Schengen 
Agreement regarding the acquisition or exercise of social, economic or other rights 
contrary to European Union law, regulations  of the European Union members and the 
Schengen agreement and international law. Sanctioned is also the case when the 
offender was obliged to know and could have known that the transfer is done in order 
to obtain or exercise of social, economic or other rights contrary to EU law, regulations 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
197 
of the Member States of the EU and the Schengen Agreement and the international 
right. For primary offense the penalty is imprisonment of at least four years, for the 
special form of imprisonment of one to five years, and for the qualified form of 
imprisonment for at least four years. 
The second law, which stipulates the other two incriminations in respect with 
this matter, is the Law on Foreigners. Namely, in art. 148: Assisting foreigners in illegal 
entry and transit, with imprisonment of one year or with fine is punished helping illegal 
foreigner to enter the country or pass through the territory of the Republic of 
Macedonia contrary to the provisions stipulated in the Law on Foreigners. If the 
operator had intended to obtain illegal profit, it constitutes a more severe form of the 
crime that is punishable by imprisonment of at least three years. As aggravating 
circumstance will be considered the endangering the life of the foreigner, committing 
the crime in a group, gang or other association created to perform such work, so in 
these cases the perpetrator will be punished by imprisonment of at least eight years. 
The attempt of the offense is also punishable. A criminal liability for legal persons is 
also envisaged.  
In the next article, 149, titled “Assisting foreigners in illegal residence”, a 
prison sentence of three years is provided for a person who with the intention of 
acquiring unlawful proceeds for himself or another person will help the foreigner to stay 
in the Republic of Macedonia contrary to the legal provisions. The attempt is punishable 
and if the offender under paragraph 1 of this Article is a legal person, it shall be 
punished by a fine and will be imposed a temporary ban on performing certain activities 
or permanent ban on performing certain activities. Vehicles used for committing the 
crime shall be confiscated. 
Both incriminations provided in this Law should be complementary but also 
consistent with the Macedonian Criminal Code in combating the phenomenon of 
smuggling migrants. In part perhaps this is an achieved goal – sanctioned is the 
attempt and criminal liability of legal persons is prescribed. But given the description of 
the legal basis of the acts, and the expected sanction, the real problem for any judge or 
prosecutor may represent the choice of legal provision under which the factual situation 
will be subsumed. In other words, helping foreigners in illegal entry and transit and 
aiding illegal foreigner in residence is a constitutive description of the incrimination of 
Article 418b, smuggling migrants. The problem is that if the Criminal Code provision is 
applied then the sentence will be at least four years if it is a basic form or from one to 
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five years if it is proved that there is consent of the migrant. We remind that in severe 
forms, the legal minimum is eight or ten years. This means that identical legal situation 
applying one law means a penalty of at least four years in prison and according to the 
other (Law on foreigners) a sentence of one year or a fine. Taking into account the 
principle in dubio mitius then the more lenient law should be applied. But the crucial 
question is whether it is the case in practice. 
In terms of suppression of the recently actual cases of illegal immigration, we 
should especially mark the recent activities of the Republic of Macedonia regarding the 
prevention of this phenomenon. The Law Amending the Law on Asylum, introduced 
changes in Article 16 in which it is regulated that foreigner on the border or inside the 
territory of the Republic of Macedonia may orally or in writing express the intention of 
submitting a request for asylum in front of a police officer of the Ministry of Interior. 
The Police Officer records the foreigner who expressed intention and directs 
him within 72 hours to apply for asylum before the authorized official at the 
Department for Asylum in the Reception Center for Asylum Seekers. 
If the foreigner does not fulfill the obligation or does not apply for asylum 
within 72 hours from the time of the declared intention, he will be proceeded in 
accordance with the regulations for foreigners. 
In the new Article 16-a, it is determined the formal aspect that is submitting 
the application for asylum, elaborating all possible options. The adoption of these 
solutions was with the intention to overcome or prevent the problem of illegal 
migration, on the other hand to facilitate the potential asylum seekers access to the 
body conducting the procedure for recognition of the right of asylum. 
This activity of Macedonia on preventive level means even greater affirmation 
of Article 16 of the Protocol that refers on measures of protection and assistance. It 
seems that this approach is needed given the fact that the last years the number of 
migrants (not only in Macedonia) receives a ‘planetary’ dimension and the social 
response proves to be inadequate. 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
The migration phenomenon is a complex matter of intense social, legal, cultural 
character. Lately, the negative context of migration is gaining on intensity and it results 
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in social reaction on international and national level that seems insufficient in quality, 
but also inefficiently deals with this phenomenon. Verification of this thesis is the 
recent effort of the UN and the European Union that cannot reconcile their views on 
this ‘burning’ issue. Macedonia almost completely accepted and incorporated relevant 
international standards regarding the prevention and suppression of smuggling 
migrants.  
In terms of criminal legislation we can put some remarks about the consistency 
of the legal framework composed of five incriminations in the two different laws that 
are abovementioned. It may be suggested that in future the existing set of criminal 
offenses should be revised aimed at harmonizing and reducing the possibility of 
different legal epilogue in identical situations. It should be also specifically indicated 
that the prescribed and pronounced penalties are draconian; particularly from 
comparative point of view Macedonia is a leader in the region in terms of the legal 
minimum for this type of offenses. At the end, we would like to point out that the focus 
should be put on prevention, having in mind that appropriate safeguards contribute to 
reduction of the crime rates. 
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Abstract 
 
The dynamics of mixed migrations in our region which, thanks to its geographic 
location and its connection with the European countries is becoming ever more 
attractive for transit, but also a destination of a large number of migrants and Third 
World refugees is growing. 
All researches and available data indicate that the Balkans is nowadays both 
the location of origin and a destination of human trafficking, the main route of the Near 
East refugee crisis, migrant and drug trafficking, as well as a transit point for illegal 
migration of many African refugees. This paper analyzes the capacities of the Balkans 
for a regional cooperation in the field of migrations and asylum, because this issue 
cannot be treated separately as a problem or an advantage of one country, and whether 
the regional mechanisms and the cooperation with the EU in confronting illegal 
migration and overboard crime, the legislative and the regional initiative which develops 
a comprehensive approach of migration management and protection of the migrants, as 
well as the asylum issue, the systemic setup of the responsible security services in the 
countries of the region are efficiently organized to manage the migration processes as 
well as the ever-intensifying security threats. 
 
Keywords: mixed migrations, region, institutions, capacities, cooperation 
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Introduction 
 
 The Balkans, located between the East and the West, are becoming an ever 
more interesting geographic, geopolitical, and security-related subject of analysis of 
many EU, Balkanic and world politicians, some of the subjects including the location  
through which the main route of migrants towards Europe was and is still passing for 
the citizens of the countries from the Near East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, but also from 
some African countries. 
 A large number of people decide to migrate to the EU countries from the Near 
East and from North Africa due to economic reasons, but also under the pressure of the 
military conflicts. Migration is becoming an issue that needs global approach and 
coordinated solutions. Countries are lately intensively discussing about the migration 
issues on bilateral level, but the need to address it on a regional and, since recently, on 
a global level is imposing. 
 Migrations are mainly directed towards Germany. The migrants’ route is used 
by many criminal bands for human trafficking, migrant smuggling and drug dealing, but 
also for support to the movement of terrorists from the East who, as a consequence of 
the change in the dynamism of the military actions, try to escape from the locations 
where they were hired and involved in murders of military personnel but also of civilians 
who use this route to advance towards the EU. 
 The analysis of such dynamism of migrations and the course of events leads to 
the obvious conclusion that the migrations are mainly of a mixed character, that they 
are used for diverse purposes but represent a serious menace to the peace and security 
in the Balkan region, as well as in the Republic of Macedonia, which is located on the 
most geographically and politically frequent “crossroads” of these events. 
 Such circumstances inevitably raise the question of cooperation in the field of 
security, migrations and asylum not only on the regional, but also on a wider, European 
level, as well as of the cooperation with NATO as the most modern form of organization 
in view of world security protection, because it is not possible to treat this issue as a 
separate problem or benefit of a respective country. 
 As for the migrations that have, for already quite a long period of time, been 
manifested as mixed migrations: refugees, asylum seekers, illegal migrations, migrant 
smuggling, human trafficking etc., it must be noted that the number of illegal migrants 
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and asylum seekers is lately continually increasing, and that the countries of their 
origin nave changed. 
 Republic of Macedonia has put great efforts to manage the mixed migrations 
in recent years, especially the migrant inflow from Greece, which refused to cooperate 
with Macedonia for a considerable period of time; this resulted in a collapse on the 
north Greek border, passing the burden of finding the solution onto the Republic of 
Macedonia, which was, at first, left to protect its south border alone, thus protecting 
EU, i.-e the ‘external EU border” from illegal immigrants, although it was from an EU 
Member-state, that is, from Greece, that the biggest problems for Macedonia was 
coming from. Greece failed to manage its southern islands and water border in 
compliance with the European regulations on the protection of external borders as 
pursuant to the Dublin Convention68, and to other regulations by which Greece is 
obligated to take security actions in view of the protection of the EU external borders. 
 The decision of Germany to suspend the Dublin Convention, according to which 
the refugees were obligated to seek asylum in the first country they set foot on, caused 
exaltation among the migrants, especially because the message of the German 
authorities to all migrants emphasized that Germany would temporarily shelter all 
refugees, which incited them to choose Germany, and not any other Western European 
country as their final destination. 
 But, a wider analysis of this situation immediately led to the conclusion that 
EU itself failed the plan of  protection of its own borders, but also on the plan of 
respecting its own regulations that the huge EU bureaucracy had spent a lot of money 
to enact; this especially refers to the FRONTEX mission as a specialized EU organization 
for protection of the EU external borders. 
 Hence the serious challenge that incurred not only for the Republic of 
Macedonia, but also for the other Balkan countries that wanted to protect their borders 
against illegal intrusion and the potential threats to the security of each respective 
state, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the need  to act in compliance with the 
                                                          
68 Dublin Convention is a treaty among EU states (adopted in 1990, came into force in 1997) 
which determines the EU Member-state responsible to review an asulum application submitted 
in one of the convention signatories. The said convention prevents the search of the same 
applicants by several EU Member states simultaneously, also providing the re-direction of the 
asylum seeker from one country to another, simply because no one wants to take the 
responsibility of their case. 
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international laws regarding the human rights protection and the refugee rights, that 
is, to adjust their policies and practice to the newly arisen real situation. 
 The main direction of the research and the analyses in this paper are the 
description and the conclusion regarding certain situations and tendencies of creation 
of valid estimations about the influence of mixed migrations on the security of the 
country, but also identification and the confrontation with the counter-indications so as 
to identify a safe solution of management of the said mixed migration processes. 
 
 
1. Influence of the mixed migrations on the security of the Balkans and of 
Republic of Macedonia 
 
The world and especially the EU witness examples of countries that besides 
their coherent migration policy, supported by regulations, frequently expe 
rience serious difficulties regarding security and migration management, 
especially in the recent years when the migrations are of mixed character. The problem 
becomes even more complicated if the said management comes untimely, that is, when 
measures and activities to prevent the unwanted effects and their influence on the 
country’s security are not taken when necessary69. 
 Migration, especially the illegal mixed migration, obviously requires timely and 
permanent inter-ministry cooperation and coordination, including the most important 
instances on this level, as are the Ministry of Interior, Defence Minsitry of the Republic 
of Macedonia, the Crisis Management Center, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, 
Ministry of Health, as well as the other ministries and responsible sectors involving all 
the capacities and very often some regional cooperation as well. 
 Macedonia has seriously felt the pressure and the security risk of mixed 
migrations in the last three years, especially with the massive migration wave of people 
from the Near and Far East in 2015, when the only positive signal was the fact that 
Macedonia was recognized only as a transit destination towards EU. 
                                                          
69 migration management is a notion sovering a large number of Government functions and a 
nation-wide system of organized and humane management of cross-border migrations, 
especially the entry and presence of foreigners within the borders of a country and protection of 
refugees and other people in need of protection. 
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 Nevertheless, Macedonia suffered serious implications regarding the 
management of such challenges. The experience of the 1999 Kosovo crisis, all security 
services, the inclusion of all capacities and the army of Macedonia, the NGO sector and 
the International organizations such as IOM, UNHCR, the Macedonian Red Cross, 
contributed to safe crisis management and provided protection to migrants as a 
modern state, according to the international conventions and directives.70 
 Mixed migrations undoubtedly complicate the support to the real refugees and 
asylum seekers who need protection in the first safe country that they reach, but 
considering that the first safe country besides Turkey is Greece, the usual European 
practice regarding immigration and refugee policy71 was put in question, and asylum 
seekers were allowed to “choose the country that they consider as safe” which, for the 
largest number of migrants, especially for those coming from the East, was Germany; 
on the other hand the African migrants emphasized France and England as safe 
countries. 
 Such “new” immigration policy of the EU, and especially of Germany, towards 
the refugees, made it possible for the majority of the to head to Germany, followed on 
that route by migrant smugglers, human traffickers, threats, attacks from criminals etc. 
 The large number of migrants in the massive mixed migrations brought other 
types of security menace but also financial implications as: illegal entry into 
Macedonia72, insufficient accommodation capacities for the asylum seekers, the 
                                                          
70 The change in the structure of illegal migrants incited certain challenges that were not 
prominent in the past years (lack of translators of Arabic language and of the dialects spoken by 
the illegal migrants, lack of valid readmission contracts with the Asian and African countries, the 
increased number of people and of their stay in the Shelter Center, the significantly higher 
financial funds for their possible return to their country of origin, lack of programs for assisted 
voluntary return, risks to public health etc. 
71 refugee (recognized) is a person who, as a result of wellgrounded fear of prosecution for 
reasons such as race, religion, nationality, membership in certain social groups or political views, 
is outside their country of origin is unable or, as a result of the said fear, is not willing to submit 
to the protection of that country (Refugee Status Conventio, Art. 1aA (2), 1951, modified by the 
1967 Protocol). 
72 llegal entry is an act of frontier passage without adherence to the necessary requirements 
regarding legal entry into the receiving country (Article 39b), UN Protocol against Smuggling of 
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increased number of individuals seeking asylum, accidents on their migration route, 
which, in the beginning, largely followed the railway through Macedonia, crimes 
committed by Macedonians but also by foreigners who established a “chain of 
cooperation” among perpetuators from several countries along the route as migrant 
smugglers, riots in the Shelter for Foreigners, due to the insufficient space and poor 
accommodation conditions etc.73  
 Such mixed migration movements resulted in three serious threats: wave of 
refugees, who are already in large numbers in te region and in Macedonia, the terrorism 
threat as well as the menacing advocates of the radical Islamic groups fighting there 
but originating from the Balkans and from Macedonia.  
 Also, following the security condition and the migration dynamism in Africa, 
the announcements received on the second migration wave, on which there are serious 
indications, but also insights of its approaching the EU, will result in security risks 
                                                                                                                                                    
Migrants by Land, Sea or Air, Amendment to the UN Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, 2000).  
73 Directive no 2002/90/ЕC of the Council of 28 November 2002 defining the aid of 
unauthorized entry, transiting and residence. 
Foreigners who, for any reasons, can not be removed from the territory of the Republic of 
Macedonia, are accommodated in the Foreigners’ Shelter of the Ministry of Interior. In case of 
any prolonged stay of the foreigner citizen in the Shelter Center, the Minsitry of Interior brings a 
decision on their temporary detention, against which the citizen is entitled to lodge a complaint 
to the Commission in charge at the Macedonian Government. The re asons for which the foreign 
citizen can be expelled from from the Republic of Macedonia correspond to Article 1 of the EC 
Directive 2001/40/ЕC of 28 May 2001 on common recognition of decisions on rejection of third 
country citizens. 
Understanding that the efficient efforts against illegal migration inevitably impose the need to 
strengthen the punitive policy, the Law on Foreigners introduces the following acts of crime: 
“assisting a foreigner in illegal entry and tansit” – Article 147 and “assisting a foreigner in their 
illegal residence” – Article 148.  The establishment of legal regulations regarding the mentioned 
acts o crime was pursuant the EC 2002/90/EC Directive which defines assistance to unallowed 
entry transit and residence and the Framework Decision no. 2002/90/ЕC of the Council, defining 
assistance  of illegal entry, transit and residence, as  well as the Framework Decision no. 
2002/949/JNA of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal legislation framework 
in favour of preventing the allowance of illegal entry, transit and residence adapted toth e penal 
system of the Republic of Macedonia.  
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different from the period of the arrival of refugees from the war-stricken Near East, 
following the central Mediteranian corridor leading towards Italy. 
 Thousands of migrants head to the Italian coast on a daily basis, coming 
mainly from Africa, mostly from Libya and Egypt, but there is also a possibility of 
another refugee wave fromTurkey towards the Balkans and Macedonia, following the 
known Maceodnian route, if the EU and Turkey fail to find a solution to their opposed 
interests, which are becoming ever more complicated.  
All these threats are completed by the fact that the majority of refugees 
originate from countries stricken by ebola, malaria and measles and that the refugees 
enter the country without being subjected to any medical control or any supervision, 
thus creating a serious epidemiological risk, due to which the problem and the menace 
to the security of the citizens of Macedonia, the region and Europe really becomes 
serious.  
The analysis of the statistical data presented by the International Center of 
Study of Radicalism, Brukings Institute, in the table below, shows the total number of 
individuals that have left to fight in Syria and Iraq, since the conflict started. The 
number includes casualties and people who retired from the conflict zone. The 
numbers are alarming, as there is almost no region wherefrom no people have left to 
fight. The number of such people from Western Europe (5,480) is particularly worrying. 
Considering that many of them could not or must not use public transport to return to 
their homes, it can be concluded that they they have well used the migrant route 
towards the EU, which mainly led through the Balkans and Macedonia. 
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Table no 1. Legion of foreign fighters in Islamic State. Total number of passengers who 
left to fight in Syria and Iraq since the bginning of the conflict. 
WESTERN EUROPE NUMBER OF PEOPLE LEFT TO FIGHT IN SYRIA AND IRAQ 
France 1.500 
United Kingdom 700 
Germany 680 
Belgium 650 
Тurkey 600 
Sweden 300 
The Netherlands 250 
Аustria 150 
Denmark 150 
Norway 140 
Spain 100 
Italy 90 
Finland 70 
Ireland 60 
Switzerland 40 
TOTAL: 5.480 
NORTH AMERICA   
USA 130 
Canada 100 
TOTAL: 230 
NEAR EAST   
Saudi Arabia 2.500 
Јоrdan 1.500 
Lebanon 900 
Israel / Palestine 120 
Јеmen 110 
Kuwait 70 
TOTAL: 5.200 
АFRICA   
Тunisia 3.000 
Мorocco 1.500 
Libya 600 
Еgypt 360 
Аlgeria 250 
Sudan 100 
Somalia 70 
TOTAL: 5.880 
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FORMER EAST BALKANS   
Russia 1.500 
Uzbekistan 500 
Bosnia 380 
Turkmenistan 360 
Kazakhstan 250 
Kosovo 220 
Tajikistan 190 
Аlbania 140 
Kyrgyzstan 100 
Serbia 100 
Ukraine 50 
TOTAL: 3.790 
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC   
Pakistan 500 
China 300 
Australia 250 
Indonesia 60 
Affhanistan 50 
TOTAL: 1.160 
Source:International Center of Study of Radicalisation, Brookings institute, EU 
 
 
2. Irregular migration  
 
The last years of the 20th century passed, and the new century began with a 
great dynamism on the military plan, military interventions, terrorist activities from 
diverse groups, but also massive geopolitical changes worldwide, causing disturbance of 
the people in North-West Africa, the Near East (Libya, Egypt) etc.  
This incited millions opf people to leave their locations of residence in search 
of better life, especially after the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Arabian spring and 
Syria. The migration of some of those people towards the EU countries was illegal.  
The pressure onto the European region was increased by the African migrants 
mainly coming from North-West Africa (Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Sudan and Somalia from 
Eastern Africa), with the occurrence of the terrorist organizations like Boco Haram, but 
also as a result of the unfavourable economic situation, the famine and poverty. 
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Unlike regular migration, the irregular one is a process of movement involving 
illegal methods of entry and residence of people seeking better life regardless of the 
means used to reach their desired destination, i.-e. country. 
Irregular migration is a method that jeopardizes the immigration laws of the 
destination country.74 Measures and activities should be taken both in the countries of 
originand in the target countries, as closely as possible to the problem source. The 
basic activities to suppress of illegal migrations can be identified as follows: 
- external border activities, especially in the countries of origin and in the target 
countries; 
- measures on the external borders, border checks and surveillance, 
- activities on the state territory, surveillance of the status of foreign citizens 
with and without documents, 
- International border cooperation. 
There are many examples of illegal migrations worldwide. Two groups of illegal 
migrants can be distinguished: the first group includes the migrants that arrive into 
their target countries illegally, secretly, through unallowed passages, over mountains, 
through unmarked border crossings or by water, that is, by boats anchored on 
unallowed locations in the coastal countries.  
The second group covers the illegal migrants who reach their taret countries 
on a legal basis (for example, with tourist visas, student visas etc.), and than stay 
beyond the validity of their visas, with the purpose to work ans reside illegally, abusing 
the confidence gained upon the issuance of the visa with a limited validity period. 
As for the method of border crossings – there is a raising tendency of migrants 
to illegally cross the border organized in large groups, using the migrant smuggling 
services. 
 
 
3. Notional distinction between migrant smuggling and human trafficking 
 
Pursuant to the information already confirmed by EUROPOL, the number of 
criminals involved in smuggling of migrants and refugees throughout Europe is at least 
                                                          
74 EC Communication (‘COM(2006) 735 final) The Global Approach to Migration one year on: 
Towards a comprehensive Europeаn migration policy’  
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30 thousand people who are the main perpetuators of crimes related to such acts; they 
operate in groups, usually consisting of minor criminals from Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Greece 
and lately from Macedonia and Serbia. 
One example given by EUROPOL refers to 15 perpetuators from Syria and 
Egypt arrested in Greece in 2015. It was confirmed that only that group gained 7.5 
million euros from human trafficking. What characterizes the mixed migrations as well 
as their organizers is the fact that they are used for othe crimes as well such as weapon 
and drug smuggling. 
In order to obtain a better picture of the difference between migrant 
smuggling and human trafficking, the following two phenomena can be clearly 
differenciated through an analysis of their existing definitions:  
 the primary purpose of human trafficking is exploitation of its victims.  
 The noltion of migrant smuggling implies assistance in their illegal intrusion 
into the target country; but, unlike the victims of human trafficking, the 
smuggled migrants have previously agreed to be smuggled. 
 The people intending to illegally enter another country most frequently are the 
first to come in contact with their smugglers. 
 Human trafficking is most often considered as a crime against the basic human 
rights, while migrant smuggling is treated as crime against the state, as its 
immigration regulations are broken. 
 Migrant smuggling always implies a transnational element and is primarily 
directed against the interests of the state and not against an individual, i.-e 
the smuggled person. 
 Human trafficking does not have to include international elements and can be 
carried out within the borders of one single state. 
 In some cases human smuggling can be transformed into human trafficking, i.-
e the irregular migrant can become a victim of traders. 
But, a large number of smuggled people become victims of human rights 
violation. Many scientists that have researched trhis phenomenon agree that in 
practice, the differences between smuggling and human trafficking are not always 
obvious and can grequently overlap. 
 There is a considerable need to differenciate between these two notions: the 
first one implies a human trafficking victim, who is often traumatized and needs proper 
medical aid, while in the second case, there is an illgal migrant, a person who has been 
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transferred across the border in inhumane conditions, but are mostly in a very good 
physical condition.  
 For example, a person can seek some help from smugglers in order to reach a 
particular destination illegally, and fall victim of exploitation at the end of the journey, 
for example, by working in slavery conditions in order to provide financial compensation 
to the smuggler. 
 In other situations, female migrants can be aware that they are going to be 
prostitutes, but unaware of the violence and exploitation implied. In the last two cases 
the crime committed is the one of human trafficking. 
 
 
4. Аsylum 
 
 The asylum right is a constitutional category in Macedonia. Republic of 
Macedonia guarantees asylum right to foreigners and apatrides, exiled for their 
democratic political belief and activity; it is a form of protection offered by a state on 
its territory pursuant to the principle of non-return and the internationally or nationally 
regognized refugee rights.  
 Asylum is granted to a person who is unable to seek protection in their country 
of citizenship and/or residence for fear of prosecution based on race, religion, and 
nationality, membership in a social group or political movement. 
 The Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection regulates the conditions and the 
procedure of obtention and termination of an asylum right of a foreigner or and apatrid 
seeking asylum in the Republic of Macedonia, as well as the rights and obligations of 
asylum seekers with a granted asylum right in the Republic of Macedonia. 
 Novelty: the migrant can, in written or in spoken form, express intention to 
submit an asylum right applicationin front of a police officer of the Ministry of Interior, 
who issues them a sample of the certificate on their expressed intention and advises 
them to submit an asylum requirement within 72 hours. 
 The asylum right implies protection granted to the following categories of 
people, by Republic of Macedonia under the conditions and in a procedure envisaged by 
this law 
- A recognized refugee (a refugee according to the Convention on the Status of 
Refugees of 1951 and the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees) and 
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- A person under subsidiary protection 
Almost 60 million of people have been forcefully removed worldwide, due to 
conflicts, no matter if the relegation happens within their countries or in other 
countries where they are refugees. This is the highest number ever recorded, as 
pursuant toth e new Report of the UN High Committee for Refugees and is equivalent 
to the whole population of Italy. 
The number implies 8.3 million people more than in 2013, mainly due to the 
Syrian war, the advance of Islamis State in Iraq and the renewed conflicts in Africa. 
The number of refugees increased from 11.6 to 14.4 million people (not counting 
the 5.1 million of Palestinians) on the world level for the same period, which has been 
the largest annual increase since 1990.  
Syria is the country of origin of most refugees, who outnumber those from 
Afghanistan, which had been holding the leading position for more then 30 years. 
Six out of the ten countries of refugee origin are African. The current conflicts 
in Somalia, South Sudan, Congo and Central African Republic make them leaders in the 
negative statistics.  
 
 
5. Key principles of the migration policy of the Republic of Macedonia 
 
 Upon the designing of the migration policy for the period of 2015-2016, 
Republic of Macedonia remains devoted to respect of the basic principles and 
recommendations of the international organizations especially of the International 
Migraiton Organizaiton75, which regard the migration management and have universal 
meaning. 
They are the following: 
 Respect of international standards, human rights and protection. This refers to 
respect, protection and granting of migrants’ human rights as pursuant to 
international law, protection of vulnerable categories of migrants, as well as of 
international standards related to migrant workers. This principle also implies 
supressionof xenophobia, racism and discrimination, as well as incorporation of 
gender equality into migration policy. 
                                                          
75 International Organization for Migration,“Framework for Migration Governance“. 
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A comprehensive and proof-based policy, developed in close cooperation with 
relevant partners. 
 Implementation of a thorough and coherent migration policy on a national 
level, designed on the basis of relevant insights, with the participation of all 
government institutions in close cooperation of all parties concerned, and the 
engagement of relevant parties on a national, regional and international level 
(government agencies, NGO’s, associations, migrants’ organizations etc.). 
 Addressing the socio-economic needs. 
 Integration of new migrants, re-integration of returnees and providing acess to 
healthcare and social services for all migrants. 
 Support to labor migration (including the temporary and circulatory migration) 
and support to brain-gain (,,brain inflow“). Integration of migrations into the 
development processes through decreasing of costs on foreign currency 
remittances, their productive use and the so-called brain-gain (,,brain inflow“). 
 A policy that is adaptable, i.-e capable to meet the challenges in times of crisis, 
and alleviate the risks related to migrant movements.  
 Allowing access to legal migration. This is achieved through transparent and 
efficient application of migration-related legislation. 
 Provision of regular migration channels as pursuant to the national 
development policy. Collection of credible and timely information on migration 
flows and dissemination of appropriate information on migration policies and 
procedures to enable the migrants to bring decisions based on relevant 
information. Efficient implementation of the visa regime and efficient management 
of migrations and development. 
 The policies, the action and operational plans in the mentioned fields should 
refer to several specific fields and their particular aspects, designed so as to make 
it possible that their specific purposes correspond and be consistent with the 
general aim of the migration policy in a wider sense as well as the other relevant 
policies. 
 Therefore, the basic principles that are applied and determine the design of the 
Macedonian migration policy are as follows: 
- Consistency – coordination of specific policies (policy related to the citizens of 
the Republic of Macedonia abroad); policy of immigration and integration of 
foreigners; policy towards illegal migration, migrant smuggling and human 
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trafficking; policy of asylum and protection of refugees) as well as coordination 
with migration policy in a wider sense of the word; 
- Compatibility – coordination of the migration policy with the economic, social, 
demographic and culturological policy of the Republic of Macedonia. Verification of 
the coordination of the purposes of the said policies, the efficiency of the enacted 
measures, the influence of migration policy and continuous adjustment to the 
changes in the migration processes; 
- Тransparency – visibility/clarity in the enactment of certain policies and the 
overall migration policy in relation to the administrative procedures and spending 
of funds so as to provide for public confidence and support; 
- Sustainability – continuity of designing, preparation and monitoring of the 
implementation of the measures and activities of migration policy, imdependently 
from the changes in the organization structures. 
 Besides the principles mentioned above, in order to successfully implement the 
migration policy of the Republic of Macedonia it is necessary to fulfill the following 
basic conditions – Responsibility of the ministries in charge and of other 
institutions for the progress in the fulfillment of the policy aims and their 
implementation; 
- Public educational and information campaign in view of the development of a 
large-scale support to migration policy; 
- Advancement of the national capacity to analyze, create and implement of the 
migration policy, and 
- Partnership with the countries of origin and destination, as well as with the 
regional and international organizations, the NGO’s and the other organizations of 
civil society of the private sector and the other relevant factors.76 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
It is obvious that the strengthening of the institutional capacities, the 
improvement of the cooperation among competent subjects on the national, regional 
                                                          
76 Resolution of the Republic of Macedonia on Migration Policy 2015 – 2020 (Official gazette no. 
8 of 16.01.2015) 
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and international level are the basic preconditions for efficient and safe management of 
the migration processes, especially when they appear in the form of cross-border 
migrations. 
Realizing the Balka events so far, and the risk and threat estimation, it can be 
emphasized that the Regional security is a problem, as the Region lacks the continuity 
of its monitoring and appropriate and timely solutions thereto. 
The building of regional capacities on the Balkans, in view of fast exchange of 
security-related data among the countries, impses the need to a common intelligence 
center  with counter-terrorist activities on the Balkans that will control all the activities 
of the militant individuals who will participate in the global djihad in Syria, Iraq and 
other countries, who than return toth e Balkans or to EU by the Balkan route, can 
considerably contribute to efficient migration maganement. 
The concept of integrated border management in EU – is the basis to a future 
development of IGU in Maedonia, and, in that direction, it is necessary tyo apply this 
common model of border management, in view of the protection of internal security, 
prevention and identification of illegal migrations and cro—border crime. 
 The change in the structure of the illegal migrants meant the incurrence of 
certain challenges which were not popular in the recent years (lack of translators 
from/into Arabic language and the dialects spoken by the illegal migrants, lack of valid 
contracts on readmission with the Asian and African countries, increased number of 
people and their prolonged period of residence in the Shelter Center for Foreigners, 
considerably higher finances for their possible return to the countries of origin, lack of 
programs on assisted intended return, public health risks etc.) 
 The increase in the number of asylum seekers outside the region created a 
situation in which the West Balkan countries do not actually have access to translators 
from/into all the languages spoken by these people, especially from/into Pashtu, Dari, 
Urdu, Farsi and other languages. The availability of translators of the languages spoken 
by the asylum seekers is also important for language analysis. It is performed in case of 
doubts related to the identification of the asylym seeker’s country of origin. 
 Besides the identification of the person’s identity, appropriate identification 
implies the recognition of the category to which the person belongs: asylum seeker, 
victim of human trafficking, unaccompanied minor, illegal migrant, crime perpetuator 
etc. 
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Abstract 
 
The contemporary refugee crisis brought numerous challenges and raised many 
questions about the capacity and the ability of Macedonian security system. Two 
aspects of dealing with this crisis are especially significant: first – to minimize the 
challenges of the large number of refugees, while respecting the accepted world 
standards for protection, and second – to protect Macedonia's borders and interests.  
The first "wave" of the worst refugee crises in modern society fared relatively 
well and the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia demonstrated a high level of 
response capability. Along with the political decisions that aimed to prevent 
endangering the security of the state and citizens, in terms of introducing a state of 
emergency and the involvement of several bodies and institutions, were mitigated the 
consequences that could arise for the system as a whole, but also for the security of 
citizens in general.  
However, monitoring of the current security and political situation in the 
Middle East, especially in the countries from whence came the largest number of 
refugees before, leads to the conclusion that it is possible to recurrence the situation 
from 2015 and 2016. Therefore it is very important to monitor the condition of multiple 
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levels, to propose measures and activities aimed at timely and quality response to 
future challenges related to any new security threats. 
The paper aims to analyze the recent papers in this area, and to offer new 
horizons to the possible movements of refugees, their origin, objectives and interests 
and so on. The authors will analyze the statistics on refugee movement, and measures 
undertaken by the security forces.  It could appear as a good basis for planning the 
future activities. 
 
Key words: refugee, crisis, security forces. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Migration in the modern world are real, everyday needs, which included a 
numerous number of countries in the world. Depending on the period of development 
there were just different ways of migration and reasons why people decide to migrate. 
In the 20th century we can recognize three general periods of massive migrations of 
people on the European continent: after World War I, after World War II and in the 
nineties. In the beginning of the new century, there a lot of new challenges on 
migration issue. In 2014 starts the biggest migration in the modern history, meaning a 
millions of migrants’ from the Middle East settled in Europe. This paper will focus on 
this contemporary migrant crisis, with different approach and statistics. 
However, almost 20. years ago Massey and his collaborators argued that: The 
theoretical concepts now employed by social scientists to analyse and explain 
international migration were forged primarily in the industrial era and reflect its 
particular economic arrangements, social institutions, technology, demography and 
politics…. The classical approach has now entered a state of crisis, challenged by new 
ideas, concepts, and hypotheses (Massey, et al. 1998, 3). Although, as they pointed out, 
‘these new ways of thinking have not yet cohered into a single theory’, Massey et al. 
believed that ‘the time has come…to reassess theories of international migration and 
bring them into conformity with new empirical conditions’. The ‘post-industrial, post-
Cold War world’ needed a new theory of migration appropriate for ‘a brand new century’. 
(Massey, et al. 1998, 3). In the next two decade, the exponential growth of social-
scientific research into international mobility of people shows no sign of abating: we 
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have more researchers, students, research projects, journals and publications than ever 
before. However, the quest for a generally accepted theoretical framework for migration 
studies remains elusive. We still lack with to explain why some people become mobile, 
while most do not, and what this means for the societies where migrants come from, 
pass through and settle in.  
There are some wider accepted definitions on terms related to migrant and 
migration, but there is no general approach on solving problems and controlling the 
migrant route. As different type of migration we can recognize (Human Migration Guide 6 
– 8, 2005, p. 1): 
- Internal Migration: Moving to a new home within a state, country, or 
continent. 
- External Migration: Moving to a new home in a different state, country, or 
continent. 
- Emigration: Leaving one country to move to another (e.g., the Pilgrims 
emigrated from England). 
- Immigration: Moving into a new country (e.g., the Pilgrims immigrated to 
America). 
- Population Transfer: When a government forces a large group of people out of 
a region,  usually based on ethnicity or religion. This is also known as an 
involuntary or forced migration. (This will be the author exceptional interest, 
having in mind that most of the migrants coming from Middle East are running 
away because of the war or conflicts in their own countries).  
- Impelled Migration (also called "reluctant" or "imposed" migration): Individuals 
are not forced out of their country, but leave because of unfavorable situations 
such as warfare, political problems, or religious persecution. 
- Seasonal Migration: The process of moving for a period of time in response to 
labor or climate conditions (e.g., farm workers following crop harvests or 
working in cities off-season; "snowbirds" moving to the southern and 
southwestern United States during winter). 
About people who migrate (Human Migration Guide 6 – 8, 2005, p. 2): 
- Emigrant: A person who is leaving a country to reside in another. 
- Immigrant: A person who is entering a country from another to take up new 
residence. 
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- Refugee: A person who is residing outside the country of his or her origin due 
to fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion. 
- Internally Displaced Person (IDP): A person who is forced to leave his or her 
home region because of unfavorable conditions (political, social, environmental, 
etc.) but does not cross any boundaries. 
- Migration Stream: A group migration from a particular country, region, or city 
to a certain destination. 
People move for a different reasons. Generally speaking there are two factors 
of migration: Push Factors: Reasons for emigrating (leaving a place) because of a 
difficulty (such as a food shortage, war, flood, etc.) and Pull Factors: Reasons for 
immigrating (moving into a place) because of something desirable (such as a nicer 
climate, better food supply, freedom, etc.). Several types of push and pull factors may 
influence people in their movements (sometimes at the same time), including: 
1. Environmental (e.g., climate, natural disasters) 
2. Political (e.g., war) 
3. Economic (e.g., work) 
4. Cultural (e.g., religious freedom, education) 
 
 
CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION IN A MODERN WORLD 
 
The number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly 
over the past fifteen years reaching 244 million in 2015, up from 222 million in 2010 
and 173 million in 2000 (UN IMR 2015, 2016.). The increasing numbers are to be taken 
very seriously and appropriate politics and measures are to be taken. As Castles and 
others argued the international migration is part of transnational revolution that is 
reshaping societies and politics around the globe (Castles and others, 2015: 8). The old 
dichotomy between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving states is being eroded. 
Most countries experience both emigration and immigration (although one or the other 
often predominate) while some countries have taken on an important role as transit 
zones for migrants. The differing ways in which such trends have affected the worlds’ 
regions is a major theme in a contemporary studies and researches.  
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 As far as globalization provide benefits, also incurring problems faced by many 
people around the world. The increased standards and low incomes, or relentless wars 
and terror against people, encouraging those people, who come from war-torn 
territories to leave their country. Most of the time, they migrate to some of Western 
European countries, not only to receive asylum, but to begin a “new life”. Unfortunately, 
they are not able to enter EU without visa and other permission, so they use forge 
canals, walking a thousand of kilometers, often caught in the network of smugglers of 
migrants. Today's migrations, which mainly consist of nationals from Iraq, Iran, Syria, 
Afghanistan and others pass through our country, that follow the Balkan route, which 
includes the Republic of Macedonia. Mainly there are five reasons that encourage 
people to migrate, as so:77 
1. The war in Syria, which lasts for five years and there are no hopes to be 
finished shortly. So far, there were about 250,000 dead people, so the 
population tends toward migration. Also, a large number of migrants come 
from Afghanistan, Somalia, Nigeria, and so on, also because of the war or war 
activities in a certain territories.  
2. A second major reason is the cost of transportation. In the past when 
migrating went mostly through Libya and hence paid ship to reach Italy and 
the transport cost about $ 6,000. Today it is known that the Balkans route is 
twice cheaper, or about $ 3,000. 
3. One of the leading reasons is the great welcome for refugees from Germany.  
Germany suspend the Dublin Regulation, which states that every refugee must 
seek asylum in this country where they first arrive, delighted Syrians. 
4. The recruitment of young forces in Syria, up to 30 years for taking part in the 
current war is the next leading factor, so a lot of them have decided to migrate 
in order to avoid mobilization. Contradicting previous said that Syrian 
government bring a decision that by paying the $ 300 fee, young men could 
delayed the time for going to the army. And also, they facilitated the way of 
obtaining a passport. 
5. And as a final reason – the International community. Before starting this wave 
of migration, Syria left around 4 million people and rushed to neighboring 
countries. However, due to poor conditions in which they live in these 
                                                          
77 https://www.iom.int/countries/former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia#fm 
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countries, this time refugees choose Europe as an appropriate solution to their 
problem. 
Republic of Macedonia if facing both, emigration and immigration. However, 
this paper will focus at the most on the contemporary migrant and refugee crisis, 
having the first wave in 2014-15, but with a high possibility to happen again in the near 
future. In this context the author agree that Macedonia have taken an important role as 
a transit country for almost a million migrants passed through the territory of 
Macedonia in the past two-three years. And not only the Republic of Macedonia, but a 
lot of other Balkan countries has been so-called “transit countries” on the Balkans 
route.  
 
 
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND CONTEMPORARY REFUGEE CRISIS 
 
Since 2014, the Republic of Macedonia is facing the greatest challenges in the 
modern history – a contemporary migrant and refugee crisis. More than a million 
people from the Middle East (most of them citizens of Syria and Iraq, but also from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and some African countries), passed through the territory of 
Macedonia on their road to EU (especially Western European countries). The new 
situation implies two different approaches. On one hand, the humanitarian aspect, and 
on the other hand security implications. Republic of Macedonia has signed up a 
numerous international conventions and resolutions on migrant and refugee protection, 
where the obligations of each particular country are foreseen, when facing international 
issues related to migrants and refugees. Therefore, Macedonia is obliged to act in 
human way, respecting at the higher possible level all human rights of migrants and 
refugees. The refugee crisis consisted of persons who have fled of war, which is 
generally caused by violence at their own countries. According to EU Directive No. 
2004/83/EC78, those individuals have the right of protection, so-called subsidiary 
protection. The county give the best possible way to respect international and domestic 
                                                          
78 European Union's minimum standards definition of refugee, underlined by Art. 2 (c) of 
Directive No. 2004/83/EC, essentially reproduces the narrow definition of refugee offered by the 
UN 1951 Convention; nevertheless, by virtue of articles 2 (e) and 15 of the same Directive, 
persons who have fled a war-caused generalized violence are, at certain conditions, eligible for a 
complementary form of protection, called subsidiary protection. 
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standards, but we must have in mind that Macedonia is a small and vulnerable country 
with limited resources and capacity to answer all needs of migrants and refugees. On 
the other hand, Macedonian Police and Army give their best efforts to protect our 
borders and to prevent uncontrolled movements of large groups of migrants. The 
purpose of the migrants was not to stay in Macedonia, but on a fastest way to reach 
some of the EU countries (most in Germany, Belgium, Sweden, later Austria and others). 
As a matter of fact, there were a lot of challenges for Macedonian people, their personal 
safety and especially protection of the property. However, there were no serious 
violations of international standards, and there were no serious threats of domestic 
security.  
 We could say that this is the main problem that Europe has faced in the 21st 
century, and that definitely this refugee crisis will have consequences, both for 
Macedonia and Europe in the coming years. That is why, the elaboration of this theme 
is necessary and appropriate. The authors will present official data, collected by the 
official state agencies responsible to answer the refugee crisis challenges, and will 
address different aspects of Macedonian occasions when solving this issue.  
 The so-called "refugee crisis" in the Republic of Macedonia began in 2014, but 
has taken serious numbers in the mid-August of 2015, when a number of 53000 people 
come to Greek-Macedonian border in the period of two-three weeks. After this new 
situation, on 19th August 2015, the Government declare a crisis on Southern and 
Northern Borders.79 According to the legislation, this decision opens the possibility for 
proper engagement of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia. Iinter-institutional 
coordination body daily monitors the illegal migrants who intend to enter the territory 
of the Republic of Macedonia from Greece and establish appropriate response analyzes 
all possible scenarios. Because of increased pressure on the southern border and the 
growing intensity of transit through etc. Balkan migration corridor, but the situation in 
global terms, it was estimated that it is necessary further increased and more effective 
control of the border areas where there have been mass illegal crossings from Greece. 
The involvement of the Army has an outcome in two directions. First, to increase the 
security and tranquility of the local population and second, to ensure a more 
comprehensive approach to the treatment of persons who have expressed their 
intention to seek asylum in the country according to the capacity and the 
                                                          
79 http://vlada.mk/node/10918 
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recommendations of the conventions whose signatory is the Republic of Macedonia. 
Just after declaring the crisis, within the Crisis Management Centre, a Headquarter was 
establish, with the main task to monitor and follow the situation and to prepare an 
action plan and to implement the planned activities. Headquarters of the Center for 
Crisis Management is an operational expert body which manages the activities of 
prevention and management of crisis situations and is composed of representatives of 
the following ministries: interior, health, transport and communications, defense and 
foreign affairs. Its members include the head of emergency medical assistance in 
Skopje, the Director of the Directorate for Protection and Rescue, as well as 
representatives of the Army, Intelligence Agency, the Directorate for Security of 
Classified Information and the Red Cross of Macedonia. 
 The statistics for 2015 are different and depend of the source used. However, 
the precise number is impossible to count. The institutions has a different approach and 
begin fully control in the middle of the crisis. According to the official statistics of the 
Ministry of Interior, the number are as follows: 
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Table 1. Number of refugees in the Southern border of the Republic of Macedonia in 
201580 
Indicators /  
Month 
Illegal crossing of 
the National border 
Foreign nationals who 
have been refused for 
entry 
Asylum 
seekers 
Children without 
parental 
accompaniment 
January 282 323 201 750 
February  199 355 138 808 
March 166 353 141 785 
April 284 389 112 547 
May 318 325 175 746 
June 16.021 319 671 1.043 
July 57.367 505 229 2.577 
August 171.066 414 15 6.976 
September 171.422 368 20 6.118 
October 191.589 491 29 4.150 
November 144.273 354 41 2.377 
December 101.843 346 116 1.077 
Total in 
2015: 
854.830 4.542 1.888 27.954 
 
To facilitate the movement of migrants across the territory of the Republic of 
Macedonia, the Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Asylum. Macedonia 
changed its asylum law on 18 June 2015 to let migrants entering the country illegally 
avoid jail if they leave within three days. The move follows a series of fatal accidents 
involving migrants traveling through Macedonia on the way to more prosperous 
European countries, following dangerous routes to avoid police arrest. It allows 
migrants to apply for temporary asylum at the border or the nearest police station. 
That will allow them to travel legally through the country for three days.81 The new Law 
                                                          
80 http://moi.gov.mk/analiza/granichni-premini/2015 
81 http://www.voanews.com/a/macedonia-migrants-asylum-law/2828577.html 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
230 
Amending the Law on Asylum82 make a distinction between the intention to submit a 
request for recognition of right of asylum and the formal aspect, ie the request for 
recognition of the right of asylum, by potential asylum seekers.  
Undeniable is the human aspect of this law, which has contributed significantly 
to improve the mobility of migrants from the southern to the northern border of the 
country. However, the figures presented in Table 1 are extremely serious and worrying. 
With a look at the last column, one may note that in 2015 in Macedonia come 27954 
children without parental care. IOM and other international organization take care 
about all of them (at least temporary protection). Less than 1000 children were 
connected with their families. Others were send to Serbian authorities for further 
proceedings. IOM has followed them through the final destination.83  
 The first wave of migrant crisis passed without serious consequences for the 
country. Financial costs were quite high, and the assistance of the relevant European 
and international institutions lacking. It is not immodest to say that the state was left 
to itself to cope with the wave of migrants which were about 50% of the total 
population. At a later stage of dealing with the migrant crisis, several EU countries84 
sent police officers in Macedonia. Their activities were more declarative than actually 
helping in controlling and dealing with the influx of people on Macedonian borders. The 
good side of dealing with the crisis is recognized in fact that the authorities has learned 
good lessons. Capacities of the Police and Macedonian Army shown as appropriate and 
with enough skills and knowledge to deal with eventual upcoming crisis.  
 
 
CURRENT SITUTATION OR WHAT WE CAN EXPECT 
 
According to the last reports, number of migrants especially on Greek island is 
increasing. Since the EU signed a deal with Turkey to halt the influx, the numbers have 
dropped dramatically but there are fears the reduction may not be sustainable. And 
because of new rules that prevent irregular migrants crossing to the Greek mainland, 
                                                          
82 Article 16a of the Law Amending the Law on Asylum, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Macedonia nr. 145, June 2015 
83 http://publications.iom.int/system/files/wmr2015_en.pdf, p. 133 
84 Including Austria, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia and later Croatia. 
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record numbers have become stuck in increasing squalid conditions, and are becoming 
more angry and desperate, says the UK-based charity. More than 10,000 migrants are 
currently being held on islands of Lesbos, Chios and Samos - the bulk of whom are 
fleeing violence and poverty in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.85 
Europe's migrant crisis in numbers:86 
- Over 275,000 migrants have reached Europe in 2016. 
- All but 10,000 have come by sea 
- 161,599 have arrived in Greece 
- 101,485 have reached Italy from North Africa 
Following the situation in Turkey, the one may conclude that controlling and 
dealing with migrants is not going to be a high priority of Turkish Authorities. As the 
spring is coming we may witness a new migrant crisis on our borders. The summer 
months routinely see a rise in the number of migrants attempting to reach Europe as 
they take advantage of better weather conditions to make the arduous journey. Concern 
among European politicians is obvious, and visits that happen during January and 
February 2017, among other aim was to assure that Macedonia continues to be a 
credible partner in dealing with migrants. Although the Balkan route was declarative 
closed almost every day the official’s record number of new migrants who cross the 
territory of the Republic of Macedonia. An average of 200 migrants per day arrive at 
the southern border, or about 2,500 in a month. After this, they are using different 
ways and channels to reach the EU.  
 One might say that Greece is taking serious measures to prevent new strong 
wave of migrants and supported by the EU to reduce the suffering of people arriving 
mainly from Turkey. Greek Coordination Centre for Management of the Migrant Crisis 
declare 64832 beds of total capacity, and at the moment there are 33783 people cared 
for.87 The very new situation in Greece is as follows:88 
- Total arrivals in Greece (Jan - Feb 2017): 1,864 
- Total arrivals in Greece during Feb 2017: 471 
- Average daily arrivals during Feb 2017: 39 
                                                          
85 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37099332  
86 https://www.iom.int/news/iom-Europe’s-migrant-crisis-in-numbers 
87 file:///C:/Users/user-pc/Downloads/GreeceSites20170214.pdf  
88 file:///C:/Users/user-pc/Downloads/Daily_Arrival_Greece_20170212.pdf  
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- Average daily arrivals during Jan 2017: 45 
- Daily estimated departures from islands to Mainland: 13 
- Estimated departures from islands to Mainland during Feb 2017: 778 
 The route of migrants are well known. They are using Turkey, Greece, 
Macedonia (or Bulgaria), Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria to reach Germany at the 
most. The picture below shows the Balkans route. In the beginning of the crisis they 
used Hungary instead of Croatia and Slovenia, but Hungary has built up a wall in order 
to stop the migrants on Serbian borders.  
 
Picture 1. Migrant route to Germany through Balkans route89 
 
                                                          
89 UNHCR, published on http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37099332  
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
233 
As the spring is coming we can expect those number to increase. The main 
reason is that the war in Syria is not ending, and the situation in Middle East is not 
getting better. That’s why, the Macedonian authorities should monitor the situation on 
a daily basis, to prevent any escalation, to protect our borders and to secure people and 
their properties.  
 
 
CONCLUSSION 
 
Past two years were extremely challenging. It was a very new experience for 
Macedonian Police and Army, as well as for all other institutions and agencies to deal 
with almost one million migrants in a period of less than a year. In the very beginning, 
we were unable to deal on an appropriate way, so we were witnesses of a numerous 
accidents involving migrants. In this manner, the author is emphasizing that migrants 
are often a victims of crime. Trafficking in Human Beings is another challenge for the 
Police and they should be aware of importance and meaning of this global phenomenon. 
More than 35 people were killed on Macedonian railways, a lot of them were fallen into 
the network of smuggling migrants. 30 criminal charges for total number of 42 
Macedonian citizens were brought for smuggling in the first half of 2015.      
However, migration flows, in particular when inadequately managed, can 
actually result into conditions of exclusion and vulnerability for those moving, as well as 
for their host communities. Migrants often face specific barriers and obstacles that 
result in specific patterns of marginalization. Even that Macedonian is not in their 
interest, all of us should be aware that they could be a potential challenge. As a 
consequence, Macedonia must follow what will happen in the near future, to monitor 
the situation especially what happening in the Greek islands and how the 
implementation of EU – Turkey agreement goes. Lessons learned from the previous 
situation and crisis management are good experience and possible solutions for 
upcoming events regarding migrants and refugee crisis.  
The authors recognize that Macedonian authorities give their best to manage 
the crisis from 2015. The impact of the refugee crisis is important. Macedonia has faced 
numerous challenges: the protection of national interests and security; responsible and 
humane treatment of refugees (limited facilities for reception, insufficient support from 
the EU and international organizations). While the "Balkan Route" was opened, most of 
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the refugees spand less than 72 hours and relatively safely passed the way from the 
southern to the northern border. A particular problem caused the closure of the "Balkan 
route" when at the southern border remained "stuck" thousands of refugees. The fact 
that they came on our borders from EU Member State additionally has complicated the 
dealing with their pressure to enter the country. First serious problems happened in 
that time. The Police was forced to use force and other powers. Considering the 
possibility of new refugee wave, it is necessary to take a number of actions that will 
lead to better preparation of services: 
- Especially useful would be educational seminars for police officers and soldiers. 
- The enhancement of international cooperation, especially cooperation between 
neighboring countries - Greece - Macedonia - Serbia. 
- To exchange experiences with countries that have faced or are facing migrant 
crisis. 
- IOM and UNHCR to engage with more resources (material and human). 
- In addition to the already installed wire fence, the authorities to provide border 
control with thermal cameras and motion sensors. 
- To pursue continuous follow-up, to prepare analyzes on a daily and monthly 
basis, to increase the capacity for stay and accommodation. 
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Abstract 
 
It is clear from the past, that mass migration seeking paradise, new 
opportunities facilitate distribution of terrorism. The fact that at least one of the 
terrorists of 13 November in Paris entered the European Union via the Balkan route, 
Berlin atacker indicates that the phenomenon of sleepy Islamists should not be 
underestimated in the context of migration. Fears of an alleged strategy of the Trojan 
Horse of the Islamic State, a strategy that has intensified in January 2015. According to 
the self-acknowledged smuggler who operates in Turkey, claims to have been sent more 
than 4,000 ISIS fighters in Europe that are loaded on ships and buses full of refugees. 
However, these observations are potentially misleading. To understand this threat is 
very important to examine the number of "refugee terrorists" by the total number of 
refugees, in the total number of terrorists acts. Research done in Western Europe show 
that the number of refugees terrorists is symbolic in terms of large numbers of 
refugees arrived in the past two years. Experts on terrorism in the Western states and 
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Balkans, also warned about hysteric perception that almost every male refugee is a 
potential terrorist. Concerns about terrorism and refugees are legitimate, but the fear 
that is expressed normally is increased and worries often are wrong. 
 
Keywords: terrorism, crisis, refugees, Europe, migrations. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The study of terrorism and the study of migration have been two separate 
fields. While there is a huge literature on both, migration and on terrorism, there are 
no indepth studies on the intersection of the two phenomena. There are multiple 
causal relations between (forced/irregular) migration and terrorism but these are 
generally complex, historically, and the number of criminals and terrorists in mass 
migration movements has been low but terrorists often have a criminal background to 
begin with (Schmid, 2016). 
Today, there are over 1 billion migrants, about one in seven persons. Each 
decade, the percentage of migrants as a share of the total population continues to rise, 
and in the next twenty-five years, the rate of migration is predicted to be higher than 
during the last twenty-five years. It has become more necessary for people to migrate 
because of environmental, economic, and political instability (Kareem, 2016) due to 
process of globalization. Climate change, in particular, may cause international 
migration to double over the next forty years (Kareem, 2016). 
In 2015 the member states of the EU received more than 1,5 million new 
applications for asylum – nearly half a million of them from Syrians and another half a 
million from Afghanis, Iraqis, Pakistanis and Nigerians. The names of these countries of 
origin already suggest a causal link to terrorism. However, there is also a more sinister 
explanation. Some argue that refugee flows – consisting these days often of mainly 
young male Muslims - are deliberately used as a kind of “Trojan horse”, being part of an 
“organized invasion” of Muslims into the West. Not just some right-wing xenophobic 
conspiracy theorists think so, even NATO’s supreme commander in Europe, General 
Philip Breedlove, recently made such a claim, suggesting that refugees are ‘weaponised’ 
by Russia against Europe (Schmid, 2016). The director of Europol recently described the 
current situation as “the highest terrorist threat we have faced for over 10 years.” 
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(Mark, 2016). These security concerns are being exacerbated by unprecedented levels of 
migration into Europe from impoverished and/or war-torn areas of the Middle East, 
Africa, and the Balkans, with ISIS known to have targeted such routes for infiltration 
(Robin, 2016). ISIS displayed its ability to strike at the heart of Europe during attacks in 
Paris in November 2015 and Brussels in January 2016, while those trained by al-Qaeda 
carried out the January 2015 raid on the Charlie Hebdo  (also in Paris). The potency of 
these groups is enhanced by their ongoing ability to inspire small cells of radicalized 
supporters living in the West to carry out attacks on their behalf. The vast majority of 
plots in the West emanate from such supporters, who have claimed a liation with a 
terrorist group without ever having traveled to popular safe havens such as Iraq, 
Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, or Yemen, it appears as though Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, 
the terrorist who killed 84 people with a 19-ton truck in Nice recently, was one such 
individual (Robin, 2016). 
 
 
Analysis of problem 
 
The conflicts in that past few years generated refugee wave towards EU. EU 
faced not just with unexpected crisis but with non existing unique policy for solving this 
huge problem. Refugee crisis for EU become the tip of the iceberg, serious economic 
pressure, facing with huge social migration and terrorist attacks.  
Germany’s generosity, and the increasing pragmatism of the Balkan countries, 
were also contributing factors, the announcement that Germany it would accept any 
Syrian’s asylum application, even if they had previously applied for asylum in other 
European countries, spurred a bigger wave of arrivals, since people no longer feared 
being arrested in Hungary, and forced to claim asylum there (Patrick. 2016). Since the 
beginning of the refugee crisis countries were not well prepared for such a large 
number of refugees and devoted more to humanitarian issue, but not to the political 
and security-terrorism. The crisis in these countries found Europe and the Western 
Balkans not prepared for such a situation, where some countries have sought financial, 
human and professional assistance to respond according to prescribed legal rules. 
Debate about the refugees, both in Europe and the United States, often 
focuses on the question of terrorism: with the Islamic State raping and beheading with 
numbing regularity in Iraq and Syria, the fear is that admitting refugees from this part 
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of the world will open the door to more terrorism and violence in Europe (Byman, 2015). 
Conservative voices in Europe have invoked the specter of Europe being flooded 
with “half a million” Islamic State fighters, while humanitarians dismiss predictions of a 
terrorism epidemic. Both sides have it wrong. Concerns about terrorism and the 
refugees are legitimate, but the fears being voiced are usually exaggerated and the 
concerns raised often the wrong ones (Byman, 2015). Because refugees are from conflict 
countries (Syria and Iraq) where the ISIS is based and it is normal to be afraid of 
sending their fighters among refugees who can do many terrorist acts, but this is not 
their policy. According to Islamic State every good muslim should travel to Islamic 
State and fight against its enemies and not leaving its state.  
Since 2014, Europe has experienced a number of terrorist incidents—including 
the November 2015 attacks in Paris and the March 2016 bombings in Brussels largely 
perpetrated in the name of the Islamic State by European fighters returning from the 
conflicts in Syria and Iraq (Archick. 2016). According to The Religion of Peace from 
09/11 till March 2017 in Europe happened 154 terrorist attacks, killed 1106 persons an 
injured 1324 persons. This cannot be the only concrete evidence to date that terrorist 
travelers systematically use the flow of refugees to enter Europe unnoticed. Till today 
we don’t have exactly researches about the numbers of terrorist acts and number of 
persons killed by refugees. Even that it was found that two of the attackers had entered 
the EU through Greece as part of the large influx of refugees from Syria. However, some 
incidents have been identified involving terrorists who have made use of migratory 
flows to enter the EU.  
The majority of Europeans believe the influx of refugees across the continent 
has led to an increase in the likelihood of terrorism. According to a survey by the Pew 
Research Center, in eight of the ten European countries surveyed at least half are 
concerned about the terror threat. The majority of people in five nations say refugees 
will be an economic burden and take away jobs and social benefits. (Independent, 2016).  
Hungarians, Poles, Greeks, Italians and French identify this as their greatest concern. 
Sweden and Germany are the only countries where at least half say refugees make their 
nation stronger because of their work and talents. Fears linking refugees and crime are 
much less pervasive, although nearly half in Italy and Sweden say refugees are more to 
blame for crime than other groups. (Pew Research Center, 2016).  
While most Europeans think the recent surge of refugees could lead to more 
terrorism, there is less alarm that Muslims already living on the Continent might 
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sympathize with extremists. The percentage of the public saying that most or many 
Muslims in their country support groups like ISIS is less than half in every nation 
polled. Still, 46% of Italians, 37% of Hungarians, 35% of Poles and 30% of Greeks think 
Muslims in their countries are favorably inclined toward such extremist groups. On 
these and other questions included on the poll, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Poland often 
stand out for expressing greater concern and more negative views about refugees and 
minority groups (Pew Research Center, 2016). 
The most frequently quoted arguments are in terms of the following attitudes 
of the public: refugees are dangerous and pose a threat to national security, refugees 
pose a threat to the EU economy, refugees have no place in Europe and should seek 
asylum in the nearest peaceful country in their region instead, refugees are people with 
another mentality and religion, and a large number of them cannot adopt the European 
values and model of behavior and cannot possibly integrate in the European community 
(Kyuchukov, 2016). Refugee crisis is seeing not only humanitarian tragedy but as threat 
for existence of European Union. 
Europe’s terrorist threat, while rising, has come overwhelmingly not from 
foreigners but from fellow Europeans. According to EUROPOL nearly two-thirds of the 
arrestees for terrorism suspect 432 (63%) in 2016 were EU citizens, the majority were 
born in the EU (58%) (Taub, 2016). At the same time, European officials remain 
concerned about European citizens who have joined other extremist groups, as well as 
self-radicalized individuals who may not have traveled abroad to fight but who have 
been motivated by Islamist propaganda to commit violence at home (Archick. 2016). 
According to the most research organizations the numbers of foreign fighters from 
Western Europe are more than 5000. 
A number of other suspected cases, including terrorist use of fraudulent 
travelling documents, have since been identified. A real and imminent danger, and one 
that will probably continue to exist for a long time, is the potential for elements of the 
(Sunni Muslim) Syrian refugee Diaspora to become vulnerable to radicalization in 
Europe (EUROPOL, 2016). UN report found little evidence that asylum seekers are 
inclined to be radicalized, or that terrorist groups systematically use migration flows for 
their purposes (UN Report, 2016).  
Just for comparison the U.S. has accepted more than 3 million refugees since 
1975, but few of them attempted terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. But as the Cato report 
for 2016 called “Terrorism and Immigration” notes, “Refugees were not very successful 
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at killing Americans.” Only three—all of them from Cuba—managed to mount successful 
attacks, killing a total of three people.90 To put that in context, the percent of 
Americans arrested for violent crime in 2015 is 250 times greater than the percent of 
refugees who turn out to be terrorists, successful or otherwise (Irwin, 2017). According 
to the same report identified 154 foreign-born people, including 20 refugees (these 20 
terrorists account for 0.0006% of all refugees admitted into the country), who were 
convicted of carrying out or attempting to carry out a terrorist attack in the U.S. over a 
40-year period, from 1975 to 2015 (Kiely, 2017). Foreign-born terrorists who entered the 
country, either as immigrants or tourists, were responsible for 88% (or 3.024) of the 
3.432 murders caused by terrorists on U.S. soil. Only 10 illegal immigrants became 
terrorists, a minuscule 0.000038% of the 26.5 million who entered from 1975 through 
2015, in other words, 2.65 million illegal immigrants entered the United States for each 
one who ended up being a terrorist (Nowrasteh, 2016). Including those murdered in the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the chance of an American perishing in a 
terrorist attack on U.S. soil that was committed by a foreigner over the 41-year period 
studied here is 1 in 3.6 million per year. For instance, the chance of an American being 
murdered in a terrorist attack caused by a refugee is 1 in 3.64 billion per year while the 
chance of being murdered in an attack committed by an illegal immigrant is an 
astronomical 1 in 10.9 billion per year. By contrast, the chance of being murdered by a 
                                                          
90According to the CDC, cows caused at least 108 deaths just between 2003–2007. That's about 
21 deaths per year, roughly 288 times more than refugees; According to the National Safety 
Council, injuries sustained from falling down stairs accounted for 1,307 deaths in the year 2000. 
That's a 1 in 2,739 chance over one's lifetime; According to the Journal of Burn Care and 
Research, an average of 100 people die each year from burns caused by hot tap water; 
The CDC found that 279 people died from dog bites between 1979 and 1994, which comes out to 
an average of about 18 people per year; Roughly 100 people die every year due to bee stings, 
according to the CDC; An average of eight people die per DAY due to traffic accidents as a result 
of texting a driving. That's 2,920 people per year; There were 76 wind-related deaths in 2011, 
and 104 in 2012; NSC statistics show that 357 people died from accidental suffocation or 
strangulation in bed in the year 2000. So not only is that way, way more than the average of 
0.075 deaths per year caused by refugees, but it also means you're actually four times more 
likely to be suffocated by your own bed than to be killed by a foreign-born terrorist of ANY kind. 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/andyneuenschwander/13-things-more-likely-to-kill-you-than-a-
refugee-terrorist?utm_term=.hdJ027R3d#.ywpKaxyBA Visited on 13, April 2017. 
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tourist on a B visa, the most common tourist visa, is 1 in 3.9 million per year 
(Nowrasteh, 2016). 
Brookings Institute, a center-left think tank in Washington D.C. says that 
“concerns about terrorism and refugees are legitimate.” But they point out that the 
situations in Europe and the U.S. are very different, for at least three reasons. First, 
according to the Brookings Institute, European Muslims are more vulnerable to 
radicalization, partly because of alienation from their communities and governments 
(The controversy over burkini bans in France is one example of this). While there are 
exceptions, American Muslims tend to be better integrated into their communities and 
the surrounding culture. Syrian refugees coming to America face similar challenges, 
but the U.S. has not had to absorb nearly as many of them as Europe. At the time 
when Europe has received nearly 700,000 first-time asylum applicants from Syria, the 
U.S. has resettled fewer than 20,000 over the same period. A second challenge is 
Europe’s proximity to the Middle East. America has not had to deal with collective 
admission of Syrian refugees in the way that Europe has. Other experts have already 
noted that the EU is “more exposed to irregular migration flows over its external 
borders. Third, while questions can (and should) be raised about the strength of 
America’s refugee vetting process, the measures currently in place are among the most 
rigorous in the world (Irwin, 2017). 
Demographic concerns and terrorist acts. Since 1985, Europe received about 
11.6 million asylum applications – meaning that last year’s 1.3 million amounted to 
about one-tenth of all applications received during the past 30 years by current EU 
countries (Pew Research Center, 2016). The European Union's population is about 500 
million. According to UNHCR nearly 370,000 refugees and migrants have arrived in 
Europe in 2016 is 0.074% of total Population of Europe. In 2015 more than 1 million 
refugees and migrants arrived in Europe, many fleeing wars in Asia and the Middle East. 
Considering the EU’s wealth and advanced economy, it is hard to argue that Europe 
lacks the means to absorb these newcomers. To put this in perspective, the U.S., with a 
population of 320 million, has some 11 million undocumented immigrants. They make 
up about 3.5 % of the U.S. population. The EU, by contrast, had between 1.9 and 3.8 
million undocumented immigrants in 2008 (the latest available figures), or less than 
one percent of its population. On 1 January 2016, the number of people living in the EU-
28 who were citizens of non-member countries was 20.7 million, while the number of 
people living in the EU-28 who had been born outside of the EU was 35.1 million 
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(Eurostat, 2016). In the USA the percentage of people living in the USA who were born 
outside the country reached 13,7% in 2015 (more than 40 million residents) and is 
projected to hit a record 14,9% in 2025 according to a Pew Research Center. This is 
twice the proportion of non-EU foreign-born people living in EU. By comparison, the 
foreign-born population is 1.63% of the total population in Japan, 7.7% in Russia, 20% 
in Canada and 27% in Australia (OECD, 2017). 
The biggest concern among the hawkers of crisis seems to be fears about 
culture. The U.S. has many more undocumented immigrants than the EU and has 
always been a nation of immigrants, America’s vitality is in large part due to the energy 
and ideas that waves of immigrants have brought to its shores. (Kenneth, 2015). But 
most European countries do not think of themselves as immigrant nations. Many 
Europeans fear that an influx of foreigners will undermine their comfortable 
cultures. Research suggests this concern is a major factor in support for populist 
extremist parties in many EU countries. That fear is accentuated in largely Christian 
Europe by the Muslim religion of most of the new arrivals. Some governments — 
Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia — have expressed a strong preference for only Christian 
refugees. This disquiet has been building for decades as Europe’s population has slowly 
changed. Predictably, the UKIP party in Britain and politicians such as Marine Le Pen 
in France, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Matteo Salvini of Italy, Milos Zeman in the 
Czech Republic are now using the refugee surge to accentuate these fears. (Kenneth, 
2015). 
Implications for counterterrorism. It is clear from the past that mass 
migration seeking paradise, new opportunities have facilitated the distribution of 
jihadist terrorism. However, these observations are potentially misleading. To 
understand this threat will present the report of mass migration and terrorism, and it 
is necessary to examine the number of "refugee’s terrorists" with the total number of 
refugees. Example of Algerians in the U.K. is illustrative. Prior to the 1990s, relatively 
few Algerians lived in Britain, but by 2004 the estimated number had risen to between 
25,000 and 30,000, according to a study by the Information Centre about Asylum and 
Refugees in the U.K. By comparison, just 44 Algerians are known, with some degree of 
certainty, to have been involved in terrorist activity in the U.K. between 1980 and 2013. 
This works out to less than 0.2% of the British-Algerian population. The 2010 U.S. 
Census estimated the country’s Somali-born population at about 85,000, yet only 36 
were involved in terrorism up until 2013, working out to 0.04%. If these examples are 
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representative, we can expect far less than 1% of the current wave of refugees to 
become involved in terrorism. (Mullins, 2016). It is also apparent that the vast majority 
of jihad terrorists operating in Western countries did not arrive as refugees. For 
example, jihad terrorism indicates that 15% of jihad terrorists who became active in the 
U.K. prior to 2013 arrived as asylum seekers or refugees. In the U.S., it is just 5%. In 
these cases, “refugee terrorists” are clearly the minority. Moreover, during the same 
time, 48% of British and 61% of American jihadist came from abroad, as opposed to 
being born in these countries. These disparities clearly demonstrate that claiming 
some form of refugee status is not a particularly common method of entry to the West 
for jihadi terrorists. Indeed, the historical record suggests that terrorists who come 
from abroad are more likely to enter a given country using a valid visa. (Mullins, 2016). 
Furthermore, several future jihadi terrorists who did come to the U.K. /U.S. as refugees 
originally did so as children traveling with their families or were otherwise legitimate 
claimants at the time they completed the application, only to radicalize later on. They 
did not, therefore, deliberately infiltrate mass migration flows to conduct acts of 
terrorism. In many respects they were homegrown terrorists. The Tsarnaev brothers, 
who had been living in the U.S. for 10 years before they bombed the 2013 Boston 
Marathon, are a case in point. The average length of time spent living in the West for 
foreigners who became jihadi terrorists after 9/11 was 9.1 years in the U.K. and 10.7 
years in the U.S. Although those who claimed asylum typically became involved in 
terrorism sooner than this — with respective averages of 1.8 and 5.3 years after 
entering the country — the fact remains that relatively few jihadi terrorists have 
entered the West disguised as asylum seekers with the preexisting intention of 
committing acts of terrorism. Instead, they are far more likely to be radicalized while 
living in a Western country come to the West from jihadi conflict zones (Mullins, 2016). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, recent history suggests that although mass migration and terrorism 
are indeed connected, refugee terrorists are the exception to the rule. (Sam Mullins, 
2016). Refugee coming from conflict countries are not primarily a concern for 
counterterrorism, but this mean that they should not be ignored by law enforcement, 
and should treat them as according to the law, especially processing and sharing 
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information upon their arrival with other agencies and other countries.  
The challenge with immigrants is a major problem for all European countries, 
and this crisis has shown that the EU only works in theory. When faced with this 
challenge, the EU has not been able to find a common solution. Measures introduced to 
address the problem are not as effective, every state had an individual approach and 
the approach is consistent with the national interests and policies, many countries see 
this situation as a matter of security, while some see as a humanitarian crisis. But the 
answer is somewhere in the middle. We should not neglect the security aspect of 
migration issues, but also and the humanitarian dimension. Legal regulation of 
migration should not be left aside. This movement of people should be done in 
conformity with these rules. The crisis must be solved by solving the crisis in the 
countries from which generated all this. We must have a long-term, comprehensive 
strategy, using various political, diplomatic, economic and security means, while not 
always bypassing the entire region as countries directly involved in the conflict and 
other countries around. All this requires commitment not only of state institutions as 
the main responsible but also and other international organizations such as UNHCR, 
IOM and other nongovernmental organizations. This applies as usual for states that 
have little experience with this issue. Terrorists in this context are a drop in the ocean. 
However, this does not mean that they do not have to go through the standard 
procedures outlined in the relevant legislation.  
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Abstract 
 
Taking into account the gender dimension of trafficking in human beings is 
essential to ensure adequate support for the female victims as well as effective 
prevention and the prosecution of traffickers. Directive 2011/36/EU of 5 April 2011 on 
preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims from a 
gender perspective recognised that this is a gender-specific phenomenon, affecting men 
and women in different ways. Therefore, the Directive obliged member states to take 
into account the gender dimension of trafficking, to develop knowledge on the gender 
specificities of the way men and women are recruited and exploited, the gender 
consequences of the various forms of trafficking and potential differences in the 
vulnerability of men and women to victimisation and its impact on them.  
This paper aims to verify in depth the compliance of Spain in terms of 
application of the Directive, in particular the adoption of a gender perspective. It will do 
it from the viewpoint that legal actors such as judges, practitioners and legislators need 
to work with some supposedly consensual idea of legal culture as a regulative ideal 
when they argue what the European law requires. The main hypothesis is that the 
Spanish legal culture regarding human trafficking interferes with the EU policy on the 
matter, especially the fuller implementation of its gender aspects, rendering the 
transposition and implementation of different elements of the EU Anti-Trafficking 
Directive contradictory and ineffective. To support her conclusions, the author offers 
contextual information based on pre-legislative and academic discussions related to the 
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legislative actions taken by the government to transpose the EU Anti-Trafficking 
Directive from a gender perspective.    
 
Keywords: Human trafficking, legal culture, gender perspective, migration 
control, prostitution 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It has been recently published the European Implementation Assessment on 
the implementation of Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and 
protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA 
(henceforth ‘the Directive’), drawn up by the Ex-Post Impact Assessment Unit of the 
Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value, within the European 
Parliament's Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services. It concludes that 
there is an uneven implementation of the Directive’s requirements across the Member 
States, in particular related to the gender dimension, which is not taken into account in 
the application of the Directive by some Member States. There is a shortfall of 
implementation of gender-specific measures in dealing with this social problem. When 
analysing the Spanish case, it is said that, ‘despite efforts made by Spain since the 
adoption of the Directive, there continues to be an ineffective application of a gender 
perspective both in terms of legal and policy framework and in terms of implementation 
of measures required by the Directive’ (European Parliament 2016: 236). 
The next section of this Article analyses the European standard on tackling 
human trafficking from a gender perspective, represented by the Directive. The third 
section shows with more detail the outcome of the European Implementation 
Assessment with regards to Spain. The fourth section offers a critical discussion of what 
is entailed by speaking of an ‘uneven implementation’ of the Directive’s requirements 
related to the gender dimension of human trafficking when analysing the Spanish case. 
The Article then goes on to show there are inherent difficulties when implementing an 
international or European standard in national contexts, discussing the relevance of the 
role of legal culture in shaping the link between the way in which the problem of 
trafficking is defined at the European level and how it is implemented at the national 
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level. In the fifth section an in-depth study of the Spanish context will show that there 
are two competing narratives when speaking about human trafficking, one related to 
illegal migration and one to human rights, and that the former is the one with more 
tradition and acceptance within the Spanish legal culture. The Article will end with 
some conclusions.  
 
 
The European standard: the gender dimension in the Directive 
2011/36/EU 
 
The use of a gender-specific focus shows that human trafficking affects women 
and men in different ways as they are trafficked for a different purpose and have 
separate experiences. Worldwide statistics reported by the UNODC (UNODC Global 
Report 2016) and EU-wide statistics reported by the Eurostat (Eurostat 2015) indicate 
that the vast majority of victims of trafficking identified in the EU Member States are 
still women and girls subjected to trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation. 
Certainly there are also men trafficked for the purposes of labour exploitation, and a 
small number of boys trafficked for sexual exploitation. Over the last 10 years the 
percentage of men and boys among detected trafficking victims has grown up, an 
increase that goes almost parallel with the significant increases in the share of victims 
who are trafficked for forced labour (UNODC Global Report 2016: 6). However, the 
number of female victims dominate in all forms of human trafficking starting from its 
most common form, sex trafficking, through to labour trafficking and the less frequently 
occurring types of trafficking crimes, such as exploitation for conducting criminal 
activities and begging, and more recently exploitative sham marriages.  
The Directive recognises ‘the gender-specific phenomenon of trafficking and 
that women and men are often trafficked for different purposes’ (Recital 3). From the 
perspective of the protection of victims, the Directive insists on the idea that this 
gender-specific perspective is part of ‘an integrated, holistic, and human rights 
approach to the fight against trafficking in human beings’ (Recital 7). Therefore, the 
Directive obliges EU Member States to take into account the gender dimension of 
trafficking when developing both preventive and repressive policies, as well as policies 
focusing on the protection of victims. From a preventive viewpoint, the Directive 
encourages Member States to develop knowledge on the gender specificities of the way 
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men and women are recruited and exploited, the gender-specific consequences of the 
various forms of trafficking, and potential differences in the vulnerability of men and 
women to victimisation and its impact on them, as well as to develop gender-specific 
assistance and support measures where appropriate. In all initiatives concerning 
measures to discourage and reduce the demand that fosters all forms of exploitation, 
and measures to reduce the risk of people becoming victims of trafficking in human 
beings, by means of research, including research into new forms of trafficking in human 
beings, information, awareness-raising, and education, Member States should adopt a 
gender perspective (Recital 25). From a repressive viewpoint, the Directive also 
indicates that the level of penalties should take into account aggravating 
circumstances, for example, when the offence is committed against a particularly 
vulnerable victim. Factors that could be considered when assessing the vulnerability of 
a victim are, for example, gender and pregnancy. Moreover, the Directive prescribes a 
more severe penalty when the offence is particularly grave, ‘for example when the life of 
the victim has been endangered or the offence has involved serious violence such as 
torture, forced drug/medication usage, rape or other serious forms of psychological, 
physical or sexual violence, or has otherwise caused particularly serious harm to the 
victim’ (Recital 12). The seriousness of the offence could be taken into account within 
the framework of the execution of the sentence.  
What has Spain done to implement the gender-specific perspective in national 
legislation and practice? 
 
 
The outcome of the European Implementation Assessment with regards to 
Spain 
 
According to the European Implementation Assessment, Spain is unable to 
tackle all forms of exploitation and to identify and protect all victims. Two factors have 
been identified as relevant: first, the primary identification of trafficked women as 
illegal migrants, and only secondarily as victims, with the State failing to adopt a 
human rights approach instead of a securitizing one, a fact partly due to the ineffective 
application of a gender perspective; and second, the exclusive focus on trafficking for 
the purpose of sexual exploitation, which makes invisible victims of other forms of 
exploitation. 
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In Spain, the double identification of trafficked women as illegal migrants and 
victims steadily colonised the territory of human trafficking and captured the attention 
of government agencies already in a consensus about a crime-control discourse in 
which the identity of trafficked women remains hidden behind their primary identity as 
illegal migrants. In such a context, the fight against trafficking is re-structured not in 
terms of focusing on victim’s rights, but in terms of avoiding a diffuse threat to the 
State (Aradau 2004: 253). Due to the emphasis on the criminal prosecution, trafficked 
victims who are unwilling to collaborate in criminal proceedings are often denied access 
to protection, even though this measure has been implemented in legislation (Article 59 
bis of the Spanish Immigration Act91). This means that the number of victims identified 
is much lower than the number of individuals detected in an at-risk situation,92 because 
if they do not show interest in collaborating with the authorities they are not even 
identified as victims. Since they are generally reluctant to testify and co-operate with 
the prosecution efforts and refuse the recovery and reflection period, they do not 
receive any protection measure.  
Second, Spanish penal legislation formally complies with the European legal 
framework and punishes trafficking for labour exploitation and harvesting of bodily 
organs, but in practice these forms of exploitation remain hidden. Governmental action 
is almost exclusively focused on trafficking for purposes of sexual exploitation, 
considered as a form of gender violence.93 As a result, law enforcement authorities are 
                                                          
91 By Organic Law 2/2009 of 11 December, amending the Organic Law 4/2000 (Ley Orgánica 
2/2009, de 11 de diciembre, de reforma de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre 
derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social), after Spain was 
condemned by the Court of Justice of the European Union for non-complete alignment of 
national law when transposing Directive 2004/81/EC (Judgement of the Court, Sixth Chamber, of 
May 14, 2009 – Spain (case C-266/08)). 
92 According to data released by CITCO 2015, 2014 and 2013, in 2015 13,879 people at risk were 
detected, of which only 133, a percentage of 0.95, were identified as victims of human trafficking 
for sexual exploitation, while in 13,983 people at risk were detected and 153 were identified as 
victims in 2014, 1.09 per cent. In 2013 the figures were 13,159 people at risk and 264 victims, the 
2 per cent. There is a preoccupying downward trend. 
93 Very clear in this regard, see the Comprehensive Plan to Combat Trafficking of Women and 
Girls for Sexual Exploitation 2015-2018 - Plan integral de Lucha contra la Trata de Mujeres y 
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not able to identify victims of human trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation 
as such. For example, the result of the 11 ex officio investigations of cases of suspected 
labour exploitation by the Spanish Ombudsperson (Defensor del Pueblo) was that of a 
total of 99 presumed victims not even one of them was actually deemed by law 
enforcement authorities to be a victim of human trafficking (Defensor del Pueblo 2012: 
69 ff.).  
Given these results, the report’s authors conclude that Spain’s transposition of 
the Directive has not created an appropriate human rights framework to address 
trafficking and adequately protect and promote the rights of trafficking victims. This 
lack of a human rights framework is the basis for the Government’s inability to create 
the necessary infrastructure to apply a gender perspective. The framework is clearly 
lacking in terms of, inter alia, strategies to address trafficking for means other than 
sexual exploitation, appropriate protocols to identify girls that are trafficked to Spain 
and appropriate mechanisms to collect data. The failure to properly implement the 
Directive means that there is a lack of a gender perspective and inadequate structure in 
which identification is taking place. The direct result of this failure is the ongoing 
presence of obstacles for the recognition of trafficking victims and their access to 
rights. (European Parliament 2016: 236) 
Despite recognising standardising efforts made by Spain since the adoption of 
the Directive, this independent evaluation indicates that level of transposition of the 
Directive and the existing legal mechanisms aimed at tackling human trafficking are not 
giving the expected results. Difficulties associated with the lack of a gender perspective 
and the dominance of a crime control approach have limited the usefulness of the 
adopted measures. The total numbers of identified and protected victims remain at very 
modest levels.  
Should we conclude that the implementation of the European standard 
represented by the Directive has failed in Spain? By no means. Some difficulties are 
inherent to the process of implementing international and European standards at 
national level. In the next section we will analyse the inherent difficulties of 
implementing European standards.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Niñas con Fines de Explotación Sexual 2015-2018 -, pp. 14-19, elaborated by the Ministry of 
Health, Social Services and Equality. 
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Concerning the inherent difficulties of implementing European standards 
 
The European standard concerning human trafficking is established in the 
Directive. As we have seen, the Directive recognizes that human trafficking has a clear 
gender dimension that should be taken into account when implementing measures 
related to victim identification, protection, assistance, prevention, and repression of the 
crime. However, the implementation is by no means easy, as shown by the European 
Implementation Assessment of the Directive: ‘even in the MS which have in principle 
implemented the Directive's requirements, its effective implementation on the ground 
appears uneven. This is particularly true when one takes into account its gender 
dimension, despite the fact that this is an important element of the Directive as 
stipulated in its Article 1’ (European Parliament 2016: 12). An effective implementation 
becomes even more difficult in countries in which, on the one hand, the gender 
perspective has produced a concentration of efforts in human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation, ignoring other forms of exploitation and, on the other hand, human 
trafficking has been tackled with a crime control approach, in the context of the fight 
against illegal migration. This is the case of Spain.  
But before analysing the reasons for this, it is important to warn of the need to 
avoid the common tendency of reducing the problems surrounding the implementation 
of European standards to the scope of the practical difficulties of implementing them. 
So, to start with, we need to define exactly what is understood as the success or failure 
of a European standard. For example, although there is no doubt that many countries 
still have a low level of compliance with the Directive, it is generally recognised that its 
transposition has led to greater efforts being made, which in turn, increases the level of 
awareness of the political elite regarding the need to do something about this, and, 
therefore, this also increases the efforts made concerning this issue. 
Secondly, European standards normally tend to mask the differences between 
those promoting the action. Discrepancies about the ‘real meaning’ of these 
agreements are common and constant. It could be said that each country has its own 
way of implementing them, as the concept of legal culture would suggest.94 If indeed 
                                                          
94 The broad definition of legal culture used here is one way of describing relatively stable 
tendencies of lawful social attitudes and behaviours. The identifying elements of legal culture 
range from facts concerning institutions, like the number and role of lawyers or the ways in 
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national differences do exist, what should be done about this? Does something really 
need to be done? From a certain point of view these differences present an obstacle 
that has to be overcome through harmonisation and cooperation. For example, one of 
the objectives of the Directive was to ‘strengthen policies to prevent trafficking in 
human beings, including measures to discourage and reduce the demand that fosters 
all forms of exploitation, and measures to reduce the risk of people becoming victims of 
trafficking in human beings, by means of research, including research into new forms of 
trafficking in human beings, information, awareness-raising, and education’ (Recital 25). 
One could think that this objective is in danger because of the uneven implementation 
of the Directive. From another point of view, however, it could be argued that 
implementation should, in fact, be different if the contexts and challenges themselves 
are. It may be that maintaining political, legal and cultural diversity is an intrinsic value, 
even if it does lead to different results when implementing European standards.  
With regards human trafficking, although communication between the national 
monitoring systems with authority over this matter is improving, there is still very little 
cooperation or cross-fertilisation of ideas across the national borders. So, the Council of 
Europe, the European Union, the United Nations, and other worldwide institutions 
continue to offer general advice intended to be universally valid about how to 
effectively respond to the problem of human trafficking. Perhaps, however, we should 
first understand the specific features of each legal culture before we can overcome 
them, especially when these differences also affect the way in which European 
standards, which are intended to be intercultural but are not in reality, are interpreted 
and followed. The point is that countries make use of European standards in line with 
their national way of understanding them, locally, often with aims that are essentially 
local rather than cooperative. We should understand better this kind of approach in 
order to improve national efforts in the fight against human trafficking. The European 
Implementation Assessment also recognises that the detected shortcomings are often 
                                                                                                                                                    
which judges are allocated and controlled, to different forms of conduct like the indices of 
judicialisation and prisonisation, and, at the other end of the scale, more nebulous aspects of 
ideas, values, aspirations and mentalities. Like general culture, legal culture encompasses who 
we are, not just what we do (Nelken 2004: 1-26). Further discussion about this term can be 
found in Nelken (1997) and Nelken and Feest (2001). Specifically on why this term is preferable 
to others like legal system, juridical tradition, legal mentality or juridical ideology, Nelken (2006: 
200, 208-211). 
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dependent on specific national contexts. In the next section a brief description of the 
Spanish legal context will help us to identify the causes of the main problems detected 
by the European Implementation Assessment. 
 
 
The Spanish legal context 
 
In this section two intertwined aspects will be explored, both identified by the 
European Implementation Assessment as the most relevant factors when explaining the 
Spanish lack of compliance. First, the link between human trafficking and prostitution, 
which resulted in a subsequent connection between human trafficking and gender 
violence that ended in the invisibility of other forms of trafficking that are not for 
purposes of sexual exploitation. This viewpoint can be framed within the myth of white 
slavery (Maqueda Abreu 2009a, 2009b; Puente Aba and Iglesias Skulj 2015: 72), which 
stills permeates world politics on the topic today (Doezema 2000, 2010). Second, the 
link between human trafficking and illegal migration, which ended in the securitization 
of the entire legal framework and the relegation of a human rights approach to a 
secondary place behind the crime control paradigm that dominates the fight against 
human trafficking in Spain. 
 
 
On the link between human trafficking and prostitution 
 
Up to the late 1980s, most members of the Spanish feminist movement 
conceptualised prostitution as an extreme form of women’s exploitation, a position that 
usually coincided with the abolitionist legal approach (Valiente 2004: 210). Since then, 
some Spanish feminists began to state that there are two types of prostitutes, those 
who work voluntarily and those who are forced into prostitution by others, and that the 
state should actively fight forced prostitution but not free sex work (Garaizábal 1991; 
Pineda 1995: 108-109). 
Despite the lively discussion inside the feminist movement, the parliamentary 
debate that led to the 1995 Spanish Penal Code hardly contained any reference to 
prostitution (Valiente 2004: 209-210), even though the new code contained important 
reforms regarding its regulation. It no longer defined promoting the prostitution of 
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others or benefiting from it as a crime, except in the case of prostitution of minors and 
legally incapacitated people, but punished people who forced others to be prostitutes. 
In spite of implicitly distinguishing between voluntary and forced prostitution 
(Carracedo Bullido 2001: 155-157), the new code coincided with the goals of those in 
favour of regulation only to a certain extent (Garaizábal 1991: 10). 
At the time of the enactment of the 1995 Penal Code no reference at all was 
made to human trafficking.95 The first legal intervention on human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation dates back to 1999, when the 1995 Spanish Penal Code was revised by 
Organic Law 11/1999 of 30 April to include it as a new crime (Article 188), while at the 
same time modifying some aspects of the regulation of crimes related to prostitution. A 
year later, in 2000, the new Immigration Act (Organic Law 4/2000 of January 11, 2000 
on the rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration - Ley 
Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en 
España y su integración social) offered permanent residence and work permits to illegal 
immigrants trafficked into Spain and forced into prostitution if they denounced their 
traffickers or co-operated with public authorities in the prosecution of these traffickers 
(Article 55).  
These two amendments were clearly based on an abolitionist approach. In fact, 
Spanish policies related to human trafficking were from the beginning based on the 
same abolitionist stance that considers prostitution as a form of sexual exploitation.96 
                                                          
95 The previous 1944 Penal Code regulated two different offences regarding human trafficking: 
trafficking in workers and cooperation in illegal immigration (Article 499 bis 3) and trafficking for 
the purpose of prostitution (Article 442 bis a). It also included an offence of cooperation in 
prostitution activities and the recruitment of women for prostitution, inside or outside the 
Spanish territory (Article 452 bis a). The facilitation, promotion or recruitment of women under 
18 years were considered criminal activities in any case (Article 452 bis b). 
96 This can be clearly observed both in public discourses of Spanish policy makers, such as the 
Minister of Labour and Social Affairs (see El País, February 20, 2002: 24), and official documents 
such as the parliamentary report on the current situation of prostitution in Spain (Informe de la 
ponencia para elaborar un dictamen informativo sobre la situación actual de la prostitución en 
nuestro país, published in the Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales, sección Cortes Generales, 
VIII Legislatura, Serie A, April 13, 2007, 19 ff.), or the Third Gender Equality Plan 1997-2000 (III 
Plan para la Igualdad de Oportunidades entre Mujeres y Hombres 1997-2000, elaborated by the 
Spanish Women’s Institute, Instituto de la Mujer 1997: 73-74, 78). It is also confirmed by experts 
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The connection between human trafficking and prostitution was quite clear in the 
Comprehensive Plan to Combat Human Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation 2009-2012 
(Plan integral de Lucha contra la Trata con Fines de Explotación Sexual 2009-2012), 
and it has been reinforced in the Comprehensive Plan to Combat Trafficking of Women 
and Girls for Sexual Exploitation (Plan integral de Lucha contra la Trata de Mujeres y 
Niñas con Fines de Explotación Sexual 2015-2018), both elaborated by the Spanish 
Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality.  
The strong connection between human trafficking and prostitution is quite 
surprising, especially because, as indicated before, Spanish penal legislation related to 
prostitution cannot be defined as abolitionist, but as imperfect regulationism. The 
explanation is to be seen in the influence exerted by the Women’s Institute (Instituto 
de la Mujer). Its Third Gender Equality Plan 1997-2000 (III Plan para la igualdad de 
oportunidades entre Mujeres y Hombres 1997-2000) inspired the penal reforms related 
to the topic. This document used an abolitionist perspective (Valiente 2004: 221). Since 
then, the link between human trafficking for sexual exploitation and prostitution has 
been continuously reinforced by governmental actions. 
The aforementioned connection has at least two important consequences. 
Firstly, it brands the implementation of systems for the prevention and early detection 
of situations of trafficking. For example, inspections in places at potential risk of human 
trafficking are centred in premises where prostitution is carried out. Less attention is 
dedicated to places where labour exploitation is a well-known reality, such as the 
sectors of agriculture, in particular seasonal work, textile industry, domestic service, 
construction and hotel/catering trade. It should be noted that there is still no plan to 
combat human trafficking with other purposes than sexual exploitation. This is a proof 
of a lack of strategic and policy instruments to combat these forms of trafficking in 
Spain, confirmed by the fact that there is no single institutional structure in charge of 
developing and co-ordinating anti-trafficking action for all types of exploitation and all 
victims of trafficking, including men and boys (GRETA 2013: 22-23).  
Secondly, the issue of trafficking in women has been linked in the Spanish 
context to the wider phenomenon of gender violence (see for instance Jurado Román 
2010, Gutiérrez García 2015). The task of proposing awareness-raising measures against 
                                                                                                                                                    
(Puente Aba and Iglesias Skulj 2015: 74). Nevertheless, there were no references to gender 
issues in the parliamentary debate that led to the 1999 amendment (Valiente 2004: 216). 
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trafficking has been confided to the Government Office for Gender Violence since 2011, 
when royal decree 263/2011 of 28 February attributed to this Office the competence in 
the fight against all forms of gender violence, considering trafficking as a form of 
special vulnerability to gender violence. The preparation of protocols for detecting and 
reporting situations of trafficking in health, social and educational areas has been 
carried out through a new Common Protocol for healthcare actions against gender 
violence, approved on December 20, 2012. Nevertheless, this link between human 
trafficking with the purpose of sexual exploitation and gender violence does not mean 
that protection measures offered to the victims of gender violence are also offered in 
cases of human trafficking, because they are not. 
 
 
On the link between human trafficking and illegal migration 
 
Trafficking of human beings is located in Spain in the migration, crime, and 
security nexus, following international trends on this regard (Aronowitz, 2011; Spencer, 
2014, pp. 299 ff.).  
In 2000 an amendment of the 1995 Penal Code (by the new Immigration Act) 
integrated in the same article two offences, smuggling of migrants and clandestine 
immigration and illegal trafficking in human beings for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation, with the latter applied only when the illegal migrant was victim of 
trafficking for sexual exploitation, in which case an aggravated punishment was 
provided (Article 318 bis). In 2003 the offence was reformulated (by Organic Law 
11/2003), but maintained the same approach by which the victim of human trafficking 
could only be a foreign citizen, as clearly stated by the Spanish Supreme Court in its 
judgement 625/2007 of July 2.  In 2007 (by Organic Law 13/2007 of 19 November, Ley 
Orgánica 13/2007, de 19 de noviembre, para la persecución extraterritorial del tráfico 
ilegal o la inmigración clandestina de personas) this offence entered the limited 
catalogue of crimes that at that time were subject to universal prosecution by Spanish 
courts (see León 2010: 400-401 on the reasons that justified this change). 
The lack of distinction between smuggling and trafficking was severely 
criticised (Pozuelo Pérez 2005; Villacampa Estiarte 2006, 2011; Daunis Rodríguez 2010, 
2013, 2014; Iglesias Skulj 2011, 2012). It resulted in a purely security-based approach 
(León 2010: 368), ‘triggering multiple initiatives intended to protect the sovereign 
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spaces of the EU as much as the sovereign bodies of women’ (Puente Aba and Iglesias 
Skulj 2015: 76, citing Aradau 2004: 253). Even when implementing a human rights 
approach this was done in the context of migration policies and the fight against the 
smuggling of migrants. For example, one of the objectives of the First Human Rights 
Plan for 2009-2011 (Plan de Derechos Humanos) was to combat human trafficking, 
including through closer international co-operation, but it addressed human trafficking 
exclusively in the context of illegal migration (GRETA 2013: 14). 
The connection between human trafficking and illegal migration is also quite 
surprising, not so much from a conceptual viewpoint – as Outshoorn (2005: 143) 
observed, ‘The dynamics of trafficking are best explained by migration theory’ -, but 
from a practical one. The available statistical data show that most of the trafficked 
victims come from the EU (65 per cent of the registered victims in the period 2010-
2012, according to Eurostat 2015: 41). The percentage is significantly lower in Spain (45 
per cent of victims from the EU in 2011, according to Defensor del Pueblo 2012: 102-
203), a fact that can be explained by the early conceptualization of trafficking as an 
aggravated form of smuggling of illegal migrants, in this way preventing the 
identification of EU victims of trafficking as such. We should also remember that during 
this period certain provisions of the Penal Code concerning labour rights violations were 
used to prosecute cases of human trafficking with purposes of labour exploitation, 
before this form of trafficking was introduced in 2010. For example, Article 312.2 - 
which punishes the recruitment of workers by offering them false jobs or misleading 
working conditions and the employment of foreigners without work permits in 
conditions that prejudice, reduce or remove their rights as established by law, collective 
agreement or employment contract - and Article 313 - which criminalises the enabling 
of migration of a person to another country through fake contracts, job offers or other 
forms of deceit. Victims of these offences were not recognised as victims of human 
trafficking. 
In 2010 a new amendment of the 1995 Penal Code (by Organic Law 5/2010 of 
22 June amending the Penal Code - Ley Orgánica 5/2010, de 22 de junio, por la que se 
modifica la Ley Orgánica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del Código Penal) made once 
again independent the offence of trafficking in human beings with the purpose of sexual 
exploitation, forced work and the extraction of bodily organs (since then regulated in 
Article 177 bis) from that of smuggling, while still maintaining in force Article 318 bis, in 
spite of its obsolescence in the new legal framework. But the confusion between the 
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smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings is still evident in some 
governmental tools. For example, the National Action Plan Against Human Trafficking 
for Sexual Exploitation 2008-2012 (Plan integral de lucha contra la trata de seres 
humanos con fines de explotación sexual), approved in December 12, 2008, in spite of 
emphasizing the importance of distinguishing trafficking in human beings from the 
smuggling of migrants, stated that ‘both trafficking and smuggling occur through 
causes established by irregular migration networks’. Following this trend, the National 
Strategy against Organised Crime for 2011-2014 (Estrategia Española contra el Crimen 
Organizado 2011-2014) included human trafficking as one of the crimes to be combated 
as a priority,97 but linked it with the fight against illegal migration (GRETA 2013: 15). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The inadequacy of the Spanish legal framework with regards to the obligations 
to identify, assist and protect victims of trafficking is directly connected with a 
governmental focus of Spain’s anti-trafficking action on sexual exploitation of women 
and girls, on the one hand, and the combat against illegal migration on the other hand, 
rather than assisting and protecting all victims of trafficking for all forms of 
exploitation. In order to ensure the implementation of European standards we should 
take into account why the Spanish legal culture is still influenced by these two factors, 
so that we can decide the priority that must be given to proposals elaborated to 
improve efforts made by Spain in the fight against human trafficking. The Spanish 
policy response to human trafficking shows an over-concentration on sexual 
exploitation and migration control, locating law enforcement at the centre of the 
strategic response. 
Perhaps it is time to defy the established criminal policy narratives which 
structure the legal interventions and the implementation of policies regarding human 
                                                          
97 Human trafficking is usually perceived as an issue related to organised crime. This is also the 
case in the European Union, where the Directive says that human trafficking is a serious crime 
‘often committed within the framework of organised crime’. The same focus is assumed in Spain. 
Conversely, human trafficking would be better understood ‘as a crime often perpetrated by 
people known to or, in many cases, related to the victims…’ (IPPR 2013: 4). Critically on this 
regard, Spencer (2014). 
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trafficking in both the European and national context, and pay attention to other 
narratives that have been trying to be heard. These oppositional narratives offer a 
different analysis to that of the dominant discourses. Although until now they have 
featured little in policymaking discussions, an increasing body of evidence suggests that 
‘policy is structured around a set of questions that have probably more to do with 
anxieties concerning migration and prostitution than they have with an anxiety over 
trafficking, for as Spanger (2011) has noted the dominant discourses are most often 
concerned with constructions of morality’ (Spencer, 2014, p. 306). 
 
 
References 
 
1. Aradau C (2004) The Perverse Politics of Four-Letter Words: Risk and Pity in 
the Securitisation of Human Trafficking. Millenium: Journal of International 
Studies 33(2): 251-277. 
2. Aronowitz A A (2011) Smuggling and trafficking in human beings: the 
phenomenon, the markets that drive it and the organizations that promote it. 
European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research 9(2): 163-195. 
3. Carracedo Bullido R (2001) Legislación penal española. In Dirección General de 
la Mujer de la Comunidad de Madrid (ed) Simposio internacional sobre 
prostitución y tráfico de mujeres con fines de explotación sexual. Madrid: 
Dirección General de la Mujer de la Comunidad de Madrid, 149-159. 
4. CITCO (2013) Balance 2013 de la lucha contra la trata de seres humanos con 
fines de explotación sexual. Available at 
http://www.interior.gob.es/prensa/balances-e-informes/2013  
5. CITCO (2014) Balance de la Lucha contra el Crimen Organizado. Available at 
http://www.interior.gob.es/prensa/balances-e-informes/2014  
6. CITCO (2015) Balance 2015 de prevención y lucha contra la trata de seres 
humanos en España y avance del Informe 2015 sobre los delitos de odio. 
Available at http://www.interior.gob.es/prensa/balances-e-informes/2015  
7. Daunis Rodríguez A (2010) Sobre la urgente necesidad de una tipificación 
autónoma e independiente de la trata de personas. InDret: Revista para el 
Análisis del Derecho 1/2010: 1-44. 
8. Daunis Rodríguez A (2013) El delito de trata de seres humanos. Valencia: Tirant 
lo Blanch. 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
264 
9. Daunis Rodríguez A (2014) El enfoque trafiquista y la perspectiva de género en 
la prostitución y la trata de seres humanos. In Laurenzo Copello P and R Durán 
Muñoz (eds) Diversidad cultural, género y Derecho. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 
631-664. 
10. Defensor del Pueblo (2012) La trata de seres humanos en España: víctimas 
invisibles. Madrid: Defensor del Pueblo. 
11. Defensora del Pueblo (2014) Comparecencia de 11 de junio de 2014, de doña 
Soledad Becerril Bustamante, Defensora del Pueblo, ante la Subcomisión para 
el análisis y estudio de la trata de seres humanos con fines de explotación 
sexual, constituida en el seno de la Comisión de Igualdad del Congreso de los 
Diputados, para informar en relación con el objeto de la misma. Available at 
https://www.defensordelpueblo.es/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/2014_11_junio_Defensora_Trata.pdf  
12. Delegación del Gobierno para la Violencia de Género (2015) Apoyando a las 
víctimas de trata. Las necesidades de las mujeres víctimas de trata con fines de 
explotación sexual desde las entidades especializadas y profesionales 
involucrados. Propuesta para la sensibilización contra la trata. Madrid: 
Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad. 
13. Delegación del Gobierno para la Violencia de Género (2016) Boletín Estadístico 
Anual 2015. Madrid: Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad. 
14. Doezema J (2000) Loose Women or Lost Women? The Re-Emergence of the 
Myth of White Slavery in Contemporary Discourses of Trafficking in Women. 
Gender Issues 18(1): 23-50.  
15. Doezema J (2010) Sex Slaves and Discourse Masters. The Construction of 
Trafficking. London-New York: Zed Books. 
16. European Parliament (2016) Trafficking in Human Beings from a Gender 
Perspective. Directive 2011/36/EU. European Implementation Assessment. 
Brussels: Ex-Post Impact Assessment Unit. 
17. Eurostat (2015) Trafficking in human beings. Luxembourg: Publications Office 
of the European Union. 
18. Garaizábal C (1991) La prostitución: Un debate abierto. In Forum de Política 
Feminista (ed) Prostitución: Debate y propuestas del movimiento feminista. 
Madrid: Forum de Política Feminista: 6-10. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
265 
19. GRETA (2013) Report concerning the implementation of the Council of Europe 
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings by Spain. First 
evaluation round. Strasbourg: Secretariat of the Council of Europe Convention 
on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings. 
20. Gutiérrez García A (2015) La trata de mujeres con fines de explotación sexual. 
Una clase específica de violencia de género. In Gallardo Rodríguez A and M del 
Pozo Pérez (eds) ¿Podemos erradicar la violencia de género? Análisis, debate y 
propuestas. Granada: Comares, 105-118. 
21. Iglesias Skulj A (2011) El control penal de las trabajadoras del sexo en el ámbito 
de las políticas contra la trata de mujeres con fines de explotación sexual (el 
caso español). Derecho Penal y Criminología 32(92): 22-41. 
22. Iglesias Skulj A (2012) Sistema penal y perspectiva de género: trabajo sexual y 
trata de personas. Granada: Comares. 
23. Institute of Public Policy Research (2013) Beyond Borders. Human Trafficking 
from Nigeria to the UK. London: IPPR. 
24. Jurado Román N (2010) Trata de blancas versus violencia de género o 
respuesta a una demanda social. In Avilés Gómez M (ed) Delitos y delincuentes: 
cómo son, cómo actúan. Alicante: Editora Club Universitario, 305-320 
25. León FJ de (2010) Spanish legislation against trafficking in human beings: 
punitive excess and poor victims assistance. Crime, Law and Social Change 
54(5): 381-409.  
26. Maqueda Abreu ML (2009a) Prostitución, Feminismos y Derecho Penal. 
Granada: Comares. 
27. Maqueda Abreu ML (2009b) A propósito de la trata y de las razones que llevan 
a confundir a l@s migrantes con esclav@s. In Carbonell Mateu JC, JL González 
Cussac and E Orts Berenguer (eds) Constitución, derechos fundamentales y 
sistema penal. Semblanzas y estudios con motivo del setenta aniversario del 
Prof. Vives Antón. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 1244-1260. 
28. Nelken D (ed) (1997) Comparing Legal Cultures. Aldershot: Dartmouth. 
29. Nelken D (2004) Using the Concept of Legal Culture. Australian Journal of 
Legal Philosophy 29: 1-26. 
30. Nelken D (2010) Human Trafficking and Legal Culture. Israel Law Review 43(3): 
479-513. 
31. Nelken D (2014) Comparative Legal Cultures. In Bruinsma G and D Weisburd 
(eds) Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice. Volume 2. C. New York: 
Springer, 458-467. 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
266 
32. Nelken D and J Feest (eds) (2001) Adapting Legal Cultures. Oxford: Hart. 
33. Outshoorn J (2005) The Political Debates on Prostitution and Trafficking of 
Women. Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 12(1): 
141-155. 
34. Pineda E (1995) Algunas reflexiones sobre el estado actual del feminismo en 
España. Género y Sociedad 3: 95-116. 
35. Pozuelo Pérez L (2005) Tráfico de personas y explotación sexual. In Bacigalupo 
S and M Cancio Meliá (eds) Derecho penal y política transnacional. Barcelona: 
Atelier, 417-440. 
36. Puente Aba LM and A Iglesias Skulj (2015) The Spanish Action Plan Against 
Trafficking in Women: Policies and Outcomes (2008-2011). In Guia MJ (ed) The 
Illegal Business of Human Trafficking. Heidelberg et al.: Springer, 71-86. 
37. Spencer J (2014) Human trafficking policy making and the politics of 
international criminal justice. In Van Duyne PC, J Harvey, GA Antonopoulos, K 
von Lampe, Maljević and A Markovska (eds) Corruption, greed and crime 
money. Sleaze and shady economy in Europe and beyond. Oisterwijk: Wolf 
Legal Publishers, 291-312. 
38. UNODC (2016) Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2016. Vienna: United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
39. Valiente C (2004) State feminism and central state debates on prostitution in 
post-authoritarian Spain. In Outshoorn J (ed) The Politics of Prostitution. 
Women’s Movements, Democratic states and the Globalisation of Sex 
Commerce. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 205-224. 
40. Villacampa Estiarte C (2006) Normativa europea y regulación del tráfico de 
personas en el Código penal español. In Rodríguez Mesa MJ and LR Ruiz 
Rodríguez (eds) Inmigración y sistema penal. Retos y desafíos para el siglo XXI. 
Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 69-108. 
41. Villacampa Estiarte C (2011) El Delito de Trata de Seres Humanos. Una 
Incriminación Dictada desde el Derecho Internacional. Cizur Menor: Thomson 
Reuters Aranzadi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
267 
341.171.071.51(4-672EУ:497):32 
 
Politicisation of enlargement:  
The future of the Balkans in Europe 
 
Helga Molbæk-Steensig, 
 Copenhagen University, Faculty of Law,  
E-mail: Helga.molbaek-steensig@jur.ku.dk 
 
 
Abstract 
 
When will we join the EU?’ and ‘Why is it taking so long?’ These are recurring 
questions in euroenthusastic circles in the Balkans, while, ‘Can we afford it?’ and ‘Will I 
lose my job to an immigrant?’ are recurring questions in eurosceptic and anti-globalist 
circles in the old EU member states. The question of enlargement has become 
politicised, something you can be for or against. In 1999 Alston and Weiler described 
European enlargement as a moral imperative (Alston and Weiler 1999: 672) and the 
Treaty of the European Union still prescribes that membership is open to any European 
country that is committed to promoting the European values of human rights, minority 
protection, market economy and rule of law (TEU art 49 and 2). The term ‘enlargement 
fatigue’, however, emerged after the 2004 enlargement, and thus raised the question 
‘should we continue enlargement’ rather than ‘how can we facilitate enlargement’. While 
the TEU has not changed in this respect, discourse in the member states and towards 
the candidate states have changed. Similar to the concept of European integration 
(Føllesdal 2004: 4), European enlargement has become politicized.   
This article will consist of a historic account of the EU enlargement policy from 
the first enlargement to the latest. Reviewing the reasoning for changing the 
enlargement policies from the post-accession harmonization process of the 1970s and 
1980s to the pre-accession process in the 2000s, and European conditionality policies 
in the Balkans, asking how and why they changed and what it means for a Balkan future 
in Europe. Throughout the analysis I will utilize Schulz-Forbergs theory on how the 
power of conceptualisations, such as the concept of enlargement, change over time, as 
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well as theories on European normative power and legitimacy indicators as described by 
Andreas Føllesdal, Alston and Weiler, and others. 
 
Keywords: Enlargement fatigue, politicisation, EU accession, legitimacy, 
normative power 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a 
society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men prevail.”  
(Treaty of the European Union (TEU) art. 2)  
 
Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is 
committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.[…]  
(TEU art. 49) 
 
The legal foundation for European Union(EU) enlargement lies in article 49 of 
the Treaty of the European Union(TEU), and it relies on two concepts, the geographic or 
historic notion of a ‘European state’ – which has not been clearly defined – and political 
adherence to the common European values as prescribed in article 2. The provision for 
enlargement has changed somewhat from the article 98 of the treaty establishing the 
Coal and Steel Community in 1952, which welcomed any European state that could 
achieve unanimous agreement on enlargement with the existing member states. The 
political reasoning behind the provision in 1952 emerged from the debate between the 
federalists and functionalists, famously summarised by French president Schuman in his 
1950 declaration “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It 
will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.” 
(Schuman declaration may 9th 1950). Gradually increased European integration in depth 
and in breadth, and thereby gradual enlargement, was thus very much part of the post 
Second World War order and the plan for development of European cooperation.  
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Whether the initial motivation for European cooperation is categorised as a 
new human rights and rule of law paradigm in the super-narrative of avoiding another 
war like the Second World War (Schulz-Forberg 2011), or as a security objective for 
Western Europe during the cold war (Kelstrup, Martinsen & Wind 2012), or both, the 
situation changed in the 1990s. Communism fell, a large number of newly democratised 
states emerged on the European scene, and of course, a devastating war took place in 
the former Yugoslavia, with crimes against humanity in category with those committed 
during the Second World War. These developments simultaneously challenged the 
union’s legitimacy based in the war-prevention discourse, and provided the union with 
dozens of new potential member states and thereby increased geopolitical power. As a 
response, during the following two decades, the union has changed its enlargement 
procedures and continually debates its integration policies. For reasons of scope, this 
article will deal only with the enlargement process.  
This article will consist of two background chapters, where the first part ‘A 
Brief History of Enlargement’ accounts for the changes in EU enlargement procedures 
from the first enlargement in 1973 to the latest in 2013 and the potential futures for 
candidate- and potential candidate countries. This is an internal perspective on EU 
enlargement and how it is influenced by intra-EU developments, economic and political. 
The second, ‘Bulwark or Bridge State’, reviews the influence of candidate states’ 
national narratives on accession speed and process to the EU. This second chapter 
starts the theoretical part of the article, utilising Benedict Anderson’s theory on 
national narratives and Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power. This is an external 
perspective on enlargement, analysing how an imagined community’s national 
narratives affects both the internal cohesion and its foreign policy space. 
 Two analytical chapters will follow this, the first accounting in brief for the 
theoretical synthesis, of Bourdieuan doxa and liberal international institutionalism and 
soft power, explaining the EU stance towards new member states. The second accounts 
for the theory on politicisation through theories on legitimacy and normative power, 
and insights from conceptual history.  
 Finally, this leads into the conclusion, which will reiterate the theoretical 
results and attempt to make some predictions about the specific challenges and 
timelines for the candidate- and potential candidate states in the Balkans to accede to 
the EU. 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
270 
A brief history of enlargement98 
 
After the creation of the Coal and Steel union in 1952, the UK attempted twice 
to join the union, but in both cases demanding special agreements for import of 
commonwealth goods, and was in both cases rejected. The first successful enlargement 
was in 1973, when Ireland, UK, and Denmark joined the European Economic Community 
(EEC). At this time, harmonisation to the acquis took place in a five-year adjustment 
period following accession rather than before accession (Leonard 2005). In the following 
years, European cooperation changed with the Schengen Agreement in 1985, the Single 
European Act in 1986, and the Maastricht and Edinburgh treaties in 1992-1993 that 
established the pillar structure and gathered a lot of European cooperation into one 
organisation, the EU. The Amsterdam and Nice treaties addressed issues of democratic 
deficit within the EU by increasing the power of the European Parliament, making the 
union more supra-national and less intergovernmental in the process. The Amsterdam 
and Nice treaties from late 1990s and early 2000s also prepared the EU for an influx of 
new members (Schütze 2012). The second and third enlargements, including Greece, 
Spain, and Portugal, were similar to the first enlargement but with a longer transition 
period for the former dictatorships and more restrictions on workers’ freedom of 
movement from Spain and Portugal (Leonard 2005). 
 The fall of the iron curtain in 1989-1990 resulted in an emergence of several 
new potential candidate states. In this period, Turkey also approached the EU in order 
to join a full customs union after having had its application for membership shelved in 
1987. These prospects of many new potential member states including one very large, 
raised the issue of the EUs absorption capacity. The concept of EU absorption capacity 
was based in a worry that integrating new member states could damage not only their 
economies because they were not ready for full market competition, but also the 
economies of existing member states and the momentum of integration, political goals, 
and public opinion in the EU (Accession Process EUR-Lex - l14536). This led the 
harmonisation process to move. Instead of a transition period after accession, 
harmonisation now had to be concluded before accession.  
                                                          
98 Elements of this chapter is based on chapter one in my master’s thesis. Not previously 
published. 
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 The 1990s also prompted internal challenges to the EU. First, the Maastricht 
treaty, which was to be ratified in 1992, was rejected in Denmark, which had per 
tradition put the matter to a referendum. Some analysts (Kelstrup, Martinsen & Wind 
2012) mark this event as the beginning of an EU legitimacy crisis. Andreas Føllesdal has 
noted that the referendum results and court cases in Denmark and Germany concerning 
the constitutionality of sovereignty transfer challenged the permissive consensus 
legitimacy that the EU had relied on until then. The implicit consensus of the 
populations could no longer be assumed and thus the integration process – at least in 
depth – was politicised (Føllesdal 2004). This politicisation was also underway in the 
enlargement process – integration in breadth – but was addressed by the EU 
institutions with the changes to the accession process.  
 
 
New accession process and enlargement fatigue 
 
The 1993 summit in Copenhagen, where the European Council formulated the 
Copenhagen Criteria99 for new member states, was the beginning of a new accession 
process. New candidate states now had to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria and harmonise 
with the acquis before accession and got assistance from the EU institutions to do so 
(European Council Press Release Copenhagen 1993 and Annex II). In order to ease 
negotiations on the harmonisation of national legislation with EU law, the acquis was 
divided into 31 chapters for the fifth enlargement in 2004. 
In 2004, the UK among a few other EU member states opened its borders 
immediately to workers from the new EU member states as part of the already existing 
British managed migration agenda. The influx of workers was greater than expected and 
the government failed to prevent the popular discourse of the job-stealing Polish 
plumber, despite the migrants actually benefitting the UK economy and job market 
(Springford 2014). By 2007, the UK along with other EU members had introduced 
restrictions to workers from the newest EU member states Bulgaria and Romania 
                                                          
99 Stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities; 2) A functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competition and market forces in the EU; 3) The ability to take on and implement effectively the 
obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union (Conditions for membership, europa.eu).  
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(Szołucha 2010: 4). These restrictions now apply to Croatian workers as well. The 
restrictions on the movement of workers from new member states is not directly tied to 
increased conditionality for candidate states, but it is an indicator of a growing 
reluctance in existing member states to have more candidate states accede; a tendency 
also known as enlargement fatigue.  
 The term ‘enlargement fatigue’ is assumed by some scholars to be the result of 
a combination of insufficiently tight conditionality applied in 2004 and 2007, and the 
crisis of confidence following the 2005 failure of the constitutional treaty, the result of 
which included a lack of institutional capacity to admit new member states (Szołucha 
2010). It is worth noting, though, that the Lisbon treaty in 2009 solved the institutional 
capacity problem, and addressed the constitutional crisis, but in member state 
discourse, enlargement fatigue remains in force. Likewise, the financial crisis, which hit 
the South and Southeast European countries particularly hard, has contributed to the 
discourse of absorption capacity and enlargement fatigue, but the European 
institutions’ solutions were neither lesser integration or a slowdown of the enlargement 
programme. Therefore, enlargement fatigue is an internal EU issue in public discourse 
and domestic political programmes. It influences enlargement processes in subtle ways 
when central political figures gain popular support by stating that there is a pause in 
the enlargement strategies. However, these are often cheap comments, such as in 2014 
when Juncker promised no more enlargements within the next five years (Juncker 2014). 
The real issue with enlargement fatigue is not that it delays enlargement, since there is 
no real indicator that this is happening. Current member states’ demand for restrictions 
on new member states, however, is. Restrictions to workers’ movement in Bulgaria, 
Romania and Croatia, halted the economic benefits of membership for both citizens in 
these countries and potential receiving countries with high demand for workers.  
For the latest enlargement, and this will apply to future enlargements in the 
post-Yugoslav states as well, conditionality has been strengthened. The number of 
acquis chapters are adjusted to fit each candidate state, generally in a manner that 
increases the number of chapters. Moreover, for the Balkan states, the Stabilisation and 
Association Process and Agreements (SAP and SAA) facilitate a longer road to 
membership with more financial and institutional support along the way. The 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) is a conditionality programme specifically 
for the Western Balkans. The EU provides financial and institutional assistance for 
economic and democratic reforms in return for cooperation with the ICTY, regional 
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cooperation, and harmonisation with the acquis (European Commission: Understanding 
Enlargement 2007), and the objectives in the Stabilisation and Association Agreements 
(SAA) must be fulfilled before the country can apply for membership.  
In short, the road to EU membership is longer for the Balkan states than it 
ever was for the states that joined in earlier enlargements, especially in first through 
third. This could be construed as unfair for candidate and potential candidate states, 
and within the discourses of enlargement fatigue or absorption capacity, it absolutely is, 
since the Balkan states simply have the bad luck of being late to the party.  
There are, however, weighty arguments for why the EU has chosen to lengthen 
the road. Internal arguments include that the EU is a larger and more complex 
organisation than when it started, and it cannot afford any more reluctant member 
states such as Denmark or the UK which have opt-out and opt-in agreements and large 
continents of eurosceptics, currently concluding in the Brexit. The many different kinds 
of sovereignty transfer, through varied kinds of constitutions in the older member 
states also create legal problems with the primacy of European law, as shown in for 
example the Danish supreme court case (Maastricht case 1998) which reiterated a 
dualistic understanding of European law in relation to Danish law. The member states 
from the 2007 enlargement also proved vulnerable to the financial crisis and have not 
benefitted as much from EU membership as predicted, and while both Bulgaria and 
Romania have come far in combatting corruption and protecting democratic 
institutions, frequent untimely elections and corruption scandals have negatively 
affected the central and northern European discourses surrounding these countries. 
Thus, having learned from poor experiences from both old and new member states, the 
EU has strengthened conditionality within the rule of law, including prior to 
membership acceptance of EU law primacy, and provisions on sovereignty transfer that 
are specific and democratic.  
Moreover, the post-Yugoslav states are in a specific position because of the 
succession from Yugoslavia, both legally, where there are still cases of unsolved 
jurisdiction, such as the Ljubljianska Banka dispute or maritime demarcation, and within 
transitional justice. Given the European narrative of the EU as guarantor of peace and 
the Balkan conflict history, transitional justice had to be part of the accession process, 
as did regional cooperation. In addition, the EU is incorporating the idea of collective 
rights to combat structural inequalities and discrimination (COM 2005) especially to 
facilitate integration of Romas in European societies (COM 2011/173). Because of the 
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constitutional tradition in Yugoslavia and the both positive and negative experiences 
with collective minority rights and coexistence of several cultural, linguistic and ethnic 
groups, the post-Yugoslav countries represent potentially very strong allies in the 
achievement of the goal of non-discrimination, but only if accession and integration is a 
success. In the meantime the SAAs go some way to allow the states to integrate 
gradually, gaining the benefits of membership as they harmonise. 
   
 
Bulwark or Bridge state? 
 
Narratives matter. In Benedict Anderson’s analysis of states as imagined 
communities, the national narratives are key in establishing the state as an entity for 
which individuals will work, fight and die (Anderson 1983). However, a nation’s narrative 
not only affects its internal cohesion, but also its external soft power. As Joseph Nye 
has noted in relation to American foreign policy, the policies, words and images that are 
successful in communication with a domestic audience can have negative effects on 
foreign soft power (Nye 2004). In American policy, the case of the ‘war on terrorism’ is 
an example of this: It mobilised both American institutions and voters, but foreign 
powers found it hard to work with the notion of a war of infinite duration, and the 
incarceration of foreign prisoners without trial damaged the American position as a 
human rights and freedoms frontrunner. Within European policies, national narratives 
and soft power are of even greater importance as the power of the EU relies for the 
most part on a combination of economic and normative power, and European 
enlargement is a tool for facilitating the strengthening of these two kinds of power. For 
potential candidate states, this means that a national narrative that furthers European 
normative power, by being in line with promoted European values (TEU art 2), will 
improve the state’s position in the accession process, compared to a state with a 
national narrative that is in conflict with the promoted values.  
 
 Nicole Lindstrom has illustrated the power of the national narrative in foreign 
policy towards the EU in a comparative study of the Croatian and Slovenian narratives 
and path to Europe. Both Slovenia and Croatia tried to sell themselves to Europe as 
‘not really Balkan’, but rather bridge states between the Balkans and Europe. This 
makes sense given the negative Balkan discourses in western Europe, coined 
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‘Balkanism’ by Maria Todorova in the 1990s (Todorova 1994). Slovenian discourse as a 
bridge state was built on liberal principles, making the Slovenian war of independence 
out to be one between the Balkan tide of nationalism and the Slovenian struggle for 
democracy and human rights. At the same time, Croatia tried to establish itself as a 
bridge state in cultural terms, a civilised Catholic country that acted as a bulwark 
against the unruly Moslems and Orthodox Christians. The Slovenian narrative was 
easier for the EU to swallow than the Croatian narrative because the EU, already 
containing many different cultures and several religious directions, had no interest in 
adopting a Huntingtonian ‘Clash of Civilisations’ understanding of its enlargement 
programme (Lindstrom 2008). 
In short, it is central to acknowledge that European enlargement, although 
assumed as a ‘moral imperative’ by central scholars, has a power-political component as 
well. The union does not expand mainly to benefit the new member states, and despite 
the inherent discourse in the conditionality programme, membership is not a prize for 
states doing well economically and in incorporating rule of law principles. The EU 
expands for its own benefit, to ensure its security and strengthen its hard, economic, 
and soft power. The inclusion of new states expands the economy, and increases 
relative hard power capabilities, successful transition, growth and reconciliation in SAP 
candidate states under the influence of European conditionality policies, increases 
normative power legitimacy and institutional soft power.  
In the following chapter, the theoretical background for these conclusions will 
be explained in further detail along with a presentation of the process of politicisation 
and how it affects the future of the Balkans in Europe.  
 
 
Soft power in high and low politics 
 
Alston and Weiler called in 1999 for a charter of human rights to be added to 
the Treaty of the EU, because, as they noted, it is difficult to export values when you 
have not yet imported them in a predictable and institutionalised manner (Alston & 
Weiler 1999). For Europe, human rights were always a high policy matter, a foreign and 
security policy goal.  It is a central claim for this article that European enlargement is 
likewise high politics, a foreign security policy goal – not just for the potential member 
states where this is obvious, but also for the union itself. The belonging of a concept 
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within the field of foreign or security policy does not mean that the union does not 
adhere to it itself or promote it internally as a double-standard Europe narrative may 
suggest (Molbæk-Steensig 2015), but it does mean that it has the status of ‘high 
politics’.  
While Keohane and Nye(1977) and later Barnett(1990), have argued, quite 
convincingly, that the realist strict division of politics in high and low politics is 
increasingly artificial because foreign policy goals and actions very much influence low 
politics in terms of funding, votes, and narrative, and because domestic policies 
influence foreign policy legitimacy and thereby soft power, I will argue, that a status 
hierarchy remains. In a Bourdieuian understanding, the fields of foreign and domestic 
policy may be overlapping, but there remains a barrier to entry between low and high 
politics, where foreign policy takes place in specific ministries and through specific rules 
for legislation and executive power in the parliaments. Moreover, we see repeatedly, in 
the 1990s and 2000 in Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Macedonia et cetera, that through 
changing governments, economic and political crisis, the foreign policy goal of EU 
membership remained. Similarly, during the Cold War, the Scandinavian states kept 
their foreign orientation towards the West even though they in several cases had leftist 
coalition governments with one or more parties advocating socialist policies. Thus I 
hypothesise that foreign policy or ‘high politics’ will absolutely be discussed 
domestically, but the rate of radical changes in its goals and methods will be slower and 
less party political than within low politics.  
European enlargement is security policy because of the union’s reliance on soft 
power and normative power in its foreign policy. In Cooper’s application of Nye’s theory 
on soft power, EU soft power relies on four elements, the recipe for success, the safety 
in numbers, the seat at the table, and the concept of united in diversity (Cooper 2004). 
The concept of ‘united in diversity’ is a powerful narrative to attract potential new 
member states, it allows for integration specifically without threatening the national 
narratives while the safety in numbers element is the closest thing Europe comes 
wielding hard power. Enlargement engages the recipe for success and the seat at the 
table. The prospect of membership for close neighbours of the EU allows the EU to 
wield conditionality policies and keeps neighbouring countries oriented towards Europe, 
whether their pending membership is close – such as in the Balkans or in the further 
future – such as Ukraine. The recipe for success is the idea that European economic 
success and long lasting peace depends upon specific institutional solutions, which can 
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be exported. These include free trade and the rule of law, but also the institution of the 
Ombudsperson, parliamentarism and supranational human rights protection. The 
continued power of the recipe for success relies on successful enlargement and 
integration. Democratic failures and constitutional crises such as those occurring in in 
Hungary and Poland damage the EU soft power relying on the recipe for success. The 
Brexit, depending on its outcome and the political conceptualisation of it may also 
damage this part of EU soft power.  
Thus far, European enlargement has been a stable part of European normative 
power and thereby of its security policy. When Alston and Weiler describes it as a moral 
imperative it is not a nominal judgement based in moral philosophy, but rather an 
expression that enlargement is a key component in the supra-concept of what 
European cooperation is and why it takes place. In a Bourdieuan terminology, the 
concept of enlargement has been doxa. In a conceptual history view, enlargement has 
been a hegemonic concept which was not discussed politically (Schulz-Forberg 2014) 
the question was how to enlarge, not whether. This changes with a politicisation of the 
concept. 
 
 
Politicisation 
 
In Bourdieuan terminology, a politicisation can be understood both as a 
concept’s movement from the status of doxa to a lesser universally accepted norm, and 
as a topic’s movement from one field, for example the legal field, to the political field. In 
a conceptual history understanding, a politicisation is a way for a concept to move from 
one area or field through appropriation, often morphing and changing through this 
move. Hagen Schulz-Forberg exemplifies this with the Wilsonian concept of self-
determination after World War I that lost its conditionality on institutional maturity 
when it was imported by the former colonies (Schulz-Forberg 2014). Similarly, human 
rights, which are conceptualised in the UN as universal, interdependent and indivisible 
(Kofi Annan 1997), but in their appropriation by national law scholars they in some 
cases lost their indivisibility (Christoffersen 2014), and in their appropriation by the 
political right, they lost their universality as well (Messerschmidt 2016). The 
appropriation is not always destructive, in the case of the African Union, the concept of 
human rights was developed to encompass collective rights as well as individual rights, 
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and rights of particular importance in Africa, such as the right to development (African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981).  
The concept of enlargement has done exactly this, moved from the status of 
doxa, a key element in the purpose and raison d'être for the EU, to a politicised object 
that can be discussed. Such a politicisation could mean movement from high politics to 
low politics. This is seemingly in opposition to the high-low politics discussion earlier, 
but in the politicisation, the concept of enlargement has morphed (Schulz-Forberg 
2014). Enlargement is no longer a simple political decision following a unanimous 
agreement by the current member states, it is a lengthy process of harmonisation to 
the acquis - Europeanisation. Specifically of Europeanising constitutions to rely on a 
monist understanding of legal plurality accepting EU law primacy, of harmonising 
institutions into the European parliamentary tradition, tradition for judiciary 
independence and checks by the Ombudsperson. The ‘recipe for success’ narrative that 
is part of European soft power is more prevalent than before 1990, and the accession 
process is a transformation of a candidate state into an institutionally speaking 
Western European state. The narrative of ‘united in diversity’ is of course still in place, 
but is applied mostly to cultural and linguistic elements, along with a general principle 
of subsidiarity.  
 
 
Balkan enlargement – a conclusion 
 
In relation to the Balkans, and in a foreign security policy view, very little has 
changed. Both the EU and the Balkan states have an interest in enlargement. For the 
EU, however, this is only true, if the new member states are not going to be problem 
states, within political values such as Poland, Hungary or Great Britain, or through 
reluctance such as Denmark, Sweden or Great Britain – again, or through economic and 
institutional unreadyness, such as Greece. In order to assure this, new candidate states 
go through a more thorough harmonisation process ahead of accession.  
The narratives of absorption capacity or enlargement fatigue, and the 
increasing number of political turns towards protectionism and nationalism in old and 
new member states influence intra-EU policies and the in depth integration as well as 
strategies in the accession process, but the goal of enlargement remains the same. 
Unlike in the 1960s where France vetoed British membership, there is all but no risk 
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that membership of the Balkan candidate and potential candidate states will be vetoed. 
As such, amidst Eurosceptic discourse, and protectionist and nationalist discourse in 
both old and new member states, enlargement into the Balkans, remains a foreign 
policy goal for the EU. Accession of Turkey is another matter as it has been politicised 
from the beginning with the shelving in 1987 and overwhelming popular opinion against 
Turkey joining (Eurobarometer 2006). This is despite the fact that Turkey has been a 
member of the Council of Europe since 1949 and a member of the Western European 
Union since 1992 and the customs union since 1995. We may see EU soft power based 
in the ‘seat at the table’ element suffer from the prolonged non-delivery on the promise 
of membership to Turkey. Especially following the 2017 Turkish amendments to its 
constitution that go directly against EU conditionality, and could therefore indicate a 
geopolitical turn of Turkey towards the south and east rather than towards Europe.  
To reiterate, politicisation of European enlargement has resulted in a morphing 
of the concept from a traditional international relations’ alliance where the only barrier 
to entry was permission by all member states, to a process of harmonisation. This 
means, that European enlargement into the Balkans remains an implicit imperative, a 
key proponent of the conceptualisation of the European Union. Since the summit in 
Copenhagen 1993 and the start of the SAP in 1999, all Balkan countries are included in 
this implicit imperative. The morphing of European enlargement through the 
constitutional crisis of 2005, financial crisis in 2008 and Lisbon treaty with increased 
supranational cooperation in 2009, has transformed the enlargement process into a 
lengthy harmonisation process with a higher demand for institutional Europeanisation. 
In another light, the European soft power both relies on and to a higher extend wields 
the ‘recipe for success’ part of its soft power, and to a lesser extent the ‘seat at the 
table’ element.  
For the Balkan euroenthusiasts, this is both good and bad news. It means that 
unlike the UK in the 1960s and Turkey in the 1980s until today, the Balkan states will 
not be rejected on cultural or power political grounds – for both the UK and Turkey, 
opponents of their membership have argued that they were too big and would upset 
the power dynamic in the union. On the other hand, complex harmonisation prior to 
accession is a fact of contemporary accession to the union, and the process is longer 
and more demanding than it was before. While the SAAs give access to some EU funds, 
specific trade agreements and institutional support, full benefit of membership for 
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regular citizens will not be achieved without the freedom of movement for people, 
goods, and services that follows full member ship.  
 In order to achieve the fastest and smoothest enlargements process, the 
Balkan states, institutions, politicians, civil society groups and anyone else interested in 
enlargement, should remember that EU enlargement is not something the EU does to 
be nice to the Balkan countries, it is a mutually beneficial activity within high politics. 
The union expends to ensure its security and soft power. This means that formally 
fulfilling EU requirements while also catering to Russian interests, as long as Russia 
maintains its illiberal internal and external policies, will likely not result in speedy EU 
membership. The EU is an alliance of security as well as an economic union and a 
community of values.  
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Abstract 
 
General concept of systemically corrupted foreign policy means long term 
accomplishing geo-strategic and geo-economic interests in the function of the biggest 
global capital in the world (Labovic, 2016). This highest and the most sophisticated type 
of unconventional political corruption has strong impact on the international economic 
and political relations, international and regional security. Systemically corrupted 
foreign policy is performed through the most perfidious methods, on the level of 
continued foreign policies. When the political, diplomatic and economic measures can 
not give results, as an ultima ratio - the military intervention is used in countries that 
are tens of thousands kilometers away from the country aggressor. Due to the above 
mentioned reasons, there has not been individual criminal responsibility for the killed 
civilians. This type of interventions eliminates the subjective criminal-law responsibility, 
because these activities, foreseen as criminal offences against the humanity and the 
international law are not treated as international criminal offences, but as a legitimate 
manner of conducting politics.  
In that context, also, special, hybrid war is used by the great powers for 
breaking the resistance of disobedient governments in smaller countries, which have 
themselves fallen into a condition where rule of law is absent, corruption is rampant 
and lack of respect for human rights and freedom is present. Of course, all this is done 
in those smaller countries with a lot less resources and not always by using extreme 
and/or militant means.  
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In the context of the most immanent functions of the science, such as 
discovery, explanation and prognosis, in the paper have been explained thesis about the 
concrete interests of the great powers in the Western Balkans and especially in the 
Republic of Macedonia, as well as forecasts about its realization in further phases.  
 
Key words: systemically corrupted foreign policy, security  
 
 
Introduction 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, the general concept of systemically corrupt 
foreign policy, actually represents a very old practice, according to which the foreign 
policy of great powers has been being implemented continually, regardless of the fact 
which ideologically-political and/or party provenance personifies the institution of 
president of a country or government (depending on the type of the political system). 
That’s so, because if we take a closer look at the foreign policies of the different 
governments of today’s only superpower, we will notice that there are no fundamental 
differences between them, that is to say the differences are minimal. Relatively bigger 
differences are noticeable between the governments of different ideologically-political 
provenances about their internal policies, for example ones relating to taxes, 
healthcare, social policies, education and others. 
Actually, when it is spoken about the general concept of systemically corrupt 
foreign policy, it is referred to on the level of the political system, which systemically 
and systematically generates such a national strategy in foreign policy, whose 
realization of priority national interests and strategic goals is attained, among other 
means, through conventionally disallowed and unacceptable moral and humanist 
means. Moreover, the military interventions are called “air campaigns” like democratic 
campaigns for “export of democracy”. These campaigns have been hidden under 
utterance for prevention of alleged or intentionally fictions humanitarian disaster, 
protection of human rights, establishing democracy and rule of law etc. The substance 
of the general concept of a systemically corrupted foreign policy, systemically and 
systematically generates the political and economic system of the capitalist 
expansionism and the exterritorial imperialistic neo-colonialism. The general concept of 
systemically corrupt foreign policy is hidden crime. Seeing from an extra institutional, 
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sociological approach, it means de facto and not de jure, a crime protected beyond the 
law ( Labovic, 2016). 
 In that sense, (Michael D. Lyman and Gary W. Potter, 2009) claim that “Crime 
is a great producer of the capitalist oil. Those who wish to have an effect upon the 
results created by the machine understand that the money that crime creates are an 
effective means that allows them to get to where they want, just as much as money 
which has been acquired in another way. Those who make money control the machine. 
Crime isn’t a byproduct of an otherwise effective political economy. It is the main 
product of the political economy. Crime is, actually, the basis on which are built the 
political and economic relations in the democratic capitalist societies.”  
On the subject of the general concept of systemically corrupt foreign policy, it 
isn’t matter about the realization of direct and personal criminal profit or any sort of 
realization of personal interests of the highest representatives of such policies (or in 
the least, personal interests are not the primary interest). The most perfidious type of 
unconventional “white” corruption surpasses all conventional corrupt transactions 
(Labović, 2016). Even among the highest political and business elites on a global level, 
because here it is about such a concept of a systemically corrupt foreign policy which is 
generated systemically and systematically by the political and economic system of the 
capitalist exterritorial imperialistic neocolonialism, within the function of realizing long 
term geo-strategic and geo-economics interests of the biggest global capital in the 
world. (See figure No.1. Labovic, 2013) 
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Methods 
 
Regarding the methods which are used in the paper, it would be significantly to 
say that following methods have been used: crossover application of logical method and 
empirical method. It means in the context of rationalistic epistemology, use of logical 
principles for argumentation, based on undeniable empirical facts. Some of these 
empirical fact are notorious, some of them are gathered by certain official statistics. 
Also, in the paper has been used deductive, inductive and reductive method, historical 
and comparative method, analysis of various contents of relevant literature, media texts 
or some other relevant documents. 
Crossover application of logical and empirical method understand that there 
are not separated chapters titled as “theoretical foundations” and results obtained by 
surveys from public opinion or some other quantitative methods, which could provide us 
with relevant empirical data, but, they have very limited scope of use, taking into 
consideration inductive illusion (see explanation of the mentioned sintagma in the one 
of the following chapters). Namely, quantitative methods could be only used for 
scientific functions and aims, such as: description, critic and interpretation of empirical 
data.  Author of this paper prefers much more qualitative methods, such as the most 
immanent scientific method - logical method based on and connected with undeniable 
and relevant empirical facts for the respective topic of this concrete research. There are 
many reasons why only logical method, based on and connected with undeniable 
empirical fact, can penetrate much deeper into most significant, the most abstract and 
the most complex determinative structures of the causes for the most perfidious, 
sophisticated phenomena, which become themselves causes for other consequences, 
relations among them and ongoing, actual, but long-standing processes. Only by this 
method and real scientific approach it could be possible to achieve the most immanent 
scientific functions and aims, such as: scientific discovery, scientific explanation, 
scientific prognosis (forecast), normatively-prescriptive and inextricably linked with it - 
practically-applicable function and aim of the science. 
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The use of sophisticated methods and special (hybrid) war in the context 
of general concept of systemically corrupt foreign policy 
 
The general concept of systemically corrupt foreign policy is nothing new. It’s 
just a newly meaningful theoretical concept. As a fact of life, it is present in the history 
of international relations, especially among great powers. Today, indications for it can 
be found especially in the way of the excellently coordinated functioning of the 
international financial, security and political multilateral organizations, of the so called 
international community towards the governments of disobedient leaders. We are 
actually, witnessing the notorious empirical facts, widely known in the contemporary 
international reality, as it pertains to the application of the method of double 
“standards” for same or similar situations, during internal or international conflicts; also 
of forceful interferences in the internal affairs of sovereign states, which represent a 
flagrant breaking of one of the basic principles of the international public order, even a 
complete suspension of the international public law, when military power is used 
against sovereign states without a decision by the UN Security Council. All this is done 
under the pretense of preventing humanitarian catastrophes or protecting the national 
interests of the leading countries of NATO, which are tens of thousands of kilometers 
away from the country that is the target of the attack. Also, as an excuse for the violent 
“export of democracy”, allegedly for prevention humanitarian disaster or protection of 
human rights and freedom in sovereign states, actually, in order to cover up the 
enormous importance which those countries hold for the spheres of influence of the 
great powers.  
The goals of the general concept of systemically corrupt foreign policy, are 
achieved by the great powers through instrumentalized amalgams on the level of 
multilateral political-security and financial institutions, and even the international 
courts. Although, in such a way, with the accomplishments of these interests isn’t 
always guaranteed in all parts of the world. When those interests of the highest 
importance can’t be realized successfully by diplomatic, political and economic 
measures and tools, onto the scene are brought out the instrumentalized amalgams of 
the second level. That’s the level of executing secret politics, which is carried out 
“down” on the ground by intelligence services, which prepare the playing field for the 
recruitment, instructions, organizing and any other kind of support needed for carrying 
out a special (hybrid) war, which as a distinct phase, allows for the prediction of 
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terrorist attacks aimed at different targets on different levels, in different parts of the 
world (Lyman & Potter, 2009; Chambliss, 1986).  
The intelligence services through secret channels of collaborationist networks 
realize the agitation, organization and allocation of complete financial and other kinds 
of logistics in the carrying out of special or hybrid wars. In phase one, under the guise 
of developing democracy, media and NGOs are supported, which should serve to incite 
and organize protests, and in subsequent phases extremely criminal and militant 
groups are encouraged and organized in order to carry out acts of violence and to clash 
with the police, until the very final scenarios of triggering terrorist attacks. Civil unrest 
or maybe civil war, coups etc. in countries, whose governments don’t converge around 
the goals of global politics (Шолте, 2008). Terrorist organizations are financed and are 
given all kinds of logistical support. The powerless states are pressured by different 
kinds of subtle actions in order to bring about certain changes, sometimes in their 
constitutions. Through the help of donations different needs are met, regarding the 
financial grey areas and different lacunae within the budget deficits of developing 
countries. There are also subtle diplomatic pressures, all the way opened threats and 
blackmail for the stopping or giving out of financial aid under favorable conditions, 
which are truly indispensable for those underdeveloped or developing countries. 
 
 
Instrumentalization of science in the context of general concept of 
systemically corrupt foreign policy 
 
In order to realize the aforementioned long term geostrategic and geo-
economics interests, science has taken a covert, but leading spot. Namely, science today 
isn’t just one of the forms of social awareness. Science, in the real sense of the word, 
among its other attributes, represents a primary factor of the technical and 
technological development of the world. In the social sphere, science is the primary 
factor for social development. From an ontological, epistemological and methodological 
aspect, science is the most subtle means through which one can realize the most 
perfidious infiltration of models of research and attainment of knowledge in all spheres, 
in the most countries of the world. Through such scientific models, which have been 
imposed on globally, under the guise of the most respectable rational authority – 
science, scientific theories concepts and models have been being served up in order to 
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have impact on all other spheres of the social life with the purpose of the unification, 
harmonization and approximation of economic, legal and political systems of the most 
countries in the world. The general goal is the same - achieving the long-term 
geostrategic and geo-economics interests of the biggest global capital in the world. 
Namely, it isn’t unknown that some of the transitional countries, especial those 
of the former SFRY, had an educational system which exhibited a certain level of 
quality, not taking into account the ideological and political dimensions, and some other 
weaknesses, which could be surpassed. Nonetheless, the weakening of educational 
systems, is not a goal unto itself. Actually, it is a secondary goal in the realization of 
other larger and long term geostrategic and geo-economics goals of the great powers, 
because by weakening the educational systems, especially in the most impactful part 
about scientific and research oriented endeavors, the perfidiously hidden intention is 
the obscuring of the value of social sciences and their capacity to dig in the deepest 
and reach into the crux of phenomena, processes and relations within society, in the 
most complex of its determinist manifolds of reasons for the most subtle forms, which 
manifest themselves, which as the consequences by themselves become reasons for 
even harsher consequences, bursting out onto the surface with all its ferocity. Those 
consequences at the end is felt by most people in the world. So, through skewed 
“scientific” and quasi-expert conclusions, by the subtle imposition of the “bare” 
positivistic empiricism, supported by the inductive illusion of the power of sociometric 
and statistical methods, the global media networks, the global NGOs and their national 
branches in the countries around the world, the global textbooks and books published 
by global publishing houses, which hold the monopoly on publishing the most 
prestigious international scientific magazines for scientific papers with the so called 
“impact-factor” – indexed in databases on the “web of science”, to the students and 
citizens around the world have been served a completely erroneous viewpoint for the 
chain of causes and effects for the most important phenomena, processes and relations 
in the world (Labovic, 2016).  
The unconscious or conscious participation in implementing the global agendas 
of others, among other things, as a consequence it causes the highest levels of damage 
for the fragile societies like ours. The aforementioned tendency relates mostly to the 
area of social sciences, which eo ipso and ipso facto can never be completely without 
some degree of ideology. The sciences from the STEM fields, because of the different 
nature of the subject, are completely another subject.  
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If that is so, and it is so, not because I claim it to be, but because there are no 
rational counter-arguments, by which could be confirm opposite, then among other 
reasons, one reason becomes clearer. Namely, why may be a small part of the domestic 
scientists of social sciences, which want to really work in the science, cannot really 
promote, not only publish their scientific works in relevant international scientific 
journals, but also to be equally promoted as the global textbooks by the global authors 
from global powers are, in today’s world. Meanwhile, it is very important to point out 
that it isn’t matter about any sort of textbooks and other kinds of works, but about 
scientific works, peer-reviewed by the most referent and competent reviewers in the 
concrete subject. For example, in one of the mentioned scientific works, some of the 
basic thesis of the leading global authors, as reviewers of such work, have been refuted 
by the author of that work.  
Of course, the point isn’t that these textbooks lack quality and that nothing 
can be learned from them. On the contrary, but at the same time, if we observe the 
matter from a scientific heuristic aspect, we have textbooks, with similar or higher 
quality at our universities. Still, these textbooks can’t even cross the borders of their 
own college. From  “x” number of our own domestic reasons, they aren’t used as 
textbooks even on the very same subjects on colleges which are similar within the same 
university, let alone that they could be used as mandatory textbooks on the most 
prestigious universities of the western world (reminding that western textbooks are 
mandatory for our colleges). But why not, if it truly is so - the scientific works are 
valued exclusively according to the criteria of quality??! 
 
 
International political relations, international and regional security seen 
through the prism of general concept of systemically corrupt foreign policy 
 
From the aspect of international political relations, international and regional 
security, the non-democratic forms of decision-making processes in the highest political 
instances of the most relevant macro-regional organizations in the world, NATO and the 
EU, show on the level of notorious empirical facts from the recent history of 
international relations, for undertaking of military interventions upon sovereign states 
without the approval of the UN Security Council. These military actions, cynically named 
“air campaigns” represent a flagrant breaking of the principles of international public 
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law, regardless of the attempts for rationalizing the legitimacy of the application of 
military force, in terms of preventing a human disaster, protecting human rights and 
freedoms, setting democratic systems and rule of law, etc.  
The above mentioned thesis is supported also with an undeniable empirical fact 
that great powers, such as USA, Russia and China are out of jurisdiction of International 
criminal court. The USA and China have not signed Roma Statute for establishing 
International criminal court, which has jurisdiction upon military crimes and crimes 
against humanity. While, Russia has signed it, but has not ratified agreement. So, 
Russia has never became member of International criminal court. In that way, the great 
powers avoiding jurisdiction of such very important international institution, they put 
the other states in the world in very discriminatory position. 
The tendency goes so far that is being requested a lawful basis through 
amending the UN Charter, to allow a possibility for legitimate use of military force for 
preventive purpose, so called preventive interventions. Taking into account the 
destructive power and the military and political implications, of such military 
interventions, they represent the most serious security concerns and risks globally and 
for a certain regions.  
In relation to all that has been previously stated, the views of the author of 
this paper, fundamentally differs in the aforementioned questions from the views of the 
authors (Paul R. Viotti/ Mark V. Kauppi, 2009), as some of the most renowned authors 
of the ten most prestigious universities of the world, whose books are translated from 
the Macedonian government through the program for translating the 500 best 
textbooks and books in the world. Namely, the authors of the book “International 
relations and world politics” Paul R. Viotty and Mark V. Kauppi consider that states 
don’t always intervene to serve their own interests, but they really want to intervene for 
humanitarian purposes or to reestablish international peace and security. They think 
that most probably, such is the case with the NATO intervention in Kosovo, which was 
carried out without the approval of the UN Security Council.  
Such stances on the subject are an attempt to mask the reality or it is the 
authors’ inability to see the true reasons for the geo-strategic positioning of the 
Western allies in the region and their attempts to approach toward realizations of their 
long term geo-strategic and geo-economics interests in the region and beyond. The 
thesis of the author of this paper is supported by the insurmountable argument based 
on the notorious fact that the West very openly and ferociously gave support to the 
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violent secession of Kosovo from the FRY, despite openly showing the double standards 
when they reacted very sharply on the attempts by other people, who even with higher 
level of legitimacy asked for a referendum regarding their right for self-determination 
and secession, with the purpose of forming their own countries (Palestine, Kurdistan, 
Republic “Srpska”, etc). The example with Kosovo, as with many other examples from 
the more recent history to which we are all witnesses, contribute for empirical 
confirmation of the thesis for general concept of systemically corrupt foreign policy 
which is being led by the great powers for the purposes of realizing long term geo-
strategic and geo-economics interests of the biggest global capital. 
 Author`s thesis is directly opposed, among others, to the thesis of Samuel 
Huntington, in his work “Clash of Civilizations” (Samuel Huntington, 1996), which is one 
of the most cited authors of the modern global publishing history. The main thesis of 
Huntington is the claim that clashes between civilizations occur because of great 
differences in the religious, ideological and cultural collective identities of the larger 
conglomerates of peoples of certain regions of the planet. With this thesis actually, 
there is an attempt to mask the true reasons for wars in the world. That’s an alibi-
thesis for the humane aspect and innocence of the high foreign policy of the west 
towards the rest of the world, especially those regions of the world, where there is 
ample opportunity for the exploitation of natural or human resources, or there are 
potential threats where they could lose certain important geostrategic positions 
because of which their domination in the international economic and political order 
could be lost.  
It is my deep conviction, that the obvious differences on religious, cultural and 
even on an ideological and political level, cannot be the basis on which start wars. The 
plethora of collective identities on a religious and generally on a cultural level can only 
be a treasure for the expansion of horizons and opening up of new dimensions in 
understanding the need for the development of the spiritual aspect of human beings 
and of their mind, and not for taking part in wars. Opposite to the general thesis of 
Huntington, I claim that the differences between religious and ethnic collective 
identities are being instrumentalized for the realization of geo-strategic and geo-
economics interests of the great powers, with their abuse to dangerous levels for 
the purposes of causing internal and external conflicts. After all, wars today are 
no longer for the purposes of territorial conquest, that is to say, occupying the 
territorial integrity of other countries, but for allowing multinational and 
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transcontinental corporations to exploit the energy and raw resources, cheap 
labor, the acquisition and expansion of markets and also for creating conditions to 
install puppet governments, with the purpose of controlling important geo-
strategic positions in the world.  
Although western democracies attempt to prove that such violent actions for 
the “exporting” of democracy are in the interests of the majority of the citizens of 
countries in which for the ostensible protection of human rights and freedom, stopping 
humanitarian catastrophes or stopping security risks regarding the spilling over of 
military clashes in a certain region and beyond, securing the peace and stability of 
countries in the region and so on, still, the notorious empirical facts prove that those 
countries are actually the subject of their spheres of interest, but first of all the 
interests of the largest global capital. Such claims correspond to a large extent with the 
empirical reality of the aftermath of the military interventions in FRY, Afghanistan, Iraq 
and Libya, when the western multinational corporations quickly positioned themselves. 
The rationalization that military interventions are led for the purposes of preventing 
humanitarian catastrophes, protecting human rights and freedom, the establishment of 
democracy, peace and stability in certain countries and regions, fall before the 
undeniable facts from the harsh reality of cases, where the collateral damage expressed 
in thousands of killed civilian victims and extensive material damages, much more 
surpasses number of killed people and done damages during the civil war (for example) 
in Libya. And what is most important, regardless of the collateral damages from such 
military interventions, the declared goal wasn’t achieved for which purpose the military 
intervention was undertaken (Labovic, 2016). Instead of preventing the chaos, for 
example in Libya, after six years following the military interventions, there is an even 
bigger chaos, compared to period before the civil war erupted. Also, we might not forget 
the case of Ukraine and Syria, where the war is still going on. The consequences from 
the long standing war in Syria have been still unpredictable: the biggest refugee crisis 
and migratory waves so far in the recent history. 
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The concrete interests of the General concept of systemically corrupt 
foreign policy in the Western Balkans and especially the Republic of Macedonia 
 
It would be naïve to believe that the aforementioned tendencies and goals are 
focused only on a few countries. Even though, countries like ours are not the main goal, 
but the secondary or third goal of the mentioned long term geo-strategic interests of 
the great powers in the region and beyond, still in context of unification, harmonization 
and approximation of social systems within a global framework, it’s important for these 
long term geo-strategic interests, to fill the “blank spaces” as much as possible. That’s 
so, because in some future time, in another constellation of international and political 
factors, powers and relations in the different regions of the world, the blank “spaces” 
can represent small, but important bastions, that is to say might be barriers in the 
realization of above mentioned interests.  
The above mentioned thesis refers in a specific manner to the Western Balkans 
and especially Macedonia. Macedonia is not area of primary geo-strategic and geo-
economic interest of the great powers. So, in the very beginning we must clarify that 
Macedonia as small and very weak country, with very specific mentality of the 
Macedonian people, no way to be military attacked by some of the great power. 
Macedonia might be attacked in some kind of soft, asymmetric threats and 
unconventional attacks, such as terroristic attacks, triggering civil unrest or maybe low-
intensive and high controlled civil war, coups etc. However, Macedonia has certain 
geo-strategic importance, in particular because of the significance of “corridor 
10”. So, achieving long-term dominant control on the entire territory of Republic of 
Macedonia by the Western allies versus possible Russian domination is very logical 
conclusion. If certain long term intelligence forecasts for some possibilities of newly 
created constellations of geo-strategic re-positioned political forces and relations in 
Balkans countries become true in the future (may be for 40-50 years, taking into 
consideration that strategic analyses of intelligence services are long term planned), it 
will not be impossible to set some kind of Pan - Orthodox transversal, which will lead 
toward Russia. In that direction should be understood the efforts of “international 
community” to set Albanian ethnic entity as constitutive factor in the Macedonian 
state. Namely, amid when the Macedonian minority in the neighbor countries is almost 
at all not recognized, Albanian minority in Macedonia tends to become constitutive 
nation in bi-national state in the next phases, by full support of the Western allies. The 
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project of “Great Albania” should be understood more metaphorically than territorially 
(Labovic, 2017).  
In that sense, both authors and politicians in Macedonia from different 
positions talking about unity. On the one side, ones claim that unitary character of 
Macedonia will not be endangered with Albanian language as official language on entire 
territory of the state, as well as with the other requirements in the “Albanian 
Platform”.  On the other side, there are those who claim that unity will be endangered. 
In my point of view, by contrast all other scholars and politicians, it is not matter 
about unity (at least it is not about territorial aspect of unity), it is about 
endangered position of Macedonian ethnic entity as constitutive nation. There is a 
lack of valid argumentation about this topic. Nobody have stated the arguments and 
facts that Albanians have two and a half states in the Balkans, while Macedonians can 
lose in the future a position of constitutive nation, that they have it now in their only 
state. Of course, there are not explicit provisions in the contemporary constitutions in 
the leading EU states, about constitutive nation, for examples of Germans, French, etc. 
but also there are not such provisions in positive Macedonian constitution. 
Nevertheless, de facto, the German and French nation are constitutive nation in 
Germany and France. It means, the German and French language is solely official 
languages on entire territory of these leading states of EU. Further more, all citizens in 
Germany and France are German and French, in state - legal sense. Certainly, they have 
different ethnic and religious origin.  
Very recommended cases of Switzerland and Belgium are very often stated as 
inspirational examples by many scholars and politicians, but they are not adequate 
examples. For instance, Switzerland is not adequate example in mentioned sense, 
because of an undeniable fact that this state consists of the ethnic entities as a 
constitutive cantons of Germans, French and Italians, who have their own indigenous 
nations and states out of Switzerland. All citizens in Switzerland are Swiss in the state - 
legal sense. In comparison with the Swiss, the Macedonians as an ethnic entity do not 
have any other state except Macedonia.  In such circumstances, the irrational name 
issue between Macedonia and Greece additionally is complicated by its 
internationalization.  
Therefore, distinguishing between very abstract and complex categories, 
such as: civil sovereignty and statehood position of constitutional nation; unity 
and functional federalization; unity and territorial federalization, are needed. More 
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accurately, all citizens in the Macedonia, according to the constitution enjoy all rights, 
regardless of their ethnic, religious or whatever other difference. That is constitutional 
provision for civil sovereignty. In the reality, there is still a space for development these 
constitutional rights. The citizens must enjoy absolutely all rights in the practice. It 
means, anyone Albanian, Serbian or anyone else from any nationality can really achieve 
any position in the society, even position of President of the State, Prime minister and 
so on, solely due to her/him abilities, qualities as an individual, but not only because of 
her/him belonging to ethnic collectivity. The endangering of the statehood position 
of the Macedonian nation as constitutional nation, very likely could have long-
term much more damaging consequences than territorial federalization (Labovic, 
2017). This thesis, among many other reasons, should be understood in the context of 
the fact that there are over 5000 ethnic entity in the world, but only 193 of them have 
their own states.  
Taking into consideration all above mentioned, the argumentation that 
unitary character of Macedonian state will be endangered is a wrong and 
dangerous thesis. This thesis surely be used by the opposite side, who will point out in 
future, that unity is not endangered and all statements about it were false, because in 
Macedonia will not occur classical, territorial federalization. In Macedonia may 
happen language and functional federalization, without territorial separation of 
constitutive federal units, such as the statements of nowadays defenders of 
“Macedonian causa”. In some indirect, theoretical aspect might be said that unity will 
be endangered. But, de jure and de facto, in a direct, classical manner the unity, as 
centralized government in entire Macedonian territory without federal units, will not be 
endangered. That will not happens, not because of the lack of such tendency by 
Albanians, but due to long term geo-strategic interests of the Western allies, 
which tends to set dominant control on entire territory of Republic of Macedonia. 
It would be inexpedient to put under control only one part of Western Macedonia, if 
expectations for separation a part of Macedonia have been realized.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
I. On the question: how this most perfidious, hidden and unrecognizable 
type of the most subtle unconventional corrupted policy can be surpassed, my 
answer is:  
In the world since many centuries ago, all the way up to this very day, within 
the reality of international political and economic relations, the theory of force still 
holds sway. The triple factoring of economic, military and political supremacy, will be for 
a long time the expression of a pernicious application for the domination in the 
globalized world. But, is there hope?  
I see hope in the tendency of gradual  and slow changing of the world through  the 
process of establishing a balance of power among the great powers, which is already 
moving from unipolar towards multipolar, or, most probably – multipolar bipolarism. 
During that, a big role, among other factors, will play the science. Namely, through the 
most desirable democratic paradigm of the concept of deliberative democracy (Fishkin, 
1991; Mannin, 1987; Mannin, 1994 ), is where I actually see the best possible way, for a 
gradual, slow but certain change. Through such scientific debates, through the power of 
arguments and facts, there will be a constant pressure for developing and 
strengthening the consciousness on an ever larger number of nongovernmental and 
governmental actors in the global scene for the negative byproducts from the general 
concept of the systemically corrupt foreign policy, which can have harmful 
consequences not only for the rest of the world, but also for themselves. 
 
 II. The thesis about general concept of systemically corrupt policy reflects 
in particular to the Republic of Macedonia in above explained concrete geo-
strategic interests. The realization of such interests have been being planned 
through following goals (steps) in a several tactical phases, when will be provided 
conditions for constitutional majority: 
1) Under the guise of providing equal sense of belonging and equal status of 
the Albanian community in Macedonian state a key purpose is to install the Albanian 
factor in the constitutional system, a lot more stable than it is now. So, the Albanian 
factor is intended to be more important and long-standing deciding factor in Macedonia 
for a long-term geo-strategic security interests of the Western Allies in Macedonia in 
terms of preventing future possible Russian influence.  
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2) To resolve the irrational name issue quickly and painlessly, in order to entry 
of Macedonia into NATO, without US and EU exposes unnecessary pressures towards 
Greece, as one of the most important geo-strategic position in the world;  
The propagandist scholars and analysts close to VMRO DPMNE, have been 
being stressed out primary foreign factors and secondary internal factors, but only 
those who belong to the Macedonian opposition, with total neglecting of high systemic 
corruption exactly in the highest ranks of the then actual government. And conversely, 
propagandist scholars and analysts close to the Macedonian opposition, tried 
completely to conceal the role of the international factors and the explanation for their 
very concrete interests in Macedonia. The true is always on the middle of these extreme 
attitudes. 
So, great powers cannot realized their interests in any country if a country is 
internal strong with high degree of internal cohesiveness. It refers especially for the 
small and weak countries. Their leaders in particular must pay attention on the way how 
conduct their leadership. The internal political reasons cannot be avoid. Namely, the 
announcement of the political “bombs” by the SDSM, when were presented serious 
indications about systemic corruption linked to the highest politicians in the 
Macedonian government, was used as serious occasion for realization of the interests of 
the so called international community. 
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Abstract 
 
In 2003 the European security strategy named A Secure Europe in a Better 
World was adopted. Since then, the security environment changed radically and the 
perception of security is different than before. The forces that prompted the changes 
are a result of the dynamics of contemporary globalization that has managed to 
reshape space, sovereignty and power. These changes bring with them new and often, 
unpredictable risks and hazards that increased in intensity and time. The global 
interconnectedness and interdependence between countries and peoples have 
contributed to greater mobility of tourists, terrorists, students and refugees. 
 Over the past decade the European Union has faced numerous crises and 
turmoil which indirectly/directly affected its stability and prosperity. From conflicts in 
Africa, security tensions in Asia, economic crisis, climate change, supply of natural 
resources, partnerships and expansions, the stability of the Western Balkans, refugee 
crises to terrorist attacks by non-state actors. These complex events led to tensions 
and divisions within the Union and beyond, the same were a prelude to reforms of the 
existing security strategy. A moment of rethinking the new content will interact with 
the current and future political-security and economic-social environment. Through 
analysis of the old-new strategic documents in the area of security will acknowledge the 
extent to which the European Union has evolved. The focus is directed towards the 
questions whether the "old Europe" is prepared for the new security challenges, and 
whether strategic goals and principles correspond to the real situation in Europe and 
the world? 
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Introduction 
 
 In May 2003 EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, presented the draft of the European Security Strategy 
(ESS). The same year, the European Union adopted its first security strategy entitled as 
A Secure Europe in a Better World. The document was passed when the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) had already started, as well as the interventions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The European security strategy begins with the sentence "Europe has never been 
so prosperous, so secure nor so free" (European Security Strategy, 2003). But by 2003 
Europe and the world had changed dramatically, and the arguments and attitudes 
within the strategy do not match the current security environment. It was necessary to 
devise new content and conceptual approach that will cover the current and future 
events, whereas the commitments in the document should be operational for effectively 
addressing current and future security challenges and threats. The strategy should set 
priorities that are prerequisite to start the next stages and cycles of restructuring. 
Because of the very complex and variable security content, major adjustments are not 
eligible, yet possible if there are substantial changes in international relations as well 
as the part involving challenges, risks and threats (Нацев, 2006: 461- 477).   
The main arguments that the European Security Strategy relies on are 
outdated, been changed foreign policy priorities of the Union, security environment,  
threats and dangers, interests and objectives of the member states, the transatlantic 
partnership, the position and role of the EU on the international stage. 
 Five years after the adoption of the strategic document of the EU, it has been 
revised, i.e. a Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy has been 
presented, under the title Providing Security in a Changing World that aimed at 
evaluating the ESS. The report outlines how the strategy has worked in practice and in 
which segments it needs to improve. It also states that, "the EU has made substantial 
progress over the last five years, and already contributes to a more secure world" 
(Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008).  It has 
contributed to human security, reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good 
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governance and human rights, and preventing conflict. It also highlights the experience 
and capabilities of the Union in the field of common foreign and security policy by 
participating in 30 civilian and military missions. However, it did not offer new 
guidelines but rather confirmed the "achievements" and "lessons learned" from past 
years, stressing that the EU should be "more capable, more coherent and more active" 
(Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008: 2). 
 This raises the question whether the EU needs a new security strategy, and 
which segments of the strategy should be changed? The opinions and answers were 
different, which may be divided into several categories. The first category includes those 
representatives of the Member States countries that considered that the strategy is 
outdated and needs to draft a new document. The second category covers those 
countries that were concerned with "local policies" and are not interested in broader 
strategic changes. While as the third category addresses the member states of the 
Union, whose representatives believed that no need for a new security strategy, 
because "the strategic gap" is filled with new documents on security. 
 In this context, former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & 
Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, Catherine Ashton, pointed 
out that the adoption of several security documents are "complemented" the European 
Security Strategy (Drent and Landman, 2012: 4). This involves the implementation of 
individual sub-strategies in the field of security and beyond that work on certain 
segments of the ESS. The following sub-strategies are included: The EU Strategy 
against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003), The Strategy for the 
External dimension of Justice and Home Affairs (2005), Counter Terrorism Strategy 
(2005), Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their 
ammunition (2006), Strategy for a Secure Information Society (2006), Energy 2020-A 
Strategy for Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy (2010), Internal Security 
Strategy (2010) and Cyber Security Strategy of the European Union (2013). However, 
the new wave of changes in international relations, contributed to re- actualizing the 
issue of a new security strategy among European senior officials. In July 2012, the 
foreign ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden suggested ideas for making the 
European global strategy (Lundin, 2012: 3). While, the High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, pointed out 
that "The European Union has all the means to be an influential global player in the 
future - if it acts together. We need a common, comprehensive and consistent EU 
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global strategy" (Global Strategy to steer EU external action in an increasingly 
connected, contested and complex world, 2015; Annegret and Kaim, 2015).  
 
 
Why EU needs a new strategic approach 
 
 More than a decade ago, the EU leaders adopted the European security 
strategy. Since then there are many reasons why Europe needs a new security strategy. 
First, the causes that result from the changes within the Union need to be identified, 
and those reasons that originate outside the EU space need to be analyzed.  
 Internal changes relate to the process of territorial expansion of the EU. The 
European Union focused on geographical expansion, which allowed it to grow into a 
competitive force on the global stage. Since 2003 the number of EU member countries 
has increased from 15 to 28 countries with over 503 million inhabitants, representing 
7% of the world population, and realizing a total production of 30 % of the world 
economy (World Economic Outlook, 2015). However, taking into account the phases of 
the EU enlargement (2004, 2007, and 2013) concluded that half of the current member 
states were not involved in the creation of the European security strategy at all. 
Meanwhile the document emphasized the unification of countries "as a union of 25 
states" which have not been official member states, predicted to become a global player 
(European Security Strategy, 2003: 1). However, an attempt was made to overcome the 
divisions between "old" and "new" Europe. 
 But developments outside the European Union contributed to a different 
approach in the area of security. The EU looked at security in a globalistic sense or as 
emphasized in the Report on the Implementation of the ESS, "Globalization has brought 
new opportunities, but globalization has also made threats more complex and 
interconnected" (Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 
2008). So the new strategy should take into account the security environment, global 
challenges and key threats, which will affect the achievement of the strategic objectives 
of the EU. Therefore strategic objectives in the document must be reformulated or 
supplemented, and they relate to: (a) Addressing the threats; (b) building security area 
around Europe and (c) strengthening the international order based on effective 
multilateralism (European Security Strategy, 2003: 6-10; Гоцевски и други, 2007: 127). 
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 Addressing the threats. The focus of Europe aims at transnational threats such 
as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state 
failure and organized crime. But globalization processes contributed to the 
internationalization of risks and threats have increased in intensity, space and time. 
Since 2003, the number of macro terrorist attacks has increased in the world and 
Europe. The attacks in Madrid, London, Brussels and Paris, indicate that the EU is very 
vulnerable in its territory. The latest crises and conflicts in the Middle East and North 
Africa are growing. The number of decaying states gravitating around Europe is 
increasing.  
 It is obvious that attitudes in the European Security Strategy were aimed at 
immediate risks and threats, not towards future threats. Therefore, in addition to the 
security strategy, the Union has adopted the following strategic documents: EU 
Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, The Strategy for the 
External dimension of Justice and Home Affairs, Counter Terrorism Strategy, Internal 
Security Strategy and Cyber Security Strategy. These documents complement the 
concept of security in modern conditions whose focus is on economic, societal, 
environmental and information security. This means that apart from the usual threats 
Europe faces new security risks and dangers produced by living standards, the impact of 
the financial crisis, energy insecurity, climate change and immigration (Dennison and 
Associates, 2013). 
 Building security area around Europe. The strategy emphasizes that "the first 
line of defense will often be abroad" (European Security Strategy, 2003: 6). The EU 
needs to involve earlier, before the crisis emerges. It refers to Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean area countries, but the EU remains to address the problems and 
developments in the Balkans, South Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova in the future.  
 However, with the new geographic expansion, the EU faced a number of 
difficulties in securing its territory. Many countries border it and this creates additional 
problems in dealing with new risks and threats. For example, United States borders 
with only two countries (Canada and Mexico). Hence, the degree of EU security, through 
the prism of geographical aspects, will depend on developments in the immediate 
environment such as Eastern Europe, North Africa and Middle East. 
 In this context, the question arises whether the EU would be able to deal 
simultaneously with multiple security challenges and threats coming from neighboring 
countries? Integration processes have increased the level of security in the EU, but also 
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brought the Union closer to critical areas. Some neighboring countries are valid for 
weak states that cannot establish control over its territory, nor can cope with security 
challenges. The problems of these countries, such as political instability, violent 
conflicts, extremism and terrorism, organized crime, refugees and humanitarian crises 
affected the European security and stability (Drent and Landman, 2012). 
In order to reduce the challenges and threats from the neighbors, it 
implemented the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. The ENP includes the 
promotion of democracy, rule of law, strengthening of trade relations and helped in the 
reform of the eastern and southern neighbors. But, after ten years, the dramatic 
changes in geography, politics, economics and security, contributed to the review of the 
European policy towards its neighbours. Today, ENP includes sixteen countries (Algeria, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, 
Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine) from the Middle East, North Africa and 
Eastern Europe, which gravitate around the Union (Lehne, 2014). 
 Compared to the past, these regions are far from politics to bring them closer 
to the Union. They have fragmented and are becoming unstable, and their political and 
economic transition has been disabled. In the south, the Arab Spring (2011) did not lead 
to a democratic transformation of the Middle East and North Africa, but to the unrest 
and clashes on a large scale. Military intervention on Libya (2011) and the civil war in 
Syria (which is ongoing) destabilized the entire region. Mass migrations of these risky 
countries to the EU have contributed to disruption of the level of security and stability 
in Europe. In the East, the crisis in Ukraine (2014), received enormous proportions when 
Russia annexed Crimea, which contributed to greater tension between the EU and 
Russia. Also, the countries of the Western Balkans (applies to Kosovo, Bosnia and 
Macedonia, where the EU had several civilian and military operations) are still politically 
unstable, and are triggering new security problems. 
 These events show that the European Union is still far from using its 
instruments to improve the security environment. Because the new security document 
should clearly emphasize what are "the zones of stability" and "the zones of crisis and 
instability". Then, countries and regions, which are a major threat to Europe, should be 
emphasized, how Europe will deal with them, what instruments it would use in the 
event of crises and dangers outside its territory.   
 Strengthening the International order based on Effective Multilateralism. The 
strategy emphasizes the respect for international law and cooperation with 
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international organizations such as the UN, IMF and World Bank crucial to 
strengthening the international order. Hence, the EU is ready to share the burden and 
responsibility for global security and building a better world. It sees solutions through 
the creation of an international order based on effective multilateralism in which other 
regional organizations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union will 
participate (European Security Strategy, 2003: 9).  
 Geopolitical turbulence led to a change of power in international relations and 
disrupting the balance between the actors. Besides the states, the world order consists 
of other non-state actors who have different interests and purposes. Mutual rivalries 
are expected to increase that will lead to making the world a less cooperative place. 
Because of this, we believe that the EU should move in another direction. In the past 
decade, the international system has moved from multilateral engagements to a multi-
polar system, in which multilateralism is increasingly marginalized. We consider it 
necessary to rethink and consider whether effective multilateralism is adequate or 
needs to be reviewed, or if a new concept needs to possibly be developed (Drent and 
Landman, 2012). 
 
 
The EU’s new strategic approach  
 
 In 2016 High Representative Federica Mogherini presented the Global Strategy 
for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) to the European Council. 
In the "Global Strategy" are presented ambition for a stronger Europe, fundamental 
interests, principles and priorities of the EU's engagement in the world. It relies on 
peace and security, prosperity, democracy and the rules-based global order (with 
multilateralism as its key principle) as vital interests for external action. Preservation 
of peace and security of its citizens and territory are of crucial importance for the 
Union, and the correlation between internal and external security means "broader 
interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of 
instability and working towards a safer world". Despite interests, the European Union 
will be guided by the principles of "realistic assessment of the strategic environment" 
and "idealistic aspiration". The solution between isolationism and interventionism, the 
EU will see through the prism of "principled pragmatism", as a new approach to foreign 
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and security policy (A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security 
Policy, 2016). 
Union calls for the principles of unity, ("In a more complex world, we must 
stand united"), engagement ("In a more connected world, the EU will engage with 
others"), responsibility ("In a more contested world, the EU will be guided by a strong 
sense of responsibility") and partnership ("investing in our partnerships" with states, 
regional bodies, international organisations, civil society and private sector). 
There are dilemmas and obscurities about whether the EU will focus more on 
pragmatic objectives or to its ideals. While the global actors apply the Machiavellian 
version in foreign and security policy, Europe will focus on realization of the interests 
through the prism of "Realpolitics with European characteristics" (Biscop, 2016). In 
terms of EU unity are emphasized that "there is no clash between national and 
European interests". This principle does not reflect the real situation in the EU, because 
only a few days before being adopted the "Global Strategy", the United Kingdom 
(through a referendum) decided to leave the EU. In addition, it is obvious dominance of 
a few countries whose national security policies are promoted as strategic objectives of 
the Union, and still are not exceeded the tensions between the national interests of the 
member states, as well as between the roles which are the EU has as a regional and 
global power and transatlantic partner (Dennison and Associates, 2013). 
From the past experience, we have seen how certain countries (e.g. The Big 
Three - France, Germany and the United Kingdom), decided among themselves for 
following directions of EU’s development, holding aside other member states. The Big 
Three is the one that influenced on the common foreign and security policy, and making 
it the most represented in decision-making in international institutions and 
organisations such as the UN, NATO, the World Bank, IMF, G7 and the G20. 
In order to promote its interests, and also to hold on to its principles, the 
European Union will strive towards achieving the following priorities: (1)The Security of 
our Union; (2) State and Societal Resilience to our East and South; (3) An Integrated 
Approach to Conflicts; (4) Cooperative Regional Orders and (5) Global Governance for 
the 21st Century. 
(1) The Security of our Union. In the introduction of the Strategy is said "we 
need a stronger Europe. We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the 
European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought 
unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned" (A Global 
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Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, 2016: 13).The Europe 
suggests necessary of strengthening of the security and defense capabilities and use of 
combined policies (soft and hard power) and tools for effective action in the field of 
energy security, migration, climate change, terrorism and hybrid threats. It will try 
through five lines of action - Security and Defense, Counter-terrorism, Cyber Security, 
Energy Security and Strategic Communication to strengthen its security and to 
participate in collective security and defense. 
But due the refugee crisis, the Union faces the threats of terrorism, a 
resurgence of nationalism and anti-European views, collapse of the Schengen area and 
disintegration of the Union. Refugee crisis (which is the largest since World War II), 
contributed the main focus of the EU to be directed towards countries - transit of 
migrants and refugees (countries from Western Balkan and Turkey). In 2015 more than 
a million refugees and migrants arrived in Europe (Munich Security Report, 2016: 40), 
and as a result of that, the same year the number of victims from terrorist attacks (in 
the countries of the OECD, which includes 25 European countries), rising by 650 per 
cent when compared to 2014 (Global Terrorism Index, 2016). Furthermore, radical and 
eurosceptic parties might be a reason to undermine the unity of the West and could 
lead to fragmentation of the European Union. The processes of disintegration could 
eliminate Europe as a competitive actor of the international scene. 
(2) State and Societal Resilience to our East and South. As well as in past 
years, the vulnerability of the Union comes from outside its borders. In order to deal 
with the threats, EU is prepared to invest in strengthening security in the countries and 
societies of its surrounding regions. Through the policies of enlargement, European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and Effective Migration Policy would deal easier with the 
challenges and dangers of migration, terrorism and organized crime. 
(3) An Integrated Approach to Conflicts. Multi-dimensional approach and the 
use of different policies and tools will help the Union in conflict prevention. European 
"comprehensive approach" refers to the participation in all stages of the conflict cycle, 
and implementation of "multi-lateral approach", which would involve all those players 
present in conflict. EU plans to respond rapidly, responsibly and decisively in case of 
crises. Especially in the fight against terrorism, it will rely on its security and defense 
capabilities (A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, 
2016). 
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But the crises from Greece to Ukraine, the collapse of countries from Libya to 
Iraq and the war in Syria were the cause of dysfunction of the EU and other 
international organizations in crisis situations. In particular the Union was not effective 
in the prevention from terrorism at home. 
(4) Cooperative Regional Orders.  Europe will promote cooperative regional 
orders, which represents a mix of bilateral, sub-regional, regional and inter-regional 
relations. In order to preserve European security order and peace will be driven by 
specific goals in different parts of the world. The European Union will advocate for 
improving relations with Russia which are still of crucial strategic importance for 
European security order. The EU will apply multilateral cooperation for a peaceful and 
prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa and will continue to strengthening 
the transatlantic partnership with the United States and Canada through the NATO. In 
the strategy are emphasizes the direct connection between the European prosperity 
and Asian security. Trade relationship with China will be a priority for the Union and its 
relations with other strategic partners and organizations, such as Japan, India, ASEAN 
and Mercosur. 
Analyzed from an economic perspective, these countries are crucial for the 
European economy, China and India are the Union’s largest trading partners, while 
Japan and Indonesia are on the third and fourth position. Over the past two decades, 
China has managed to rescue 600 million people out of poverty and by 2030 its gross 
domestic product is expected to represent 20% of world GDP, exceeding the EU and the 
USA. Next is India, which by 2030 will reach about 16% of world GDP (The European 
Union in a changing global environment: A more connected, contested and complex 
world, 2015: 9). 
   We can conclude that the priorities of the Union are unchanged and almost 
identical with the priorities of the Security Strategy from 2003. However, current 
developments about tension in relationship between the East and West, leaves a scope 
for establishing new international organizations who may advocated a more equal 
relationship and involvement of other countries from the world. In this regard the 
countries of the group BRICS will endeavor to create a parallel security and economic 
institutions as a possible alternative to the existing western international organizations. 
In the longer term, the BRICS countries will seek to reduce the impact of the West 
within the existing global institutions, NATO, the IMF and the World Bank. In this case 
the EU could be find itself between the "hammer and the anvil" because cooperation 
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with new partners from the East could bring confrontation with allies from the West 
(Dennison and Associates, 2013). 
(5) Global Governance for the 21st Century. The European Union will continue to 
advocate for "a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order" and 
involvement of international and regional organizations as well as state and non-state 
actors in the global order. The EU strives for reforming the Security Council of the UN 
and international financial institutions, and will strive for a united representation of the 
euro zone within these institutions. 
European representative Federica Mogherini points out that "this is no time for 
global policemen and lone warriors", which means that the EU will promote 
international system based on multilateralism. The realization of its foreign and security 
policy will be viewed through the prism of connection with old and new players on the 
global stage and discovering new formats for cooperation. EU will invest in so-called 
"win - win" solutions, leaving the illusion that the international politics can be a "zero - 
sum" game (A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, 
2016: 4). 
 
 
The EU as a Global Player - from vision to action 
 
The EU Global Strategy has a very ambitious approach to external security 
action. In the current period of transition and reform in the EU, the issues are how 
much will be able to realize its ambitions spread on several continents and be effective 
in addressing issues of different political, economic, social, security and defense 
character? 
By promoting the concept of "soft power", The European Union managed to 
gain international credibility and strengthen its international position. With its 
developed and widespread economic platform, a trade association and integration it 
tended to be a strong actor on the global stage. However, strong competition in the 
world weakened "the European soft power" and contributed to shifting the global 
strategic epicenter towards Asia. This shows that the Union needs an urgent 
transformation of its foreign policy if it desires to be a global actor. It will have to 
change its strategic priorities and to broaden the agenda with new strategic partners 
who will play an important role on the international scene in the coming years. 
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"Civilian power" of Europe is not enough for global influence and not operates 
with reality in this insecure and unstable world. Therefore, it is ready to invest in all 
areas of foreign policy, especially in the field of hard power - security and defense. Hard 
power of the EU is crucial for European autonomy for external action, and to climb on a 
better position on the international security scene. The European Union should be more 
flexible and to make certain changes in three areas - diplomacy, common foreign and 
security policy and development.  
That is necessary, because Europe is more fragile and less secure than in 2003. The 
changes in external strategic environment and within the Union, as well as the 
abandonment of one of the three largest and most important countries of the Union, 
United Kingdom, will prevent the realization of the European vision and ambition into 
action. Because, the United Kingdom is an impressive diplomatic power, the fifth most 
powerful economic and fifth military power in the world. Brexit will reduce the EU's 
credibility globally, especially in the CSDP. The EU and UK are the largest trade 
partners, more than 80% of British companies have trade relations with the EU, and 
also UK is one of the most popular destinations for Chinese investment in Europe 
(National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review of the UK, 2015: 
53, 71). While in the European defense budget, United Kingdom participates with even 
21.4%. (SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database, 2011). In addition, in the middle between 
the EU and the UK are the USA, which is strategic partner in security, defence, foreign 
policy and the economy, and a major actor in NATO. These indicators show that there is 
a possibility of disturbing the European security compactness and strategic autonomy 
of the Union in international relations.  
In the last part of the Strategy states that from this document should produce 
several sub strategies which will be in the context with political priorities and goals of 
the Union. The purpose of individual strategies is to determine the civil-military 
spectrum, tasks, needs, opportunities, priorities and deadlines for review of existing 
strategies. The EU Global Strategy will strive for periodically reviewing and consultation 
with the Council, Commission and European Parliament. Hence, the European Union 
provides a complement to "strategic gap" and stressing its next steps as a regional and 
global power. In October 2016, the EU Council adopted the strategic priorities for 
implementing the EUGS for 2016-2017, focusing on five priority areas for the external 
action of the EU: (1) Security and Defence; (2) Resilience building and integrated 
approach to conflict and crises; (3) Strengthening the nexus between internal and 
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external policies; (4) Updating existing or preparing new regional and thematic 
strategies and (5) Stepping up public diplomacy efforts (Council conclusions on the 
global strategy on the EU’s foreign and security policy, 2016). 
The next step on the EU was in November 2016, when by the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was presented 
Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. This Implementation Plan on Security 
and Defence is calling on the EU to be a credible actor in security and defense spheres. 
According to the Plan, the European Union will contribute to: (a) responding to external 
conflicts and crises; (b) building the capacities of partners, and (c) protecting the Union 
and its citizens (Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, 2016). The Plan is part 
of a broader package that includes workout of additional documents in this sphere. At 
the same period, the European Commission adopted the European Defence Action Plan 
(EDAP), which is closely related to the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence 
and EU-NATO Joint Declaration. EDAP is focusing on strengthening the European 
defense policy and investing in defense capabilities as well as improving European 
strategic autonomy and strengthening its ability to acting together with partners. For 
that purpose, was adopted the EU-NATO Joint Declaration in Warsaw (2016) which 
gives strong impetus to the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU in security 
and defense spheres. 
The cooperation in the defense sector is a strategic priority of the EU. The 
future plans of Europe are aimed at building a robust defense capabilities with which 
can be a global player. In European Defence Action Plan underlines that Europe in the 
area of defense is behind its partners. The European Union from 2005 to 2015 had a 
decline in defense spending by about 11%, and has an annual budget of 200 billion 
euros on defense (European Defence Action Plan, 2016:4). According to future 
projections (up to 2020) the Union Defense is expected to allocate around 147 billion 
euros (Ballester, 2013). Opposed to the EU, the United States in 2015 invested more 
than twice in defense, and China has increased its defense budget by 150% in the past 
decade. In 2015, Russia has invested 5.4% of its GDP in defence (European Defence 
Action Plan, 2016). 
These financial projections of the European Union are not sufficient for it to be 
a "super power". From the foregoing, it is evident that the European strategic identity 
will depend on developments in Asia. Therefore, in the European security strategy, 
which is also the main instrument for the implementation of the common foreign and 
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security policy should explain how it will engage in relations with new actors and 
organizations. So far, the position of the Union was like that one of the non-aligned 
countries, to be among the great powers, a closer partner to one side, and more or less 
autonomous to other participants (Drent and Landman, 2012: 2). But if it wants to be a 
competitive force, it is necessary to strengthen (in financial terms), Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), which is a fundamental pillar for achieving the EU as a 
global player. The EU budget for CFSP increased from 285 million euros in 2008 to 396 
million euros in 2013. However, according to future projections, the Union plans to cut 
down the figure of 354 million euros by 2020 (Yearbook of European Security, 2014: 55, 
57, 68).  
According to these indicators, the process of demilitarization of Europe is real, 
and the negative trend in the financing of the common foreign and security policy will 
continue in the next few years. Doing so will reduce the possibilities of the EU to be the 
next superpower that will have greater engagement in international affairs. 
This steps which provides Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy 
exceeds the flaws that had The European Security Strategy from 2003, which lacked 
"strategic upgrading". We emphasized that constant revision of security documents is 
not necessary, but any delay would reflect on the internal and external security policy. 
Seen through the prism of "strategic updating" of strategic documents, the European 
Union is in a worse situation than its allies. In comparison to the EU, the United States 
has revised its National Security Strategy (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2015.) in a relatively 
short time. The new strategic document of the European Union has clear plans for 
implementation of the European strategic objectives and priorities. Is needed a small 
caution and modesty in ambitions related to security and defense issues, which are 
highly sensitive during crises, instability and polarization in the policies and interests of 
the EU Member States. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In the past twenty years the European Union’s contribution was enormous. Its 
model of integration and interaction is an example for several regions in the world. But 
today, Europe is facing a deep crisis that could easily disrupt its cohesion. The dynamic 
processes of the globalization that have brought new risks and dangers to the "door" of 
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Europe, question the European security and stability. Rapid changes in the security 
environment compelled the Union to make a full scan and analysis of the possible 
consequences for its security.  
 For this purpose the Union was forced to adopt a global strategy for foreign 
and security policy. While the intentions in the document is too  ambitious, however, 
correspond with real situation, interests, needs, opportunities and capacities for the 
implementation of the common foreign and security policy of the European Union. The 
lessons learned and past experiences are implemented in the Strategy, as well as future 
steps and plans for external action of the EU. 
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Abstract 
 
This study examines the state of the EU enlargement process in the Western 
Balkans. A more strategic approach from the side of the EU is needed to engage with 
the region and its myriad challenges – from security to economic development to the 
rule of law. The Western Balkans are surrounded by EU member states, yet membership 
remains a remote prospect, and other players, such as Russia, are ready to step in. It is 
in the interests of the EU to foster a secure and prosperous region, but it has to 
persuade the region's elites and public alike that the accession process will bring about 
sustainable reforms, stability and prosperity. This necessitates an enhanced reform 
drive and better communication by the governments in the region. The EU should work 
with governments and civil society to improve the evaluation process of progress made, 
induce consensus on EU enlargement among competing political parties, and support 
enhanced regional cooperation mechanisms. The EU needs to overcome 'good 
neighbourly relations' conditionality by proactively intervening to overcome bilateral 
disputes, to open accession negotiations with all countries as soon as possible, and 
ensure that the accession process serves as a powerful motor to drive reforms and 
institutional transformation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
European Union (EU) enlargement is under threat. There is little enthusiasm 
among European member states for further enlarging the Union. The slowing down of 
the EU integration process in the Western Balkans has been accompanied by a 
slowdown in investment in the region by EU member states. European states face 
different problems of their own making. Citizens across the continent feel less 
connected with the European supranational institutions and globalization processes.  
Economic progress has been stagnating and populist leaders have exploited anti-elitist 
feelings. In the Balkans leaders imitate and improve populist strategies. New regional 
powers, such as Turkey, Russia, and China threaten to use the impasse in the EU 
enlargement process. It is in the interests of the EU to foster a secure and prosperous 
region, but it has to persuade the region's elites and public alike that the accession 
process will bring about sustainable reforms, stability and prosperity. This necessitates 
an enhanced reform drive and better communication by the governments in the region. 
The EU should work with governments and civil society to improve the evaluation 
process of progress made, induce consensus on EU enlargement among competing 
political parties, and support enhanced regional cooperation mechanisms. The EU needs 
to overcome 'good neighbourly relations' conditionality by proactively intervening to 
overcome bilateral disputes, to open accession negotiations with all countries as soon 
as possible, and ensure that the accession process serves as a powerful motor to drive 
reforms and institutional transformation. This paper analyses the state of affairs and 
discusses the methods how best to invigorate the enlargement process.  
 
 
STATE OF PLAY IN THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS  
 
The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) – as a tailor-made, country-by-
country, progressive approach and intermediate step on the path towards accession – 
has, since May 1999, been the centrepiece of EU strategy towards the Western Balkans. 
On 19 and 20 June 2000, at the Santa Maria de Feira European Council, all Western 
Balkan countries were considered as potential candidates for EU membership. A few 
months later, on 24 November 2000, the prospect of possible accession to the EU was 
confirmed at the Zagreb Summit. At the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003, 
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all EU member states declared their ‘unequivocal support to the European perspective 
of the Western Balkan countries’ and that ‘the future of the Balkans is within the 
European Union.’  
Following Croatia’s accession to the European Union (EU) on 1 July 2013, no 
candidate country is on track for membership before the end of the same decade. 
Beyond politics, EU investments in the region have also slowed down. Nationalism has 
remained a strong force in the region, and in some places it has been supplemented by 
the growth of Islamist radicalisation. Disillusioned Balkan youth have even headed to 
Syria to join the terrorist fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Different 
regional powers, such as Turkey, Russia, China and the Gulf states, have begun to 
become more engaged in the region, sensing a business and geopolitical opportunity 
enhanced by the absence of a momentum towards EU enlargement. 
Citizens in the region have grown wary while EU institutions and member 
states do not envisage further enlargement before 2020. Elites in candidate countries 
have become increasingly aware that the negotiations will take a long time. For 
example for the 2004 enlargement negotiations began on 31 March 1998 with the six 
best-prepared countries (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia), and on 15 February 2000 with all the other candidate countries (Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia) All except Bulgaria and Romania 
became members in 2004, which means the negotiations lasted six years. Sofia and 
Bucarest joined the EU in 2007, negotiating for seven years. Croatia negotiated from 
2005 to 2013. It is highly unlikely that any of the Western Balkan countries will be able 
to join the EU in such periods of time.  Moreover, the Greek debt crisis dealt ‘a serious 
blow to the enlargement narrative as one of sustained convergence, EU-driven 
modernisation, and increasing prosperity’. (O'Brennan, 2013:40) National leaders have 
tried to manipulate the situation to their own advantage, often disregarding the 
necessity of democratic consolidation and paying only lip-service to the EU accession 
process.  Organised crime, corruption and immigration, or large-scale unrest, could pose 
greater threats to Europe-wide security and stability if the prospects of Western Balkan 
countries’ accession fade into the distance. The Western Balkans and the EU need to 
recharge the EU enlargement process through a reinvigorated accession process and 
strategy.  
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MOVING FORWARD 
 
Forging a consensus among elites to promote reforms 
 
Politicians in the region must comprehend that the consolidation of democracy 
depends on elite consensus and cooperation. A critical step for successful 
democratisation is the transformation of divided elites into consensually unified ones 
through an elite settlement of basic disputes among elites. An elite pact, 
settlement or political settlement is a ‘relatively rare event in which warring national 
elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganise their relations by negotiating 
compromises on their most basic disagreements’. (Burton and Higley, 1987:295) 
Alternatively put, formal and informal pacts between contending political actors can 
move relations from a stage of disruptive confrontation to one of respectful, consensus-
based political competition between elite groups. This is needed in the Western Balkans 
as soon as possible.  
The EU should apply pressure on political parties in the Western Balkans to 
defuse the ‘winner takes all’ mentality of political elites. Party dialogue and a culture of 
consensus-building over policy issues and institutions should be further promoted. To 
safeguard against the appropriation of the EU enlargement progress for the 
furtherance of party political interests, the EU should formally insist that candidates for 
key positions leading the respective country’s accession process – Chief Negotiator, 
Minister and Deputy Minister of European Integration, Chair of the Parliamentary 
Committee for EU Enlargement and similar positions –are elected or appointed by a 
consensus among the political parties in the respective national parliaments. The more 
the ruling and opposition parties are formally engaged in the enlargement process, the 
less they will be inclined to take a confrontational stand against the necessary reforms. 
Consensual policymaking will decrease inter-party bickering and defuse the tensions 
that contribute to the ‘winner takes all’ mentality.   
Although it might look as if the EU were trying to interfere in the internal 
affairs of the countries in the region, this move would signal to the elites and to 
citizens in the region that political settlement and consensus over EU enlargement is a 
crucial issue for the democratisation and socio-economic development of the Western 
Balkans. 
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Problems related to corruption and party political influence on the 
independence of public institutions, the media, and electoral processes are prevalent 
throughout the Western Balkans, a point repeatedly made in the European Commission 
progress reports. To address these barriers to the EU integration of the region, the EU 
should use IPA II to further support reforms in the 'enlargement countries'. In 
particular, under the public administration reform and rule of law components of IPA II, 
the EU should increase the focus on strengthening the independence and the 
competencies of following types of public institutions:  
• the state/national/supreme Audit Office,  
• commissioner on freedom of information 
• the Broadcasting Council/media regulatory body,  
• the Ombudsman Office,  
• anti-monopoly Commission 
• special anti-corruption bodies, and  
• the Electoral Commission.  
Building consensus is a key issue here. The emergence of a system of 
election/appointment of officials heading these bodies through a consensual vote in 
national parliaments would increase the likelihood of the confirmation of highly 
qualified candidates by a strong majority. Among other things, the strengthening of the 
efficacy and the role of the above-mentioned institutions will in the short run influence 
the fairness of elections. Free and fair elections, where the results of the voting are not 
disputed by any party, should be an urgent priority.  
 
 
Engaging public opinion in the EU 
 
Enlargement without supportive constituencies in both places, among the 
candidate (and potential candidate) countries and EU member states, and enlargement 
regarded as a purely technical, elite-driven process that few people understand, will not 
survive the current erosion of trust. The situation today does not differ much from 
circumstances and public opinion in the EU five or ten years ago. The risk is that a 
failure to step up the enlargement process during the tenure of the Juncker 
Commission would result in weaker, more authoritarian Western Balkan states. 
However, elucidation of the potential drawbacks of non-EU action regarding 
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enlargement will not suffice to convince the citizens of EU member states who oppose 
further expansion. More openness, transparency, clarity, and precise communication and 
data are needed. If significant progress is made in the reform process in the Western 
Balkan countries, and a successful EU communication strategy is implemented to 
communicate the evaluation of that progress, then it would become easier to convince 
the EU public, in particular in the more sceptical EU countries, to support the 
enlargement process. In other words, the dissemination to ordinary citizens of more 
easily accessible and comprehensible analysis in addition to the resources and materials 
produced by the European Parliament Information Offices (EPIOs), EC 
representations/delegations, Europe Direct network  will serve in better presenting the 
results of the Western Balkan reforms to the European public and could become a 
crucial tool for the European Commission and the European Parliament as well as for 
the national governments of member states to promote and explain the benefits of 
further enlargement. In the next section we will discuss how to prepare such kind of an 
analysis. 
 
 
Transform Commission progress reports into accessible, results-oriented 
evaluations 
 
EU progress reports assess the respective countries' progress in complying 
with the Copenhagen accession criteria and the conditionality of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process. Progress is measured on the basis of decisions taken, legislation 
adopted and measures implemented in a yearly time frame, from October in the 
previous year to September in the current year. The reports are not sufficiently clear, to 
ordinary citizens at least, in the assessment of the progress made. In the reports on 
many occasions, the word 'progress' is used in tandem with specific adjectives (some 
further, further, limited, very limited, patchy, hampered, little, good, slow, very slowly) to 
indicate the level of improvement in specific chapters. It is far from clear, however, what 
is the difference between ‘limited’ and ‘very limited’, ‘slow’ and ‘very slow’, or how 
‘further’ progress being made in certain policy areas has been evaluated.  
Moreover, progress in some areas is easily defended by the ruling elites as 
general progress of the country and a good performance of the government as far as 
EU accession is concerned. With constrained media spectrum it is easy for government 
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to ignore the ‘limited’ or lack of progress in certain other areas. On the other hand, 
opposition parties can easily focus and warn the public about the policy areas where the 
country has made little or no progress, blaming the government for not doing enough 
in the EU accession process. Civil society organizations that specialize in certain 
problematic area, say environmental protection, will have a completely different view on 
the progress made of the country, than say, a NGO working in the area of consumer 
rights, where the Report has found strong progress being made in the adoption and 
implementation of the relevant acquis. Very few think tanks and civil society 
organizations in the Western Balkans have capacities and analytical skills to assess the 
overall progress made. Given the polarized political scene in the Western Balkans, 
where media and civil society organizations are considered closer to the ruling parties 
or the opposition, the Reports can serve as PR tools to praise or criticize the 
government work on EU accession in the past year. The reports should be more specific 
and concrete with easily comprehendible and quantifiable indicators. To make the 
progress reports mobilising factors for civil society actors, politicians and public 
administrators across the region, ESI suggests doing for each chapter – and for each 
country – what the EU did in the visa liberalisation process for the region: produce one 
document ('roadmap') that clearly sums up what the core requirements are under each 
policy area (or chapter) that every accession candidate should meet. (European Stability 
Initiative, 2014). The Reports would then also serve as a tool to compare progress made 
within a country throughout time, as well as in comparison with the other Western 
Balkan countries.  
This transformation of the EU progress reports would help the discussions in 
the European Parliament and indirectly assist wider European audiences to better grasp 
the intricacies of the Western Balkans enlargement process. Clearer indicators would 
serve MEPs to produce more informative debate and resolutions. The Progress Report 
should also devote a new concluding section that would assess the communication 
strategies – both in terms of objectives set initially and the evaluation of the 
implementation of the strategy– of the EU and Western Balkan governments alike vis-
à-vis the benefits and challenges of the EU accession process and the progress made in 
a given year. Furthermore, at the moment the progress reports relate to improvements 
made in a single year, not to a continuum of progress. The Progress Reports should be 
complemented with an annual analytical evaluation of how close to full compliance to 
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the acquis a country is. In the next section we will discuss who and how to prepare such 
kind of an analysis. 
 
 
Engaging public opinion in the region 
 
The European Commission and the European Parliament should urge the 
governments in the region to reshape their communication strategies regarding 
enlargement with specific and timely delivery of information on the reforms made. 
Western Balkan governments must be obliged to prepare and implement annual 
communication strategies on the benefits and challenges of the EU accession process 
and the progress made in a given year. Within the annual communication strategies, 
accountability concerning the adoption and implementation of the acquis would be 
increased by the dissemination to the public by Western Balkan ministries of quarterly 
reports. These communication strategies would be evaluated in the EU Progress 
Reports, both in terms of the clarity and appropriateness of the objectives set initially 
and the evaluation of the implementation of the strategies. If evaluated by the 
Commission, governments in the region will devote necessary resources to improved 
communication with its citizens on the EU accession process. The annual analytical 
think tank reports can support this evaluation through providing independent verified 
updates on the communication strategies of the Western Balkan countries.  
More openness and information from a variety of sources, both governmental 
and non-governmental, would serve to mobilise public opinion in the Western Balkan 
countries to support further reforms. To enhance the overall process the European 
Parliament and the European Commission should also insist that governments in the 
Western Balkan countries provide open, accurate data to local policy research institutes 
so that they can produce informative reports based on up-to-date data. No good 
analysis can be produced on the effectiveness of a communication strategy on the 
progress in the EU accession process of a given Western Balkan country if reliable data 
is not provided to analysts, for example. In that respect, the EU delegations in the 
region should closely monitor the implementation of the Access to Information laws 
which typically aid researchers in situations where data is not easily available. IPA II 
projects on Western Balkan states achieving Open Government Partnerships should 
also aid the process.  
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Regional cooperation must improve  
 
Notwithstanding a number of open bilateral issues, regional cooperation among 
the Western Balkan states should be further enhanced with the proactive support of 
the EU and the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) In particular, the EU should urge an 
enhanced role for the RCC in stimulating regional cooperation in a variety of fields, 
including soft ones such as education, science and culture. The RCC should continue to 
serve as a platform for the region’s governments to evaluate the future of regional 
cooperation, specifically based on careful examination of the actual needs of states in 
the region. The EU should enhance the implementation of the RCC’s SEE 2020 Strategy 
and monitor the convergence of its goals with those of the EU since SEE 2020 is closely 
following the vision of the EU strategy Europe 2020. Continuous EU support is 
necessary as key elements of the Strategy such as “transport, energy, competitiveness 
and integrated growth have secured support from the Prime Ministers of Western 
Balkans economies and several EU Member States through the Berlin Process.” (RCC 
press release 2015) 
Beyond the RCC, the role of other regional bodies, such as the Regional School 
of Public Administration (ReSPA), should be strengthened to aid the enlargement 
process. ReSPA should serve as a hub for supporting leading civil servants engaged in 
the EU negotiations. EU negotiations by individual countries should be open for 
monitoring by civil servants of other Western Balkan countries. Apart from discussions 
and negotiations over strategic issues civil servants from the region should be able to 
monitor the negotiations and acquire practical knowledge of the process to be 
replicated in their own countries. This kind of regional cooperation should be enhanced 
by the EU and ReSPA. Regional initiatives, such as the SEECP, should also be supported 
by the EU, especially if the region is to focus on cooperation in solving a number of 
common problems such as corruption and political party influence on the independence 
of public institutions, the media, and electoral processes.  
 
 
Revisit ‘good neighbourly relations’ conditionality  
 
When EU conditionality touches upon identity politics, the transformative 
power of the EU is weak and ineffective. A problem arises when ‘a state’s national 
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identity contradicts the conditions linked to the benefit of an external incentive, the 
state will not or only inconsistently comply with these conditions independently of the 
expected costs of adaptation’, and that ‘national identity plays a crucial role as filter by 
sorting out whether governmental action is to be based on cost-benefit calculations 
(“logic of expected consequences”) or in accordance with socially constructed and 
accepted identities, rules, and practices.’ (Freyburg and Richter, 2008:14) In other 
words, if the conditionality criteria pertain to an issue area perceived as problematic for 
national identity, a different line of reasoning will be triggered than in cases where the 
criteria are considered unproblematic. National identity ‘determines the logic of social 
action that governments will follow when responding to the Union’s conditionality 
criteria’. (Freyburg and Richter, 2010:266) 
The EU condition for the Macedonia to reach a ‘negotiated and mutually 
acceptable solution on the name issue’ is effectively hidden under the ‘good neighbourly 
relations’ criteria. (European Commission, 2009:6) Failing to achieve good neighbourly 
relations is in fact, pushing the Macedonia to negotiate on its name and identity. This 
amounts to posing additional unprecedented criteria for membership of the EU and 
NATO, a policy that delegitimises the principle of ‘conditionality’, one of the main 
instruments of the EU in the enlargement process. The blocking of the Macedonia’s EU 
accession drive removes the major incentive for the country’s political elites to work 
towards membership. Moreover, there is a high risk that Macedonian public opinion will 
turn against accession.  More importantly, the possibilities for further soft mediation of 
Macedonian-Albanian political disputes will diminish at a time when there is a danger 
that nationalism and ethnocentrism will rise again.  
Serbia has been trying to keep its policy on Kosovo separate from its aspiration 
to join the EU. However, since the EU has made clear that Serbia’s progress towards 
accession depends on improving its relations with Kosovo, it might lead the country to 
take another look at the integration process. Despite the change of government in 
Serbia, the policy and discourse on Kosovo remains the same. It seems that no 
government in Belgrade in the near future will recognise Kosovo’s independence. As it 
is very unlikely that the EU will have Serbia as a member if it does not establish good 
neighbourly relations with an independent Kosovo, the danger is that Belgrade will 
abandon EU enlargement, further complicating Balkan affairs. Serbia should be allowed 
to tackle this issue at the very end of the negotiations process. It would not be prudent 
to push Serbia on recognition of Kosovo when five Member states do not recognize 
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Prishtina. While negotiations last and normalization of relations between Belgrade and 
Prishtina progresses the status of the Serbian minority in Kosovo must be upheld with 
a special attention to the Serbian municipalities in the North. If in due time the 
situation of Serbs in Kosovo is well accepted by the public in Serbia there might be a 
window of opportunity that Belgrade recognizes the independence of Prishtina at the 
time when the country would be acceding to the EU. EU conditionality runs the risk 
that it will not be taken seriously by other governments in the region that have or 
might have problems in bilateral relations with their neighbours or in regional 
cooperation. If the upper hand in bilateral disputes within the regional cooperation 
conditionality lies in the hands of one or more EU member states, laggards in the 
process of EU enlargement such as Kosovo might worry that they will suffer 
insurmountable obstacles in the accession process once Serbia joins the EU. If and 
when Serbia accedes to the EU special controlling mechanism should be put in place in 
order to secure that Belgrade would not be able to block progress of Kosovo’s 
accession. Although such mechanism would be an unorthodox measure, given the 
experience with the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism for Bulgaria and Romania, 
it would not be a completely unorthodox measure.  The credibility of the enlargement 
process ‘remains in doubt so long as individual member states continue to make the 
accession process hostage to bilateral complaints, thereby undermining the element of 
fairness in the conditionality principle’. (Fouéré, 2014:8)  
The view of the European Commission that ‘bilateral issues should not hold up 
the accession process which should be based on established conditionality' 
(Enlargement Strategy 2014: 17)’ should be given more political weight. In principle a 
way must be found to prevent the postponement of EU enlargement to certain Western 
Balkan countries as a result of veto-wielding powers by member states around the 
principle of ‘good neighbourly relations’ conditionality. A blockade of the enlargement 
process for Serbia and the Macedonia could have serious implications for regional 
stability and innovative solutions such those proposed above should be found. The EU 
should consider devising mechanisms/informal bodies to help solve specific bilateral 
disputes between member states and candidate countries. At some instances the EU 
can rely on most active/interested Member States. The German/British initiative in 
Bosnia is an example of individual member states pushing for resolution of problematic 
issues when the EU as a whole does not.  While not all bilateral disputes merit such an 
effort, it is necessary in some, particularly difficult cases that revolve around the 
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questions of statehood or national identity. The experience of the resolution of the 
Slovenia-Croatia sea border dispute should be considered, and an enhanced role and 
powers for the European Commission and/or the European Parliament in this process 
might be an option.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In recent decades, the EU has invested so much in the Western Balkan region 
that the region is now strongly integrated economically with the EU, which accounts for 
more than two-thirds of the region’s total trade. Therefore, an exit strategy should not 
be under consideration. On the contrary, closer integration should be moving further 
ahead. A deceleration of the accession process would seriously undermine the credibility 
of the EU and its self-proclaimed ‘soft power’, leaving the door open for the stronger 
influence of rising regional powers such as Russia. The increasingly indifferent feelings 
towards the EU from the side of elites in the Western Balkans have begun to usher in a 
return to authoritarian tendencies.  Nationalism could easily rise in the region. New 
conflicts could develop, especially in the Macedonia, Kosovo or Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The decline of influence by the EU could be exploited by regional powers such as Russia 
or Turkey. Given the visa-free travel to the EU Schengen countries for the Western 
Balkan countries (except Kosovo), there is a danger that radicalised Islamic youth from 
the Balkans would move in and become active in Europe. Organised crime, corruption 
and immigration could also emerge as potential threats to Europe-wide security and 
stability if the Western Balkan countries’ accession is postponed indefinitely. The 
Western Balkans and the EU need to recharge the EU enlargement process through a 
reinvigorated accession process and strategy.  
To do so an important target audience should be the EU public. The Western 
Balkans are not a priority for ordinary EU citizens. The countries do not have a good 
reputation – following years of negative media reports from the region and stereotyping 
within the EU resulting from reports of criminality caused by migrants from the 
Western Balkans. As the EU is undergoing an internal crisis, and its member states are 
less likely to be supportive of enlargement, the European Commission should take 
greater initiative by using clear language explaining to citizens of the EU and the 
Western Balkans the benefits of the accession process and the reforms required to join 
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the EU. The public in the Western Balkans should also become more aware of the 
intricacies of the accession process and know better where their respective countries 
stand, and why some have not progressed further. Hence, better produced EU progress 
reports and reports by independent think-tanks in the Western Balkans are needed 
together with more precise and timely communication from the governments in the 
region. 
Transparency and accountability are needed in the reforms, hence more accent 
should be placed on improving institutions and agencies that monitor and evaluate 
public policymaking.  Elites in the Western Balkans must be induced to drop the 
prevalent confrontational mentality and move from disunity to unity in working 
together to further the enlargement process and democratic rule in general.  Regional 
cooperation should be enhanced, and the EU should assist this through the various 
forms of multilateral institutions currently in place. There is no point in working on EU 
accession if the region does not improve and does not coordinate better its own 
activities and projects aiming to help the life of ordinary citizens. Brussels should 
accept that some of the regional problems, especially those involving bilateral issues 
and concerning ‘good neighbourly’ relations, will remain unresolved without the EU’s 
direct involvement. Overall, devoid of EU accession prospects, the Western Balkan 
countries face the risk of a social-economic implosion and authoritarian consolidation. 
The Western Balkan countries need more assistance and attention from the EU than 
the Central European candidates that acceded to the EU in and since 2004. A set of 
concrete measures were suggested in the paper in order to revitalise the enlargement 
process. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with the external dimension of the EU energy policy in the 
scope of which we can also define the common perception of energy environment of the 
EU. The EU is particularly interested in the states of the Western Balkans which are in 
different phases of integration process towards the full EU membership, integral energy 
security of the EU and, finally, the EU's Energy Union. In the context of energy policies, 
these states are significant as an area of potential transport routes important for the 
diversification of EU energy supply, particularly gas. Simultaneously, this region is 
where the EU is facing conflicting interests beyond regional subjects, primarily Russia, 
which are to a great extent realized using the energy (gas) dependence of the states in 
the region. Consequently, the EU is strongly affirming the issue of energy security and 
helps the states - candidates for EU membership define and coordinate their energy 
policies as the basis for energy security. The EU puts emphasis on security and not on 
economic aspect of this policy. Subsequently, with security in general, energy security is 
a significant prerequisite to the process of joining the EU. Also, there is a strong 
interdependence of these two aspects of security in this region, where the general 
security of the Western Balkans influences the energy security of the EU. Thus, the 
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paper will elaborate on the impact of security in the Western Balkans on energy 
security from the EU perspective. In particular, one part of the paper is dedicated to 
analyzing energy interests of the EU member states which share borders with this area 
and which should actively participate in stabilizing this region. This paper establishes 
the hypothesis that in the future, energy security of the EU will increasingly depend on 
the supply routes stretching across the Western Balkans and the neighbouring states, 
which places great importance on the active improvement of the stability of this area 
and its inclusion in the EU. The importance of the Western Balkans for the energy 
security of the EU and its efforts to stabilize the Western Balkans for energy security 
will be analyzed. 
 
Keywords: Energy security, security, EU, the Western Balkans 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Numerous issues are connected to the concept of energy security, and many of 
them suggest that the "ensuring of secure energy supply which includes not only 
ensuring of energy sources under favourable conditions, but also ensuring of transport 
routes for energy supply" (Tatalović 2008:7) is essential. This paper uses one of the 
possible definitions, adopted by the EU, of energy security as "the uninterrupted access 
to energy sources at an affordable price" (European Commission, 2014: 3). Threats to EU 
energy security lead to an increased engagement of the EU on the Western Balkans 
within the framework of the Energy Community (ECom)100 and the High Level Group for 
Central and South-Eastern European Gas Connectivity (CESEC).  
The Western Balkans (WB) neologism is used in a political, not in a 
geographical sense. At first it referred to the candidate states for the EU accession 
situated in the area that includes the states of "former Yugoslavia, minus Slovenia, plus 
Albania". Croatia is no longer a part of it, since by joining the EU it dropped out of the 
                                                          
100 The Energy Community does not refer only to gas but also to electricity, renewables, oil, 
energy efficiency, environment and competitiveness, but in this paper the emphasis will be on 
gas. 
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"outsider club"101. The common contextualisation of the states in this area is being 
derived from the concept of regionalism on which the EU and its enlargement policy are 
based. The regional contextualisation was enabled through some common features of 
these states - these are the post-conflict states with inherited instability, not only as a 
consequence of the recent wars and ethnic conflicts, but also of an unfinished political, 
economic and social transition. A non-transparent market, the new elites for its control, 
legal dysfunction, delays in the democratisation process, economic stagnation and 
security destabilisation make these states insecure, which increases the potential for 
external actors' activity.  
The subject of this paper is neither the organisational structure nor the 
organisational issues of the ECom, nor is it the environmental or social impact of 
energy policies. The energy issues are not reduced to a technical aspect, to one of the 
sectors of the economy, but are a matter of interest within a wider strategic frame, 
since the solutions to certain energy issues are not important only for their economic 
impact, but have also a broader, strategic importance. The European energy policy has 
three dimensions: economic, environmental and the one that is the subject of this 
paper, and that is security-related. The main goal of this paper is to show how energy 
in/security, among other reasons, motivates the EU for taking measures on the WB. 
These measures are aimed at secure gas supply, and at the same time, they support the 
EU efforts for securing peace, stability and prosperity in this area. The reason is 
twofold: the enlargement policy, since the states of the WB aspire to EU membership, 
and the energy security, because these states can contribute to diversification, not of 
the gas sources, but of the gas supply routes to the EU. 
We have based the explanation of the link between energy sources and security 
on the expanded concept of security of The Copenhagen School, on the contemporary 
understandings of the notion of power, and on the discipline of geopolitics. We will 
show that the establishing of the Energy Community first, and then of the CESEC, the 
institutions connecting the EU and the Western Balkans countries/WBC (and the 
Southeast Europe in a broader sense) in a joint effort to enhance the energy security, 
                                                          
101 This political term was created at the first EU summit held outside the EU area, in Zagreb in 
2000, while defining the strategy of the EU enlargement. Montenegro (since 2010) and Serbia 
(since 2012) have been engaged in accession negotiations, Albania has received the status of a 
candidate country; Macedonia has had it since 2005. Only BaH and Kosovo are just potential 
candidates due to the unresolved issue of sovereignty. 
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represents a operationalization of several concepts on which the EU bases its activity. 
We synthesised various concepts, elaborated by different authors, and brought them 
into connection with energy security. These are EU external governance by way of 
externalisation of the European energy policy or external Europeanization (with a 
special emphasis on security dimension), wider regional community concept and the 
concept of security community. In the paper, there are also traces of neo-functionalist 
approach, but this time we will not pay much attention to it. The paper is based on an 
analysis of the EU documents, newspaper reports and statistics.  
 
 
Conceptualisation and definition 
 
The study of security in the global community is one of the most challenging 
issues in political science in a broader sense, and in a more strict sense, in international 
relations. The growing importance of security phenomena for contemporary societies 
has motivated an increasing number of scientists to start dealing with security-related 
issues (Tatalović and Malnar, 2016: 54). Within this frame, the notion of energy security 
which is difficult to conceptualise, is being examined as well. Energy activities vary 
depending on the type of energy source (coal, oil, and gas), field of activity (extraction, 
transport, distribution) or actors (manufacturer, buyer, and distributor). The definition of 
energy security depends also on the point of view, and is hence differently defined by 
the importing countries, exporting countries, developed countries, developing 
countries.102 In this paper we will define the energy security from the importers point of 
view, since the subject of our research is the externalisation of the EU energy policy to 
the Western Balkans, and both the EU and the WBC are major importers of energy 
sources. From the point of view of energy importers, energy security refers to a secure 
source of sufficient quantities of energy at affordable prices or a "predictable access to 
desired types of energy sources (in this case gas) in desired quantities in order to 
assure the supply security as well as transparent and affordable prices" (Nosko, 2010).  
                                                          
102 For more details, see D. Yergin, Ensuring Energy Security, Foreign Affairs, Volume 85, No.2, 
March/April 2006, p. 69-82. 
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From the energy security defined in that way it follows that the main threats 
are the supply insecurity and the price uncertainty103. These two threats are 
interdependent, and the emphasis in this paper will be on the energy supply in/security. 
The energy supply security is a matter of (national) security of the importing countries 
ever since World War I when the First Lord of the British Admiralty Winston Churchill 
decided to make the British Navy faster by using oil which had to be imported from the 
then Persia, instead of coal which Britain had in sufficient quantities. The focus then 
was on oil, and the conventional wars (the "oil wars") have been fought over the control 
of oil sources, and this so as to enhance the military security. Today, the focus is on gas 
and on conflict (unconventional warfare) over the control of gas transport routes and 
this with a view to enhance the freedom of foreign-policy decision-making. 
Due to empirical reality, the chosen definition of energy security puts an 
emphasis on the gas supply security. Unlike oil which is mostly being traded on liberal, 
market-based principles, whereas gas due to capital-intensive and fixed gas pipelines is 
predominantly being traded on the basis of long-term, predefined agreements. Besides, 
both the EU and the Balkans´ states import large quantities of gas from Russia via gas 
pipelines under its control. The focus is shifted from oil to gas and from the control 
over sources to the control over transport routes and the required infrastructure. 
Therefore, the subject of interest is not the technical or physical security of the critical 
gas infrastructure, often being targeted in war, but the impact of peacetime control 
over that infrastructure on the energy, and, in a broader sense, on economic security, 
and, first and foremost, on freedom of political decision-making. Structural over-
dependence of the EU and the WBC on Russia as the gas exporter and on the transport 
routes under its control is used by Russia for exerting pressure and intimidation – by 
cutting off the supply or changing the prices according to its political preferences and 
                                                          
103 Fossil fuels, oil and gas are still predominantly being used and their price has not always 
been a market category. Although the oil is being largely traded on a global level based on the 
market principles, its price depends on the stock exchange speculations (the "paper-oil bubble"), 
geopolitical events (wars that disrupt supply, etc.) or psychological reactions based on the 
expectation of worsening of geopolitical conditions. Due to limited possibilities and expensive 
transport infrastructure, the price of the gas is being even less of a market category – it is being 
traded based on long-term agreements, and its price often depends on the current political 
preferences, so it is being used to exert influence with the aim of changing those preferences.    
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regardless of market conditions.104 To which extent the EU has become energy (gas) 
insecure, became clear after the first gas-dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2006, 
when the gas supply to Europe was disrupted due to political differences between 
Russia and Ukraine105. Therefore, the focus of this paper is on strategic, political threats 
to gas supply security, and strategic approach moves the subject away from economic 
policies and closer to foreign and security policy. 
It is difficult to measure the energy security objectively, but dependence on a 
single source can change the perception of interdependence beneficial to both sides 
into a negative, unequal and threatening dependence. The Westphal's definition, which 
perceives the energy security also from the importers perspective, includes at the same 
time the solutions according to which the energy security relies on geographical 
diversification of energy supplies, diversification of energy sources, and predictable, 
stable and low energy prices (Westphal, 2006: 60). The EU seeks to increase its energy 
security precisely by diversifying sources and transport routes, and by connecting 
through interconnections with neighbouring states. Interconnections enable the 
diversification of transport routes, possibly also the diversification of gas sources in the 
future, and solidarity between the neighbouring states in the event of the gas supply 
disruption that would decrease its negative effects. Such a solution strongly directs the 
EU to addressing the energy security issues in collaboration with its immediate 
neighbourhood. The sense of interdependence with its neighbourhood leads the EU to 
seek out the solutions in external action, which constitutes the very basis of the 
establishing of the Energy Community in the first place. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
104 Beside the Russian geopolitical factor, the gas supply security can also be influenced by an 
increase in demand as a result of the emergence of new economic forces, the growing use of 
natural gas as a "clean" energy source and the long-distance cross-border transport which is 
strongly influenced by the geopolitical events in areas it transits through. 
105 Russia and Ukraine failed to reach the agreement on the price of the Russian gas, which led 
Russia to cut off its gas supply to Ukraine, an important transit country through which no less 
than 80% of the Russian gas was transported to Europe at that time.  
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
339 
Geopolitical importance of energy sources and broadened concepts of 
security and power 
 
The classical geopolitics refers to an analysis of the impact of geographical 
features on power relations in the international relations. In the analysis of energy 
security of the EU and the WB, geography is important for two reasons – it influences 
the energy self in/sufficiency and security-related interactions conditioned by 
geographical proximity. Robert D. Kaplan describes geopolitics as the battle for space 
and power played out in a geographical setting and differentiates between military, 
diplomatic, economic and energy geopolitics (Kaplan, 2014), which connects politics to 
geography and geology. Geographical position conditions non/possessing of energy 
sources, distance from energy sources and infrastructural connecting, and even an 
energy power(lessness). Geographically uneven distribution of energy resources in the 
world brought about a division between the energy exporting countries and energy 
importing countries, and when the energy sources are being transported by predefined 
land route, transit countries also get involved. The importing country, transit country 
and exporting country, being the key actors in the gas trading, are in a position of 
significant interdependence that can be influenced by geopolitical changes. 
Russia bases its power in international relations on geographically conditioned 
energy sources abandonment and uses it so as to maximise its political power. With the 
same goal, it seeks to control gas transport routes towards the importing states. 
Russian president Putin decided that Russia's "vast energy and mineral resources 
(would) serve as a basis to develop its economy; as an instrument to implement 
domestic and foreign policy" because "the role of the country on international energy 
markets determines, in many ways, its geopolitical influence" (Kupchinsky, 2009)106. Gas 
and the infrastructure necessary for its transport are not a driving force nor the only 
reason, but are an important factor and a part of a wider security political engagement, 
and even of conflicts of external actors in the area of the WB, because the "energy 
sources are the only credible thing that Russia can offer" to the states of this area.107 
                                                          
106 Cited according to Ebel, R. E. (2009) "The Geopolitics of Russian Energy - Looking Back, 
Looking Forward". CSIS, Washington, July 2009, p. 9.  
(http://csis.org/files/publication/090708_Ebel_RussianEnergy_Web.pdf 22 January 2016 
107 See Mappes-Niediek, N. (2017), "Sve podsjeća na 1914. godinu, Balkan je fitilj koji može zapaliti 
Europu", 18 February 2017., Index.hr. 
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Energy relations in the WB area are legitimately perceived in terms of geopolitics also 
because the energy-related conflicts are "forging new military alliances as geopolitical 
rivalries combine with mercantilism to create zero-sum games" (Mohan, 2015). 
Geography is considered important also by representatives of some 
contemporary theories of international relations. Authors of the Regional security 
complex theory maintain that it is "a theory of security in which geographical variables 
are central" (Buzan, Weaver, 2003:70), because the very "simple physical adjacency 
tends to generate more security interaction among neighbours than among states 
located in different areas" (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 45). The states of the WB are not 
important for the EU gas security as a source of gas (some do not have their own 
sources and are totally dependent on the Russian infrastructure), but because of their 
geographical position in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU and at the crossroads 
between the gas sources more to the South and East and gas importers more to the 
North and West. These geographical variables generate a possible impact on the EU 
energy security, since these are potential gas transit states to the EU. 
The connection between the energy sources and the security or power was 
strengthened way back during the World War I, but the neologism energy security 
started to appear more often in the discourse as yet another type of security in the 
post-Cold War era. The Copenhagen School of security studies and its representatives 
Buzan and Waeaver dismiss the traditional reducing of security to a single sector and 
horizontally broaden the notion of security by including the non-military threats, 
maintaining that security is a special type of policy applicable to the whole range of 
issues. Buzan emphasises the distinctive character and dynamics of security in five 
sectors: military, political, economic, environmental, and societal (Buzan et a., 1998: vii). 
Energy issues are connected to each of these sectors, therefore they are transsectorial, 
and each of these sectors can be negatively affected by the energy insecurity. 
In the post-Cold War international relations, military power is no longer 
dominant. Non-military forms of power are becoming ever more important, and the 
energy power is one of them. The energy power influences other forms of power: the 
military power, because the energy supply disruption decreases the state defence 
capabilities; the economic power, since energy sources are a rare, geographically 
                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/sve-podsjeca-na-1914-godinu-balkan-je-fitilj-koji-moze-
zapaliti-europu/951405.aspx - 19 February 2017. 
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conditioned and thus lucrative commodity and an indispensable factor in economic 
development and competitiveness; but also the foreign-policy power, because the 
monopoly on energy sources and transport routes is being misused as a strategic 
instrument of influencing other states. Hence energy issues need to be considered in a 
holistic manner (Keay and Buchan, 2015), and although Buzan and Weaver (2003:45) 
object that geopolitical theory in the study of only particular policies loses its 
theoreticalness, it is however appropriate to define the energy power in terms of 
geopolitics or geoeconomy.108 
 
 
EU energy policy and the impact on the Western Balkans  
 
The EU energy policy has three pillars – the economic one, in which the 
emphasis is on competitiveness; the ecological, in which the emphasis is on 
sustainability; and the third, security-related, in which the emphasis is on the supply 
security, and it is the subject of this paper. The energy policy of the EU has two 
dimensions. The inner dimension implies insisting on liberalised and integrated energy 
market. Such market moderates the influence of geopolitical changes on the EU energy 
security, but it is not a sufficient guarantee, hence the secure gas supply becomes a 
strategic goal that goes beyond the arguments of market efficiency. External dimension 
of the European energy policy is important, because the EU secures a significant part of 
its needs for gas outside its borders, and it constitutes an integral part of two EU 
foreign policies: the foreign-trade and the common foreign and security policy. Already 
in 2006, after the first Russian-Ukrainian crisis, the EU perceived the energy security as 
a challenge to foreign policy, and hence concluded that it was necessary to "permit a 
better integration of energy objectives into broader relations with third countries and 
                                                          
108 Often used syntagma "politics of gas pipelines", and Tomas Maltby refers to many other 
authors who wrote on this issue. Maltby, T. (2015), Between Amity, Enmity and Europeanisation: 
EU Energy Security Policy and the Example of Bulgaria's Russian Energy Dependence, Europe-
Asia Studies, 67:5, 809-830. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2015.1046817 - 19.1.2017 
(accessed 1 January 2017) 
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the policies which support them"109, because in a "world of increasing interdependence, 
energy security will depend much on how countries manage their relations with one 
another, whether bilaterally or within multilateral frameworks" (Yergin, 2006:82). 
Therefore, the aim of the energy policy of the EU is "to build up a wide network of 
countries around the EU, acting on the basis of shared rules or principles derived from 
the EU energy policy" (European Commission, 2007). 
Both the internal and external dimension of the EU energy policy are crucial to 
the energy security and necessary for the EU as "the importing nation" to ensure the 
secure gas supply, especially when the external suppliers are state-centric and 
monopolistic. An over-dependence on a single exporter constitutes the main supply 
security threat, and a large number of competitive importers and states through which 
the gas transits towards the EU, enlarged after the dissolution of the USSR, being an 
additional threat. The EU is very concerned about its gas supply vulnerability, thus the 
security pillar of the EU energy policy led in 2015 to a European Commission (EC) 
proposal for the establishing of the Energy Union. The EC has given priority precisely to 
"energy security, solidarity and trust" and has connected this pillar with other pillars – 
"internal energy market" because it increases resilience to supply disruptions, "energy 
efficiency" because it helps to reduce energy demands and "decarbonising of the 
economy" and "research, innovation and competitiveness" because they reduce the need 
for the fossil fuels import and minimise the consequences of supply disruptions.110 The 
original Donald Tusk´s proposal (the then Polish Prime Minister, today the President of 
the European Council) for establishing of the Energy Union111 a year earlier was aimed 
at, first and foremost, strengthening the security pillar of the European energy policy. 
                                                          
109GREEN PAPER A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy 
{SEC(2006) 317} Brussels, 8 March 2006 COM(2006) 105 final, p. 16 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com2006_105_en.pdf - 9 February 2017. 
110 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment 
Bank; A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate 
Change Policy, COM/2015/080 final;  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2015:80:FIN 
111 Tusk, Donald, "A united Europe can end Russia's energy stranglehold – European energy union 
could break Moscow's monopoly and restore competition", Financial Times, April 21, 2014;  
https://next.ft.com/content/91508464-c661-11e3-ba0e-00144feabdc0 
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In spite of the fact that extensive European projects in other areas were running into a 
deadlock, Keay and Buchan believe that the time may well have seemed ripe for the 
proposal to establish an Energy Union, since, in relation to energy, European countries 
had common goals – decarbonisation and facing common security challenges. The 
reason being the outbreak of Ukrainian crisis in 2014 which brought a serious new 
threat of the Russian gas supply disruption through Ukraine, and it was via this route 
that majority (about 80%) of the Russian gas was coming to Europe (Keay and Buchan, 
2015:2). 
The WBC are the EU's closest neighbourhood and are even more vulnerable to 
energy security threats: the secure energy supply is adversely affected by partially 
destroyed energy infrastructure and by over-dependence on the Russian gas imports, 
and this exclusively through Ukraine, which enables Russia to exert foreign-policy 
influence in these countries. The area of the WB is not institutionalised in a political 
sense, and the strongest link among the countries in this area is the integration into 
the EU. These aspirants to EU membership are, in terms of energy, interesting to the 
EU because they are situated on a potential (non-Russian and/or Russian) gas 
transport route. It is for this reason that they are a place of confrontation of external 
actors over the control of the (future) gas infrastructure. One of the actors is Russia, 
which seeks to preserve its monopolistic position in the energy sector and make use of 
it as an instrument of political influence. The other is the EU, which seeks to protect 
the area from the Russian influence and, being a major energy importer, to at least gain 
control over the energy transport routes and, at the same time, to increase its energy 
security. 
An example of a conflict over the gas infrastructure control are the South 
Stream and the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) pipeline projects, which are in direct 
competition with each other due to the same planned route. The EC strongly supports, 
both politically and financially, the non-Russian project SGC for the supply of 
Azerbaijani gas to Europe. Although of small capacity, it would contribute to 
diversification of, not only the transport routes, but also the sources of gas. On the 
other hand, the EC has successfully put pressure on the Russian South Stream project, 
persistently insisting on harmonising the project with the EU legislation, primarily with 
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the Third Energy Package112. Russia suspended the plans for the construction of the 
South Stream at the end of 2014, but has not given up on plans to construct a new 
route for the export of much larger quantities of its gas, a route which bypasses 
Ukraine, but has the same direction as the Southern Gas Corridor. The construction of 
the Turkish Stream to Turkey is under way, but it is not yet defined through which route 
the gas will be transported further to Europe. When Bulgaria, under pressure from the 
EU member states, gave up on participating in the project of the South Stream, Russia 
has put forward plans for the Tesla Pipeline, which would connect the Turkish Stream 
with the EU through Macedonia, a WB state.  
On the other hand, the EU could potentially benefit from the WB to enhance 
its gas supply security, for example, by constructing a new gas network that would 
connect the EU to the new gas sources. The prospects for that are reduced due to 
instability inherent in this area – the corruption and legal insecurity reduce the 
willingness of investors to invest into local energy markets and to finance a new 
infrastructure, and a protectionist, state-governed approach is contrary to liberal rules 
of the EU and presents an obstacle to the regional energy policy. Therefore, the EU 
decided to govern the energy policies of the WBC, to create a "'common regulatory 
space' around Europe … a predictable and transparent market … as well as security of 
supply, for the EU and its neighbours"113. The EU seeks to enhance both its own and the 
energy security of the WBC, because, as it was in 2006 recognised by the European 
Parliament114, the energy security has a profound influence on the overall security. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
112 Since 1996, three energy packages have been issued. The 2009 Third Energy Package was a 
new package of laws, directives and regulations of the EU, which further increased the 
regulatory power of the EC.  
113 GREEN PAPER COM (2006) 105 final, p. 16. 
114 European Parliament resolution on a European strategy for sustainable, competitive and 
secure energy. Green Paper 2006/2113(INI)  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/printficheglobal.pdf?id=534172&l=en  
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Energy Community as the implementation of the concept of wider regional 
community through external governance of the EU 
 
The European Commission holds a view that the coherent and coordinated 
energy policies of the EU MSs and of the neighbouring, potential future members and 
potential transit states, are an important prerequisite for achieving an acceptable level 
of secure energy supply of the EU. Therefore, it advocates the enhancement of the 
energy security of both the EU and the area in its immediate neighbourhood, so it was 
the main actor in the creation of broader regional energy initiatives and is being their 
strong promoter. Because of the energy security threats, the EU has incorporated the 
area of the WB into a "wider regional community" within the framework of energy 
regional formats - The Energy Community (ECom) and The High Level Group for Central 
and South-Eastern European Gas Connectivity (CESEC), the latter being particularly 
important for the enhancement of the gas supply security through the construction and 
connection of the gas infrastructure. In this connection, the "regional cooperation is the 
tool with which to achieve …. goal", and the goal remains "the creation of … Internal 
Energy Market" (Dimitrova and Associates, 2016:1), but also a higher level of gas supply 
security. 
The integration of the WBC, the majority of them has the status of an EU 
candidate, into the ECom and CESEC, represents the implementation of the EU concept 
of "wider Europe" from 2003 that did not include the candidate states115, but envisaged 
the expansion of the regional cooperation to the EU neighbouring states through the 
creation of a wider regional community. The goal is to enable the convergence of 
markets and policies through cooperation and coordination, and ultimately to ensure an 
overall political-strategic orientation as well, regardless of the heterogeneity of a "wider 
Europe". The regional format in addressing the issue of energy security is an added 
value not only due to the transnational nature of energy security, but also because it 
reduces divergences that arise from the national approach to the issue of energy 
security. Countries have always been prone to this because of the asymmetric level of 
                                                          
115"Wider Europe" refers to the neighbouring countries without the prospect of EU membership - 
South Mediterranean countries and eastern neighbours. Communication from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament, Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework 
for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 
March 2003 https://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf -23 January 2017. 
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energy security, so, for example, unlike the EU, the WBC are almost 100 percent 
dependent on the Russian gas and on its supply route through Ukraine. 
The EU concept of "wider regional community" is being implemented by way of 
an "external governance", i.e. through the expansion of the "'legal boundary' of the 
Union with only limited openings of its 'institutional boundary'" (Lavenex, 2004: 680). 
The EU is a system whose essential feature is "an ability to formulate and implement 
public policy programmes governing the operation of society"116, and by way of external 
governance, i.e. through "the ability ... to influence the rules that govern social entities 
beyond its borders" (Renner, 2009:4), the EU creates a "common regulatory space"117 
with its neighbourhood. The governance is "less than 'government', 'governance' is more 
than 'co-operation', as it implies a system of rules which exceeds the voluntarism 
implicit in the term co-operation" (Lavenex, 2004: 682). Solioza and Stubbs (2009: 10) 
consider that the EU has started to focus in a new way on what happens beyond its 
borders, and through external governance, it governs in fact the issue of new 
dependencies in a changed geopolitical environment. The expansion of the EU acquis 
communautaire118 beyond the circle of its members to its immediate neighbourhood is a 
form of external governance, in which internal and foreign policy goals become one; 
therefore it is actually a matter of an external projection of internal solutions, of an 
extra-territorialisation or externalisation of the European policies. The ECom and CESEC 
represent the externalisation of the European energy policy, "the adaptation of the 
European Union in Southeast Europe" (Renner, 2009:13), and thus, the EU, in the 
context of enlargement policy, also determines its future borders. 
The concept of the Energy Community is based on an earlier idea of a pan-
European energy community119. Already at the European Council in 1990, the legally 
non-binding European Energy Charter on energy cooperation of the East and West was 
proposed. After three years of negotiations, it was presented as a legally binding Energy 
Charter Treaty, which would be the first economic agreement and international regime 
of multilateral cooperation in the energy sector that would bring together the former 
                                                          
116 The EU as defined by David Easton. See: European Union: power and policy-making , ed. 
Richardson J., Mazey, S., Fourth edition, Routledge, new York, Part I, p. 3-32. 
117 GREEN PAPER COM(2006) 105 final, p. 16. 
118 According to Grabbe, acquis communautaire refers to all real and potential rights and 
obligations of the EU system and its institutional framework. (Grabbe, 2002: 3)  
119 See GREEN PAPER , COM(2006) 105 final, p. 16. 
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members of the Soviet Union, Central and Eastern European countries, Japan, Australia, 
Norway, Turkey and Switzerland. Because of the associated Transit Protocol, which was 
binding its signatories to implement the principle of free transit indiscriminately of 
origin, destination or ownership, and the principles of a non-discriminatory pricing120, 
Russia has refused its ratification. For Russia, the ratification would mean the loss of 
strategic position as the main supplier and monopolist controlling the transport 
towards Europe, what are important factors on which Russia bases its strength in 
international relations121. 
The initiative to establish an international organization under the name of 
Energy Community (launched in 2004, and carried out in 2006) was less ambitious in 
both geographical and political sense. It brought together the EU states and the EU 
candidate states from the Black Sea region and Southeast Europe, including those of 
the Western Balkans122. The timing of entering into force of the Treaty establishing the 
ECom points to the importance of certain issues on the EU agenda with respect to the 
candidate states. Earlier that year, the first Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute broke out 
with significant consequences for the supply security to the EU, in particular, of the 
"new" (former Eastern European) member states as well as the candidate states, which 
were cut off from the gas. The ECom represents a broader regional coordination of 
preferences in searching for the optimal infrastructure solutions, it encourages 
solidarity and joint projects, but also the creation of an alliance with strategic 
implications. Its tasks are the following: to "create a stable regulatory and market 
framework capable of attracting investment in gas networks", "transmission and 
distribution networks, so that all Parties have access to the stable and continuous 
energy supply that is essential for economic development and social stability" and 
"enhance the supply security of the single regulatory space by providing a stable 
                                                          
120 The main goal was the introduction of common standards of the market economy to the 
energy sector, laying of the foundations for contractual and trade relations and the rule of law. 
121 A monopolistic position of Russia is also favoured by the fact that all energy-rich Central 
Asian countries, former members of the Soviet Union, are dependent on the Russian gas 
infrastructure when exporting energy sources.  
122 Albania, BiH, Montenegro, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Kosovo, Ukraine. 
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investment climate in which connections to Caspian, North African and Middle East gas 
reserves can be developed"123.  
 
 
Externalisation of the EU energy policy 
 
The externalisation of the EU energy policy124 as a part of the concept of "wider 
regional community" has two dimensions: economic (harmonisation with the rules of 
the internal energy market) and security-related (limiting of the Russian influence). 
Both dimensions represent an effective strategy for the protection and enhancement of 
the gas supply security to the EU, because they imply energy policies in the countries 
of the WB consistent with two EU priorities: the creation of a single energy market and 
the diversification of gas sources and transport routes. Due to its geographical position, 
the states of the WB are surrounded by EU members, thus they are necessary for the 
integrity, liquidity and resilience of the internal energy market of the EU. The objective 
of the economic dimension is their integration into a single regional gas market, and 
then its integration into mostly liberalised energy market of the EU. The 
implementation of the energy acquis communautaire (the rules of the Third Energy 
Package, which establish a separation of the gas supply and the ownership over gas 
infrastructure, provision of access to third parties and transparent tariffs) is being 
insisted on in order to transform the markets of the candidate states. From a 
functionalistic perspective, the externalisation of the EU energy policy increases 
efficiency and the capacity for solving of the issues of internal EU policies. 
The states of the WB potentially are also countries important for the gas 
transport towards the EU. Thus, the EU seeks to "reorientate their strategies, and their 
consideration of the policies and objectives" (Maltby, 2015: 813) in advance and, 
regarding the secure energy supply, to include them into the network of mutual 
                                                          
123 The preamble of the Treaty establishing the Energy Community. https://www.energy-
community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/ENERGY_COMMUNITY/Legal/Treaty#TitleI 
124It is based on the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the Development of Energy Policy for the enlarged European Union, its 
Neighbours and Partner Countries, COM(2003) 262 final/2 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/international/doc/2003_communication_en.pdf - 27 
January 2017. 
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responsibilities. The reason is that for the efficient functioning "of the wider European 
gas market" it is not sufficient to apply the common rules and standards, but it is 
necessary to also have an appropriate infrastructure that will connect the countries of 
this area to each other, but also to the EU as a whole, and the EU is ready to support 
this financially. Through the externalisation of its energy policy, the EU seeks to hinder 
Russian infrastructure expansion – for example, the construction of the Tesla Pipeline 
for the export of Russian gas to Central European markets, from the Turkish-Greek 
border, where the Turkish Stream should have ended, through Macedonia and Serbia 
further on to Hungary. In addition, the EU seeks to implement alternative transport 
routes possibly from the alternative sources – for example through the Adriatic-Ionian 
gas pipeline as an integral part of the Southern Gas Corridor or through the planned 
LNG terminals. At the same time, the EU also seeks access to the markets of these 
potentially gas transit states, in order to prevent that their gas insecurity (exclusive 
dependence on the Russian gas) facilitates Russian entering into the ownership 
structure of the energy sectors and the energy infrastructure, and wining over the 
political decision-makers to gain support for the Russian foreign-policy goals. This goal 
of minimisation of the Russian influence represents a security-related dimension of the 
externalisation of the EU energy policy. 
In the basis of the concept of "wider regional community" lies the regionalism 
as a "policy or project of cooperation and coordination" (Solioza and Stubbs, 2009: 2). In 
the case of the ECom, the regionalism has a double function: a) the already described 
inclusion of the neighbouring states into the expanded regional cooperation in the 
sense of the external action of the EU, that is, the Europeanisation of the 
neighbourhood; and b) the exporting of the model of regional cooperation in the sense 
of preparation for the EU integration. The external action of the EU at the same time 
represents an external dimension of Europeanisation which we consider in the context 
of the EU enlargement (hence, we also call it pre-accession or enlargement 
Europeanization (Borzel, 2011: 8), in contrast to the internal dimension of 
Europeanisation, membership Europeanisation (Borzel, 2011: 8) that refers to how the 
EU influences national political systems of its member states. According to Maltby, 
during the process of Europeanisation, the EU exerts pressures to redefine interests, 
preferences, policies and strategies (Maltby, 2015:813), as well as to converge policies. 
The establishment of the Energy Community is one of the objectives agreed at the 
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European Council meeting held in 2003 in Thessaloniki125, when it was officially 
confirmed that the states of the WB area would become members of the EU after the 
fulfilment of the criteria, so the ECom has to be considered in the context of the EU 
enlargement. The ECom includes EU member states and the neighbouring candidate 
states and, in a geographical sense also, it represents the EU enlarged to include the 
future members. 
The European Council Conclusion on Energy Union from March 2015126 
explicitly refers to regional cooperation in energy policies, which also involves co-
operation regarding the cross-border gas transport. This new concept was made 
operational in 2015 by signing of the MoU between the MSs of the High Level Group for 
Central and South-Eastern European Gas Connectivity (CESEC)127 with a view to address 
the urgent issue of the gas supply security128 through establishing interconnections 
that enhance the resilience of the system and diversify the supply, and serve to 
accelerate the creation of an integrated gas market, and this co-funded with EU 
resources. The European Commission previously carried out so-called stress test of gas 
supply security, which also included member states of the ECom, and showed that 
precisely the WB states would be affected the most. CESEC Action Plan129 developed 
afterwards therefore calls for the acceleration of the construction of interconnections, 
so as to avoid repeated "blackouts" and to enable each of the states to have at least 
three different sources of gas at its disposal. The first meeting of the CESEC was held 
as a sign of support and assistance to the WB states after Russia abandoned the South 
Stream project. CESEC also represents the creation of a wider regional community, a 
                                                          
125 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/76201.pdf  
126 European Council Conclusions on the Energy Union (19 March 2015) 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/conclusions-energy-
european-council-march-2015/- 3 January 2017. 
127 Signatory states of the initiative led by the European Commission are Austria, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Croatia, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, and later they were joined by the 
6 agreement parties of the Energy Community: Albania, BiH, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and 
Ukraine.  
128 CESEC Memorandum of understanding allows for the extension of the initiative to the 
eclectic energy and the sector of heating and cooling. 
129 The Action Plan defines seven key projects that contribute the most to the field of enhancing 
of gas supply security of the CESEC countries, including two Croatian projects.  
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regional approach beyond the borders of the EU. Thus, the WB states have somehow 
become members of the future Energy Union130, a deepened European integration in 
the energy sector, even before actually becoming members of the EU.  
 
 
EU as an exporter of regional security 
 
Regional cooperation, alongside Copenhagen and Madrid criteria (relative to 
political, economic and administrative transition and adoption of the acquis 
communautaire), was introduced as one of the additional criteria for the WBC within 
the Stabilisation and Association Process. Thereby the EU has altered the previous way 
of conducting the enlargement policy, which was mainly "a bilateral affair between the 
EU and the applicant country" (Renner, 2009). The concept of regional cooperation is 
the key concept for the EU, which originally connects the EU to the concept of the 
security community131. When the today's EU was created in the post-war era, memories 
of the interwar nationalism were still present, so the focus was not only on the 
preferential trading arrangements, but also on the security alliances. "The European 
Union is set up with the aim of ending the frequent and bloody wars between 
neighbours, which culminated in the Second World War"132. The history of the European 
integration is being used by the EU as a model, so the concept of regional cooperation 
is being applied also to its future members within the framework of its enlargement 
policy, which is the most successful example of the EU foreign policy because it 
provides security, stability and progress. The EU proceeds from the position that 
"regional cooperation is a prerequisite for successful integration into the EU for many 
reasons" and one of them being that it is "the key factor to achieve political stability, 
security and economic development in the region" (Samardžija, 2007).  
All EU pre-accession initiatives in the Western Balkans based on cooperation 
aim also, among other things, at regional reconciliation, at preparing these states for 
the future security community, in which war as means of conflict between the states is 
                                                          
130 See European Council, Conclusions on the Energy Union (2015). 
131In accordance with the theoretical interpretation of the pluralistic security community of Karl 
Deutsch (K. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957). 
132The history of the EU - https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en - 2 July 2016.   
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dismissed and the states are resolving mutual differences by agreement or by any other 
peaceful means. Within the framework of the policy of enlargement to post-socialist 
states (and those in the area of the WB), the EU is not mentioning the security 
criterion, however, as it seeks to avoid introducing new divisions and conflicts, it always 
takes into account this criterion as well.133 The Energy Community has an ambition to 
develop into a framework for universal regional cooperation in the WB area, and as a 
form of "wider Europe" it aims to "promote stability and prosperity within and beyond 
the new borders of the Union" and "to develop a zone of prosperity and friendly 
neighbourhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-
operative relations"134, because the stability and security of neighbourhood enhance the 
EU security (even the energy-related one). Solioza and Stubbs are talking about a new 
wave of regional cooperation that is imposed from the outside, as a kind of "peace-
building project" because it is being established through promoting cross-border 
activities such as transport (for example, gas transport), trade and tourism, but also 
guarantees security and stability, and possibly leads to political integration (Solioza and 
Stubbs, 2009:5). 
For the operationalization of the regional cooperation in the WB the energy 
sector was chosen, and the Treaty establishing the Energy Community was the first 
legally binding agreement between the states of the WB since the end of the 1990s 
wars. Regional cooperation is inherent in the transnational aspect of the energy 
security, which can rarely be a national category (except in the case of energy self-
sufficiency, which is rare), but is almost always transnational. For this reason, the 
regional energy infrastructure projects have a priority over the national ones, and the 
choice of the energy policy of one state has an impact on the other.  
The goals of the ECom are a diversification of gas supply in order to enhance 
the energy security, but also to achieve and maintain peace and stability135. They are 
                                                          
133 For more details, see Vukadinović R., Čehulić Vukadinović L., „Evropska ideja od Karla Velikog 
do Evropske unije“, chapter IV.2 Politika proširenja EU, Crnogorska akademija nauka i umjetnosti, 
Podgorica, 2016. 
134 COM(2003) 104 final, p. 4.  
135 Along with enhanced and sustainable economic development in the Southeast Europe, 
according to the Energy Community Treaty. https://www.energy-
community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/DOCS/2178178/0633975AD2077B9CE053C92FA
8C06338.PDF - 
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comparable to the goals of the European Coal and Steel Community, the embryo of the 
today's EU. "The common interest of protecting these two industries (coal and steel) 
created enough trust among the founding countries to expand their cooperation into 
many other political fields. And the prosperity it brought to its citizens inspired 
additional European countries to join over the years, bringing the Community from six 
countries back then to today's 28 Member States of the European Union."136 Likewise, 
the ECom institutionalises a cooperation regarding the energy policies of the WB states 
expecting that, in accordance with neo-functionalist approach, it will have a spill-over 
effect to other areas, too. It is expected that the cooperation in the energy sector 
through strengthening of interdependence and creation of trust and partnership 
between the states, may result in development of a "new political community" (Haas, 
2004: 16) on the WB, an area that has an inherent political fragility and tensions.  
The EU seeks to turn its neighbourhood into a security community also 
because of its own vulnerability to developments in the immediate neighbourhood. 
"Interdependence – political and economic – with the Union’s neighbourhood is already 
a reality", and "closer geographical proximity means the enlarged EU and the new 
neighbourhood will have an equal stake in furthering efforts to promote trans-national 
flows" (in the original source, trade and investment are being mentioned, but this can 
also refer to gas) and "shared interests in working together to tackle transboundary 
threats"137. The energy security of the importing countries, in particular the importers of 
gas, depends on secure energy supplies and a secure route for their transport, so the 
political stability of the exporting country and the countries through which they transit 
is also of great importance. Due to perception of interdependence, by way of 
externalisation of its energy policy through multilateral initiatives such as the Energy 
Community, the EU is trying to govern its neighbourhood, and this EU external 
governance should contribute to creating a security community in the neighbourhood. 
According to T. Borzel, EU has "the transformative power" and "seeks to transform the 
domestic structures of the WBC in order to foster peace, stability and prosperity in the 
region ridden by war and ethnic conflict" (Borzel, 2011). 138  
                                                          
136 Maroš Šefčović's blog, The "road" to the Western Balkans integration. 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/sefcovic/blog/road-western-balkans-
integration_en - 31 January 2017. 
137 COM (2003) 104 final, p. 3. 
138 The transformative effect of the EU is also mentioned by Samardžija, V. (2007: 199-213).  
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The main identity of the EU as a "security community" was strengthened in an 
altered geopolitical environment. The EU has therefore turned to external governance 
in the area where it seeks to enhance its security against the threats that come from 
the outside, from the "others". The choice of energy field as a content of external 
governance is not random since the EU "will try to expand its sphere of governance in 
particular in areas which have become securitized inside (and) where vulnerability is 
attributed to developments in the third country in question" (Lavanex, 2004: 686). The 
choice of the area of the Western Balkans as an object of external governance is 
consistent with the expectation that the EU will opt for the external governance "in 
those issues identified as 'threats to mutual security'" and this in a way so that it will 
expand its legal boundaries in "a more strategic attempt to gain control over policy 
developments“ (Lavanex, 2004: 685-688).  
The creation of a security community on the WB is not only a prerequisite for 
the integration of these states into the EU, but also to make use of this space for 
diversification of the gas supply routes to the EU, since the geopolitical stability and 
security is a prerequisite for the investments in expensive infrastructure projects in any 
area. As energy issues are being used as an area of strategic competition both by 
Russia and the EU, the decisions concerning the gas supply that include the WB, due to 
specific geopolitical constellation of that region, may have a significant impact on 
energy-related and other types of security of the EU. Therefore, the conversion of the 
WB into some form of a non-institutionalised security community will contribute not 
only to enhanced energy security, but to the overall security of the EU. Thus, also 
through the externalisation of its policies, the EU this time seeks to actively contribute 
to avoid repeating of military conflicts from the early 90s in its immediate 
neighbourhood, among other things, because of the spill-over effect, if not of a conflict, 
then of the consequences. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to examine the interdependence of the EU MSs and 
the WB states related to energy security, as well as how the EU is trying to govern this 
interdependence. EU does this through external governance of a wider regional 
community ("wider Europe"), that is, by way of externalisation of its energy policy or by 
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external Europeanisation whereby it proves its transformative power. The external 
strategies of the EU have an economic but also a significant security dimension, which 
is related to the regional dimension and the project of creating a security community. 
The best example is the establishing of the Energy Community with the aim of 
creating coherent and coordinated energy policies of the EU MSs and the neighbouring 
WB states. This is a prerequisite so as to achieve an acceptable level of the gas supply 
security for both the EU and these states, since the gas supply security is always 
transnational, but also an issue closely related to geography. The coherence is 
necessary not only because of the envisaged integration of these states into the EU, 
but also because of their potential transit role in the gas supply to Central and Western 
Europe. Their non-integration decreases their potential to contribute to the EU energy 
security, and could also be a destabilising factor and a new threat to the security of the 
EU member states, since "(none) organised European sub-region can be a means of 
(de)stabilisation of Europe” (Nakić, 2013). Due to its geographical position and the EU 
membership, the Republic of Croatia is interested in the accession of its WB neighbours 
to the EU, not only, but also because of the enhancing of the energy security.  
This paper tackles only the concepts promoted by the Energy Community and 
CESEC, therefore many issues remain for further investigation: for example, the level of 
implementation of the EU legislation in the WBC, to what extent has the establishing of 
the Energy Community influenced the governments of the WBC to project their energy 
preferences onto the EU level, etc. Finally, it remains to explore the key question – 
given the small geographical size of the Western Balkans, whether energy controversies 
in this area are less a matter of competing for control over the gas infrastructure, and 
more a matter of broader foreign policy interests. 
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Abstract 
     
Today, in the modern and dynamic development of humanity almost all 
activities are related to dependence on energy, especially oil dependence, starting from 
the economy as well as activities in the society and international politics. Since the 
development of air and road traffic, especially after World War II, the transfer of wealth 
from some countries (producing countries) to other countries (consumer countries) is 
already an everyday major activity. Climate change is expected to pose a safety hazard 
if the planet warms by 1.3 degrees by 2040, is expected to occur "enlarged internal and 
cross-border tensions caused by the large number of migrations, conflicts due to lack of 
resources, increased spread of diseases coming to possible new geopolitical change". 
Geopolitical approach of oil is in fact a key resource that is used in transport and is 
located in few countries (which then in 2000 moved to the resource nationalism that 
could use oil as a weapon and where people may face civil strife) that must be 
transported over long (and increasingly) risky maritime routes (including passage 
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through straits), can lead to wars on access to oil resources or control over oil transport 
routes. 
 
Key words: Geopolitics , Geo strategy, Oil, Climate change. 
 
 
Introduction        
    
The complexity of questions due to the challenges that are imposed by the 
climate changes, leaves a deep reflection on the theoretical problems associated with 
these questions. The suggestions for practical solutions for the ongoing transformation 
of the structure of modern societies are becoming more and more urgent. The climate 
change is a complex global question, whose impact is expected to result in serious 
security implications for the humanity. The long term impact of climate change will be 
expressed through negative changes in temperature, precipitation, frequency of 
extreme events (droughts, heat waves, forest fires) and the anticipated negative effects 
on agricultural production, forestry, water resources, food security and biodiversity is a 
present issue which will gain more and more importance in the following years. The 
effective reaction to climate change must cover two crucial elements: global reduction 
in emissions of gases that cause the greenhouse effect (GHG) and adjustment on 
regional, national and local level to deal with the climate change.    
Today, we are witnessing the emergence and the vulnerability of countries from 
climate change, the vulnerability of certain segments and prominence to the 
importance of certain regions in Africa and Asia, in which is expected to start 
decreasing and instead to increase the importance of Russian and Arctic regions, which 
are rich with oil and natural gas.     
 
 
The relationship between oil and climate changes   
    
Today, in the modern and dynamic development of humanity almost all 
activities are related to dependence on energy, especially oil dependence, starting from 
the economy as well as activities in the society and international politics. Since the 
development of air and road traffic, especially after World War II, the transfer of wealth 
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from some countries (producing countries) to other countries (consumer countries) is 
already an everyday major activity. Moreover, the way of consumption-usage of the oil 
had a negative impact on the environment and the human well being. The oil used in 
energy, and especially its application in the transport, makes it a resource with 
strategic character. In the literatures that cover international relationships and 
economy, the oil is mentioned in almost every segment and every book, and it became 
an integral  segment of the world politics. In the last decades of world politics, an issue 
appeared that attract the worlds public opinion and the political agenda- the climate 
changes. The best reference in this context is the first report for  the Club of Rome 
(Limits to Growth, 1972), which highlights the unacceptable way of how the society 
functions. Considering this alarming signal, it is necessary to highlight the negative 
effects on the environment from oil usage. It is required reduction of classical and 
traditional use of this fuel, taking into account the indicator of growing demand for this 
fuel as result of developing globalizing processes and increased global population. In 
future other types of independent economic societies are required, which are not based 
on oil dependency but instead focus on renewable sources.     
 This situation creates difficulties for the countries that import oil, for example 
many Western societies are vitally dependent and associated with oil. North Africa plays 
a major role in supplying the European markets, the exportation of oil and natural gas 
has regional influence in stabilizing the political and economic developments in Europe. 
The export of oil in North Africa in 2010 amounted to 3,9 MMBD (Million Barrels Per 
Day). According to the projections of the EIA (Energy Information Administration) the 
export of North African oil will decrease and will be around 4% in 2020, compared with 
the period of 90s of the previous century when the export was 6%. North Africa is still 
an important „player“ in the world market, which is extremely important for Europe. The 
destabilizing processes that occurred in the so-called Arab Spring, which aimed to 
change the regimes of the authorities, become a real challenge for energy security and 
the security of distribution of oil and gas to Europe. The transport sector fall about a 
third in consumption of oil, creating enormous CO2 emissions into the atmosphere, 
contributing to the creation of greenhouse gases that are directly related to climate 
change. The people and the environment are mutually tightly connected, the 
environment affects human activity, but at the same time, the human activity could 
damage the environment. The society become dominant due to the developmental skills 
in production and use of energy. The activates which harm the environment are directly 
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associated with energy. The production of energy causes irreparable damage to the 
environment. The increased concentrative level of carbon and other gases in the 
atmosphere, creates the greenhouse as a result of bumming fossil fuels it affects the 
persistence of global temperature and the increase for more than two degrees Celsius 
can cause serious global problem, including the extinction of many plant and animal 
species, and collapse of entire ecosystems. (Bales and Associates, 2008) The climate 
change would also pose safety risks if the planet warms by 1,3 degrees by 2040, it is 
expected to occur "increased internal and cross border tensions cause by the large 
number of migrations, conflicts cause by lack of resources, increased spread of diseases, 
coming to possible new geopolitical changes." (Bales and Associates, 2008) 
 
 
Variability in demand for oil and geopolitical processes in the world  
 
Today, the oil issue is more and more politicized, the oil and the safe access to 
it are aspects that are present on top of all state agendas. The oil issue is becoming 
more popular, and the reason lies in the volatility in oil prices as result of world political 
impacts. As of early 2000, it was observed a steady increase in oil prices until the 
summer of 2014, till then the oil market was characterized with price incensement, this 
can be a big problem because it may affect the achievement of state interests (it could 
have an impact on the balance payments for the countries importers  through increased 
consumption of oil importing). (David and Yueh, 2010) Starting from the middle years of 
the last century, climate changes occur as a problem that attract the public attention. 
Till then the visibility of climate change was negligible on the need for attention. 
However, we can say that we are witnesses of two world processes in the global energy 
system. (David and Yueh, 2010) On one hand, the dependence and increased 
consumption of energy, especially of oil from the new world economies as China and 
India are more and more accurate, and on the other hand the negative environmental 
effects from oil usage, especially the emissions of carbon dioxide.   
Unfortunately, people and society always pay attention to the current 
problems, leaving other unsolved, believing that they will never make enough to impose 
solid solutions. The oil is one of the most urgent problems of state  agendas, and for 
some countries, the oil politics almost corresponds with external politics (whether they 
are countries which are importing or exporting oil). Although climate changes are 
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evident and we are already feeling them, the oil problem is more meaningful in the 
world global politics. This is due to the fact that the current condition of modern 
society, the oil is a key element, that relies on current patterns of development, and oil 
is an important energy source because it is an essential element in today’s transport 
system, relying on people’s and wealth’s movement, and  important ingredient in many 
products that dominate the modern way of living: 90% of  products in warehouse imply 
the use of oil on one way or another, while we feel the vulnerability and loss from 
climate change spontaneously. (Anthony, 2009) 
For this reason, it is very important to persist to minimize the transport sector 
only in the countries where the organization for economic collaboration and 
development (OESD countries) is established. In the year 2014, the oil consumption in 
the transport sector was 1252 million tons, while in the year 2030 is expected to be 
1289 million tons of oil consumed in the transport sector. (World Energy Outlook, 2014) 
India’s growth  is expected to be from 37 (from year 2006) to 156 million tons of oil (by 
the year 2030), while in China will range between  127 to 440 million tons. Globally 
speaking, the level of emission of carbon dioxide due to transport (millions of tons) is 
expected to grow from 6444 in year 2006, to 8013 in year 2020, or to 8921 in the year 
2030. (World Energy Outlook, 2014)  
While some studies speak for the oil treasure of Middle East, the biggest part 
of the reserves are focused on the Bay. Middle East might have more 65% of the world 
oil reserves and 40% of gas reserves, but 90% of them, are placed in the Bay. The US 
Energy Department calculated that the Bay earned  an average of 14,5 millions from the 
export by the end of year 2000, which is equal to 41% of the total world exports. The 
Energy Department also predicts that the Bay by the year 2020 will reach average 
earnings of 37,2 millions from export, which is equal to 56% of the world total export. In 
the Bay there are also the main natural gas reserves, around 33% from world gas 
reserves. Second country that owns the biggest natural gas reserves is Iran with 16%, 
while all other countries from this region own less than 3% from world reserves. 
(National Security Strategy, 2010)         
As presented in these examples, the current world is characterized by the big 
oil dependency, but minimizing the oil dependency should be one of the most important 
politics which every country should strive for. Minimizing the oil dependency is not only 
stopping the climate changes, but the oil capacity which influences and decides the 
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destiny of the world politics is decreasing at the same time. (World Energy Outlook, 
2014)  
 
 
Global triangle – oil, geopolitics and climate changes   
   
The geopolitical approach towards oil is the fact that it is a key resource which 
is used in transport and it is located in few countries (which after year 2000 crossed to 
resource nationalism, and can use the oil as weapon and where people can come across 
civil strife), and must transport through long (and even more) sea risked routes 
(including crossing between sea straits), it can bring wars to access oil resources or 
controlling oil transport routes. The newly found economies are oil dependent, using oil 
in industry, energy production and transport not only will create bigger pressure for 
remaining oil resources, but it is expected to come to strife or wars. This trend may 
cause global chaos to entire humanity, through climate changes prism which will 
influence the rich and especially the poor countries. These processes happen in a 
condition where from year 1901 to 2000 the world oil production has grown 180 times 
more. (Mircea, 2009) Not considering the measures and steps which are taken to the 
field of energetic efficiency,aiming towards pure energy and the alternative fuels for 
transport, energy and industry, the oil will continue to be the most important fuel for 
stability of world economy, as well as for the regional and international safety. (Morse, 
2009) 
The countries’ international role which produces small amount of oil reserves 
will decrease significantly, while the role of Russia towards Arabian countries in world 
politics is expected to change in their geopolitical influence. (Friedman, 2008) With the 
rise of oil prices, the countries who own big number of oil sites will aim towards more 
autocratic mode of operation, creating tendencies toward connecting the price of oil 
and the internal politics of the country. (Giddens, 2009) From this point of view “oil” 
can be considered as an “enemy” of democracy.  
Every resource which enhances the power of the country who uses the same 
exact resource can be called strategic resource. In that case, every resource which 
promotes economic and military power, or promotes the growth of the mobility can be 
considered as strategic resource. The specifics of geopolitics through oil prism are due 
to the fact that it is about a strategic resource, resource that the whole world depends 
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on, especially the transport sector. At the same time, the problem becomes more 
complex because the oil resources are centered in couple of countries. The coal exists in 
almost every country but the oil exists in the Middle East, Russia and some of the more 
conflict countries in Africa and Latin America. Looking through the prism of oil price 
and the role (the power) of the state who owns the oil reserves, it can be said that they 
have important influence in creating the world geopolitics, using the oil as a powerful 
tool, such as Venezuela (which uses the income of the oil export taking over the anti-
American activities in Latin America), or Iran (who uses their income to promote their 
interests in the countries of the Middle East, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi 
Arabia).(Morse, 2009)    
When it comes to Russia, the low oil price has direct and big influence on their 
internal and external politics. When the oil price is high, Moscow can easily play the 
role of blackmail force with pipelines to supply oil system, using the gas delivers as 
political weapon, complementing the needs and incomes of this fuel minimizing the 
capacity, the power for delivering the gas as political weapon. Other country that has a 
clear politics and that can create a problem of regional level, with global consequences 
is Iran. Iran owns 9% of the total oil reserves in the world. The most of the Iranian oil 
reserves are placed in the region of Khuzestan near the borders with Iraq. The average 
production of oil is about 5 MMBD (Million Barrels Per Day), Iraq according the 
distribution capacities is closer to Iran, or daily from Iraq are being exported 5.5 – 6 
MMBD (Million Barrels Per Day).      
On а short term period, the tensions reinforcement between the biggest oil 
consumers (USA, China and India) will bring to raising their military expenses, reducing 
them in a way that the available funds aim for creating new and pure energetic base. 
The possibility for funds reorientation from the military goals to development of 
alternative energetic capacities and at the same time will minimize the pressure on 
fossil fuels and discharging of carbon dioxide whoalso comes from their combustion 
process. Even if there was some sort of conflict conditions with a goal toget access to 
oil resources, the growth of the oil demand ( which is due to developed economies, the 
growth of the population on global level, urbanization process and the growth of the 
income ), will cause rise of the oil prices, hitting both the developed nations and nations 
in development at the same time, because the bigger part of the income will be 
redirected for food production, which price will rise with the rise of the oil price. On a 
long term plan, keeping the same course of oil consuming today, will cause dramatic 
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and irreversible disturbances of climate changes, with negative effects on the entire 
human civilization.   
The problem with climate changes is energetic problem, and solving the same 
depends on the human capacity to transform the way of production and the way of 
using the energy. (Benea and Baciu, 2011) Even the countries from the group G-8 are 
putting the problems with climate changes and high level energy on their agenda 
almost every year in the last decade. (David and Yueh, 2010) Today’s society almost in 
every segment is oil dependent as a fuel, while the safety of oil reserves is а problem of 
national security.  
The geopolitical aspects of viewing oil as fuel, can be highlighted that by the 
year 2020 India and China will depend on imported oil transported from the Middle 
East and Africa, both countries who have more and more interest and are bonding with 
African treasure. (National Research Council, 2010) In order to protect their economic 
interests and to promote their politics, the two countries are reinforcing their military 
presence in this part of the world. China is promoting the “Pearl strategy”, while India 
creates military unions with Eastern Africa based on contracts that India has signed 
with Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar and South Africa.(Adger, 2006) This can simply 
count as Indian Ocean geopolitics, but considering the fact that these two countries will 
be giants in world economy in the following years. The bond between them in the Indian 
Ocean, focused on the oil, will have achievements on a global level and will influence 
even the most undeveloped Eastern regions. 
 
 
Conclusion        
   
Climate changes and energy security are key drivers for future energy policy. 
While energy security has been a pillar of energy policy for about a century, concern 
about climate change is more recent  and is bound to radically change the landscape of 
energy policy. Therefore, policy makers are now under increasing pressure to address 
these twin challenges: to develop cost-effective policies that will both ensure the 
security of energy system as well as to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Generally, 
there are two approaches that are commonly used by the policy-makers to assess the 
energy security implications of resource concentration. The first one focuses on the 
notion of diversity, while second one focuses on measuring import dependence. 
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In general, physical impacts of climate change are complex and unpredictable, 
expressing the large average global temperatures, rising sea levels, the increasing 
shortage of arable land and lack of water, the progress of the world is particularly 
sensitive to these influences. Projections of climate change during the 21st century 
indicate the following: The global average temperature will increase by 0,8 degrees 
Celsius since the early 20th century, by 2100 will increase by 2-7 degrees Celsius 
depending on the quantum of future emissions of greenhouse gases and technology 
development.      
The exporters of oil and natural gas could get greater geopolitical importance, 
while importers of energy will have its geopolitical consequences. All these things could 
cause internal politics destabilization in the affected countries as well as radicalization. 
Further escalation of climate change in the most vulnerable areas will lead to the 
radicalization of politics vehicle especially if it is overloaded with historical ethnic and / 
or religious intolerance. The best example of a region in which all these factors can 
bump is South Asia, but the vast region of Southeast Asia, the Middle East and sub-
Saharan Africa which in the future may not be immune to this kind of development. The 
demand of India and China should not be neglected and should be closely followed in 
the future, which depend on imported oil shipped from the Middle East and Africa, the 
two countries are increasingly interested and tied with African heritage. 
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Abstract 
 
In recent years the number and severity of natural and man-made disasters, as 
well as fires, has significantly increased. The resilience of the Western Balkans societies 
to hazards has to be improved, and that can be done by introducing new study 
programmes and lifelong learning courses in educational offer. It will provide a 
sustainable educational foundation in Disaster Risk Management and Fire Safety field in 
Western Balkans countries and ensure national highly skilled professional resources 
and regional capacity for resilient society. Aim is to build regional-based disaster 
preparedness and a culture of safety and resilience at all levels according to EU 
Integration Strategies and National relevant strategies.  Based on the above ideas, the 
project proposal Knowledge FOr Resilient society – K-FORCE was successfully prepared 
and selected for funding under ERASMUS+ programme Capacity Building in Higher 
Education – EAC/A04/2015. The partners are eleven HEIs: from Denmark (DTU, AAL), 
Sweden (LU), Slovakia (UNIZA), FYR Macedonia (UKIM), Bosnia and Herzegovina (UBL, 
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UNTZ), Albania (UT, EPOKA), Serbia (VTSNS) and 5 non-academic partners (Protection 
and Rescue Directorate of the Republic of Macedonia, National Fire Safety Association 
of Republic of Serbia, European Youth Parliament Serbia, Ministry of Security of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina: Protection and Rescue Sector and Sector for International 
Cooperation and European Integrations and Union of chambers of commerce and 
industry of Albania). To become resilient society, it is necessary to implement the EU 
Civil Protection Mechanism at a regional level and intensively cooperate and 
communicate, for which a new skilled young workforce is required, well prepared to 
cooperate in multilingual and multicultural environment.  The paper presents the 
results of survey done among the youth in WBC in order to investigate the level of 
safety culture and mutual level of understanding the risks in their environment. 
 
Keywords: resilient society, youth, safety culture, higher education. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the past decades the number of natural and anthropogenic disasters and 
fires has shown a significant growth in the Western Balkans (WB). Human losses, 
extensive damages to the urban areas, negative environmental impact and further 
weakening of the regional economy are some of indicators of increasing vulnerability.  
The WBs are highly prone to natural hazards and to the impacts of climate change. 
Furthermore, within the last 15 years most of the nations in the region newly gained 
their independence following a regional conflict and have undergone major structural 
changes. The newly independent nations and their urban areas sustain inadequate 
institutional capacities and have significant socio-economic and spatial vulnerabilities, 
increasing their risk to disasters initiated by natural hazards (Gencer 2014). Preliminary 
surveys, targeted to identify the problem origin, indicated that competences, knowledge 
and skills of the existing staff in the field of Disaster Risk Management and Fire Safety 
Engineering (DRM&FSE) are insufficient to solve its growing problems, as they acquire 
knowledge and skills from other engineering disciplines. Knowledge and skills shortages 
in this sector are already being identified by great interest shown after 2014 flood in 
the WB, while the expected climate change and hazard events expansion will only 
exacerbate the situation. The recent devastating floods in the WBc region, notably in 
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Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2014, confirmed that most countries of this 
region continue to have difficulties integrating risk reduction into public investment 
planning, urban development, spatial planning and management and social protection. 
With the impact of climate change, combined with changes in land-use patterns, risks 
of disasters will further increase in the coming years.Within the expanding emergency 
sector labour market, an urgent demand is expected for more educated and  trained 
staff, as well as for continuing education in DRM&FSE field. There is a rising need for 
multidimensional approach and interdisciplinary engineering competences. Considering 
before mentioned, in WB region, available education is becoming insufficient and 
unsustainable without further modernization. In order to improve the resilience of the 
region to hazards, it is necessary to provide the required number of experts in the field 
of DRM&FSE. The concept of resiliency should be an integral part of disaster 
preparedness. Resiliency emphasizes the capacity of human recourses, infrastructure, 
operations, and even social systems to respond to and recover from extreme events. A 
special emphasize should be placed on building countries’ financial resilience that 
would, jointly with knowleable humane resources, enchance preparedness to disaster 
risks. The growing cost and frequency of natural catastrophes and their implications for 
economic growth and development have led to a concern over the level of public 
awareness and education relative to large-scale catastrophes and disaster risk 
reduction measures. Public awareness and education of disaster risk reduction are, in 
particular, increasingly acknowledged as important components of effective risk 
management of natural catastrophes (Stocktaking Report on Risk Awareness And 
Education on Natural Catastrophes, 2008).   
 
 
ENHANCING KNOWLEDGE AND EDUCATION IN DISASTER RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
 
In recent years the number and severity of natural and manmade disasters has 
significantly increased. In addition, future disaster will be extreme and more complex 
with far-reaching and longer-term consequences as a result. Consequently, Decision No 
1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism emphasizes an integrated 
approach to disaster management as increasingly important (Decision of the European 
parliament and of the council, 2013). To become resilient society, it is necessary to 
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implement the EU Civil Protection Mechanism at a regional level and intensively 
cooperate and communicate, for which a new skilled young workforce is required.  
According to European Parliament Resolution Community approach on the prevention 
of natural and manmade disasters, prevention has a crucial significance for protection 
against disasters, requiring a further action. Reaching the prevention objectives and 
carrying out prevention actions, improving the disaster risk knowledge base and 
facilitating the sharing of knowledge, best practices and information, were defined as 
the first ranked action to take. Education and training (ET 2020) lie at the heart of the 
Europe 2020 strategy (ET 2020) to exit the recession and establish the foundations for 
future knowledge-based growth and social cohesion. The same goal is promoted in 
multiple EU documents, e.g.: European and Mediterranean Major Hazards Agreement 
(EUR-OPA), South East Europe 2020 Strategy – Jobs and Prosperity in the European 
Perspective (SEE 2020 Strategy) and Supporting growth and jobs – an agenda for the 
modernization of Europe's higher education systems COM (2011) 567 final. 
The above listed are common objectives and goals both for EU and WB region, 
considering the on-going European integration process in the Balkans. The resilience 
improvement by developing higher education (HE) is in compliance with WB countries’ 
national HE strategies and action plans, as well as national strategies in the field of fire 
protection and emergency. 
Resilience to natural hazards should be a core element in the design of 
development programs. We need to better understand how and where we are 
vulnerable to disasters, and how best to manage the risks we face. Informed, 
knowledgeable and educated citizens and public authorities, with the human and 
financial resources to back them up, are the key to successful disaster risk management 
planning and implementation (Disaster Risk Assessment and Risk Financing: A G20 / 
OECD methodological framework, 2012). 
 
 
STATE AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES OF DRM&FSE HIGHER 
EDUCATION IN WESTERN BALKANS  
 
Within civil protection in Western Balkans Region, disaster risk reduction and 
disaster management need to be treated as a matter of priority, particularly in the light 
of the severe floods in 2014.  
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In July 2015 Serbia became the 33rd participating state in the EU Civil 
Protection Mechanism. Serbia will have to accomplish a countrywide risk assessment 
and assessment of its risk management capabilities. 
The floods in the south of the country in February 2015 showed the need for 
Albania to further strengthen its capacity in this sector. As regards civil protection, the 
2014-2018 national strategy for disaster risk reduction and civil protection has not been 
adopted yet. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina expressed its interest in becoming a member of the 
EU Civil Protection Mechanism in 2014 and concluded a protocol on cooperation and 
establishment of a point of contact with the mechanism. Further coordination and 
cooperation efforts and further preparations for joining the mechanism are needed. 
Western Balkans' higher education needs to respond and to educate and train 
young people for the sector that will significantly grow as these countries need to fulfil 
Chapter 27 requirements according to EU Enlargement Strategy. 
Climate change, fast urbanization and new technologies, in interaction with 
irresponsible human activities, cause the need for multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary 
engineering competences, knowledge and skills. Considering these, available HE is 
insufficient and unsustainable at regional level without modernization and further 
development. The brief analysis of available bachelor, master and doctoral study 
programs in the field of Disaster Risk Management was conducted on the regional and 
European level (Laban et al. 2015). WB countries included in this research were Serbia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia.   
The research showed that there is an insufficient number of master degree 
programs in WB region to ensure sustainable and uniform capacity building in human 
resources in this area, and academic bachelor studies are implemented only at 
University of Novi Sad, Faculty of Technical Sciences in Serbia. A similar program does 
not exist even in neighbouring European countries, and the current situation in HE in 
this field is not self-sustainable, because there are no doctoral programs to ensure 
future researching staff. Number of graduates is insufficient for regional or national 
needs. Consequently, there is a need for experts who are competent to operate in all 
phases of the catastrophic events and that are able to solve problems in the field. Also, 
there is a need for education of competitive experts who will be able to create a 
sustainable financial plan for disaster preparedness and preventive measures, according 
to regional economy recourses. At this moment, existing HE programs do not meet the 
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mentioned WB countries’ needs for qualified staff. In order to improve regional 
resilience to hazards and capability for regional cooperation in risk prevention and 
response, it is necessary to provide the required number of multidisciplinary experts by 
modernizing and developing HE at the regional HEIs in subject field. Aim is to build 
regional-based disaster preparedness and a culture of safety and resilience at all levels. 
The WB HEI needs to assess the level and quality of HEIs capacity (infrastructure, 
facilities, laboratories, workforces etc.) in this field and to identify the key competences, 
knowledge and skills necessary for contemporary practice and future needs. A master 
study programs should be developed to satisfy various criteria, according to regional 
needs for resilient society, such as the shift from reactive to proactive actions and 
developing a culture of prevention. Based on the above, the project proposal Knowledge 
FOr Resilient society – K-FORCE was successfully prepared by University of Novi Sad in 
cooperation with 11 HEIs from Denmark (DTU, AAL), Sweden (LU), Slovakia (UNIZA), FYR 
Macedonia (UKIM), Bosnia and Herzegovina (UBL, UNTZ), Albania (UT, EPOKA), Serbia 
(VTSNS) and 5 non-academic partners (Protection and Rescue Directorate of the 
Republic of Macedonia, National Fire Safety Association of Republic of Serbia, European 
Youth Parliament Serbia, Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Protection 
and Rescue Sector and Sector for International Cooperation and European Integrations 
and Union of chambers of commerce and industry of Albania). The K-FORCE project 
proposal has been selected for funding in ERASMUS+ program Capacity Building in 
Higher Education – EAC/A04/2015. The three years period of the project realization will 
start in October 2016. The project goals answering to above-mentioned issues will be 
achieved through development of innovative master studies implemented in six HEIs in 
the region and PhD studies implemented at UNS, Faculty of Technical Sciences (FTS) as 
well as through continual knowledge improvement of staff already working in this field 
through newly developed LLL courses.It will help harmonization of new programs 
content with the region’s needs. Final goal is to produce capable experts, able to 
withstand difficult requirements of today and tomorrow. 
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FUTURE EDUCATION ASPIRATIONS ASSESSMENT  
 
The Youth Safety Culture survey was conducted as part of the Knowledge for 
Resilient Society (K-FORCE) project (http://kforce.uns.ac.rs/) funded by the European 
Union under the Erasmus+ scheme to asses future education aspirations of youth. 
The primary target group was set as High School and University students from Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. The survey itself was characterised as a mass 
survey aiming to have as many subjects (answers) as possible, with the questions being 
simple and easy to understand for young people from different backgrounds. 
Survey was drafted by European Youth Parliament Serbia (EYP Serbia) and contained 
three sections: 
• previous experience in the field of DRM&FSE, 
• safety culture and personal stances and  
• future education aspirations. 
Subject classification was proposed in regards to the subjects’ country and city 
of residence, age, level of current education (High School or University) and field of 
education. The survey took between 5 and 10 minutes to fill out and was anonymous.  
A total of 1462 subjects gave their responses to the survey. Because of missing 
information, invalid responses or other reasons, 98 responses were deemed invalid and 
the data analysis was done on 1364 subjects that filled out the survey completely and 
correctly. 
Some of the comprehensive results, regarding youth future education 
aspirations are given in the tables below. For each question, possible answers are listed 
and the number of subjects which gave that answer is specified below it, as well as the 
percentage that this number represents to the total number of subject who answered 
that question. 
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Table 1 Sample characteristics  
Total subjects: 1364 
By country of residence: 
Albania 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Serbia Croatia 
486 469 396 13 
35.6% 34.4% 29.1% 0.9% 
By current education: 
University student High School student Not enrolled 
978 370 16 
71.7% 27.1% 1.2% 
By area of education: 
Engineering 
and 
Technology 
Humanities 
and Social 
Sciences 
General 
High 
School 
studies 
Natural 
Sciences 
Arts 
Medical 
Sciences 
Not 
enrolled 
664 272 204 183 24 10 7 
48.7% 19.9% 15.0% 13.4% 1.8% 0.7% 0.5% 
 
Table 2 Future education aspirations of respondents 
I had a chance to learn about disaster risks and fire safety as part of my High 
School/University curriculum or during a lecture organised at my School/University. 
Yes No 
562 802 
41.2% 58.8% 
If yes, in what context? 
I had a complete course 
concerning this. 
I had a part of a course 
concerning this. 
I attended one lecture. 
75 246 241 
13.3% 43.8% 42.9% 
I had a chance to learn about disaster risks and fire safety outside of my 
School/University. 
Yes No 
839 525 
61.5% 
38.5% 
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If yes, in what context? 
I am a member of an 
organization that 
addresses these 
issues. 
I attended an open 
lecture. 
I heard about it during a 
conference/seminar. 
I read an article. 
38 148 124 675 
4.5% 17.6% 14.8% 80.4% 
I would be interested in studying Disaster Risk Management or Fire Safety at University. 
1 2 3 4 5 
404 251 296 212 201 
Mean value: 2.67 Median: 3 
I would be interested in obtaining a Master’s degree in Disaster Risk Management and 
Fire Safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
579 283 227 143 132 
Mean value: 2.24 Median: 2 
I would attend an elective course in Disaster Risk Management and Fire Safety (if one 
existed) at my University. 
1 2 3 4 5 
239 238 309 269 309 
Mean value: 3.12 Median: 3 
I would attend a free course in Disaster Risk Management and Fire Safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
131 135 311 333 454 
Mean value: 3.62 Median: 4 
 
Aim of the survey was to acquire preliminary data about the existing interest 
among youth for future K-FORCE project activities. According to the preliminary data 
there is a promesing number of students hat would be interested to attend a course or 
are interested in  studying Disaster Risk Management or Fire Safety at University.  The 
information from the conducted survey will be used to better develop and implement 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
382 
curricula in the field of DRM&FSE at partner Universities in Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Serbia. 
 
 
A BRIEF INSIGHT INTO NEW STUDY PROGRAMS  
   
DRM&FSE subject area refers to multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary 
disciplines. Curricula include subjects from various academic disciplines, with 
Engineering and engineering trades as the dominant academic discipline, 
Environmental protection, Architecture and Construction, Civil Protection, Fire Science, 
Rescue studies, Climatology, Hydrology, Seismology and Economy as well as other 
disciplines (Health, Sociology).  
The implementation of interdisciplinary DRM&FSE study programs in the field 
of Technical Sciences will enable continuation of the studies for a number of different 
profiles of engineering undergraduates, as well as continual education of professionals 
by offering LLL courses. Introduction of a novel interactive ICT platform for staff, 
student and workers' training will enable preparation of real-life case studies. 
These programs support the creation and dissemination of Open Educational 
Resources in diverse European languages. Study programs, learning material offered by 
Flexible ICT learning platform, LLL courses, Glossary of DRM&FSE key words and terms, 
as well as an On-line Library will be available in English and regional languages 
(Serbian, Albanian and Bosnian). 
Educational ICT based laboratories created in WB HEIs with interoperability 
capabilities and on-line library will provide national, regional and international case 
studies, integrated risk methodology assessment, hazard, risk and vulnerability regional 
cross-border mapping and results publications. That will insure continuous common 
regional problem based approach and compatibility of knowledge and skills, also aligned 
with contemporary trends in DRM&FSE field. Interdisciplinary, multi-language and ICT 
based both higher and continuous education approach insures regional and 
international cooperation will allow the exchange of knowledge and the mobility of 
students, teachers and workers, and strengthens national and regional capacities in EU 
integrations. Teaching methods improvement and modern ICT use in the education 
process will coincide with higher education development in the EU. This is especially 
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true in knowledge about best available practices, EU legislation, practical laboratory 
skills and consequent harmonization with EU curricula. 
Within implementation process, European HEIs will have crucial role. They will 
be responsible for  knowledge transfer and experience sharing in including scientific 
research into education, thus securing curriculum quality from the start. They will steer 
the content of curriculum and syllabi, define student-centered learning and teaching 
methods, share case studies for capstone-type subjects and advice on best usage of 
modern ICT in the education process. Compliance of the regional study program with 
similar programs, developed in the EU countries, strengthens the capacity of individual 
countries and the region as a whole in the process of European integration. Therefore, 
the brief analysis of available master and doctoral study programs in HEIs in the field of 
Disaster Risk Management and Fire Safety Engineering was done on the European level 
(Gencer 2014). 
It was found that the majority of the most advanced engineering study 
programs in this field are available in Sweden at Lund University, Denmark at Danish 
Technical University and Aalborg University, Great Britain at University of Edinburgh 
and in FYR Macedonia at Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje. All of the studies 
are established in a close connection to Faculties and Departments of Civil Engineering. 
There are also fully developed study programs, at all three levels in Slovak Republic, at 
Faculty of Special Engineering, University of Žilina.  
As Risk Management and Fire Safety education are not widely found in WB 
HEIs’ curricula, the transfer of know-how of European HEIs to WB HEIs is special 
valuable, and response to the need for enhanced staff expertise which can underpin new 
curriculum modernization or development in a way to meet standards developed in EU. 
Cooperation with the European HEIs and their contribution is crucial for new 
programs quality due to knowledge sharing, experience transfer in the fields of 
scientific research and education, particularly in developing similar programs and 
modules and assistance in defining needs for program content and teaching methods 
improvement and modern ICT and computer technology use in the education process 
coinciding with higher education development in the EU. 
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EXPECTED IMPACT OF MODERNIZED AND NEWLY DEVELOPED STUDY 
PROGRAMS 
     
It is expected that modernized and newly developed study programs will 
contribute to resilience improvement of societies in several ways. 
Firstly, students will be educated within an interdisciplinary and problem-
solving framework, through acquiring theoretical, practical and applicable knowledge, 
skills and competences, according to National qualifications framework and European 
qualifications framework, WB countries’ needs and EU trends, which will be well 
recognized by the national and regional labor market. Students on other HEIs study 
programmes will gain basic or improved knowledge of DRM&FSE issues, consequently 
resulting in raised awareness among student population. 
Implemented programs will enable regional and international mobility of 
students and teachers from WB and their horizon broadening in this specific field. 
Teaching staff will have opportunity to upgrade their teaching experience, 
capacity to pass on the knowledge updated with novel trends in both the field and 
teaching tools and methodology. Teaching staff in other disciplines will be able to foster 
their knowledge and capacity to introduce and interconnect DRM&FSE issues into their 
disciplines. Non-profit NGOs will have opportunity to realize their own visions and 
missions in building national and regional capacities for safe and prospective WB 
societies, on the path towards EU.  Professionals in DRM&FSE area will expand and 
upgrade their knowledge and skills through LLL courses. Public bodies and 
administration in charge for civil protection will improve qualification structure and 
better act as liaison between the emergency sector and scientific and education 
institutions as well as liaison between educational institutions and stakeholders from 
the emergency sector. 
Employees in various industrial sectors will have an open access to created On-
line Library, ICT portal and LLL courses database, through which they can gain 
knowledge on various DRM&FSE issues, thus raising their awareness about fires and 
disasters. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Natural disasters devastate lives and livelihoods across the world and slow 
down the development progress achieved through many decades of hard work. 
Consequently, the fiscal and economic pressure of developing countries, such as WB, 
having to deal with the adverse effects on natural disasters is increasing. Numerous 
human casualties, significant material damage and negative environmental impact of 
natural and manmade disasters and fires in the WB are the warning calling for change 
of approach to these issues. There is a need to raise awareness about disaster risks and 
their potential financial consequences. Raising public awareness regarding natural 
catastrophic risk and risk reduction strategies is a key component in the promotion of a 
culture of safety within a nations’ borders and beyond.  Increased resilience and 
sustainable development requires a more proactive approach to tackle risk at its  roots. 
Resilient societies are based on knowledge and training, as well as 
preparedness. Building synchronized regional capacities in higher education in Disaster 
Risk Management and Fire Safety Engineering, according to regional needs and 
contemporary trends, is a first step towards building resiliency of our region.  Acquired 
knowledge in the field of Disaster Risk Management and Fire Safety Engineering will 
provide the base for building a resilient   society. It is necessary to build countries’ own, 
consistent and compatible capacities in this educational field, which will enable a 
uniform level of required knowledge and skills.  
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Abstract 
 
The events that follow our modern society in terms of endangering the safety 
of civil aviation have an undoubtedly and direct impact on the development of specific 
legislative, technological and operational segments in the area of aviation safety, to 
provide an effective protection against the acts of unlawful interference, without 
disruption of the safety, regularity and efficiency of the flights. 
The rapid rise of the civil aviation requires a fast safety development, in a way 
the common denominator of all undertaken activities and measures is the creation of 
perspectives and conditions for the highest possible level of aviation safety. It does 
require the development of new, modern and sustainable forms of security, which mean 
a contemporary approach to continuous upgrading and improvement of the theoretical 
and practical solutions of dealing with the threats, and creating conditions for the 
applicability of modern technological achievements in the countries of the region. 
Primary goal of the paper is to make a comparative analysis of the legislative, 
technological and operational segments in the field of civil aviation security in the East 
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and West countries with those in the Balkans; a secondary objective is to consider the 
conditions and feasibilities for balanced development and joint efforts for an efficient 
cooperation of the East and West countries with those in the Balkans, as an integral 
part of the common global security platform. Based on established international 
standards, recommendations and practices, the necessity should be confirmed of 
immediate implementation of the advanced safety technologies in the state security 
systems in the region, as a mutual interest of the entire international community. 
Aviation security should be an example for arrangement of the security policies 
in all other areas where security is still not regulated sufficiently. This is especially 
referring to so-called "Critical infrastructure", in order to establish the basic framework 
for defining and regulating a very important and significant segment which is part of 
the safety system of each country. 
 
Key words: aviation, safety, security, critical infrastructure, acts of unlawful 
interference 
 
 
The importance of the regulation of the civil aviation security 
 
The civil aviation, observed as a global transport system, in terms of functional 
structure, may be conditionally divided into three subsystems: aerodromes (airports), 
airlines (aircrafts) and air traffic control (ATMS – air traffic management system). Each 
of these subsystems consists of several functional elements: system user, 
infrastructure, controls, managing structures, technological procedures, technical and 
human resources, law regulation, international legislation, etc139. A potential direct 
negative impact on the safety of any of these aviation subsystems could result with 
serious consequences for the airline industry, which has a very significant and 
important role in the national economy, as well as in the national security of any state. 
The implementation of modern security systems and procedures, relating to the need 
for establishing an optimum level of safety, becomes a top priority of civil aviation. The 
complexity of the issues that treats the civil aviation, seen through the unquestionable 
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need for an adequate protection, is a very big challenge, to which in the future should 
be given more attention. 
The security in the area of the civil aviation, through the implementation of 
specific regulations, standards, recommendations, practices, advanced systems and 
procedures, has a function: 
- to protect the safety of passengers, crew, aircraft, ground staff, greeters and 
meeters or any other person and object, in matters of providing an effective protection 
against the acts of unlawful interference, and 
- to ensure readiness for rapid response against increased security threats140. 
The civil aviation security (AVSEC) involves a combination of measures, human 
and material resources, with a main goal to protect people and objects from acts of 
unlawful interference. The fundamental principles of the AVSEC philosophy are: 
- the civil aviation takes place in a safe and secured environment, free from 
unlawful interference; 
- the states develop and implement legislation and procedures, necessary to 
ensure a safe and secured environment; 
- the security measures implemented by the states, in order to protect the civil 
aviation against acts of unlawful interference, must be in accordance with the standards 
required and recommended practices contained in Annex 17 of the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, also known as the Chicago Convention, of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); and 
- accordance with their national regulation, the states will prosecute any 
person who will attempt or commit an act of unlawful interference and/or extradite 
such a person(s) in state(s) that are willing to prosecute such offenders141. 
Having all that in mind, as well as the need to secure the effective protection 
of the civil aviation regardless of the level of development of the state, the Balkan 
states have an obligation to implement and apply the required international standards 
and recommended practices related to AVSEC. To achieve an unified level of the 
aviation safety, each state builds their one aviation safety platform through 
comprehensive policy of applying a relevant legislation, that must be implementted by 
all entities involved in any AVSEC structure. 
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Typical acts of unlawful interference in the civil aviation all over the world 
 
The frequent events of the terrorist attacks all over the world, especially those 
in the area of civil aviation, show that the terrorism doesn’t recognize the state borders 
or social and political systems. Neither the countries of the West nor East nor does the 
Balkan countries are not spared from such terrorist acts. The recent events and 
developments have set a new chapter in the security sciences, especially in the 
segments related to the airline industry, where threats and dangers grow in proportion 
to the fast development of all civil aviation segments. 
Usually, the effects and damages, caused to civil aviation of such events, are 
devastating, with loss of human lives and enormous material losses. The omissions and 
deficiencies made by the security services and the readiness of saboteurs to manipulate 
the security systems at airports, smuggling firearms or explosive devices, increase the 
risk for terror atacks. The terrorism is actually the biggest danger and the most 
common cause for endangering the aviation safety, which dates back to the very 
beginnings of the air transport development.142 Throughout the history of the civil 
aviation there are frequent examples of terrorist attacks and threats. They vary 
according to the desired objectives, as well as to the means and methods used in those 
attacks. 
The unfortunate and tragic events in the area of the civil aviation always 
attract the attention of many people in public, mostly through the public media. 
Everybody, as a potential passenger, wants to be well informed and aware of the level 
and sustainability of the aviation safety and security. The feeling of being safe and 
secured during the flight or staying at the airports is one of the most important and 
strongest feelings for every passenger, making the decision to travel. 
There are many unfortunate events throughout the history of the modern civil 
aviation, but but below are listed just a few of the most characteristic of them: 
- On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 exploded 31,000 feet over 
Lockerbie, Scotland, 38 minutes after takeoff from London.  Two hundred fifty-nine 
people on board the New York-bound Boeing 747 were killed, along with 11 people on 
the ground. Afterward, United States and British investigators found fragments of a 
                                                          
142 Protection for critical infrastructure: Oliver Bakreski, Tanja Milosevska, Gjorgji Alceski – 
Skopje 2017.  
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circuit board and a timer, and ruled that a bomb, not mechanical failure, caused the 
explosion143; 
- On the morning of 11 September 2001, 19 hijackers took control of four 
commercial passenger jets flying out of airports on the east coast of the United States. 
Two of the aircraft were deliberately flown into the main two towers (the Twin Towers) 
of the World Trade Center in New York, with a third hitting the Pentagon in Virginia. 
The fourth plane never reached its intended target, crashing in Pennsylvania. It is 
believed that the passengers and crew overpowered the hijackers and took control of 
the plane. The total loss of life on 9/11 was nearly 3,000, including the 19 hijackers. It 
was the worst loss of life due to a terrorist incident on US soil.The days that followed 
saw a significant effect on world economic markets and international confidence.144 
- On 24 January 2011, bomb attack at Moscow's Domodedovo airport has killed 
at least 35 people and injured more than 100 - many of them critically, officials say. 
Investigators say the explosion, which happened in the arrivals hall, was caused by a 
suicide bomber145. The Russian authorities confirmed that the attack was act of a 
suicide bomber, wearing a belt with a hidden explosive device under the clothes, which 
was detonated at the entrance of the baggage claim area in the international flights 
terminal at the airport; 
- July 18 bombing of the bus carrying Israelis at Burgas airport on Bulgaria's 
Black Sea coast, the deadliest attack on Israelis abroad since 2004, also killed the 
Bulgarian bus driver and the bomber146. About 30 people were wounded. According to 
the reports from the Bulgarian media, the aim of the bomb attack were 150 Israeli 
tourists, landed from Tel Aviv just about half an hour before the explosion and entered 
into 3 buses at the landside, about to leave the airport to the Black Sea coast. 
- On 31 October 2015, about 25 minutes after takeoff from the Sharm el Sheikh 
Airport in Egypt, the plane Airbus A321 of the airline Metrojet exploded as a result of 
planted homemade explosive device, killing all 224 passengers and crew. The most of 
the passengers (219) on that flight, from the famous Egyptian tourist resort to St. 
Petersburg in Russia, were from Russian nationality. The responsibility for the attack 
                                                          
143 http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/26/world/pan-am-flight-103-fast-facts/ 
144 http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/the_september_11th_terrorist_attacks 
145 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12268662 
146 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/02/20132515350158754.html 
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assumed the terrorist organization Islamic State (ISIS)147. According to the Russian 
officials, the improvised explosive device had a destructive power equivalent to 1kg of 
TNT. On 18 November 2015 ISIS released photographs of the device for which it claimed 
was a bomb. Several employees at the airport, who were linked to ISIS, were suspected 
by the authorities for placing a bomb in the plane. 
- On 23 December 2015 a bomb attack occurred at Sabiha Gökçen Airport in 
Istanbul, Turkey. The blast at Sabiha Gokcen, the city's second airport and located on its 
Asian side, occurred shortly after 2:00 a.m. (midnight GMT), local budget carrier 
Pegasus said, fatally wounding a cleaner on one of its planes. There was damage to five 
airplanes in total due to the impact of shrapnel148. 
 - On 22 March 2016 in Brussels, Belgium, were three coordinated bombings - 
two of them took place at Zaventem Airport, while third in the Maelbeek metro station 
in the center of Brussels. Bombing terrorist act at the airport was realized with two 
bomb explosions in the terminal building; after the search of the airport a third non 
activated explosive device was found, which was later destroyed. In these three attacks 
of suicide - bombers there were 32 casualties and more than 300 people were 
injured149. The responsibility for these terrorist attacks in Brussels took the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). 
 - On 28 June 2016 at Kemal Ataturk Airport in Istanbul, Turkey, there was 
organized terrorist attack that resulted in gunfire and bomb attacks in the airport 
terminal building. Several gunmen, armed with automatic weapons and explosive belts, 
attacked the passengers and visitors in the international terminal of the airport. 43 
people have been killed and 239 injured in three blasts that rocked Istanbul’s Ataturk 
airport, according to Turkish officials150. 
 With a very simple observation and analysis of the terrorist attacks that 
occurred in the area of civil aviation, whether it comes to airports or aircraft, can 
undoubtedly be seen the "attractiveness" to engage in unlawful acts on this kind of 
critical infrastructures. An obvious conclusion is that a number of terrorist strategies 
are aimed to vital facilities, which are of particular importance for each country. Such 
                                                          
147 http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/31/middleeast/egypt-plane-crash/ 
148 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-airport-blast-idUSKBN0U60DS20151223 
149 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35869985 
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facilities usually have the highest level of protection and security, so the main intention 
of the organizers of such terrorist attacks is to cause a massive sense of fear, 
uncertainty and insecurity among the people, while causing distrust in the ability and 
willingness of the national authorities to cope with the dangers and threats. Hence, the 
goal of such terrorist attacks is to have the largest possible number of victims and to 
cause a great media effect. Therefore, a mandatory emphasis on safety and security is 
one of the dominant element in the mosaic of the organization of civil aviation. The 
events of recent years also have their direct impact on the projection and creation of 
specific security systems and procedures, that are constantly improve and upgrade to 
eliminate any possible shortcomings and lacks. 
 
 
Regulation of Civil Aviation Security in Europe 
 
In light of threats to civil aviation and existance of effective security system 
v.v. the complexity of the factors which lead to inefficiency of the security, there is a 
constant need of permanent improvement of the security measures, the conditions, the 
implementation of advanced systems and procedures. All this in order to build an 
effective security system through universal international standards in all aspects 
(organizational, regulatory, structural, substantive, technical, etc.). 
The European approach, represented by ECAC (European Civil Aviation 
Conference), reflect main mission as promoting the continuing development of a safe, 
efficient and sustainable European air transport system151. Established in 1955 by 
several European countries, with headquarters in Paris, ECAC works through plenary 
sessions at the level of directors of the civil aviation authorities of the Member States, 
as well as at the level of Ministers of Transport. The main objectives of ECAC are: 
respect and care for the interests of the Member States in the field of civil aviation in 
Europe, finding solutions to solve their mutual problems and misunderstandings, 
cooperation with the bodies of the EC (European Commission) and ICAO, promotion of a 
common European AVSEC policy on the European sky, providing mutual cooperation in 
the development and implementation of common standards and procedures in the field 
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of civil aviation, etc152. It is comprised of 44 countries, almost all of Europe153. ECAC 
policy in the field of aviation safety have been developed and implemented in Doc. 30, 
which is developed in order to ensure equal access of all Member States and all other 
countries, whose airlines and airports should maintain an acceptable uniform level of 
safety measures, methods, principles, procedures, specifications, criteria, materials, 
data, etc. It is expected all Member States of ECAC to continue applying the SARPs 
(standards and recommended practicies) of ICAO Annex 17 and other relevant ICAO 
annexes, resolutions and manuals. 
It should also be stressed that EU (European Union) has a significant role in 
creating a common European AVSEC policy, for all Member States and States Parties to 
the ECAA (European Common Aviation Area) Agreement, through the adoption of 
regulations and the implementation of standards in the field of security. The main 
objective is to achieve uniform standards in the security of civil aviation. Therefore, EU 
through regulations, as binding legal acts, sets guidelines regarding the regulation of 
civil aviation. First, in 2002 EU adopted its first common AVSEC rules, with detailed 
provisions on: access to sensitive areas of the airports and planes, screening and 
control of passengers and their baggage, security checks of cargo and mail, AVSEC 
training, screening and classification of weapons and other items that are prohibited to 
carry in aircraft, etc. Furthermore, in 2005 EC (European Commission) proposed 
amendments to the 2002 rules, introducing changes regarding the screening of 
passengers and baggage, security checks of aircraft, as well as recruitment or selection 
and training of AVSEC personnel. For the first time there were introduced rules 
securing the planes in terms of: access to the cockpit, dealing with inappropriate 
passengers with sky marshals on each flight, new ways to secure the aircraft, and more. 
The new rules were adopted in EU Regulation 300/2008, which included all ad hoc 
measures adopted in 2006, in reference with the threat of terrorist attacks in aircraft 
with liquid explosives. 
Beside the EU Regulation 300/2008 as a basic document, below are presented 
the EU regulations that also treat the area of AVSEC: 
- EU Regulation 185/2010: contains detailed measures for the implementation of 
common basic standards on AVSEC; 
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- EU Regulation 720/2011: amending EU Regulation 272/2009 with the common basic 
standards on AVSEC in relation to the screening of liquids, aerosols and gels at EU 
states airports; 
- EU Regulation 1141/2011: amending EU Regulation 272/2009 with the common basic 
standards on AVSEC in relation of the use of scanners for security procedures at the 
airports in EU states; 
- EU Regulation 1087/2011: amending EU Regulation 185/2010 with the common basic 
standards on AVSEC in relation with the systems for a detection of explosives; 
- EU Regulation 1147/2011: amending EU Regulation 185/2010 with the common basic 
standards on AVSEC in relation with the use of security scanners at EU states airports; 
- EU Regulation 711/2012: amending EU Regulation 185/2010 with the common basic 
standards on AVSEC in relations with the methods used for the control of persons at 
the airports who are not passengers and items they carry with them; 
- EU Regulation 104/2013: amending EU Regulation 185/2010 regarding the screening 
of passengers and non-passengers by the equipment to ETD (explosives traces 
detection) combined with HMD (handy metal detector); 
- EU Regulation 246/2013: amending EU Regulation 185/2010 regarding the screening 
of liquids, aerosols and gels at EU states airports in EU airports; 
- EU Regulation 278/2014: amending EU Regulation 185/2010 regarding the 
clarification, harmonization and simplification of the procedures for ETD; 
- EU Regulation 1998/2015: containing detailed measures for the implementation of 
common basic standards on AVSEC154. 
 
 
Regulation of Civil Aviation Security in USA 
 
The main specific characteristic in US is the fact that after the tragic events of 
11 September 2001, the whole AVSEC system was transformed from decentralized to 
centralized, under the of ATSA (Aviation and Transport Security Act). As a result of it, 
the responsibility for AVSEC was transferred directly to the airport units of TSA 
(Transportation Security Administration) - sector within the US Department of 
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Homeland National Security. TSA has overall responsibility for all transportation modes 
of security within the US. The basic purpose of TSA is to secure all transportation 
systems in US, including aviation, to ensure free and safe movement of people and 
trade. Also, one of the most characteristic changes were adopted was giving the direct 
responsibility to the airport authorities for AVSEC, especially for the control of 
passengers, baggage and cargo. Also, some more obligations and powers were given to 
the airport authorities in several different areas of AVSEC. 
After such a change, the US government, represented by the FAA (Federal 
Aviation Administration) remained with supervising and regulatory role. The FAA, as an 
agency of the Ministry of Transportation in US, has the authority to regulate and 
supervise all aspects of the civil aviation safety in US. This government body was 
formed in 1958, to regulate, develop and encourage research and other activities 
related to US aviation development in general. Also, TSA at the beginning was an 
agency within the Department of Transportation, but later was transferred within the 
US Department of Homeland National Security, that provided a major progress towards 
the fulfillment of the tasks set by the US Congress. Some specific actions were 
implemented by TSA in 2002, as: the recruitment and training of screening AVSEC staff, 
100% screening of baggage at the airports, structural strengthening and firming the 
door of the cockpit, the introduction of advanced technology AVSEC equipment and 
devices, etc. 
Besides this, in the US also exists another state body connected with the 
transportation safety: NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board. NTSB is an 
independent federal agency for investigations the transportation accidents. Since its 
creation in 1967, the mission of NTSB is to focus on determining the likely and possible 
causes of all serious incidents and accidents in area of transportation, and to formulate 
the recommendations aimed to upgrade the safety in all modes of transportation, 
including the aviation. 
If we compare EU and US in terms of AVSEC measures and procedures, it’s 
obvious that generally all individual acts and activities are adequately regulated and 
harmonized within the international organizations. In order to present the similarities 
or differences in implementation, we might mention the security measures related to 
the airports in the area of access control staff, security checks of the vehicles, access to 
controlled areas at airports, etc. In Europe, for example, all this is providing with a 
combination of different subjects: airport authority, police department and private 
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security companies (outsourcing), while in US these activities remain a key 
responsibility of the airport authority. Further, the surveillance and supervision of the 
security activities in Europe are the responsibility of the CAA (Civil Aviation Agency), 
while in the United States this remains the responsibility of TSA. Referring the securing 
the aircraft, in EU as well as in US the protection and inspection of aircraft on the 
ground is usually the responsibility of the airline. 
In Europe, the CAA usually are responsible to provide and comply the safety 
standards within the national legislation, while in US it’s carried out by TSA. If we 
compare the procedures for security control of the passengers and cabin baggage, at 
the European airports it might be shared responsibility between the airport authority, 
the police and some private security companies, while in US passengers and baggage 
screening is solely the responsibility of the TSA. It should be mentioned that there are 
some differences also in terms of providing the security measures and procedures for 
cargo, mail, catering or duty free goods at the airports, as well as the security measures 
and procedures for general aviation, but the most important thing is that all those 
measures and procedures are strictly regulated and approved by relevant international 
institutions. 
 
 
Regulation of Civil Aviation Security in Russian Federation 
 
As well as EU and US, the regulation of civil AVSEC in Russian Federation also 
is a positive example of consistently compliance with the international SARPs, 
particular in the areas of appropriate legal framework, technical guidelines, procedures 
for licensing and certification and continuous supervision. Russian civil aviation is 
administered generally by five different bodies: 
- Ministry of Transportation, which regulates the entire transportation 
system in the federation, including aviation; 
- Federal Services for Supervision in the area of transportation, over 
observance and monitoring the implementation of the national legislation, 
including the civil aviation; 
- Federal Aviation Agency, with authority on licensing activities related to 
aviation; 
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- Aviation Committee, that coordinates all activities related to the use of 
national airspace and air traffic services and management, certifying the 
aircraft, airports and equipment, investigates aviation accidents, 
encourages the unification of different aviation rules, develops a 
coordinated policy in the field of aviation, coordinates the development 
and implementation of interstate scientific and technical programs, etc.; 
- Aviation Registry, which is responsible for aircraft homologation and 
certification155. 
In terms of ACVEC, it’s important to mention that the Presidential Decree № 
403 from March 2010, for establishing an integrated system of public transport safety, 
is a big step forward in the development and innovation in the field of the security; a 
program is developed for public traffic safety by implementing the new technologies 
and equipment for AVSEC, as well as the need for equipping the airports with modern 
security systems156. 
In the AVSEC field, several federal bodies have competences and authority: 
- Ministry of Transportation of the Russian Federation – a federal body of the state 
executive authority in area of transportation, defining the official state policy and 
normative-legal acts in the field of civil aviation; 
- Federal Services for Supervision in the area of transportation – a is a federal body of 
the state executive authority, carrying out its functions in control oversight legislation 
of the Russian Federation and international agreements in the field of civil aviation, as 
a special authorized body in the field of civil aviation; 
- Federal Aviation Agency – also a federal body of the state executive authority, which 
perform its functions in securing the public services in the field of civil aviation157. 
In the Report of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, connected with its visit 
of the Russian Federation regarding the safety of the civil aviation, it’s stated that 
Russian Federation has established a highly effective aviation safety system and 
surveillance mechanism, which reflects the priorities set by the government in order to 
prevent illegal activities and acts of unlawful interference in area of civil aviation. The 
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latest revisions to the ICAO USAP (Universal Security Audit Program) of the Russian 
Federation have been very positive. This program states that Russian Federation has 
established an appropriate national legislation and implemented all relevant 
international programs and policies to support the universal framework of aviation 
safety. Such a policy continues to impose strict quality controls throughout all areas of 
aviation security system and act quickly identified deficiencies and lacks to ensure 
compliance with all relevant national and international requirements158. 
Generally, in terms of the AVSEC measures and procedures, there are some 
differences in Russian Federation with those in EU or US, but also there are many 
similarities; the legislation may be different in terms of structural organization, but it 
must be pointed that the Russian AVSEC measures and procedures are based on the 
principles of ICAO and other relevant international organizations and associations, 
which basically represent the main sources of legislations for security in the field of civil 
aviation. 
 
 
International Civil Aviation Organization - ICAO 
 
The international civil aviation organizations and associations include various 
forms of gathering and joint action of different countries or other legal entities, in order 
to achieve certain common objectives in the field of civil aviation. Among prominent, 
related particularly with the AVSEC, are: 
- ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization for Civil Air Transport, 
- IATA - International Air Transport Association, 
- ACI - Airports Council International, 
- ECAC - European Civil Aviation Conference, 
- EUROCONTROL - European Organization for Aviation Navigation and 
Safety, 
- EASA - European Aviation Safety Agency, etc. 
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This paper generally is referring the ICAO, as the most important international 
organization in the area of the regulation of the civil aviation all over the world. As a 
part of UN, ICAO is established by the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed 
at Chicago on 7 December 1944 and become effective from 1947.159 The headquarters of 
ICAO are in Montreal, Canada. The basic aim of ICAO is to provide the international civil 
aviation to develop into a reliable, safe, regular and efficient manner in cooperation with 
all its Member States, based on the principle of uniformity and equality of all involved 
subjects, as a part of global transportation system. Currently it’s comprised of 190 
countries. 
The main objectives of ICAO are: developing the basic principles and 
techniques in international aviation and promotion of international air transportation, 
preventing any kind of discrimination in international civil aviation, improving the 
aviation safety, encourage the development of airways, providing balanced development 
of the aviation all over the world, preventing unfair competition between ICAO Member 
States, adopting standards and recommendations in all areas of civil aviation, 
encourage the development of airports and aircraft, care for equal opportunities for all 
Member States in the maintenance of international airways and much more. 
ICAO has three basic functions, such as: administrative, legislative and judicial. 
The most important ICAO bodies are: the Parliament, the Council, the Secretariat and 
the General Secretary. The required common rules and provisions are issued through 
regular and periodical publications, in the form of standards or recommendations, 
contained in annexes and manuals. ICAO Member States bound to implement and apply 
these provisions through their own national legislation.160 The most important 
legislative role of ICAO is the formulation and adoption of the SARPs for the 
international civil aviation. The SARPs for the international civil AVSEC were first 
adopted by the ICAO Council in March 1974 and designated as ICAO Annex 17 to the 
Chicago Convention. ICAO Annex 17 was adopted in six languages - Arabic, Chinese, 
English, French, Russian and Spanish.161 ICAO Annex 17 process the international SARPs 
for AVSEC, regarding the protection of civil aviation against the acts of unlawful 
interference. Thus, the primary targeting of each contracting state is the safety of the 
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160 T. Tuntev – Aerodromes  -  Faculty of Technical Sciences Bitola 2005 
161 http://www.icao.int/Security/SFP/Pages/Annex17.aspx 
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passengers, crew, staff and the public, in matters related to the protection of the civil 
aviation against unlawful acts. Contracting states shall establish and implement the 
regulations, practices and procedures to protect the civil aviation against all kind of 
illegal acts, taking into account the safety, regularity and efficiency of flights, and will 
ensure that such organization, regulations, practices and procedures will protect the 
safety of passengers, crews, ground staff and the general public, in matters related to 
the provision of be able to respond quickly to increased security threats.162 
The Aviation Security Policy (ASP) Section of the ICAO Aviation Security and 
Facilitation Office is responsible for the development of new and amended Standards 
and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for the security of international air transport. 
This is promulgated in the technical annex to the Chicago Convention, specifically 
Annex 17 - Security. 
Among other things, the ASP Section manages its programs by: 
- developing and updating Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (also known as the Chicago Convention);  
- managing and overseeing the work program of the Aviation Security 
(AVSEC) Panel as well as its  working groups;  
- updating and maintaining the ICAO Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil 
Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference (Doc 8973);  
- maintaining the Technical Annex to the Convention on the Marking of 
Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection;  
- providing support to the International Explosives Technical Commission 
(IETC);  
- promoting implementation of security-related SARPs; 
- Providing support to various governing entities at ICAO, in particular the 
Assembly, Council and Committee on Unlawful Interference (UIC).163 
The ASP Section is also responsible for fostering cooperation on security 
matters with other United Nations agencies and international bodies. Among the many 
entities with which the ASP Section coordinates its work are the UN Counter Terrorism 
Committee (UN CTC), Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), 
                                                          
162 ICAO – Анекс 17 International Standards and Recommended practices. 
163 http://www.icao.int/Security/SFP/Pages/default.aspx 
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International Air Transport Association (IATA) and Airports Council International 
(ACI).164 
ICAO Security Manual (Doc 8973 - Confidential) is a guidance how to apply and 
implement the SARPs related to the AVSEC. ICAO Annex 17 and ICAO Doc 8973 are 
constantly reviewed and amended on the basis of new threats and technological 
developments that have an impact on the efficiency of measures designed to prevent 
acts of unlawful interference. New and updated guidelines are often published, as a 
result of the unpredictability of the acts of unlawful interference, different ways of 
behavior, new landside security aids, new screening and surveillance methods, etc. ICAO 
Doc 8973 is available on few languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish.165 
   Reporting and sharing information among ICAO Member States about the acts 
of unlawful interference have great importance for the establishing an efficient global 
security policy. That gives to ICAO the necessary data that are crucial for the evaluation 
and analysis of different security incidents, events and trends. In accordance with ICAO 
Annex 17, each contracting state must provide relevant information for each incident of 
unlawful interference, so that by analyzing these events, the experts develop effective 
measures and procedures for AVSEC. 
ICAO is providing an efficient AVSEC strategic goals, through coordinated 
activities: 
- Initiatives to develop policies and SARPs, 
- Monitoring of the main trends and indicators in the field of security, 
- Analysis of the security, 
- Implementing appropriate programs and plans to solve some safety related 
issues.166 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
164 Ibid.  
165 http://www.icao.int/Security/SFP/Pages/SecurityManual.aspx 
166 http://www.icao.int/safety/Documents/ICAO_State-of-Global-Safety_web_RU.pdf 
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Civil AVSEC in Macedonia and other Balkan’s countries 
 
As a member of UN from 1993, Republic of Macedonia is a member of ICAO 
from 9 October 1993 and member of ECAC from 3 July 1997. That means Republic of 
Macedonia is obliged to respect, apply and implement all international SARPs related to 
the AVSEC into the national legislation. 
According to the national Act of law on Aviation, the safety and security issues 
and structures in the aviation field are organized through: 
- Ministry of Transportation and Communications, 
- Civil Aviation Agency (CAA), 
- Ministry of Interior affairs (Police), 
- Airport operators, 
- Airlines, 
- Macedonian Navigation (M-NAV) ATMS.167 
An efficient AVSEC system on the national level can be achieved through the 
development, implementation and maintenance of comprehensive flexible and effective 
legislation, programs, measures and procedures nationwide. The guidelines for the 
development of the national AVSEC should always be in line with the relevant 
international regulations. 
The AVSEC organizational structure in all Balkan states is more or less very 
similar. There are some particular differences about the level of implementation of the 
international SARPs, as well as the level of technical development, modernity, features 
and capabilities of the AVSEC equipment and aids. For example, in Serbia there is a big 
number of adequate and appropriate AVSEC programs and plans for training and 
quality control; also, there is an efficient inspection system for continuously and 
detailed monitoring and applying AVSEC measures and procedures, based on 
international SARPs. The AVSEC national legislation of Croatia, as a member of EU, is 
fully in accordance with the European legislation and all other relevant international 
SARPs. The security measures, applied by the subjects involved in the national aviation, 
are controlled by the national CAA, as a state body in charge in the area of civil AVSEC. 
In Slovenia the situation is the same as in Croatia.  
                                                          
167 Закон за воздухопловство Сл. весник на Р.Македонија бр.63 од 13.05.2013 
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In Montenegro there is a Security department within the national CAA, 
responsible for implementing the international SARPs related to the AVSEC, supervision 
of the efficiency of the involved entities against acts of unlawful interference, adoption 
of regulations, programs and procedures, coordination with the other relevant 
authorities, etc. 
 
 
Development and application of an advanced AVSEC equipment 
 
The new technologies, implemented in highly developed countries in the world, 
certainly need to be an objective for all other countries to implement them according 
theirs possibilities. The efficient and modern AVSEC equipment and devices should be 
use at all international airports worldwide, including Balkan countries. This need is 
continuing and sometimes inevitable when it comes as the urgent and unquestionable 
obligation, regarding the applicability of modern devices, for the detection of explosives, 
security scan of the whole body of the passengers, etc. In terms of equipment and 
devices used in the function of the security, it is necessary to meet the needs and 
requirements about the compatibility of the specifications required in domestic and 
international regulations. 
 The modern technology undoubtedly contributes to the development of very 
sophisticated new models and types of security devices. That means certain illicit 
substances or dangerous objects, which could disrupt the safety, should be more easily 
determined and found. As an explicit example for every day development, upgrading 
and modernization is the X-ray technology, as well as the latest modern devices for 
detection of explosives, narcotics, weapons and other prohibited items and substances. 
Such devices, offering a wide range of systems with various dimensions and 
performances, are very useful and aimed, for instance, to analyze fluid going through 
and to determine its chemical composition, in order to determine whether it’s a threat 
or not. Furthermore, developing CT (computed tomography) technology allows 3D 
images and high resolution.168 These new detectors for passengers scanning allowed 
seeing the image of the body and even the detection of the smallest objects possessed 
by the person that could be a threat. At last but not at least, the positive personal 
                                                          
168 http://www.x-rayscreener.co.uk/x-ray/#other-tech 
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identification via biometric models allowed to confirm with 100% certainty the identity 
of the person trying to access to certain restricted areas. The biometrics refers to the 
parameters associated with the human characteristics.169 
It’s also necessary to mention that the “digital security” is in the top 10 trends 
in AVSEC equipment development; this new modern technology is used to develop an 
advanced security concept, such as “walk though security”; it helps to reduce the 
waiting time and increase the flow of passengers; also it’s enabling automated 
verification, reduction of the security staff and increased level of the security.170 
The great progress of the new technologies and the training processes of the security 
staff certainly contribute to improve the physical and psychological effects that every 
modern security system should achieve. The fast development and modernization of the 
AVSEC equipment and devices are motive and incentive to all other areas related to the 
security of any other kind of the “critical infrastructure”. Not just the airports and 
aircraft, but also all other objects of “critical infrastructure” are becoming an objective 
of new security measures and procedures, such as train stations, bus stations, hydro-
powers, thermal powers, nuclear power plants, water supply plants, factories, 
government facilities, etc. The use of the new security equipment and devices must 
keep pace with the implementation of the relevant and appropriate legislation that 
comes primarily from validated universal SARPs. That’s should be an imperative for 
further and continuous development, implementation, coordination, control and 
improvement of the security, not just in a field of civil aviation, but also in any other 
area with needs to secure the “critical infrastructure”. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The global aim in the world of civil aviation is achieving the unified level of 
aviation safety and security all over the different countries and continents. Therefore, 
each government, through its CAA as state body in charge of national aviation safety 
and security, adopts a comprehensive state policy, followed by appropriate legislation 
                                                          
169https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chromeinstant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF8#q= 
biometric+security+tehnology. 
170 https://www.aviation-insider.com/resource/top-10-trends-aviation/ 
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implemented by all entities involved in any security structure within the national 
aviation transport system. According SARPs in ICAO, Annex 17 is the main sources and 
guidelines for establishing an official state policy in the field of each particular national 
AVSEC system. 
The national and international security, including AVSEC as a part, is a complex 
and extensive system, as an interdependent set of legislations, measures, plans, 
activities, technologies and programs that must be well coordinated. Therefore, the 
efficient and appropriate security policy would mean constantly contribution to 
maintaining and improving the security in all areas, especially in aviation. Hence, the 
security policy should be directed to the extension of the existing regulations and 
practices; it should be aimed at identification and defining the feasibilities, possibilities 
and conditions for applying of advanced practices, procedures and systems and their 
implementation in the development of each national security system. The practical 
applicability of certain standards and procedures, arising from the final 
operationalization of the proposed solutions, should be a priority for every country. 
Every day all over the world there are larger and more dangerous threats 
posed by globalization. That’s require a new approach to the security organization and 
facilities.  An efficient security protection must be effective 24 hours a day, with the 
inclusion of advanced security systems that follow new and modern technological 
advances. Security systems are in constant development, in order to meet the 
requirements arising from the practice. The implementation of new and modern security 
systems and devices depends on several factors, but the most significant thing is that 
the investing in security equipment and devices should be permanent. No doubt that 
the equipping of the security services in accordance with modern achievements in this 
area includes the possibility for smooth and efficient execution of the given tasks, 
corresponding to the risks and dangers of the modern times. 
The civil aviation is one of the most regulated areas on both levels - 
international and national. That could be a real example for all other areas of activities 
in the countries, especially for those with great and significant importance for the 
government and public. That’s why there is a need of cooperation, coordination and 
legislative compliance not just for civil aviation, but also for all other fields that 
contains objects of “critical infrastructure”. The modern security challenges and their 
impact on the vital state infrastructure – “critical infrastructure”, are presented through 
the vulnerability and fragility of the national security, national economy, national health 
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system, as well as the efficient functioning of the government institutions and bodies. 
That’s why the proper and adequate implementation of the relevant and approved 
international security measures and procedures should be a real challenge for 
establishing a comprehensive national security policy. This must be followed by proper 
national legislation and implementation of modern security systems and procedures in 
developing the efficient security of “critical infrastructure”. So, the national AVSEC 
system should be a base, guideline and real example for every country in the future, to 
provide an efficient and comprehensive “critical infrastructure” security system. 
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Abstract 
 
The main topic of this scientific work are technical and technological 
emergencies as a segment of security threats with special emphasis on industrial 
emergencies. During the development of this work mainly methods those are used are 
explicative, descriptive and statistical analysis, and content analysis. There is described 
and explained classification of emergencies as well as technical and technological 
emergencies. Special emphasis is given to industrial emergencies. There were described 
and explained industrial production aspects. Especially, there were described industrial 
emergencies – emergencies related to hazardous materials and mining emergencies. 
Additionally, there are presented some diagrams and map related to technical and 
technological emergencies and industrial emergencies. The aim of this scientific work is 
to highlight the risk of industrial emergencies, as an important segment of security 
threats. 
 
Key words: Emergency Management; Security; Emergencies; Technical and 
Technological Emergencies; Industrial Emergencies. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
States of the modern world are faced with many forms of security threats, 
including the phenomena that lead to emergencies. Since the beginning of man 
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emergencies cause starvation and suffering of the population, country and society as a 
whole, contributing to the social disorder and reducing the economic capacity of the 
country. Various forms of emergencies have different implications on the state and 
society, but definitely the greatest consequences remain after wars, among which the 
most difficult conflict was the Second World War, and after natural disasters, which 
usually lead to great suffering of the civilian population. The Second World War is the 
biggest disaster that has befallen humanity, and resulted in a loss of 60 million lives. 
(Weinberg, 1994, p. 894). Also, Spanish fever was fatal and in the period 1918–1919 it 
killed about 50 million people  (Taubenberger & M, 2006, p. 15). Taiping Rebellion 
(1850–1864), a conflict of imperial China under the Qin dynasty against supporters of 
converts to Christianity of Hong Xiuquan, the worst conflict in the history of China, has 
killed 50 million people  (Lone, 2007, p. 24). The First World War had over 8 million 
victims  (Howard, 2002, p. 122) while it is estimated that the Russian civil war had 
between 7 and 14 million dead (Bullock, 2008, p. 133). 
Besides the wars, the highest death toll is related to natural disasters. Only in 
the last century and the beginning of this century, natural disasters have caused 
millions of victims: The earthquake in Haiti in January 2010 took the life of 230,000 
people; The earthquake and tsunami in the area of Sumatra in December 2004 were 
murdered in South East Asia over 225 thousand people; During the floods in August 
1971, which hit the area of Hanoi, in the former North Vietnam, it has been lost about 
100 thousand lives; The eruption of the volcano Nevado del Ruiz in Colombia in 
November 1985 caused the deth of at least 25 thousand people  (The world's worst 
natural disasters: Calamities of the 20th and 21st centuries, 2010). 
Apart from wars and natural disasters, many lives were carried away by 
different accidents of technological character. Fire in the Church of the Society of Jesus 
in the Chilean city of Santiago, in the middle of the nineteenth century, has killed about 
2500 persons  (Terrific Tragedy in Chili, 1864). Emergencies with a large number of 
victims are frequent in traffic: Aviation accident on the Spanish island of Tenerife in 
1977 had resulted in 583 dead persons  (Correction of the Report on the accident 
involving aircraft BOEING 747 PH-BUF of KLM and BOEING 747 N 736 PA of PANAM, 
1978); Marine accident of the ferry MV Doña Paz in the Philippines in 1987 took the life 
of 4341 persons  (Philippine ferry survivor found at sea, 2009); The train accident of the 
train Queen of the Sea in Sri Lanka, in 2004, killed more than 1,700 people  (Steele, 
2004). 
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Among the technical and technological emergencies may emphasize individual 
accidents which belong to the industrial emergencies and often put to death many 
lives. Thus, in the explosion of ammunition in the Canadian city of Halifax in 1917, died 
about 1600 persons  (Halifax Explosion Remembrance Book; McAlpine's Halifax City 
Directory, 1918) and in an explosion in the Nigerian city of Lagos in 2002 killed more 
than 1,000 people  (Toll in Blast at Nigerian Armory Exceeds 1,000, 2002). But the 
biggest disaster occurred in pesticide factory in the Indian city of Bhopal in 1984 where 
died 10 000 people  (Abkowitz, 2008). 
Different natural, technical and social disasters, including industrial accidents, 
are the cause of a number of victims and suffering of people but are also a source of 
suffering and weakening of the economy of countries' economic potential. A large 
number of victims is characteristic of poor countries, ie. the countries of so called Third 
World (Indochina, Insulindia, Indian Subconinent etc.). 
Technical and technological advances will have the dual affect on industrial 
emergencies' threats. On the one hand, better safety standards will reduce the number 
of industrial accidents but in poor countries, with old plants, the risk of industrial 
accidents will grow due to aging machinery and equipment. On the other hand, new 
technologies will provide new forms of threats and "enrich" the diversity of industrial 
emergencies. 
 
 
DEFINITION OF AN EMERGENCY 
 
Definition of emergency can be viewed from two main aspects – linguistic and 
scientific. The scientific aspect means defining the notion of emergency, while the 
linguistic aspect relates to the different terms of an emergency in various languages. 
Because of the danger which may in certain circumstances to escalate into emergencies 
with different consequences, it is very difficult to formulate a single, comprehensive and 
precise definition of an emergency, which would include all its characteristics and 
specificities (Štrbac, 2008, pp. 15-16). 
In Serbian, for an emergency it is used a term emergency situation. According 
to Katarina Štrbac emergencies are extraordinary, disturbed, unwanted and harmful 
society condition which is caused by the activity of the human factor, the natural forces 
and other large scale harmful events, causing great losses to people, flora and fauna, 
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environment, enormous material destruction and paralyzing the functioning of 
constitutional order (Štrbac, 2008, p. 16). In the Serbian Emergency Act (Zakon o 
vanrednim situacijama, Article 8, Paragraph 1) emergency is defined as "a condition in 
which the risks and threats or the consequences of disasters, emergencies and other 
dangers for the population, the environment and property are of such scope and 
intensity that their formation or the consequences can not be prevented or eliminated 
by regular actions of competent bodies and services, so for its mitigation and removal is 
necessary to use special measures, forces and resources with the enhanced mode" 
(Zakon o vanrednim situacijama, p. 3). 
In Cambridge International Dictionary of English for emergency it is said that 
this is something dangerous or serious, which happens suddenly or unexpectedly, and 
needs immediate action, in order to avoid harmful results (Cambridge International 
Dictionary of English, 1995, p. 450). In Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary it is said 
that emergency is a sudden serious and dangerous event or situation which needs 
immediate action to deal with it (Hornby, 2005, p. 409). Webster's Revised Unabridged 
Dictionary says that emergency is sudden or unexpected appearance; an unforeseen 
occurrence or combination of circumstances which calls for immediate action or remedy 
(Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary, 1913, p. 484). 
According to the Canadian Emergencies Act emergency is "an urgent and 
critical situation of a temporary nature that: a) seriously endangers the lives, health or 
safety of Canadians and is of such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or 
authority of a province to deal with it; or b) seriously threatens the ability of the 
Government of Canada to preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of 
Canada“ (Emergencies Act (1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.)), 2010, p. 2). The United Kingdom 
Government defines emergency as: an event or situation which threatens serious 
damage to human welfare in a place in the UK; an event or situation which threatens 
serious damage to the environment of a place in the UK; or war, or terrorism, which 
threatens serious damage to the security of the UK (Emergency Response and 
Recovery, 2009, p. 9). In American Dictionary of Homeland Security and Defense 
emergency is: 1) Any incident, human caused or natural, which requires responsive 
action to protect life or property; 2) Any occasion or instance for which, in the 
determination of the President, federal assistance is needed to supplement state or 
local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and 
safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a disaster or catastrophe in the United States; 
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3) An event that may be managed locally without the need of added response measures 
or changes to procedure; 4) A sudden occurrence demanding immediate action (O’Leary, 
2005, p. 155). 
The notion of emergency is not precisely defined in other languages too. In 
Russian it is used a term чрезвычайная ситуация (chrezvychaynaya situatsiya) 
(Bošković, 2007, pp. 693, 816). According to Rezchikov and Tkachenko, emergency is an 
event in a particular territory (aquatorium, object), originated as a result of accidents, 
hazardous natural phenomena, catastrophe, natural or other disasters, which can cause 
human casualties, damage to human health or the environment, material damage and 
disruption of daily life (Резчиков & Ткаченко, 2006, p. 254). A similar definition is given 
by the Russian federal law on protection from emergencies (Федеральный закон от 
21.12.1994 N 68-ФЗ (ред. от 30.12.2008) "О защите населения и территорий от 
чрезвычайных ситуаций природного и техногенного характера" (принят ГД ФС РФ 
11.11.1994,с изменениями на 19 мая 2010 года)). In German state of emergency is 
called Notstand (Zečević, 2010, p. 316). A term Notfall, with the term Notfallsituation, is 
used to denote an emergency  (Schenk, Für den Notfall vorgesorgt, 2009, pp. 4-47). In 
French emergency is called situation d’urgence (Nikolić, Francusko-srpski srpsko-
francuski rečnik, 2005, pp. 341, 382) (Guide ORSEC départemental – Méthode générale, 
2006, pp. 13-45), and similar case is in other Romance languages. In Italian stato di 
emergenza is a state of emergency. The term for an emergency is situazioni di 
emergenza (Pavlović, 2006, p. 95) (Schenk, Previdanza per le situazioni di emergenza, 
2009, pp. 4-47). In Spanish, emergency is denoted by the term emergencias (Nikolić, 
Špansko-srpski srpsko-španski rečnik, 2006, p. 229) (Schenk, Preparados para las 
emergencias, 2009, pp. 4-47). The situation is similar in other languages. 
Thus, we arrive to the definition that emergency is an event in a certain area, 
which is a result of natural, social or technical and technological accidents, which has 
resulted in human casualties, damage to human health, harm to the environment, 
material damage or disruption of the normal way of life, and that requires a quick 
response by appropriate or available resources, in accordance with existing standards 
and procedures (Ćulibrk, Upravljanje vanrednim situacijama, 2015, str. 30). 
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CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES 
 
When emergencies are defined it is easier to make their classification, although 
at this point there is no uniformity of views, as a result of a different definition of а risk. 
There are various aspects on which it would be possible to classify emergencies. 
With regard to the possibility of overcoming the resulting consequences, 
emergencies can happen with: repairable partially repairable and irreparable 
consequences  (Mijalković & Keserović, 2010, pp. 109-110). According to the duration of 
emergencies we have short-term and long-term emergencies, and by the certainty of 
occurrence emergencies can be certain emergencies and possible emergencies. 
According to the distribution, emergencies can be divided into: local emergencies, 
regional emergencies, state or national emergencies, interstate emergencies and 
international emergencies. 
According to the classification of British author Bridget Byrne and Sally Baden 
(Byrne & Baden, 1995), emergencies are divided into six basic categories: natural (fast-
growing), technological (fast-growing), slowly evolving (eg. drought), complex (political 
emergencies), ongoing emergencies (eg, poverty) and mass migration. This 
classiffication is based on the mode and speed of manifestation of emergencies and 
partly on the consequences of an economic character. The disadvantage of this 
classification is that war and contemporary risks are almost not mentioned (Štrbac, 
2008, p. 17). 
However, the classification of emergencies usually starts with the process of 
the occurence of an emergency. One of these classifications was given by Serbian 
authors Šimon Đarmati and Vladimir Jakovljević. They divided emergencies into: 1) 
Natural emergencies , 2) Technical and technological emergencies and 3) War 
emergencies  (Đarmati & Jakovljević, 1996, p. 49). Katarina Štrbac makes a similar 
classification  (Štrbac, 2008, pp. 18-21), so to the three kinds of emergencies above 
added two more – ecological emergencies and complex emergencies. While Đarmati and 
Jakovljević, among man-made emergencies, mention only the war, Katarina Štrbac, 
although alleges other emergencies, does not unites them, but expands the 
classification. 
In order to reach optimal classification, it is necessary to link the classification 
to the sources of threats and security risks and threats. Usually, the sources of threats 
are the natural system, the technical and technological system and the social system. 
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Following this typology and in accordance with the aforementioned classifications 
emergency would be classified as: 
1) Natural emergencies; 
2) Tehnical and technological emergencies; and 
3) Social emergencies. 
In addition to these groups, as a fourth group can be singled out combined 
emergencies, which are essentially a mutual combination of natural emergencies, 
technical and technological emergencies and social emergencies (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 Emergencies Classification (Source: Author) 
 
 
TECHNICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES 
 
The life of most of modern humanity is almost unthinkable without the 
technical and technological achievements, which are in the function economic 
prosperity and quality of life. But for them, as well as fire and water, apply the maxim 
that theye are "good servant, but evil lords" (Mijalković & Keserović, 2010, p. 135). 
Technological achievements bring both benefits and risks. Construction of a dam on the 
river can bring benefits such as electricity and water supply, but carries a risk of 
flooding if the dam is damaged or collapses. The balance between risks and benefits is 
rarely very clear. When internal combustion engine is presented, no one could have 
predicted our current dependence on the car or the fact that the number of casualties 
in road traffic will be about 250 000 people every year (Sinha, 1998, стр. 1). 
Technical and technological emergencies are the result of incidents and 
accidents in industry, mining, transport. They are formed by unintentional human 
activities or due to disturbances of technical resources, and may be deliberately caused 
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by sabotage171 or war actions. They are formed suddenly, but to some extent they are 
identifiable and can be controlled, whereby the human factor plays a decisive role  
(Štrbac, 2008, p. 19). The causes, in addition to human mistakes and technology 
defects, can be natural factors (eg, storms, earthquakes, etc.). 
Technical and technological emergencies are the product of technical and 
technological achievements and their number and diversity is increasing in line with the 
advancement of technology, and to a large extent threaten lives, property and the 
environment (Figures 2, 3).172 These emergencies include accidents from the spills of 
chemicals to the fires, and accidents from the collapse of the computer system to the 
traffic accidents. They are most commonly associated with industrial or traffic 
accidents, or structural collapses. 
 
 
Figure 2 The Number of Technological Disasters 1900–2009  
(Source: The EM-DAT International Disaster Database) 
 
                                                          
171 Sabotage is deliberately and covertly causing of material damage to the economy and labor 
organizations, through attacks on economic good by individuals or groups who work on the 
buildings in which it seems the damage  (Mijalković & Keserović, 2010, p. 175). 
172 Since 1980 the number of recorded technical and technological accidents is dizzying 
increased, and this increase follows the increase in the number of victims of these accidents. 
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Figure 3 The Number of People Killed by Technological Disasters 1900–2009 
(Source: The EM-DAT International Disaster Database) 
 
There is no unified position on the classification of technical and technological 
emergencies. The authors from the University of Eastern Kentucky provide the 
classification, according to which the most important technological disasters stand out 
fires in houses, hazardous materials, terrorism and accidents in nuclear power plants 
(Schneid & Collins, 2001, p. Foreword). The authors of the New Zealand University of 
Canterbury accidents classified as accidents caused by malfunctions and accidents 
whose cause is human error (Cowan, Fauchart, Foray, & Gunby, 2000, str. 4-8). 
According to the Emergency Response Plan of the Rhode island Department of 
environmental management  (Horwitz & Mulhare, 2004) technical and technological 
emergency situations can be classified as structural collapses (dam/levee, building, 
bridge, tunnel), fires and explosions (building, industrial, residential, health care, arson, 
bomb and explosion), energy and utility incidents (fuel shortage , power outage, water 
shortage, communication problems), transportation incidents, hazardous material 
(HAZMAT and oil spills, chemical, asbestos), biological accidents, radiological accidents, 
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, information collapses. 
According to Charles Perrow (Perrow, 1984) we classify technical and 
technological emergencies according to causes (human error, mechanical failure, 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
418 
environment, system design, implementation procedures). But this emergencies will be 
classified on the basis of manifestations, so we classify this emergencies to 
transportation emergencies, industrial emergencies, infrastructural emergencies and 
construction emergencies (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4 Technical and Technological Emergencies (Source: Author) 
 
 
INDUSTRIAL EMERGENCIES 
 
Throughout its history, a man has become habituated to natural disasters and 
their consequences. Along with the technical and technological developments have 
occurred technical and technological emergencies. As part of this development an 
important place belongs to  industrial development, and along with the industrial 
development there comes emergence of industrial emergencies, which are emergencies 
which cause related to industrial production. 
Aspects of industrial production that can lead to loss of life and material 
damage can be considered in two categories (Banerjee, 2003, p. 1). The first category of 
the fast-developing situation, leading to "acute" problems, mainly in industrial plants. 
Second category includes "chronic" problems (wastewater spills, exposure to hazardous 
agents) and significantly influence the occurrence of ecological emergencies. More 
attention starts to be devoted to industrial emergencies 1970s, after an explosion in 
Flixborough in 1974.173 and after the expiration of toxic substances in Seveso in 1976,174 
                                                          
173 The explosion at the cyclohexane plant in the English countryside Flixborough, on June 1 1974, 
killed 28 and injured 89 people, and bring an extensive damage (Prevention of industrial 
disasters, 1992, p. 3). 
174 In the Italian village Seveso, near Milan on 10 July 1976 occurred the defect in the installation 
of the chemical industry, which has resulted in the spread of dioxins at Seveso and surrounding 
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and especially after the disasters of 1984 – auto-gas explosion in Mexico and the 
disaster in Bhopal. 
Industrial emergencies can be divided to emergencies related to hazardous 
materials and mining emergencies. As a special subcategory under these emergencies 
can be singled out industrial fires and accidents at work. Industrial fires occur in all 
segments of the industry. The causes of industrial fires can be natural (earthquakes, 
storms), human (lack of commitment, negligence, diversion, sabotage), or technical (bad 
installation, defects in an industrial plant, etc.). Manifestations and consequences of 
industrial fire depends on the type of industrial plant in which it occurs. Accidents at 
work occur in a variety of industrial plants, at mines, etc. The most common causes are 
inattention, faulty devices, incorrect installation etc.. 
On the basis of existing definitions  (What Is Hazardous Material?, 2010) 
(Hazardous Materials, 2010) (De Lisi, 2006, p. 7) (Schnepp, 2009, p. 5), we can give a 
definition that hazardous substances are solids, liquids and gases of radiological, 
biological, chemical or physical origin, which, due to the wrong transporting, producing, 
packaging, storage or handling can harm the life and health of people, to make the 
damage on property, endanger wildlife and environment. A large part of industrial 
production is based on the use of hazardous substances. With the loss of control over 
these substances people, property and the environment are put at risk. 
Most emergencies involving hazardous materials occurs during the transport of 
hazardous materials (tanks in roads, railways and air traffic, and tankers in water 
transportation – oil spills),175 while the smaller part relates to industrial plants 
(chemical industry, nuclear plants - disaster in Chernobyl),176 civilian and military 
warehouses, etc. (Figure 5). 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
areas. In this accident there was no dead, but about 250 people succumbed to the effects of 
chlorine on the skin, while 450 people suffered burns of sodium hydroxide (ie, caustic soda). 
Infected is about 17 km2 soil, a 4 km2 of land has become uninhabitable (Kletz, 2001, p. 103). 
175 Accidents related to the transport of dangerous goods, depending on the scope and intensity, 
can be labeled as a traffic emergencies or environmental emergencies of acute character, which 
indicates that there is no simple division of emergencies but they are intertwined. 
176 The Chernobyl disaster (explosion of a nuclear reactor, which led to the release of radioactive 
material) resulted in a 31 direct victims and 32, 000 indirect victims  (Low, 1999, p. 70). 
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Improper handling of hazardous materials may cause a fire, an explosion or 
some form of radiation, and it is important that persons who manage or work with 
hazardous materials take account of the characteristics of each hazardous material 
(flammability, solubility, toxicity) in order to avoid accidents. 
Mining, along with an agriculture, is the oldest and most significant human 
activity  (Sinha, 1998, str. 84). This is confirmed by the names of historic periods – 
stone age, iron age and bronze age. Mining emergencies are related to accidents in the 
mining industry, and the most common causes are poisoning with toxic gases, methane 
explosions, collapse of mines, fires. Emergencies in underground mines are often 
followed by a massive victims. Mining emergencies carry more lives than the rest of the 
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industry (Coppola, 2007, p. 95), and more than 80% of accidents in coal mines happen 
in China (Xiaohui & Xueli, 2004). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have seen that there are different types of technical and technological 
emergencies, as well as various types of industrial emergencies. Each of the processed 
emergencies carries its own risk and should be not neglected any of them. We saw that 
some parts of the world prone to certain industrial disasters, depending on the 
development of the industry and the level of safety at work in an area where they are 
placed. 
We have also seen that technological advances accompanied by a great number 
of different accidents. Further progress of science and the development of new 
technologies certainly will increase the risk of technological and social emergencies, but 
will have a big impact on the frequency of natural emergencies, since technological 
development can often have a negative impact on the environment. 
Fully understanding the causes of various emergencies and awareness that 
there is a risk of their manifesting is the first step in their suppression. 
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Abstract 
 
Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are means of mass 
destruction which is easily accessible. Open use of biological weapons in a military 
conflict it is very unlikely, but it is more realistic its application as a means of 
conducting subversive war and terrorism. Protection against the effects of biological 
weapons comes down primarily to the application of measures that are used in the 
prevention and treatment of contagious diseases. The authors of this paper neither 
diminished the role in the prevention of biological attacks of the appropriate security 
and intelligence services. The contents of this paper highlight issues of: the challenge 
of recognizing biological attack, the methods of isolation and detection of harmful 
microorganisms by classical microbiological methods and their weakness, the agents 
altered resistance to existing antibiotic and (im) possibilities for effective protection. 
The authors also presents the prevailing scientific conflicting views on the horror of the 
possible use of genetically modified organisms and opposing soothing views indicating 
that such opportunities are premature. The analysis of capabilities for vaccination, as a 
specific defensive measure of protection in case of biological attack, suggests that 
capacities are fairly limited. The methods of biological decontamination show that this 
is a delicate procedure.  
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Key words: biological weapons, biological agents, attacks, infectious disease, 
protection. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Biological weapons is constituted of pathogenic organisms or their toxins which 
are used in a biological attack. Often referred to as bio-weapons or agents of biological 
threat or just bio-agents. They are living organisms or replicated entities (such as 
viruses which generally are not considered alive) that reproduce or replicate in their 
hosts casualties. Insects in entomologic warfare is also considered a form of biological 
weapons. The use of biological weapons by terrorist groups or individuals sects is 
referred to as biological terrorism (bioterrorism) and it is deliberate release and 
dissemination or biological agents. According to the United States Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, bioterrorism is the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, toxins 
or other harmful agents causing disease or death to humans, animals or plants. Also 
taken into consideration and agents that do not harm people directly, but which disrupt 
the economy. 
Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are a means of mass 
destruction which can be obtained even by the poorest nations or certain groups. 
Biological weapons allows potential of causing the level of destruction and loss of life 
far more than conventional, chemical or even nuclear weapons, compared with its mass 
and cost of production and storage. Biological agents can be developed, procured, 
stored and implemented by states or non-state actors. In the latter case, or when the 
state uses it secretly can also be considered as bioterrorist Act. (Wheelies Mark et all. 
2006).  
There is question which are who these organisms or their toxins which could be 
probably used as a biological weapon ?! In case of bacteria first of all it would be all 
bacteria causing anthrax, plague and tularaemia and in case of viruses it is all of them 
causing smallpox, venezuelan equine encephalitis, Ebola, Lassa and Marburg fever. 
Rikecijata- Coxiella burneti, causing Q- fever can also be used as a biological weapon as 
well as  botulin toxin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B and ricin toxint. Toxins are often 
referred to as midspektar agents that differ from others bioweapon by not reproducing 
in their hosts and by a shorter incubation period. Here, we should also mention the 
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entomological warfare (EW), a type of biological warfare that uses insects to attack the 
enemy. This concept has existed for centuries and researching and development has 
continued to the modern era. Entomological warfare uses insect for direct attack or as 
vector to transfer biological agent such is plague. Basically, EW exists in three variants. 
The first type of EW involves infecting insects with a certain pathogen insects and 
distributing them over the target areas. Then insects act as vector, infecting each 
human or animal that would bite. Another type of EW is a direct attack of insects 
against crops; where the insect may not be infected with a pathogen, but serves as 
direct threat to agriculture. The last way uses uninfected insects, such as bees, wasps, 
etc., as a direct attack to enemy. (Lockwood 2008, 9-26)   
The goal of action of biological agents can be humans, animals and agricultural 
products. Under the former program of the US biological warfare, the anti-human bio-
agents are divided into Deadly agents (like anthrax, French tularemia, botulinum, etc.), 
and disabling agents (such as brucellosis Suisse, Kohili, Venezuelan equine encephalitis 
virus, staphylococcus enterotoxin B, etc.). Biological warfare as specific goal can have 
plants in order of devastating harvest or defoliating the vegetation leaves. The attack 
on animals is another area of biological warfare intended to eliminate animal resources 
used for transportation and food.  
 
 
1. Use of biological weapons 
 
Biological weapon can be used in different ways in order to gain strategic or 
tactical advantage over the enemy, or as threat of use or as actual use. As some part of 
the chemical weapons also biological weapons can be used as a weapon for enemy 
deflection. Hence, biological agents may be useful as a strategic deterrent in addition to 
their usefulness as offensive weapons on the battlefield. The agents can be fatal or 
nonfatal and can aim at an individual, group of people or an entire population. As 
tactical weapons in military use, a significant problem with biological weapons (BW) 
used in the attack is that you have to spend days to become effective and by that it 
may be impossible to quickly stop the opponent's force. Some biological agents (such as 
smallpox or pneumonic plague) have ability to transfer from one person to another 
through respiratory aerosol particles. 
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Today is unlikely that a State would have decided openly to use the biological 
weapons in a military conflict, bearing in mind the uncertainty of achieving desired 
effects and the real possibility of losing control over them. This is undesirable feature, 
because with this technique, agents can be transmitted to unintended population, 
including neutral and own forces. In that sense, BW is less concern that might come 
from certain criminal or terrorist organizations than the serious concern of the military 
and civilian population of any nation. Hence, more realistic is its application as a means 
of conducting subversive war, and to encourage and controlling political crises. Because 
certain types of biological weapons can be produced even in the simplest 
microbiological laboratories, the biological weapons is quite  
Historically, biological warfare has been applied since the ancient times. In the 
6th century BC Assyrians had contaminated enemy wells with a fungus which caused 
delirium at their opponents. In the new era in 1346, the Mongols, has catapulted the 
bodies of their comrades who died from the plague inside siege walls during conquering 
the Crimea. Historians also debate that the army of Britain has used smallpox against 
Native Americans. With advances in bacteriology since 1900 was provided a higher level 
of sophisticated techniques for possible use of bio-agents in the war. Sabotage in the 
form of anthrax was applied by Imperial Germany during World War I, but with 
insignificant results. During World War II, the Great Britain established Porton Down 
BW program and develop its BW by introducing the industrial manufacture of a variety 
of deadly pathogens, although offensive has never used that weapons. In this period, 
other nations like the US, France and Japan has also started a BW program (Garrett, 
2003, 341). The most notorious program in that time was led by Unit 731 of the Imperial 
Japanese army located in Manchuria. This unit was conducting a fatal human 
experiments with prisoners and produced BW for combat use. Although the Japanese 
lacked the technological sophistication of the programs of their opponents, however, 
they exceeded them with the widespread use of BW and with indiscriminate brutality. 
US and Britain during World War II discovered plant growth regulators (ie herbicides) 
and started warlike herbicide program that will be used later in counterinsurgency 
operations in Malaysia and Vietnam. 
Simulated attacks with biological weapons have shown that even the developed 
countries are quite vulnerable and that biological weapons can easily be used, for 
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example, through the ventilation systems in underground railways. 177 The effectiveness 
of biological products such as biological weapons illustrates the fact that some 
biological toxins (such botulinum toxin, shiga toxin and ricin toxin) are more deadly 
than chemical toxins that are anticipated to be chemical weapons (such as Soman, 
Sarin, VX). 
Protection from use of biological weapons primarily comprises applying of 
measures that are used in the prevention and eradication of infectious diseases. Also, it 
should not be denied any significant role in the prevention of biological attacks that 
have appropriate security and intelligence services, which are involved in data collection 
about intentions of potential adversaries, possible locations and time of use of 
biological weapons, and the type of biological agent. In reality, their actions in practice 
is rarely successful, so most used measures of this protection would be implemented 
after exposure to biological weapons occur. Foremost such measures are: a) identifying 
the biological attack, b) detection and identification of biological agents, c) taking care 
of exposure persons, d) biological decontamination. 
 
 
2. Recognition of biological attack 
 
The main problem here is determining whether a possible situation is a matter 
of natural occurred disease or of biological attack. This can sometimes be a great 
challenge, because the one who uses biological agents as weapons might use all 
epidemiological and environmental circumstances of a particular territory to impede or 
prevent the recognition of a biological attack. Even in a situation where those 
circumstances are not used to cover up the eventual attack, the element of deliberate 
use is hardly recognizable. 
A robust surveillance system which includes medical doctors and veterinarians 
could detect biological attack early in the epidemic, allowing prophylaxis of the disease 
in the majority of people (and / or animals) that are exposed but are not yet ill. If there 
                                                          
177 In March 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo sect used chemical poison sarin, during there were 11 
deaths and at least 5500 infected people. Later, in the premises of this sect was also found 
biological weapons. It is estimated that the death toll would have been much larger if this sect 
in Tokyo subway attack instead sarin would used botulinum toxin and anthrax. 
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is doubt that it is an issue of biological attack, it is necessary to conduct field 
epidemiological investigation in order of relevant data collection, which will be in 
function of acceptance or rejection of earlier doubt. To possible biological attack 
indicate certain specificities as (Treadwell, 2003, 93-94): 
- Sudden and unexpected occurrence of frequent illness and / or death which is 
not related to previous epidemiological situation, 
- Simultaneous infection of patients with two or more causers; 
- Unusual geographic occurrence of infectious diseases (such as mass disease in 
cities with Q -fever, tularemia, or anthrax, and occurrence of rare or exotic 
diseases - Lassa, Ebola or Marburg haemorrhagic fever in our geographic area); 
- An outbreak of seasonal diseases at time when usually are not register; 
- Unique reason for a disease caused by an unusual agent, with lack of 
epidemiological explanation; 
- Frequent illness and deaths of animals in relation to patients with similar 
symptoms; 
- Existing evidence of contamination of air, water, food (through the remains of 
bombs, equipment and means of  water and food contamination, report data, 
etc.); 
- The uncommon, rare, genetically modified strain of the agent; 
- Unregistered disease in people who are not exposed to common ventilation 
system when the disease is observed in individuals who have a common 
ventilation system; 
- A rare disease that is uncommon  to a particular age group or population 
where occurs; 
- Increased number of applicants for medical treatment at the same time and 
abundance of cases of unexplained illness and death. 
When suspected biological attack it is necessary as soon as possible to 
determine the way that has led to emergence of the disease in order of establishing 
effective measures of suppression. For easier and quicker orientation, based on the 
leading clinical symptoms and signs of disease, should set clinical-epidemiological 
syndrome diagnosis and registered disease be classified as any of following syndromes: 
respiratory syndrome tract- where the likely route of transmission of infection is air; 
syndrome of gastrointestinal tract - where transmission route is water or food; 
syndrome of central nervous system - where the transmission paths is air and vectors 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
433 
(which traditionally in medicine organisms which do not cause disease themselves, but 
the ones who spread infection conveying pathogens from one host to another) 178; 
Syndrome of change of the skin and visible mucous membranes - with the possible 
route of transmission as: air, vectors, contact,  and Hemorrhagic syndrome-with 
possible transmission by air and vectors. 
 
 
3. Detection and identification of biological agents 
 
The armies of some countries have developed systems and instruments for the 
detection of the biological weapons immediately after its use, such as the US Army with 
"LIDAR" system for detection of  infectious aerosols in the air. These systems have 
proved useless because have detected all the particles present in the air, without 
differentiating infectious from not infectious one, usually leading to a number of false 
alarms (Čobeljić M. 2001: 206). The growing threat of biological warfare agents and 
bioterrorism has also led to the development of special field instruments for analysis 
and identification on the site of the suspicious material which is found. One such 
technology that has been developed by researchers (at Lawrence Livermore national 
laboratory-LLNL), uses the method of "sandwich immunoassay" in which fluorescent 
labeled antibodies aimed at specific pathogens are attached to silver or gold nanowires. 
Researchers at Ben-Gurion University in Israel have developed a different device called 
a BioPen, which can detect known biological agents in less than 20 minutes by using an 
adaptation of ELISA- the similar widely used immunological technique, which in this 
case includes an optical fiber. In the Netherlands, the company TNO has designed the 
equipment for identifying specific particles in aerosols (BiosparQ).  
 (Richmond and McKinney 1999). Collection of material for laboratory testing is 
necessary to be done by staffs that are trained to take samples, to transport those 
samples and to protect themselves. In assessing the capacity of microbiological 
laboratories working on detection and identification of biological agents, in addition to 
diagnostic capability, the decisive influence has the existence of appropriate conditions 
for protection of personnel and environment, i.e. appropriate level of biological 
protection -BSL which ranges from BSL1 to BSL4. (Richmond and McKinney 1999). 
                                                          
178 For example, the species of mosquito, who serves as vectors for a deadly disease Malaria. 
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 The materials in which can be detected biological agents related the risk of 
occurrence and spread of infectious diseases can be sorted into three categories: low 
contaminating and uncontaminating materials; moderately contaminating materials; 
and highly contaminating materials. Тhe first category (low or uncontaminating 
materials) encompasses the biological material (samples of tissue, blood, urine, feces, 
etc.) of those suffering from some infectious diseases transmitted by biological vectors 
(as typhus, malaria, yellow fever, Lyme disease, tick-borne meningoencephalitis) or 
those poisoned with toxins from microorganisms such as botulinum toxin ricin toxin, 
aflatoxin. In these cases there is no transmitting interhuman disease. Moderate 
contaminating material is water, food or biological material where can be found samples 
of typhoid, bacillary dysentery, tularemia, brucellosis, glanders, anthrax; where there is 
possibility for interpersonal transmission. Highly contaminating material is one of the 
easy-to-create aerosols, such as dust or spray in witch can be found causers of anthrax 
or plague, as well as biological materials of those suffering from smallpox or 
hemorrhagic fever (Marburg, Ebola, Lassa). This material commonly, is suitable to 
interpersonal spread of the disease. Depending on the category of contaminating 
material, the adequate level of biological protection it is required. 
 For the isolation and detection of microorganisms the most reliable are classic 
microbiological methods, but their main weakness is the long time period required to 
obtain the final results: 2-4 days for bacteria, 3-10 days for viruses, and several weeks 
for lichens. Because is essential as soon as possible to detect which agent concerned, 
rapid methods of detection and identification are used, as (immuno) luminous 
microscopy detection of antigens of microorganisms with immunoenzyme tests (ELISA), 
and methods of molecular genetics that multiplies and detect genetic material of 
microorganisms (PCR and DNA hybridization). 
 In theory, the new approaches in biotechnology, such as synthetic biology can 
be used to design new types of warfare agents. Particular attention should be paid to 
future experiments because of concern: of a demonstration that vaccines can become 
inefficient; that will contribute to resistance to therapeutic antibiotics or useful 
antivirus agents; of possible strengthening of the virulence of the pathogen or 
generating a non-pathogenic contamination; of possible increased transmissibility of 
the pathogen; of modification of range of the pathogen host; of enabling avoidance of 
diagnosis tools; and possibility of biological agent or toxin to be used as a weapon 
(Kelle 2009). 
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New opportunities for the development of biological weapons such as 
recombinant DNA technology are the greatest horror for those working on developing 
methods to detect and to combat the consequences of the use of biological weapons. 
The danger stems from the fact that by genetic manipulations can be obtained 
microorganisms that are more virulent than their natural relatives. The fear that such a 
development of biological weapons could happen is more justified because a decoding 
of the complete genome of certain pathogens have become common approach in 
research and because the techniques of manipulation of the genes are being more and 
more developed. Many companies have conducted research in terms of targeted 
molecular evolution, a term that implies accelerated evolution aimed at wanted 
direction, so that in some microorganisms are introduced genetic variation and then 
artificial selection is applied. These methods are currently too complicated to be applied 
by bioterrorists but not unreachable for institutions in countries that want to develop 
biological weapons. A terrifying case suggests that in this way an Escherichia coli kind 
was obtained with gene of a resistance that is transferred from staphylococcus so that 
new species become 32000 times more resistant to third generation cephalosporin 
antibiotic than the wild species. Due to a diligence of possible abuse this kind 
bacterium was immediately destroyed (Dennis 2001). 
Biological weapons experts say there is still no possibility for preparation of 
new agents, but it is quite certain that the current ones can be made more virulent, 
resistant to a greater number of antibiotics or altered to such an extent that they 
cannot be detected by conventional diagnostic procedures. The simplest way to get the 
improved biological weapons is making the existing agent more resistant to existing 
antibiotics. The genes for antibiotic resistance are found in the genome of the 
microorganism, usually as part of the extra chromosomal genetic elements - plasmids 
that have the ability to transfer and replicate independent, and often contain other 
virulence genes. Laboratories dealing with molecular biology have no problem 
transferring selected genes from one bacterium to another179. Recently appeared the 
system CRISPR / CAS as a promising technique for correcting genes. While other 
                                                          
179 According to Alastair Hay, an expert on biological weapons of Leeds (UK), in the institutions 
of Biopreparat (Russia and Kazakhstan) which concerned the development of biological weapons, 
was developed Yersinia pestis, which is resistant to 16 different antibiotics. 
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methods require months or years for the sequencing of genes, CRISPR reduces that 
time up to weeks (Basulto. 2015). 
Although most experts in the field of biological weapons, thinks that its 
premature fear of germs which are created by genetic manipulation and that is greater 
need to think of conventional biological agents, the government agencies in the United 
States are already engaged in developing methods for detecting diseases caused by a 
genetically modified microorganisms. 
The basic principle of detection methods is based on knowledge of what should 
be looked for. Thus, RSVP (Rapid Syndrome Validation Project) is an electronic system 
that is connected to the Internet, which puts the probable diagnosis of the syndrome 
based on previously entered data on uncommon disease or unusual epidemic. Also, 
developed is a system which can detect the presence of unknown causer solely based to 
the presence of molecules or biological toxins in the investigated material. DARPA 
Agency (US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) has developed a sophisticated 
system of biosensors based on living tissues that respond to a wide range of known and 
unknown pathogens. The biosensors are three-dimensional matrices containing 
neurons, muscle cells, cells of the immune system and skin cells and epithelial cells 
surrounding the digestive system and the nasal mucosa (Dennis 2001). 
 
 
4. Protection and care for exposed diseased and healthy individuals  
 
Against biological warfare agents protection measures can be applied. Those 
measures are need to start on time (if sufficient warning is received), but definitely as 
soon is suspected that biological agent it used. The basic protection is done by means 
of personal protection, such as masks and protective clothing. Currently available 
military protective mask masks or HEPA is  highly efficient filter mask for airborne 
particles used in exposure with tuberculosis- it filter out most particles of biological 
warfare present in the air. 180 Most biological agents in the air can not penetrate the 
undamaged skin, and is little organisms stucked to the skin or clothing. After the attack 
with aerosols, the most common removal of clothes eliminates the majority of surface 
                                                          
180 For the mask tight, it must be adjusted / stick to the face of the user. 
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contamination. Thorough shower with soap and water removes 99.99% of those little 
organisms that may remain on the skin of the victim. 
The following procedure that is to be applied is medical care. The care of 
patients, in general is conducted in the area of biological attack (healing on spot), in the 
health facilities where are existing conditions for adequate assistance and adequate 
level of biological protection. Because on the onset of the biological attack is not known 
what agent is run, it is needed by the medical personnel and others involved in care, to 
apply all available measures of medical and technical protection. The medical 
professionals who treat victims of biological warfare may not need to use special 
protective suits, but should use rubber gloves and apply additional precautions like 
wearing gowns and eye protection masks. If there are indications that it is highly 
contaminating causer, are being applied measures of strict isolation of patients, 
suspected of disease suffering and the staff who care for them, from the rest of the 
population. For isolation if there are capacities, separate rooms to be used for each 
patient or patients to be grouped based on the clinical syndrome, separate from other 
patients in different rooms. If this is not possible due to a number of cases and / or an 
insufficient number of hospital facilities so that patients regardless of the reason for 
the hospitalization must be placed in common areas, it is necessary to provide at least 
minimal spatial separation of each other. In the event of mass illness also is possible 
establishing cohorts of patients in these rooms (Judith et al., 1999, 6). 
Transport and movement of patients is maximally restricted, and if their 
movement is still necessary, is needed to take all precautions to prevent further spread 
of infection181. If the available quantities of medical equipment and resources permit, it 
should be used for each patient individually, or possibly a group of patients with the 
same clinical syndrome. If for any reason that is not feasible, the potentially 
contaminated equipment should not be used in the care of other patients until is 
properly disinfected or preferably sterilized. 
At beginning treatment is implemented on the basis of the established clinical-
epidemiological syndrome diagnosis. If there is suspicion of a bacterial infection, 
antibiotics are given, with different antibiotics are given to various small groups of 
patients, so that as soon as possible based on "ex juvantibus" outcome to get to 
discovery which antibiotic is most effective. Such therapy may impede the use of 
                                                          
181 Such as placing a mask of the patient to prevent spread of airborne infection. 
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multiresistant bacteria as a biological weapon. When the final results of laboratory 
analysis (identification of the agent and antibiogram) are got, therapy can be corrected 
if needed. The victims of biological warfare may be given antibiotics orally or 
intravenously, even before the specified agent to be identified. As previously mentioned, 
the bacterial pathogens in a possible biological attack would probably be used those 
that causes anthrax, tularemia and plague. These agents are therefore grouped in the 
so-called Category A biological agents in accordance with US authors and there are 
some recommendations182 which antibiotics will be selected for treatment, prevention 
and postexposure prophylaxis of infections caused by these pathogens (Navas, 2002). 
For the treatment of those suffering from anthrax as first choice drugs are 
recommended doxycycline or quinolones for 60 days. In the treatment of tularemia, the 
drug of choice is streptomycin or gentamicin for 7 to 14 days. Tetracycline and 
chloramphenicol have bacteriostatic activity and are effective if given at least 14 days, 
with more frequent relapses than when giving streptomycin. Streptomycin was the first 
drug of choice in the treatment of plague, but if it will be used gentamicin and 
tatraciklin, chloramphenicol and quinolones are an alternative choice. They are effective 
if used at the time (within 24 hours of onset of pulmonary plague). 
Specific measure of counter-biological protection in healthy persons is a 
prophylaxis, which due to the urgency of its application is called emergency prophylaxis 
and is presented in two types: pre-exposure prophylaxis and postexposure prophylaxis. 
It covers the use of vaccines, specific immunoglobulins (immunoprophylaxis) of 
antimicrobial agents, eg. antibiotics (in chemoprophylaxis) and antitoxins. The 
application of antibiotics in postexposure prophylaxis, as well as in the case of 
treatment of patients, should start as soon as possible, and this treatment should last 
long enough. 
As a specific measure also can be used vaccination, primarily for pre-exposure 
prophylaxis, although it can be also applied post exposure, which depends on the length 
of the incubation period. Currently, protective vaccines given as injections are available 
for anthrax, Q-fever, yellow fever and smallpox. Widespread immunization of non-
military personnel is not being recommended by any government agency. 
Immunoprotection against toxins of ricin and staphylococcus might be available in the 
near future. 
                                                          
182 Working Group on Civilian Biodefense. 
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It should be noted that capacities for vaccination, as a specific defensive 
measure of protection in case of biological attack, are rather limited. Effective 
protection of the armed forces (not mentioning protection of the entire population) 
against the full range of biological agents that a potential attacker could use is 
impossible, because such prophylaxis is specific, so protection can only be achieved 
against a certain type of pathogen.  Unfortunately, inducing a protective response to 
vaccination may last longer than the time from exposure to onset of illness. Moreover, 
many vaccines require multiple doses in achieving a protective immune response, which 
limits their usefulness in emergency vaccination programs in providing prophylaxis in 
case of quick attack. In fact, not all recipients of the vaccine showed protective reaction, 
even after receivement of the recommended vaccination stack. People with impaired 
immunity are often unable achieving an effective response to vaccination and certain 
vaccines may be contraindicated for them. For example, a vaccine against hepatitis B 
does not cause antibody response in approximately 10% of the vaccinees, where 
percentage of those not-reacting is even larger at immuno-impaired persons. (Pirofski 
and Casadevall 1998). Given the large number of micro-organisms and their toxins that 
can be used as a biological weapon, of great importance are reporting data for 
biological agents that are available to potential enemy in protecting its own population. 
But even when such data are available, however, the effective mass vaccination is a 
major problem. First, there should be an effective vaccine, then it should be sufficient 
supplies of it and as a last problem is the needed time achieving a satisfactory level of 
immunity after vaccination (Geissler 1986) 183. Therefore, vaccines cannot be considered 
as first line of defense against bioterrorism for the general population, as with case 
with relatively small military population.  
Vaccines are mainly useful for an attacker, because if has an effective vaccine, 
he is able to adequately protect its own armed forces and population. Thus, the attacker 
eliminates one of the distinguishing features of biological weapons, which limits its use 
                                                          
183 In the US it was estimated that in case of biological attack with Eastern encephalitis virus, 
only half of Division (about 8,000 people) could be immunized with the vaccine reserves stored 
in the US Army. It would take three months to produce enough vaccine to protect the rest of the 
division, and even about a year to immunize an independent corps of five divisions (i.e. about 
190,000 people). In addition, it would take several weeks or months,  vaccinated people to 
achieve an adequate level of immunity. 
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of military aspect, -it is the danger that use of biological weapons cause losses in their 
own ranks. 
Vaccines are an essential component of defense strategies by its application in 
uniformed military personnel. There are licensed vaccines against anthrax, smallpox and 
plague. Moreover, new products like drugs in experimental stage are being applied in 
the Medical research centre on infectious diseases of the US military (USAMRID) for 
staff protection in risky laboratories against tularemia, Q fever, Venezuelan equine 
encephalitis (VEE) and botulinum, and against diseases such as Eastern and Western 
equine encephalitis, Rift Valley fever and others. Ministry of Defense of US recently 
began a campaign for immunization against anthrax in the armed forces and is quite 
likely that other vaccines against bio-warfare will eventually be used in protection of 
the armed forces. Currently, vaccines against other biological agents and improved 
vaccines for agents listed above, are already in various stages of research and 
development. As problematic remains the use of these vaccines in the civilian context 
because that there nature of the threat is less defined. However, some vaccines like 
those against anthrax and smallpox may have applicability to post-exposure prophylaxis 
and handling exposed civilian populations. (Cieslak et all, 2000, 849). 
 
 
5. Defensive strategy based on passive antibodies 
 
As a new feature in protection against biological agents is a newly proposed 
defense strategy based on antibodies. The introduction of antibodies taken from 
immune donors in non-immune individuals is known as passive immunization. These 
"borrowed" bodies offer short-term protection from certain diseases. The application of 
this strategy, today can be supported by modern technology. Therapies based on 
antibodies were first used at the end of the 19th century, and so far in this area there is 
more than 100 years of experience with the development of therapeutic antibodies. In 
the past, therapies based on antibodies were dependent of immune serum which was 
limited in availability and taunted significant side effects when serum was obtained 
from animals. 
Storage of reagents based on antibodies that could quickly be given the 
exposed population would greatly reduce the threat of many biological agents by 
providing a way of granting immediate immunity of susceptible persons. In cases of 
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existing dangers where vaccines are available, this measure would provide additional 
time for immunization and would reduce risk. The development of therapies based on 
antibodies may reduce the attractiveness of biological warfare as a means of terror by 
providing antidots that would help neutralizing of the threat. The eventual aggressor 
could try to defeat the passive defense based on antibodies by discovering an agent 
which could express the antigenic changes, the proteases or antibody binding protein. 
However, in this race of armaments, the advantage may be in favor of defender because 
it is technologically easier to create effective new antibody against the modified agent 
than to produce pathogen or agent for enhancing the virulence. Antigenic changes by 
default create epitopes184.  It is also possible creating antibodies that resist proteolysis 
by changing the sequence of amino acids to eliminate the proteolysis’ location. In fact, 
a means of neutralizing antibodies could be created much faster than it can be 
developed a new biological agent. An example of the speed by which can be developed 
therapeutic antibodies comes from the 1905 epidemic of meningococcal meningitis in 
New York when Simon Flexner created effective horse antiserum in several months and 
used it to treat patients before the epidemic can be naturally reduced. Although this 
example is not applicable today, given the regulations for the development of therapies, 
however, it shows a dramatic example of a concept where therapies can be developed 
quickly. The same does not goes for new antimicrobial chemotherapy or vaccines, which 
often require a significantly longer time to develop. 
Candidates for this potential use of passive immunization are botulinum toxin, 
tularemia, anthrax and plague. For most of these goals, has been conducted only animal 
studies, so the use of passive immunization in the possible event of applied bioweapon 
is still in the experimental stage. Because companies cannot ethically expose people to 
deadly agents, they can never be completely sure that the drug / vaccine acts against a 
specific danger. Experiments with people are conducted generally only for security 
purposes. Additionally, it is also problematic combining the results from studies with 
animals and the results of trials in favor of human security, implying only a high degree 
of probability that these vaccines will affect people. Most animal models are not as 
good at predicting how a man would react to certain agents and to drugs intended for 
agent countering. 
 
                                                          
184 Epitope by definition is part of the antigen molecule to which antibodies attach themselves. 
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6. Biological Decontamination 
 
For biological agents, contamination is defined as the introduction of 
microorganisms in tissues or sterile materials, while decontamination is defined as 
disinfection or sterilization of contaminated parts to make them suitable for use (by 
reducing microorganisms to a certain level). Biological decontamination includes 
measures and procedures of remove or neutralizes pathogens to the extent of 
eliminating the risk of infection occurrence. It can be categorized as partial biological 
decontamination and complete biological decontamination.  
Partial decontamination is conducted immediately after exposure to the 
biological agent. Is implemented by an individual or group (self-decontamination, 
mutual decontamination) and includes the following actions: shaking, brushing and 
cleaning of clothing and footwear, washing the opening parts of the body with soap and 
water and rubbing the skin with disinfectants. These procedures should not be applied 
uncritically. In the case of the dispersion of biological agents in the air, which is most 
effective and thus the most likely way of usage of biological weapons, shaking and 
brushing clothes will lead to a re-creation of aerosols, which will increase the risk of 
infection, rather than reduce it. The use of disinfectants for the decontamination of the 
skin can also in some cases be counterproductive, or it can speed up creation of 
infection (as with the skin form of anthrax). In such cases the most effectually 
decontamination is to limit the washing of the discovered body parts with soap and 
seep water, than to leave the endangered area (if feasible) and then as soon as possible 
to conduct a full decontamination. 
Full (complete) decontamination is performed outside the zone of biological 
weapons action. Decontamination of people is implemented in the form of bathing and 
showering, a thorough washing of hairy parts of the body and nails. Clothing should be 
carefully previously striped down, avoiding creation of the aerosols, and then packed in 
plastic bags or other packaging that can be hermetically closed. The packaging should 
be visibly marked. Next, the items and equipment are subjected to the action of 
physical and chemical agents, and is most effective when it is possible to be exposed to 
high temperatures (such as incineration, autoclaving, dry sterilization, boiling). 
Depending on the methods used, the decontamination can be conducted by 
chemical and physical methods. 
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Chemical decontamination make biological warfare agents to be safe through 
the use of disinfectants. In the use of chemicals as a means for biological 
decontamination, it should be approached carefully. There is not existing  chemical that 
could be applied in practice and to be safe for human health and the environment, and 
to be an effective tool for biological decontamination. It is recommended that 
contaminated parts be washed with 0.5% sodium hypochlorite if available, in contact 
time of 10 to 15 minutes. The solution can be applied with a cloth or swab or can be 
sprayed. Just as with hypochlorite in chemical decontamination, this solution should not 
be put in the eye, in the abdominal cavity or nerve tissue. It will neutralize or do almost 
harmful all biological agents in approximately 5 minutes. For decontamination of fabric 
clothing or equipment, it should be used a solution of 5% hypochlorite. For 
decontamination of equipment in normal cleaning should be to 30 minutes in time of 
contact. The use of the hypochlorite solution in this way is corrosive to most metals and 
damaging to most fabrics, so they should be washed well and metal surfaces to oiled 
finishing. It is important to remember that washing with soap and water after washing 
with hypochlorite for decontamination of biological agents should follow the 
decontamination of chemical agents, if that kind of decontamination is necessary. 185 
This solution evaporates very quickly at high temperatures, so, if prepared in advance, it 
should be kept in closed containers. The hypochlorite solution should be placed in 
clearly marked containers, because it's quite difficult to visually distinguish the solution 
of 0.5% than 5%. 
Physical methods are concerned with making biological agents harmless by 
physical means such as heating and radiation. To make agents completely safe, it 
requires dry heat treatment of 2 hours at 160 ° C. If used steam at 121 ° C and 1 
atmosphere of pressure (15 psi), the time can be reduced to 20 minutes, depending on 
the quantity186. The part of the sun's ultraviolet radiation that comes to the surface 
possesses a disinfectant effect, often combined with drying. Ultraviolet radiation is 
effective but is difficult to standardize the practice for disinfection or decontamination 
purposes. 
                                                          
185 For mixing hypochlorite solution, vials of calcium hypochlorite granules can be found in the 
kit for chemical decontamination of some armies (like the US Army M291). 0.5% solution can be 
made by placing a package of 170 g of hypochlorite granules in 18.9 liters of water. The solution 
of 5% can be made by placing 8 such packages of 170gr in 18.9 liters (5 gallons) of water. 
186 The method is known as autoclaving. 
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The term effective decontamination almost be equated with the concept of 
sterilization, which is mostly made with natural methods (exposure to high 
temperatures) or, rarely, with some chemicals (such as ethylene oxide) which requires 
equipment and means of protection, because that are extremely toxic compounds. The 
available means for chemical decontamination in most cases destroy the vegetative 
form of some bacteria, while their effectiveness against spores, various types of 
bacteria, fungi, protozoa, viruses and microbial toxins that can be used as a biological 
weapon is variable and incomplete. Therefore, it is always a chance of residual of more 
or less the amount (dose) of biologically active material, which can cause disease in 
humans and animals. The use of "effective" chemical substances to neutralize the 
biological agents, on the other hand, it could create a false impression in the public 
about the safety of people in certain area. Therefore, the advantage is of previously 
mentioned acts of a partial or complete physical decontamination (Birtašević 1989). 
Water and food in the zone of action of biological agents should not be used, regardless 
of the implemented decontamination, except in case of lack of other sources of supply. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Biological factors as causes of human suffering and agony, mass disease and 
death, have followed human civilization since its beginning until today. Biological 
agents have supported the war for long time and often have decisive influenced the 
outcome. 
It is claimed that reasonable state actors would never used offensive biological 
weapons. The arguments are that biological weapons cannot be controlled: Weapons 
can recover and injure the army in offensive with possible greater effect than the one 
achieved at the target. Agents such as the smallpox (variola) or other air-transmitted 
viruses likely to be dispersed and would also infect the surrounding states. However, 
these views are not always related to bacteria. For example, anthrax can be easily 
controlled and easily created by a very low cost with available laboratory equipment. 
Also, using microbiological methods, the bacterium can favorably be amended to be 
effective only in a limited environment such as the range of the target which is clearly 
distinguishable from the army in offensive. Moreover, such weapons could be used to 
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jam advancing army which would make it being vulnerable to counterattack of the 
defense forces. 
Besides the possibility of using in warfare hostilities, lately is very frequent use 
of biological agents by terrorist organizations, sects or individuals, defined as biological 
terrorism. Due to the characteristics of these means that make them suitable for 
achieving certain objectives (such as cost and ease of manufacture, ease of application, 
the possibility of combining with other agents ...), many microbes and their toxins are 
used or studied as a biological weapon. Besides the aerosols, agents can be applied 
through contaminated food and water or directly on the skin and mucous membranes. 
In recent times by changing the genetic composition with the methods of molecular 
genetics, it is possible to create organisms with new features that makes those means 
being more lethal. Since terrorists today search for new and more destructive and easily 
accessible, it is increased the danger of eventual use of biological weapons first in 
period of post Cold War and second time now, in an era of reshaping the world order. It 
indicates actually how mmuch threats from bioterrorism attack is realistic to a greater 
extent than in past. 
The medical community and the public should be acquainted with the 
epidemiology and control measures needed to increase the likelihood of a peaceful and 
reasonable behavior if it comes to outbreaks of disease. In fact, the principles that help 
physicians to develop strategies against diseases are significant when the medical 
community address the problem of proliferation of biological weapons. For the medical 
community is necessery  further education in order of quickly identification of threats. 
The prevention primarily relies on establishing a global norm against the 
development of such weapons and second, the good security intelligence. Secondary 
prevention implies timely detection and rapid treatment of the disease. The medical 
community plays an important role in secondary prevention by participating in 
monitoring the disease and by reporting and the first indication of the use of biological 
weapons. As a supplement, continuous research in improvement of surveillance and 
search after improved diagnostic capabilities, therapeutic agents and effective response 
plans will further reinforce secondary preventive measures. Lastly, we should not forget 
the role of tertiary prevention, which limits the disablement caused by the disease. Due 
to the imperfection of instruments of primary and secondary prevention, the focus of 
capabilities of countering the biological weapons  is on helping those nations who are 
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targets for the use of biological weapons. Here, the medical community must be 
prepared to face the consequences if the "unthinkable" happened.  
From a military perspective, a significant component of the protective pre-
exposure preparedness is immunization. In addition, some vaccines are also affordable 
opportunity for post exposure prophylaxis against potential threats from biological 
agents. Such vaccines could be used in respond to terrorist attacks against civilians. 
Drugs and vaccines are equally important to national security as much as combat 
platforms! 
Because of the real danger of bioterrorism, it is more likely that the problems 
related to it, will have to be faced and resolve by all, sooner or later. It remains the 
general lesson that it is better to solve it before! 
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Abstract 
 
In the history of mankind there is no other technological invention with a wider 
range of application or of greater influence on changing human lives as it is the 
invention of computers and the corresponding development of computer systems and 
networks. The benefits of the rapid development of the information technology, which 
are pretty obvious, can be viewed in the area of collecting, storing, processing and 
presenting of information, making the information a strategic resource which, in a post-
industrial era, can be proved as valuable and influential to a extent that is considered 
as capital in the industrial era. Thanks to this, the contemporary information and 
communication system, if used in a proper manner, can increase the efficiency of a 
large variety of activities.187 The increase of efficiency and improved communication are 
actually the greatest benefits of the information technology, both in the business sector 
and in communication and exchange of information among state authorities and bodies, 
by means of which large amounts of information are exchanged within a very short 
period of time with the furthermost parts of the globe. The revolution is in the fact that 
computer systems and networks enabled fast and efficient exchange of information – 
data at disposal on the most widely used network, the Internet, which is used by all age 
groups on the Planet. Beside all the advantages and benefits, the computer and the 
computer networks and systems, become a means and an object of attacking with 
elements of abuse by unprincipled individuals, groups or even criminal organizations. 
The unlawful, illegal use, or better, misuse of computer technology is more and more of 
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an incriminated character and the criminals are more and more directed towards 
execution of computer crimes and involve minimal knowledge and resources for 
achieving higher crime proceeds, at the same time causing enormous damage, deriving 
from a variety of motives. Fighting the crime imposes the need for permanent following 
and analyzing the cases involving the computer, the networks and the systems as a 
means or as an object of crime attack by individuals and organized groups. Based on 
this is the incrimination of certain computer-related crimes in the national legislation 
upon which builds on the prosecution of perpetrators and, further on, the international 
cooperation in this field as the computer crime is, naturally, not performed only within 
the borders of a single state. It is usually a crime of international character and fighting 
it requires a wider, international reaction involving application of modern methods and 
instruments, collaboration and coordination among the corresponding institutions 
worldwide. This paper is aiming at analysis of the conditions related to the evident 
shapes and forms of computer crime as they are incriminated in the Macedonian 
national legislation, as well as the situation related to discovering, revealing, evidencing 
and preventing this type of crime in the Republic of Macedonia.     
 
Key words: information technology, computer systems and networks, computer 
crime, incrimination, prevention.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The progress in technology and innovations is the key to the development in 
society and every period in the past is marked by corresponding technological benefits 
achieved on the basis of scientific and technical research and whose application 
improves and modernizes the production, the transport, the trade and the 
communications. Yet, the largest benefit produced through the technical research is the 
discovery and the application of information technology.  The development of IT has 
largely contributed to the improvement and modernization of society and humanity and 
particularly great advancement has been achieved with fast data processing and fast 
and efficient communication. Thus, on the other hand, an uninterrupted communication 
among people is conditioned, involving visual getting in touch and exchange of contents 
involving photographs, instead of simple audio communication that was only made 
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possible by applying telephone.  The development of the communication information 
technology has largely improved the world, on one hand, but has also on the other, laid 
the grounds for criminal behaviors unknown from before, but damaging the citizens, 
their property, identity, renome, even endangering the security on every social layer.  
Based on what has been going on and the tendencies, there are no suspicions about the 
information technology influencing every aspect of our lives, both now and in the 
future. Having the individuals, groups and nations faced with the challenge of adapting, 
innovating and reacting to circumstances and possibilities made available via the IT, the 
necessary transformation is made known as information revolution, from industrial into 
information society, announcing a new digital period with ones and zeros representing 
knowledge and skills, tools and weapons, currency and goods, science and art, fun and 
sport. Such a courageous ascertation has been deduced on the basis of facts that can 
be described in the following manner: everything that functions is in automation; 
everything that’s worthy is digitalized. Furthermore, in almost every single undertaking, 
the application of a computer is to be included and there will be transformations of 
various social values, either small or big, into the so-called cyber-goods. This is all going 
on in a huge newly-created virtual space, bearing the prefix cyber, leading to the 
English word cybernetics (or the science of communications and automatic control 
systems) and tending to point at the technological complexity, interdependence and 
problematic, that are present in this new, but yet not defined informatics ambience 
different from the common, physical world of matter and energy which is governed by 
knowledge, electronic impulses and digital numbers. This new parallel world becomes 
gradually an arena where various activities and processes, including criminal ones with 
warning and worrying potential, permanently creates and develops them affected by the 
tumultuous progress and the ever-growing application of information technology facing 
its rapid revolution and expansion (Ачкоски Ј. : 2012). 
The advantages of information systems and computer networks in the overall 
human living do not remain out of the area of misuse by organized groups or 
individuals, who make use of their informatics knowledge for illegitimate criminal 
purposes, regardless whether they produce illicit crime proceeds or endanger in other 
ways the rights and freedoms of citizens or their property, further widened to 
jeopardize the overall security involving national, religious, social and economic rights 
of citizens all over the globe. Criminals in the world seldom choose ways for criminal 
acting and the computer is a perfect tool for reaching certain criminal goals with 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
452 
minimum possibility for being revealed as the cause might be located at one point of 
the globe and the consequences can be felt at a number of locations, in various parts of 
the world. Even the participants in the criminal network may be unknown to each other 
– they are simply connected by the skills and the power they share through their 
knowledge of computer technology and of course, by the criminal goal.  The computer is 
growingly becoming the tool for performing various forms of illicit, unlawful and socially 
dangerous activities. Computer crime becomes a synonym of all forms of criminal 
behaviors and plays an important role in the criminal behavior itself, regardless whether 
it is about misuse of computers as means of executing criminal activities or simply 
being the object of criminal attack.  
The computers and the Internet, undoubtedly opened up the possibilities for 
increasing the social benefits, so numbers of individuals and groups, even whole 
countries have become completely dependent on the services that the cyber space 
provides. The Internet communication has provided distance education and scientific 
research, electronic trading, online entertainment, publicity of state matters, whereas 
the email has turned into a medium for doing business and for personal 
communicating, giving an opportunity for its users to get in touch, to send texts, 
pictures, musical files to individuals or groups, to buy and/or sell a product or service, 
in a quick and affordable way.   At the same time, the access to scientific-research data 
bases, that were previously available only to those who had the time, the money and 
the energy for physical access, has now become available to all citizens. The Internet, 
just like many other new technologies, represents an instrument of neutral value. Just 
as it can be useful in gaining social benefits, it can also be used in socially deviant 
behaviors, in as much as creating new forms of socially harmful behaviors and 
facilitating the execution of traditional forms of crime  (Тупанчевски Н. и 
Кипријановска Д.: 2008).  
The connection between crime and Internet has produced two types of 
computer crime: network attacks and using the network as a means and location for 
execution of other forms of crime. The international cooperation of criminals, thanks to 
the Internet, has been made very easy. Expanding its boundaries and introducing new 
forms, the computer crime today sets new challenges that threaten the citizens, the 
collective security, as well as the economic stability of many countries (Urošević and 
Uljanov, 2010: 13).  
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The computer crime has been listed among the most significant groups of 
crimes which stands out from classical economic crimes with reference to its 
characteristics, such as tools used (instrumentum operandi), the manner (modus 
operandi), the time of the crime (tempus operandi), the space span of the crime (radius 
operandi), the location of the crime (locus operandi), the object of criminal attack and 
the personality of the perpetrator. The rapid growth and expansion of the forms of 
computer crime are provided by the extended possibilities the computer offers in terms 
of storage and processing of data, in combination with transfer of the data, on the 
grounds of information communicating and networking via computer systems and 
networks (Николоска С. : 2013). 
Computer crime represents a realistic phenomenon that security and 
persecution authorities are facing in the course of their common legal purpose of 
finding  means, methods and techniques for discovering, unveiling, proving and 
preventing in the process of criminal investigation and providing the judicial authorities 
to lead a successful criminal procedure and adopting corresponding convictions and 
verdicts.    
Computer crime has also an international character which imposes the need for 
harmonization of national legislation and penal law for the purpose of providing 
unimpeded international cooperation in the exchange of data and information, 
extradition of perpetrators and taking up joint actions for criminal investigations and 
conviction of perpetrators, confiscating of unlawfully accumulated criminal proceeds. 
Analyzing the most frequently perpetrated computer crimes, indicators of whether and 
to what extent are these crimes performed for the purpose of gaining illicit property or 
performing other acts of crime driven by various motives. A period of five years (2011-
2015 inclusive) has been analyzed involving the Macedonian criminalist practice related 
to characteristic criminal events with elements of organized computer crime. 
 
1. FORMS OF COMPUTER CRIMES 
 
Computer crime represents a common formulation including various forms of 
criminal behavior. Namely, it is a crime directed against the safety of computer 
(information) systems as whole, or to segments of it, involving a number of manners 
and instruments, for the purpose of gaining illicit proceeds for the involved or for third 
parties, causing damages of various scales (Јовашевиќ Д.: 2002). 
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The defining of computer crime, depending on the forms of criminal behavior, 
has been the subject of study of Kaiser (Кајзер Г.:1996), who differentiates among three 
major computer abuses, based on the major goods of interest:   
  
1. Computer violating of the personal right, particularly in the civil sphere,  
2. Computer delicts against and over individual or social legal goods, and  
3. Computer property-related crime.  
 
There are certain notions shared among the criminologists that computer 
crime represents a part of the economic financial crime, but also ideas that it is about 
property crime and that computer abuse, in its nature, is the closest kin of property 
crime (Konstantinović - Vilić  S. and Nikolić – Ristanović V.: 2003). 
The computer crime is a crime related to information and computer systems 
and it encompasses every criminal behavior, regardless whether it is about threatening 
personal human rights and freedoms, about abuse of personal data, violation of 
morality, but also violation of property rights and interests of legal entities, which is 
considered an element of importance in categorizing this type of crime as an economic 
one.  Namely, the recent automation of the working process and the overall functioning 
of the legal entities, applying computer technology, create possibilities for financial and 
accountancy abuses and computer frauds, producing at the same huge criminal 
proceeds for the perpetrators in position and possessing the knowledge for executing 
the act of crime. Based on the analysis of statistical data about the computer crime in 
the world, the financial consequences are pretty serious which leads to the conclusion 
that the aim and the motives of the perpetrators to gain financial proceeds at the 
expense of natural and legal entities that keep their money in financial institutions – 
banks. The crime that makes vulnerable the financial institutions involve payment card 
frauds congregating perpetrators from around the globe, even not knowing each other, 
just using the facilities of electronic communication for criminal activity and making use 
of financial data downloaded from databases of financial institutions and put for sale 
electronically, too.  Also, other criminal forms have their positive financial implications 
on perpetrators, involving violations of rights, freedoms and morality of victims. For 
example: the child pornography via computers means financial gain through online 
selling of child pornographic materials, causing serious violation of the abused 
children’s feelings, causing psychological pain and great deal of insecurity. “The acts 
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qualified as computer crime are, by their nature and objective essence, close to the acts 
of damaging other people objects and fraud, also related by the identical intention to 
unlawfully gaining property or causing damage to others” (Камбовски, 2003: 117).  
The computer is increasingly considered as an instrument of execution of crime 
activities and this crime is more and more involving the application of computer 
systems and networks, as well thus leading to possibilities for tangible computer crimes 
resulting in illicit crime proceeds or causing property, financial or any other kind of 
damage, or even damaging the computer systems and the data stored in them.  Thus, 
computer crime covers several various forms of criminal activities mentioned in a 
number of definitions of the term computer crime, in line with the following related 
terms: computer abuse, computer fraud, computer crime, information or technical 
crime. (Николоска С. : 2013). 
The computer becomes an object of criminal attack when the computer or the 
computer systems and networks, as well as the data they contain, are the actual and 
final target of the criminal attack, or the aim of the perpetrators. The purpose of the 
crime attack is to destroy the computer system or the computer network or partially or 
completely damaging the data stored at a specific computer system. Besides, the 
criminal attack can be directed towards obtaining information from a given computer 
system due to a variety of motives, like, economic, political or intelligence, or for the 
purpose of planning and executing computer terrorist act. However, there are certain 
situations when the target of the criminal attack are actually the data and information 
related to bank accounts of natural and legal entities for the purpose of revealing them 
and using them in producing specific software for withdrawal of money from these 
accounts and transferring them to another, created just for the purpose of criminal 
gain. The target of a criminal attack may be also the process of collecting data and 
information and the computer system of strategic state bodies and institutions, like 
security bodies collecting data on criminal structures, aiming at abusing and “selling” 
these data to foreign intelligence services or using them for planning and performing 
terrorist attacks  (Бановић Б.: 2001). The computer becomes an object of criminal 
attack after certain preparations have been completed ahead of time, again involving 
the computer as an instrument for conducting the criminal act. In order to create and 
apply a computer virus, first and foremost, one needs a computer to “produce” that 
virus. Then, the virus is to be directed towards its target system or network, by using 
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that same or some other computer, for the purpose of destroying computer data, 
partially or completely, and making them unavailable to the users.  
Computer crime involves a great deal of intellectual engagement on the part of 
the perpetrator, that it acquires the attributes of a “perfect crime” (Џуклески Г.: 2000).  
The computer crime does not represent a “rounded phenomenological 
category” and due to this, it is impossible to offer full and uniquely acceptable 
definition of the term. It is basically a common form of crime manifested through the 
various forms it acquires, which are to be granted a character of predominance in the 
majority of crimes, particularly the ones in the area of economy. The development of 
computer crime ranks from the very first abuses of computer technology in financial 
institutions, via some forms known as white collar crimes, to the contemporary forms of 
electronic piracy, hacking, violating of privacy and sabotaging including creation and 
sending of computer viruses and worms, but very often computer crime combines 
elements of child abuse in terms of production and distribution of child pornography 
and alluring children into contacts and sexual exploitation of minors under the age of 
14. The computer crime is further spread to endangering the integrity and security of 
states involving computer espionage, computer sabotage, cyber terrorism, as forms of 
crime involving creation and using of hate speech.  
 
 
2. HARMONIZATION OF MACEDONIAN PENAL LEGISLATION 
 
The international community encounters the computer crime as early as the 
1980s when the mass computerization of almost of areas of social living throughout the 
globe. The miracle of the 20th century, the instigator of the third revolution of 
information technology and the privilege of the ingenious minds, becomes, beside its 
immeasurable values for the overall human progress, a potential danger threatening 
the overall security in the modern world. The ingenious minds of information technology 
are also a potential threat misusing the knowledge and skills they possess in 
manipulating the exchange of data for the purpose of accumulating unlawful property 
gains, spreading racial and religious intolerance, as well as a sort of competition among 
skilled computer users in the role of criminal perpetrators involved in crimes that are 
difficult to be revealed. In the direction of improving the national legislations and 
provision of penal legal protection, the international community adopts a series of 
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international acts regulating the issues of increasing security against computer abuses 
and improving the safety of information systems and databases of both legal and 
natural entities.   
The most important document in the domain of fighting computer crime is of 
course the Convention on computer crime adopted by the Council of Europe, in 
Budapest, on November 23, 2001 and whose main purpose is joint policy directed 
towards protecting the society against computer crime, among other things, by 
adopting corresponding legislature and fostering international cooperation in this area 
among the states signees of this document. The need for this Document stems from 
the thorough changes introduced through digitalization, convergence and continuous 
globalization of computer networks, but also from the risk that computer networks and 
electronic information could be used for criminal activity and that evidence relating to 
this type of crime could be saved and transferred via these networks. The Convention is 
expected to contribute to the more efficient fight against computer crime and to 
protect the legitimate interests for using and further developing of information 
technologies. Also, it is considered significant tool for re-directing from acts against 
secrecy, integrity and availability of computer systems and networks and computer 
data, as well as against their abuse through criminalization of acts described in this 
Conventions and introducing authorizations needed for efficient fight against such 
crimes that would facilitate the process of discovery, trial and conviction on national 
and international levels on the basis of secure international cooperation.   
The cited Convention provides recommendations for redefining the national 
material legislations for the purpose of incriminating behaviors that underline the 
abuse of information technologies with criminal aims, as well as recommendations for 
redefining the process procedure and foreseeing appropriate measure and activities for 
securing and saving computer data and their adjusting to a form of proof acceptable for 
the judiciary.  Also, the recommendations are partly directed towards improving the 
international cooperation as it is indispensable because of the very nature, the 
spreading and the international relations of perpetrators of this kind of crime. The 
international cooperation is also required for provision of proofs of the crimes 
conducted, identification of perpetrators and following the illicit proceeds gained 
through such criminal activity.  
The Republic of Macedonia has implemented the recommendations of the 
Convention through redefining the criminal acts in the Penal Code in 2004, 2008 and 
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2009 with reference to typical computer crimes that can be performed by simply using 
the computer and the information technology and to classical and economic crimes, 
making provisions related to the grounds for their realization by means of using the 
computer as an instrument or the information systems as targets of the criminal 
attack.  
  The Convention foresees 4 groups of computer crimes that are to be 
incorporated within the national legislations (Penal Code of the Republic of Macedonia, 
2008, 2009) as follows:   
1. Acts against the secrecy, integrity and availability of computer systems 
and data.  
2. Acts, for the realization of which is linked to using computers (computer 
frauds, computer forgeries etc.).   
3. Acts related to child pornography.  
4. Acts related to violation of copywriters’ and other similar acts.  
 
The Convention gives recommendations with regards to criminal liability of 
legal entities in cases when the act is done to their benefit, by a natural entity, 
regardless whether taken by an individual or a member of a collective body of the legal 
entity, a person heading a unit of the legal entity and entrusted the authority to 
represent the legal entity, to take decisions and to perform controlling on behalf of the 
legal entity. The Convention foresees confiscating measures regarding the criminally 
gained proceeds through computer crime, as well. 
 
 
3. COMPUTER CRIMES IN THE MACEDONIAN PENAL LEGISLATION  
 
Computer crime in the Republic of Macedonia has been for the first time 
designated as crime in the Penal Code of 1996 and the list of computer crime types is 
permanently enlarged based on the acceptance of recommendations and international 
legal acts that incriminate such activities involving forms of criminal abuse of 
computers and other machines for automatic data processing and crimes involving 
computer systems and networks as objects of attacks. However, there is no single 
chapter in the Macedonian Code that systematizes all computer crime forms, but there 
are several chapters dealing with forms of crime that include the term computer as a 
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determinant in their titles, referring even to classical economic crimes and criminal 
behaviors with information systems and networks as objects of criminal attacks and the 
computer as an instrument of the crime performed.  The Penal Code of the Republic of 
Macedonia takes into consideration the following crimes in several of its chapters:  
 
Chapter XV – Crimes against human and civil rights and freedoms  
Chapter XVIII – Crimes against personal dignity and integrity  
Chapter XIX – Crimes against sexual freedom and morality  
Chapter XXIII – Crimes against property  
Chapter XXV – Crimes against public finances, payment system and economy 
Chapter XXXII – Crimes against legal traffic and 
Chapter XXXIII – Crimes against public order.   
 
The Macedonian criminal and legal-penal practice in the studied period 
between 2011 and 2015 notifies the execution of only a part of incriminated computer 
crimes for which there are reported, indicted and convicted perpetrators, based on 
relevant proofs, determined by the court. The process of providing electronic proof is a 
complex procedure of selecting, collecting and storing of electronic evidence and the 
forensics of computer crime is an area that permanently develops and improves, just 
like the information technology and the possibilities it offers.    
This paper analyzes the incriminated computer crimes in accordance with the 
chapters of the Penal Code of the Republic of Macedonia. For crimes that have been 
identified, revealed and for which there are evidence and trial has been conducted, here 
follows the presentation of the number of reported, indicted and convicted perpetrators 
per given acts of crime.  
 
 3.1 Crimes against human and civil rights and freedoms 
 
Respecting human and civil rights and freedoms is constitutionally guaranteed 
right of citizens, that, supported by the information technology, are becoming more and 
more the object of abuse of perpetrators, who by applying their knowledge in 
information technologies for criminal purposes, abuse the rights and freedoms of other 
people in different ways. Macedonian legislation, by incriminating a set of criminal 
behaviors involving computer systems and networks, has laid the foundations of the 
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basic penal-legal protection against this kind of abuse.  The following ones are defined 
as crimes: Safety threats – Art. 144 p.4; Violation of secrecy of mail and shipments – 
Art. 147; Personal data abuse – Art. 149; Denial of access to public information system – 
Art. 149-a; Unauthorized wiretapping and recording – Art. 151; Unauthorized 
videotaping – Art. 152; Violation of copyrights and similar rights – Art. 157; Violation of 
distributor right to technically protected satellite signal – Art. 157-a; Piracy of audio-
visual works – Art. 157-b and Phonograph piracy – Art. 157-c.   
The practice in the Republic of Macedonia has notified crimes against human 
and civil rights and freedoms, as either individual crime deeds or as an organized way of 
perpetrating criminal deeds, and in particular, crime deeds that provide the 
perpetrators high crime proceeds, but also, those violating the victims’ privacy.   
 
Table 1: Reported, indicted and convicted perpetrators of computer crimes against 
human and civil rights and freedoms in the Republic of Macedonia in the period 
between 2011 and 2015   
 
Year  Art. 149 Art. 157 Art. 157 – а Art. 157 – b Art. 157 – 
c 
Total 
R I C R I C R I C R I C R I C R I C 
2011 / / / / / / 2 4 4 12 15 15 / 1 1 14 20 19 
2012 / / / / / / 5 4 1 1 14 13 / 2 2  6 20 16 
2013 / / / / 1 1 12 4 4 1 3 3 / / / 13  8  8 
2014 23 9 7 8 6 6 / 8 7 / 1 1 / / / 31 24 21 
2015 / / / 9 12 9 3 3 3 / 1 1 / / / 12 16 13 
Total 23 9 7 17 19 16 22 23 19 14 34 33 / 3 3 76 88 77 
 
Based on the above data it can be stated that perpetrators in the Republic of 
Macedonia have used their knowledge and the capacity of information technology for 
criminal purposes and abused personal data of other people, but also the copyrights for 
piracy of audio-visual works. The analysis of figures of reported, confirms continuous 
perpetration in the period of interest and the crime varies in structure for each year, 
whereas from the aspect of re-qualification of deeds based on the available evidence, it 
can be deduced that the re-qualification in the process of trial is in the direction from 
reported classical crime to computer crime. This can be viewed in the light of the ratio 
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of convicted to reported perpetrators, but also due to the development of procedure 
upon filing criminal report during the trial based on evidence provided.   When it comes 
to the figures of convicted, the percentage of conviction is rather high – 87.5% and 
implies high quality of performance and respecting the procedures of providing, storing 
and presenting the official electronic evidence.     
 
3.2 Computer crimes against sexual freedoms and morality  
 
Crimes against sexual freedoms and morality cover the criminal behaviors 
related to sexual delicts (delicta carnis), and the legislation protects the individual, 
his/her freedom to sexual intercourse, but on the other hand, regulates and protects 
the morality, the ethical views and understanding of acceptable and unacceptable in the 
realm of sexual interacting. Sexual delicts are also an aspect of the group of violent 
crime, as this is about criminal behaviors involving violation of sexual freedoms of the 
victims and their choices, orientation, decisions etc.  Based on the object of protection 
or the victims of sexual crimes, from the aspect of computer crime, we can be speak 
only about a few criminal instances of protecting the minors against the dangers 
deriving from using computer technology and computer systems.  
Child pornography, as a safety issue is not only confined to national, but it is 
becoming a huge international problem that attracts growing attention due to the 
frequently occurring cases of international trafficking of minors for the criminal purpose 
of selling organs and accumulating high criminal proceeds and human trafficking of 
minors for the criminal purposes of sexual exploitation. Beside physical sexual 
exploitation of minors, with the emergence of high-tech cameras, this form involves 
taking pictures and video-recording of children with sexual connotation (naked photos, 
sexual acts etc.) and these recordings are further multiplied and distributed on the 
pornography market. However, the international community makes great efforts and 
takes actions in the direction of getting on the way of this issue and protecting the 
young population in the “twisted world of adults”, who, are becoming more and ruthless 
in their constant race for profit, and do not care about the methods and ways involved 
in enticing children and their abuse and exploitation via taking photographs and 
recordings that are sold on the pornography market, which, based data obtained from 
relevant institutions, is rather profitable.   
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The introduction of computers and computer networks and the expansion of 
Internet particularly, provided grounds for rapid development of computer pornography 
on global level. This encouraged the scientific and professional public to take up 
defining this kind of safety issue and to initiate methods for prevention. The Council of 
Europe defines the child pornography as incorporating “all audio-visual materials 
involving children in sexual connotation” (Council of Europe, Recommendation R(91)11 
and Report of the European Committee on Crime Problems: 1993). 
Child pornography is displayed through photographs and filmed materials 
containing sexually explicit activities involving children (minors under the age of 14). 
Child abuse includes forcing and enticing children in order to perform certain sexual 
activities that are going to be photographed or filmed and they are also considered 
child pornography. These contents are made easily accessible by the perpetrators and 
even for certain money compensation if used via certain web-sites. According to the 
sociologists, this is a pervert abuse of minors and it is about sexual exploitation that 
provides high profits for the perpetrators. Or, to put it in other words, child 
pornography is not produced for the purpose of satisfying low instincts, but it is 
produced and distributed for lucrative purposes. Computer child pornography is among 
the most profitable criminal businesses conducted by means of computer networks and 
according to some researches and data published on the Internet, it is about achieving 
over 25 mln dollar income per year 
(http://www.popcenter.org/problems/child_pornography).    
Computer child pornography represents a criminal activity manifested mainly 
in three ways, such as: enticing children and their abuse in pornography footage, then, 
downloading of porn contents from Internet or reaching certain hidden or limited 
access contents by hacking and porn contents with children as actors. According to the 
findings of research carried out in the European continent, a categorization of criminal 
activities containing the term computer child pornography has been made. Namely, 
taking into account the statistics from the Missing Children Europe from the text titled 
EU more severely against child pornography, published in October, 2008, 
(http://it.com.mk/IT-EU-Protiv-detska-pornografija-mono/): 
• 39% of pornographic pictures involve children between the age of 3 and 5, 19% 
- children under the age of 3  
• In 2003, the pedophilia contents doubled online  
• In 2007 there 16% more pornography pictures online  
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• Telefono Azzurro (Italy) worked on 192 cases, 45% of which involving children 
between 0 and 5 years of age   
• Child Focus (Belgium) notified 2562 cases in 2007.   
  
The penal – legal definition of child pornography in the Penal Code of the 
Republic of Macedonia (2008) states that: “Child pornography involves pornographic 
material that visually shows conspicuous sex acts with minors, or obvious sex activities 
with a person that seems as under age, or realistic pictures of conspicuous sex 
activities with minors”. 
Computer child pornography involves enticing and abusing of minors under 14 
for the purpose of photographing and/or filming sexual contents – sex positions, 
intercourses, advertizing of products for producing pleasurable sex/erotic stimulation, 
multiplying them and electronically distributing them.  
Child pornography is becoming a burning, acute security issue that has been 
dealt with in the Convention of Child Rights, with a particular emphasis in this era of 
global communication via the Internet, when possibilities for abuses of minors are really 
enormous. The world has been shocked in the last several years by the cases of huge, 
organized pedophilic networks in several Western European countries, but also the 
organized one functioning in Australia. What is even more scandalous is the 
involvement of Catholic priests in the pedophilic networks. Large number of states in 
the world has amended their criminal codes in order to further protect the sexual 
freedom and morality of children, and children understands minors under 14, according 
to the Penal Code of our country. 94 out of the total number of 187 Interpol member 
states have already adopted corresponding legal provisions for protecting against 
computer child pornography and some of them have criminalized the possession of 
child pornography, regardless of their purpose.   
The globalization and criminalization of computer child pornography are aiming 
at taking up broad action for preventing child abuse and sexual and financial 
exploitation of children, as, with the installation and functioning of computer networks 
globally, a corresponding global prevention action is needed in order to stop this evil. 
Child pornography has existed very long before the computerization era, but its mass 
circulation is made possible through the computerization and the Internet 
communication.  
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The material criminal legislation in the Republic of Macedonia incriminates the 
following: Showing child pornography materials – Art. 193; Production and distribution 
of child pornography – Art. 193-a and Enticing and seducing a minor under 14 to sexual 
activity – Art. 193-b.  
 
Table 2: Reported, indicted and convicted perpetrators of computer crimes against 
sexual freedoms and morality in the Republic of Macedonia in the period between 2011 
and 2015   
 
Year  Art. 193 Art. 193 – а   Total 
R I C R I C R I C 
2011 2 / / 1 1 1 3 1 1 
2012 6 1 1 2 / / 8 1 1 
2013 3 1 1 / / / 3 1 1 
2014 / / 1 / / / / / 1 
2015 / / / / / / / / / 
Total 11 2 3 3 1 1 14 3 4 
 
Computer child pornography as a crime has been noted in the Macedonian 
legal penal practice over the investigated period, with reported 14 offenders, 4 of which 
were convicted, which implies difficulties in providing appropriate evidence, required for 
taking up an indictment process and reaching court verdict. For cases with provided 
evidence in the trial stage involving expert evidencing as well and charges, the courts 
have managed to adopt corresponding verdicts for all indicted.  
 
3.3 Computer crimes against property 
 
In the sphere of computer crime, beside the forms of endangering human 
rights and freedoms, increases the threat of using computers and computer systems for 
the purpose of gaining material goods or causing damages of direct or indirect nature. 
Thus, the former case can involve gains or damages caused by means of using the data 
and information or their deleting from the system and/or destroying, whereas in the 
latter case, the system is used for entering or changing data that provide further 
harmful managing the property of third parties (for instance, increasing the deposit of 
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the perpetrators bank account!).  In its nature and its objective essence, the deeds 
qualified as computer crime are close to damaging other people’s possessions and to 
fraud, to which they are also related by the identical purpose of illicitly gaining property 
or causing damage (Камбовски В. : 2003). The computer crime, just as any other forms 
of crime, understands tangible crime deeds that are contained in the criminal and any 
other special laws, and which are manifested in that exact form, regardless of the fact 
that they are performed by means of a computer as an instrument, or as an object of 
the criminal attack, so they display certain specific characteristics in relation to the 
instrument and the manner of executing the criminal attack.   
 Computer crime offenders could not be matched with those of classical forms 
of crime, because of a series of specifics that makes them different. They have to 
possess certain knowledge and skills in the area of computer technology and criminalist 
informatics. It is mainly about people involved in technical intelligence and whose 
criminal activity could not be easily made visible, and according to that, even more 
difficult to be proved. Computer technology provides grounds for criminal activity at 
large distances; the perpetrator does not necessarily need to be in the same location 
with the consequence of the performed crime.  This type of crime shows certain 
specifics and based on them, the legislation tries to classify several incriminations 
contained in the Penal Code that represent the grounds for taking up criminal-legal 
charges against perpetrators of computer crimes.   
 
Computer crimes against property involve: Damaging and unauthorized 
entering a computer system – Art. 251; Computer viruses – Art. 251-a and Computer 
frauds – Art. 251-b.  
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Table 3: Reported, indicted and convicted perpetrators of computer crimes against 
property in the Republic of Macedonia in the period between 2011 and 2015    
 
Year Art. 251 Art. 251 – b   Total 
R I C R I C R I C 
2011 45 9 9 / / / 45 9 9 
2012 23 25 21 / / / 23 25 21 
2013 41 33 27 5 3 3 46 36 30 
2014 30 14 14 / / / 30 14 14 
2015 50 20 20 2 / / 52 20 20 
Total 189 101 91 7 3 3 196 104 94 
 
In the Republic of Macedonia, the most frequently executed crime, with the 
largest number of indicted, is Damaging and unauthorized entering a computer system, 
regulated in Art. 251, with a number of 189 indicted out of the total number of 196 
reported computer crime perpetrators against property. Out of the total number of 
reported 104 are indicted and 94 convicted. The percentage of conviction is 47.6% in 
relation to reporting and 90.4 in relation to indictment which refers to application of 
computer forensics in expert evidencing of electronic evidence and indictment only on 
the basis of provided unbeatable evidence.   
 
3.4 Computer crimes against public finance, payment system and economy  
 
Electronic payments by means of electronic money represent an exchange of 
material means via telecommunicating infrastructure, such as the Intranet banking 
systems or the Internet. Basically, it is about virtual (electronic) money that exists in 
the numerical system of the computer memory and as such knows no geographical 
boundaries. They can be easily transferred at great distances instantly.  The most 
frequently used term is “electronic money” although “digital money” is a 
terminologically more accurate one, as the former can also be used in analogous 
communications. Electronic money provides purchasing products and services by means 
of computer in the frames of commercial computer networks, like Internet for instance, 
or via banking networks such as SWIFT. In a practical manner, the electronic money 
today replaces cash and payment checks. On the other hand, business entities are given 
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direct opportunity for working by using computer networks. This way of payment is also 
very subject to various abuses, both inside and outside the system, by persons who 
obtain the information of interest in a process of misuse of their position and 
authorities, of applying various technical means or simply intersecting the 
communication channels and later on using them in re-directing them to their bank 
accounts, or accounts of their accomplices, helpers etc.  
 All over the world, the criminals dealing with abuse of payment cards in the 
frames of organized criminal groups perform their deeds via Internet, most often 
hoping to achieve significant property gains in an illicit manner. In order to easily get in 
touch with “collaborators” for their crimes, these people join Internet services that have 
already formed groups with similar interests or create new forums for attracting others 
interested in similar topics to join with others and communicate. Beside the economic, 
cultural or technical reasons, there are lots of other motives that these people might 
have in common for joining such virtual groups.   
 In addition to the really large number of unemployed individuals that possess 
skills and competences for using the computer, are the corruption and the bad 
economic conditions that influence the increase of criminal deeds in the area of high-
tech crime.  Some of the traditional, already existing criminal groups begin to attract 
individuals with such skills, having in mind that a large number of computer viruses 
have originally, and among other reasons, been created for the purpose of stealing 
financial and other data contained in  the payment cards and further abuses. At that 
time a number of Internet forums have been created in servers on the Russian territory, 
but also in other countries of what was once known as the Eastern Bloc. These forums 
used to offer a variety of data, among the best selling ones being the malicious 
softwares intended for stealing computer data (computer viruses), as well as data 
related to payment cards, user names and passwords for various servers. Such servers 
are known as carder services as within their frames, the perpetrators of criminal deeds 
offer, sell and/or exchange data from payment cards, and find their accomplices.  
 In the course of the 1990s, while numerous highly educated people were trying 
to get employed, some of the programmers, who wanted to do something, and not for 
little money, started making programs known as computer viruses. The term “virus 
factories” is used to describe the job of these intellectuals, but having no employers to 
offer them legal jobs, they did not receive any payment in this period. Most often, they 
created these viruses to express their dissatisfaction. In March 2001, the Russian 
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hacker, Igor Kovaliev stated in an interview: “Hacking is an excellent job, one of the few 
that are left”. This criminal way has provided many experts with a way out of poverty 
and increased the chances for mobility of experts on the Russian market. The skilled 
engineers capable of developing new technologies, were very much interested about 
Internet, particularly in the area of economic works. Even today programmers in Russia 
are willing to work for criminal organizations, of course for good money. In this country, 
which is even now overburdened with violent crimes, certain organizations dealing with 
high-tech crime are perceived as the major force and potential of this country in the 
digital era. The criminals in this area are viewed as modern “Robin Hood” figures that 
can adequately support the organization members and their families by stealing money 
from the rich people from the West, who, “possess large sums of money on their 
accounts and cards, without any justification”. In Chine for instance, according to a 
study carried out in 2005 by the Academy of Social Sciences in Shanghai, it is clear that 
hackers and rock stars enjoy the most of respect and glorification, whereas 43% of the 
primary school students stated they appreciate the hackers (Urošević V. and Uljanov S.). 
 The wide spread usage of payment cards, the coverage and availability of 
information technologies, have all contributed to making them very attractive to a large 
number of individual or groups of criminals throughout the world. Particularly 
vulnerable are the markets that have introduced the cards into the payment system, 
but lack experience in electronic finances and there is no system for preventing abuses 
of this kind, as well as in countries with high living standard and developed system of 
online trade and banking. Today the cards can be used for cash withdrawal from ATM, 
from the banks, for payment of goods and services, for purchases at points equipped 
with POS terminals, for payments in the electronic trading system and for payments 
related to ordered via phone or mail.  The cards are used for payments on the Internet, 
avoiding going to the bank or to the store, from your home, both in our country and 
abroad. And it is the Internet that creates the largest danger related to the possibility 
of abuse of credit card data while making transactions via the Internet. The most 
frequent Internet frauds are the frauds related to selling the payment card data by 
organized criminal groups that obtain previously agreed sums of money as 
compensations on special bank accounts opened exclusively for this purpose. Also, the 
fast money transfer systems like Western Union etc. are used for this purpose.    
The Penal Code of the Republic of Macedonia incriminates the following 
computer crime against public finance, payment system and economy: Production, 
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purchasing or alienating instruments for forging – Art. 271, p. 2 and p. 3; Preparation 
and using of fraudulent credit cards – Art. 274-b and Violating the rights to published 
or protected patent and topography of integrated circuits – Art. 286.  
 
Table 4: Reported, indicted and convicted perpetrators of computer crimes against 
public finance, payment system and economy in the Republic of Macedonia in the 
period between 2011 and 2015    
 
Year  Art. 274 – b  Total 
R I C R I C 
2011 8 7 3 8 7 3 
2012 11 5 1 11 5 1 
2013 16 8 4 16 8 4 
2014 / / / / / / 
2015 13 26 26 13 26 26 
Total 48 46 34 48 46 34 
 
The fraudulent payment card manufacturing as a crime is present in the 
Republic of Macedonia, but it also has an organized and international character as well. 
With regards to the analysis of reporting, all through to the conviction, by means of 
providing firm and relevant evidence, the conviction participates with 70.8% in relation 
to reporting, and 73.9% in relation to indictment of perpetrators.   
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Republic of Macedonia has accepted the recommendations of the 
international community that refer to the incriminating of computer crime deeds and 
incorporated this in the Penal Code of the Republic of Macedonia. The Code foresees 
the incrimination of several typical computer crimes, and part of them involve the 
possibility for executing the crime by application of information technology and of the 
computer as an instrument of execution, as well as the computer systems and networks 
as objects of the criminal attack. This means that the criminals make use of the 
information technology for criminal purposes and driven by criminal motives, including 
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elements of abuse of personal data that causes damage to the victims, then, taking the 
opportunity for producing computer child pornography thus seriously damaging the 
morality of the minors as victims.  Accumulating property and financial gains is the 
most frequent motive of the perpetrators which can be deduced from the deeds of 
crime against property executed and their number outgrows that of other forms of 
financial crimes.  
The prosecution authorities keep pace with the contemporary trends in the 
forms of computer crimes and are permanently trained in the area of discovering and 
disclosing of these crimes and providing relevant electronic evidence, which is of key 
importance for the judiciary.   
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Abstract 
 
Crisis situation, as indeed is clear from the very concept of a "crisis" mostly 
very hard predictable phenomenon, something unusual, differing from the events 
regularly and predictably repeating and if there is, will threaten a large number of 
people, property and the environment. Motivation theory to prepare population to crisis 
situations are extensive and this issue is addressed by several experts as well as 
laymen. The actual motivation is divided into two groups, both psychological and 
sociological scientific discipline. Motivation of population is a very complex process, as 
there are activated internal assumptions guiding the action of a person to fulfill a 
certain goal, or of trying to meet certain targets. The motivation of citizens and their 
approach to crisis phenomena is possible to use several theories and methods to 
increase interest population preparedness in case of crisis. It is important that the 
society was motivated by the fact that individuals respond properly and deal with the 
consequences of crisis events. People are aware of the risks to their life, health or 
property only when participating directly in accidents or natural disasters. Although 
individuals can not reverse the course of events of crisis phenomena, can conduct an 
appropriate choice to significantly reduce its effects in your area by using the theories 
that are useful for practice. 
 
Keywords: motivation, theory, method, crisis situation, analysis. 
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Introduction 
 
There are several theories seeking principles, patterns, methods and tools on 
how to effectively motivate people and how to direct itself to prepare for crisis 
situations. The basic principle is an explanation of motivational theories, their analysis 
and subsequent application to practice. Consequently, if this necessary to look back into 
history, what was the motivating people a good starting point and vice versa, which is 
to motivate misleading, almost unusable in the future. Generally it is possible to 
understand the readiness of the population to the crisis situation in three areas such as 
education, prevention and motivation in theoretical or practical level, important for 
theoretical reflection area, from which it leads to the practice. 
 
 
Analysis of the present practical solutions and motivation citizens on 
crisis preparedness 
 
Preparedness in case of emergency and crisis phenomena is the responsibility 
which must involve State or public authorities, other legal entities and individual 
citizens. Preparedness in case of danger can best be achieved if the targets are well 
known teaching people the contents of education, forms, methods and means *of 
education, motivational techniques and instruments and the expected results of the 
action plan for crisis events. Following consultations with expert’s civil protection 
education and training of experts and citizens on crisis phenomena carried out today 
under three basic premises: 
 
What is important to learn?   
Everyone should think about the dangers and risks to the public. It should have 
an overview of the protection plans that have been developed for the purpose of 
prevention and management of crisis events, and mitigate their impact on human lives 
and material values 
Who should learn it?  
Elected officials - in order to obtain their support for the plan of protection in 
the event of crisis phenomena 
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The rescue organizations - to emphasize collaborative search and rescue 
operations.  
Ordinary citizens - to know what to do and how to behave in the event of a 
crisis phenomenon. 
How to learn it?  
The method of education of residents in emergency preparedness, i.e. in the 
field of civil protection should be carried out mainly in three forms, education, training 
and exercises. 
Education: 
To tackle the issue of readiness of the population to crisis phenomena is 
essential to continuing education. This can be ensured through different courses, 
lectures and seminars. Finally, we also cannot forget the power of the media and also 
the internet.     
Training: 
As far as the application of theoretical knowledge into practical design, thus 
training it can be concluded that this constitutes a significant part of future success. It 
is therefore in the first place in terms of emergency situations and without this element 
is almost impossible these situations satisfactorily.  
Exercises:  
The exercises are a necessary step in the preparation for crisis phenomenon. 
The aim of the exercises to cope with the crisis phenomenon is improving preparedness 
in the event of a crisis phenomenon, increase operational readiness and ability to 
respond. Exercise consists of the performance of duties, tasks or operations manner 
very similar to those that could be implemented in case of a real crisis phenomenon. 
Public exercises:  
Exercises to the public to attract and keep the interest of people to participate 
actively to avert the consequences of crisis events or crisis situations that stimulate the 
enthusiasm and practical knowledge and skills practice, reviewed, evaluation and 
improvement plans and operational capabilities by revealing weaknesses in the planning 
and resources and test equipment and operating instructions. Appropriate means of 
education in the context of preparedness for crisis events are the mass media such as 
print, radio, television, internet and cinema advertising - billboards. 
The main forms of preparing the population for self-protection and mutual 
assistance are: 
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a) Information and advisory services provided by the education centers, public 
institutions humanities mission, District Office, autonomous region, municipality, other 
legal entity or natural person - entrepreneur, 
b) Programs broadcast on radio and television and prepared bodies that 
manage and organize, organize and execute the preparation of civil protection or that 
their business activities may endanger life, health or property of its employees and the 
persons taken care of, 
c) Publishing activity carried out by issuing professional publications, 
*brochures, puzzles, posters, leaflets, articles in newspapers and magazines on the 
theme of civil defense and by entities that manage and organize, organize and execute 
the preparation of civil protection or that their business activities may threaten life, 
health or property of its employees and the persons taken to care, 
d) Preventive educational and promotional activities carried out by the events 
on the topic of civil protection, in particular, exercises, competitions, exhibitions and 
excursions, theoretical training and practical training managed and organized by 
district administrations, regional governments or provided by the municipality in 
cooperation with public institutions humanities mission, 
e) Publication of information in electronic form entities that manage and carry 
out the preparation of the population for self-protection and mutual assistance, or that 
their business activities may endanger life, health and property of its employees or 
other persons. 
Based on the above it is clear that currently show a reduced interest of the 
people to prepare for crisis events. Internal or external motivation is low. This fact is 
closely related to the informatisation of our society and so. "Congestion" population 
information to various content and quality. Nevertheless, this fact also contributes to 
easier access to the necessary information related to the crisis and preparing for them. 
Decline in motivation to preparedness for the crisis phenomena I see that a large part 
of the population is quite clearly not feel threatened, which also reflects that we live in 
a relatively safe society and *the prevention and control crisis situations is not 
neglected, respectively. Has been sidelined in the past, from which we benefit today. 
The specific sense that the citizens and the population as a whole is important for 
assessing motivation, because motivation is itself an internal impulse of the individual. 
If the "mood" of the poor and the population feel they may be at risk to their life, 
health, property, sufficiently motivated and is preparing to crisis events. At present, 
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they there are not taken all forms of training residents to crisis phenomena in the 
previous subchapter. These forms of training citizens to ensure that the population is 
sufficiently informed, preventive prepared and consequently motivated to prepare for 
the crisis phenomena. It can be stated that the motivation theories currently in the 
Slovak Republic are hardly applicate in educating and training residents to crisis events. 
It is the result of relatively complex procedures for the possible application of these 
phenomena into practice, especially in already cited reasons - lack of interest of the 
inhabitants of the preparation, respectively, prevention to crisis situations. In Slovakia 
there is not a comprehensive system of training and motivation of citizens to crisis 
events. How already mentioned in previous chapters, there are many laws and lower-
ranking legal rules that government matters. The motivation and training of citizens on 
a subject is poorly prepared and there are a number of shortcomings. Changes could be 
realized in the law and in the use of new tools for improved training people. The main 
forms of training citizens for self-protection and mutual assistance in terms of MV SR 
Decree. 303/1996 Coll. to ensure the preparation of the CO, as amended, as a very 
sophisticated and beneficial to society, but after examining the problem it can be stated 
that these are only "written instructions" to prepare the population to the crisis 
phenomena. It cannot be said that these forms are used in regular and mandatory 
recurring intervals. For large positive on the issue of preparedness of the population to 
incidents in Slovakia and the Czech Republic are public institutions with a humanitarian 
mission, such as: Slovak Red Cross, Blue Angel, Voluntary fire protection units, 
ambulances, mountain rescue, and water rescue service. The whole system of education 
and training of the population to cope with crisis phenomena can be considered as a 
kind of secondary interest within the public sector. It is necessary to constantly improve 
the system, to a new and imaginative means of motivation. Within the motivational 
theories that are mentioned in the previous chapters can be any one of them used to 
motivate residents. It is up to those in power, they use knowledge disciplines to 
motivate people. In general terms it can be stated that the problem is the poor state of 
readiness and training of residents in case of crisis phenomena and their effective 
motivation. In Slovakia there are many ways to properly prepare residents to cross 
event. These are not sufficiently utilized, and it is precisely in this area a big problem. In 
addition to a lack of education and training of citizens on crisis phenomena seen as 
highly negative the indifference of citizens to prepare to deal with crisis events. If the 
State took a number of ways and means of motivation population, it would be their 
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readiness undoubtedly in better shape than it is at the present time. The problem is 
that the representatives of the state cannot find a suitable way that the occupant has 
given a speech on the issue of greater concern. For another problem, ultimately, the 
lack of interest of the people and this issue. Residents do not appear interested in 
preparing for crisis phenomena, again related to lack of motivation. They should find 
appropriate means to motivate residents approached by *residents on this matter 
considerably more active. The problem I see is that it is not enacted a provision that 
would clearly and precisely determine the procedure for the preparation and motivation 
of the population to the crisis situation. In general, it can be said that the population 
has in the Slovak Republic to become well prepared to handle the crisis phenomenon. 
However, a disadvantage is that it should also show more interest. Do not give him 
enough attention to the preparation of self-protection and mutual assistance. As a 
negative can also be considered lack of leaflets, newsletters and sessions with the issue 
of preparation for crisis events. Another minus is the lack of training and practical 
exercises on their own people. Regarding the training of children in schools, it is 
important that this should be better regulated, as it is focused more on theory than on 
practice in the training of children to civil protection and crisis management. Teachers 
themselves are sufficiently motivated to be interested in the issue greater. As well as in 
schools and kindergartens in the system of training young children to crisis phenomena 
and under-period extra teachers themselves nor do they have a good education about 
the present subject matter. All courses Civil Protection are actually optional, depending 
on the population, therefore, how to deal with the preparation for crisis events. Also in 
kindergartens, teachers do not pay enough attention to preparing children to crisis 
events. Children are only marginally confronted with this issue. Preparing the 
population in retirement and sick population has a number of drawbacks, since for 
these is very difficult to access information. The entire system of training citizens to 
crisis events operate in the territory of the Slovak Republic as it was only "on paper" 
and practical use is minimal. 
 
 
Motivation theories for preparing population to crisis situations 
 
If we want to examine human behavior in a crisis situation, it is necessary to 
address the issue of what is causing that one to do so and not otherwise, and forcing a 
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person to act as the right to act. Another important point for the evaluation of the 
behavior of these phenomena is their subsequent analysis and analyzed on the basis of 
knowledge is exploring theories that could help to make people behave according to the 
rules of conduct in crisis situations. Crisis situation, as indeed is clear from the very 
concept of a "crisis" mostly very unpredictable situation, something unusual, usually 
hazardous to health, life and property of man. It is important that the company was 
clearly motivated by the fact that individuals respond properly and deal with the 
consequences of crisis situations and have them ready in as much as possible. People 
are aware of the risks to their life, health or property only when participating directly in 
crisis situations. The consequences of bad theories preparing population for crisis 
situations shows that ignorance of a suitable response to this situation, or its 
underestimation with panic multiply the loss of life and show that the given theory 
motivating the population has not been *selected properly or is completely unusable for 
the situation. Motivation as a psychological and sociological scientific discipline deals 
with a number of theories to properly motivate residents to be prepared for crisis 
situations, which does not mean that all the theories are correct. Motivation of 
population is a very complex process, as they are activated internal assumptions 
guiding the action of a person to fulfill a certain goal, or of trying to meet certain 
targets. To the motivation of population and their approach to crisis situations can be 
used several theories and methods to increase interest population preparedness in case 
of crisis. (Pommfyová, 2003). The theme is the inner motive that gives and keeps 
human activities and direct it in a certain direction to a destination, for example. It 
determines the direction and intensity of behavior and action, as well as the course of 
the operation. Theme is the core of motivation. Its effect lasts as long as the goal is 
achieved and until the target satisfy us. Subjective motivation is self-motivation a 
person to certain proceedings both at work and outside the working environment, while 
objective motivation is the ability to motivate people to perform certain one-time or 
recurring activities. Motivation can also be divided into positive motivation and negative 
motivation. The term is understood to motivate positive motivation through positive 
incentives such as self-realization, moral valuation, and tangible benefit. It follows that 
negative motivation is based on a form of punishment or fear, for example, fear of 
losing work. There are several theories seeking principles, patterns, methods and tools 
on how to effectively motivate people how to direct their efforts and effectively lead to 
the achievement of the goals. Motivation theories on the basis are divided into content 
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theory and process theory. Content theories address the question of what really 
motivates people, explaining their motivation in terms of needs, specifying the various 
needs and clarify some dynamic changes in needs. Process theory explains how arise 
motivation at work, explaining their motivation in terms of perceptions, expectations 
prerequisite for achieving the satisfaction of needs. 
The first of the most important motivational theories is Adams' theory of 
justice. Adams's theory of justice is among the theories dealing with motivated people. 
It was published by John Stacey Adams in 1965. It is based on two levels. Remuneration 
in respect of some great performance is right according to comparable data and reward 
is right and example to other colleagues at work, that is fair. When people feel *a sense 
of justice that motivates them to higher performance and sense of injustice performs 
the opposite effect, that their performance will be weak, which means mainly to prepare 
population for crisis situation  disinterest in the subject. 
John Stacey Adams theory refers to as material and non-material needs, 
rewards. Another theory dealt with the American psychologist Abraham H. Maslow. He 
came to the view that every human behavior is driven effort to meet their basic needs. 
These needs, according to him can be arranged in a pyramid with the base physiological 
needs, the needs of safety and security, needs and requirements of love, and the need 
to recognize the most important motivation for the theory of self-actualization needs. 
Explanation of the pyramid is as follows. A person first needs to satisfy their basic 
physiological needs such as breathing, drinking, eating. When a person feels the need of 
safety and security as well as requirements and love shifts to the need for recognition 
and self-realization, which is in connection with motivation population to crisis 
preparedness that *should be given space residents to be realized also for this 
preparation.  
As a further theory in turn it is Alderfer motivational needs theory by Paul 
Clayton Alderfer. This theory is based on three motivational factors: 
• The existence of job security, 
• Relations, e.g. friendship, recognition of the social network, 
• Self-realization, for example, possibility of professional growth. 
The use of this theory in practice is the satisfaction of subsistence needs, and 
then satisfy relational needs, which will ultimately lead to meet the needs of self-
realization. 
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The following theory is Herzberg's theory of two factors. Two-factor 
motivational theory was formulated by Frederick Herzberg in 1959 and named in this 
theory are two basic factors that are the source of population satisfaction and 
motivation. The first factor is non-satisfiers, including those which cause the working 
dissatisfaction. The second factor is satisfiers (motivators), including those that help 
energize motivation and satisfaction. In practice, this means that the non-fulfillment of 
hygiene factors cause dissatisfaction, while working, but their fulfillment does not 
because a feeling of satisfaction, it takes them for granted and their effect wears off 
quickly filling. In contrast, the fulfillment of motivational factors is a prerequisite to 
motivation to higher job performance and their effects on motivation was long and their 
non-fulfillment does not necessarily mean dissatisfaction. 
A fifth theory is Taylor's theory of motivation formed by F. W. Taylor as the 
father of scientific management, which took the view that with the scientific approach it 
is possible to improve the performance of workers. He focused on the examination of a 
person, especially as building management. Its aim was to maximize the outcome of 
their work while minimizing its consumption. Important nature of the material 
motivation of workers and of man understood as an economic entity, which means in 
practice in order to encourage citizen preparedness for crisis situations, that if he was 
financially motivated to undertake training and exercises in an emergency situation 
would be less loss of life, health and property. 
The next is May's motivation theory, founded by E. Mayo. He examined the 
impact of psychological factors on the results of human labor. The need to respect the 
staff to the social conditions of their activities opposed the concept of scientific 
management. The basis of his work is that they all work, process conditions, and 
physical needs of people tend to have less impact on the work, but social and 
psychological factors. He stresses the importance of social relationships for work 
motivation. To use this theory to motivate citizen to crisis preparedness can be said 
that the people should participate in exercises and training in crisis situations if their 
completed with residents with whom they share common interests and direct social 
relations. 
Another theory is McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y. Under certain 
circumstances, leading people through the right incentives are most effective form of 
this process. Theory X is the implementation of the central leadership principles set of 
guidelines, the command and control of personnel management, which is the realization 
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of authoritarian forms of governance. Theory Y management represents* the style which 
is based on the integration of the interests of members of the organization by working 
towards their own initiative and choice of funds under specified conditions, in order to 
achieve the objectives. Theory X is authoritative, pessimistic, static and rigid. Theory Y, 
by contrast, dynamic, optimistic, resilient. It is recommended not to use only the style 
of X. The possibility of using this theory to motivate citizen to crisis preparedness is 
that residents should be encouraged to be interested in preparing for emergencies, so 
as to meet their psychological needs of the interests of the very motivation. The last 
two theories are equity theory and the theory of expectations. Theory equity (fairness) 
deals with human perception as it is with individuals treated. This theory assumes that 
people will be more motivated if they would be treated fairly and demotivated when 
they will be treated unfairly. In this theory they are embedded two forms of justice and 
it is distributive and procedural. Distributive justice is concerned with how people feel 
that they are remunerated according to their value compared with others. Procedural 
justice has to do with how employees perceive fairness of the procedures used in the 
organization in areas such as staff evaluation, promotion and disciplinary matters. 
The last theory is the theory of expectations. It's best known, most successful 
theory and complex models of motivation theory as equity. It has multiple versions and 
different name. It is a model based on the conscious thinking about the situation. 
According to this theory, motivation depends on two factors ranging from how many in 
that we want to achieve something and the probability with which we expect to do this. 
Model theory of expectations was developed by Victor Vroom.  He defined motivation as 
the process of guiding the choice of alternative forms of volunteering. The motivation to 
act depends on their expectations of what the results will be for activities to follow. The 
basic model of motivational theory expectations include the following procedures: 
• motivation leads to efforts, 
• effort, combined with the ability and the environmental factors results in 
performance, 
• Power leads to different results when each of them is associated with 
values. 
Utilization of theory of expectation into practice is based on the recognition 
that each person adapts its work effort according to their subjective beliefs about the 
reachability and the attractiveness of the target, so that as you answer the following 
questions: 
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• Is the aim for me attractive? 
• Is it likely that I fulfill a task? 
• Is it likely that the role to be fulfilled obtain a remuneration 
corresponding to my expectations? 
The use of this theory to motivate citizen preparedness for crisis situations is 
that the citizen is indirectly motivated. 
All the theories mentioned in this article are applicable, to a certain extent to 
motivate citizen to participate in training, exercises and general preparation and how to 
manage a crisis with as little loss. 
The greatest rates of utilization of motivational methods have equity theory 
because this theory is to motivate residents can contribute just as much to the people 
will be more motivated if they would be treated fairly and demotivated when they will 
be treated unfairly. It should be treated with residents really fair, accessed by the crisis 
preparedness responsibly. But the biggest motivation for residents at this time is likely 
to be material needs, which means that if the people receive such financial reward for 
their participation in training, exercises and training residents to crisis situations. Also, 
it can be said that the residents will feel preparedness for crisis situations, they will feel 
safer and more confident, which is very interested in self-motivation to prepare for 
emergencies.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Each of the above motivational theories could be used in relation to motivating 
residents to prepare for crisis situations. However, if residents do not engender 
confidence among the heads of state, it is difficult to motivate them to approached the 
issue responsibly and prepare for the crisis phenomena.  Except from equity theory 
there is a scope for application of the theory of expectations and not least in the 
classical theories of Taylor, who claimed that people can be motivated mainly by 
financial rewards. It can be said that in general readiness of the population to crisis 
situation is not sufficient and the internal and external motivation for crisis 
preparedness is not given almost no attention. This primarily relates to the 
responsibility of the competent government authorities, municipalities and other 
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interested organizations and schools for the population's state of preparedness for 
crisis situations.  
For example, in the system of legislative adjustments SR essentially no 
comprehensive legislation that would comprehensively determine all the necessary 
documents for cross training of citizens and not the actual theory. Based on the 
theoretical background of the preparation of the population for crisis situations are 
clearly the issues that bind to motivate population to emergency preparedness. 
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Abstract  
 
In societies where different ethnic communities experience protracted ethnic or 
religious tension, high levels of social mistrust and feeling of insecurity are serious 
psychological barriers to promoting interethnic integration. The purpose of this 
research is to provide insight into the complex relationships between two empirically 
extracted dimensions of social trust (perceived collective respect for diversity and 
perceived collective willingness for cooperation) and personal feeling of security on one 
hand, with the ethnic background and minority/majority status on a local level on the 
other.  
The convenient sample used in this study consists of 764 participants, 48,3% 
ethnic Macedonians and 51,7% ethnic Albanians (52,2% females), from 19 towns in the 
country that differ in the minority/majority status of the two ethnic communities, 
depending on their ethnic composition. The respondents voluntarily and anonymously 
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provided information on their perceptions of the two dimensions of social trust by 
answering on a six-item subscale from De Rivera's Emotional climate scale (2007) and 
their personal feeling of security in the country by assessing it on a 7-point Likert scale.  
It was hypothesized that both independent factors (ethnicity and 
minority/majority status) will produce differences along all measured variables. The 
two-way ANOVA results showed that the two ethnic communities differ in respect to 
both dimensions of social trust and the personal feeling of security. In addition, there is 
a difference in the feeling of security that stems from minority/majority status on a 
local level, whereas this variable interacts with the ethnic background only in regard to 
the perceived collective willingness for cooperation. The results were interpreted within 
the frame of the existing inter-ethnic relations in the country and discussed from the 
perspective of their consequences in improving the overall emotional climate in the 
society. 
 
Key words: social trust, feeling of security ethnicity 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Recent scholarly research and discussions have become attentive in assessing 
the effects of ethnic diversity on social trust and social participation. Particularly 
interesting questions are whether the ethnic diversification leads to erosion of trust 
and increase in the overall feeling of social cohesion and security.  
The existing historical, social, religious, and language differences between the 
two major ethnic communities in the Republic of Macedonia - Albanians and 
Macedonians – have contributed to parallel coexistence and lack of interaction. The 
violent conflict between these two communities that started more than fifteen years 
ago ended with the Ohrid Framework Agreement that introduced measures to improve 
the status of the ethnic Albanian community. This agreement is still predominantly 
perceived as inefficient in resolving the issues of mutual mistrust and relatively high 
interethnic distance (Pecijarevski, 2011) despite the relative cooperation at 
governmental and institutional levels (eg. Rosůlek, 2011). The lack of social cohesion is 
the underlying cause for instability in inter-ethnic relations. One of the few empirical 
analysis carried out in the country, suggests that the social capital of Macedonian 
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society is very weak, leading to poor social cohesion and political stability and 
distrustful and distant inter-ethnic relations (Maleska, 2010). 
The role of social trust and a perceived personal security in providing social 
cohesion 
In explaining the concept called culture of peace, de Rivera points out that it 
can be defined as a multifaceted variable encompassing several wide measurable areas 
such as social norms, gender equality, democratic participation, open communication, 
respect for human rights, sustainable development and social cohesion and tolerance 
(de Rivera, 2007, 2009a; de Rivera & Paez, 2007). When the society applies appropriate 
mechanisms to address and obtain promotion of these eight core dimensions, these 
measures effectuate in relevant behavior of the majority of people. In such countries, 
people report having less fear of speaking, less anger at the government and less 
insecurity, and experience more social trust and care for the others out of the 
immediate family (de Rivera, 2009b). Further, it is also expected that they would be 
more able to accept differences without emotionally negative responding to them and 
respect each person's uniqueness and identity. It is proposed that under such overall 
psychological conditions, it is more likely that communities will take into account the 
plurality of people's values and interests and support resolution of conflicts without 
violence (Bar-Tal, Halperin & de Rivera, 2007).  
In de Rivera's view, the objective measures for any of these areas can be 
related to subjective self-reported measures of a nation’s emotional climate (de Rivera, 
1992).Therefore, the aspect of overall culture of peace labeled as social trust and 
tolerance could be operationalized as the extent to which understanding, tolerance, 
solidarity, and mutual obligation form the basis of the society and its role as a societal 
feature is of crucial importance in context of crisis or conflict188. Simmel (1950, p. 326) 
describes it as “one of the most important synthetic forces within society” while 
Fukuyama (1995) defines trust as the expectation that arises in a community on behalf 
of its members on the basis of shared norms and a belief that the others will behave in 
mutually supportive ways. Defining social trust in this way actually means accepting the 
two seemingly opposed approaches in conceptualizing it – the one that understands it 
as a quality of society rather than of individuals and vice versa.  At the individual level, 
social trust is associated with pro-social behavior (Sønderskov, 2011), while at the state 
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level, those societies where high-trusting people dominate are also those with better 
democratic governance and higher tolerance for diversity (Knack, 2002). Although not 
much research has been done to support the idea of mutuality of the individual and 
societal level of social trust, there is some evidence showing that countries with high 
trust scores have more trustworthy and honest citizens (Knack and Keefer 1997; Basabe 
& Valencia, 2007). Building on this notion, social trust could be meaningfully measured 
by using attitudinal survey questions although the approach that would include 
behavioral measures as well would be more valid (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman & 
Soutter, 2000).  
Collective emotions that shape individual and societal reactions in crisis and 
conflict are always accompanied with an overall feeling of security which might refer to 
personal and collective security separately (Bar-Tal, Jacobson, & Freund, 1995). This 
feeling of security is considered to be based mainly on cognitive assessments, although 
the affective component is always present as well. It is defined as a general evaluation 
of the ration between perceived threat or danger versus available defenses and the 
ability to cope with the perceived threat or danger (Bar-Tal, Halperin & deRivera, 2007). 
In addition to demonstrating the meaningfulness of measuring the experience of 
security, research has shown that the national emotional climate accounts more to 
feelings of being secure or insecure than the socioeconomic status does (Mahoney & 
Pinedo, 2007). Thus, this concept can at the same time be treated as part of the 
emotional climate and as its consequence.   
Taking into account the important role of the discussed concepts in developing 
a context for non-violent resolution of conflict and their not yet well examined role in 
forming political attitudes in multiethnic societies with protracted interethnic conflicts 
(Canetti-Nisim, Ariely & Halperin, 2008), as well as the need to obtain data on these 
relevant constructs from the region (Fritzhand & Petricevic, 2014), we have conducted 
this study in order to enrich the body of research with data on the extent of social trust 
and perceived personal security of the two largest ethnic groups in the Republic of 
Macedonia as well as to examine the relationships between the group status (minority 
or majority) on a national level and local level on one hand and the perceived trust and 
security on the other.  
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Relevant research 
 
It has been demonstrated that the higher the level of ethnic diversity within a 
community, the lower the level of trust (Rice and Steele, 2001). Research suggests that 
ethnicity can be related negatively to social trust only in communities that belong to 
ethnic minorities (e.g. Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Post, 2011; Smith, 1997). The reason 
that social trust is lower among ethnic minorities is ascribed to their frequent 
experiences with negative stereotyping, discrimination and lower socio-economic status 
(Smith, 2010).  
In answering the question about whether ethnic diversity has negative effect 
on trust, Dinesen & Sønderskov (2015) empirically demonstrate that ethnic diversity in 
the micro-context affects social trust negatively, but that the effect vanishes in a larger 
context. The authors propose that their findings suggest that interethnic exposure (not 
contact) underlies the negative relationship between social trust and ethnic diversity (in 
residential contexts)189. It might be expected that heterogeneity produces even less 
social trust in contexts where different ethnic groups have history of conflicts and 
tensions and where multiculturalism is not fostered systematically through education  
(Bahry, Mikhail, Kozyreva, & Wilson, 2005; Håkansson & Sjöholm, 2007). 
Recent studies mostly suggest that ethnic diversity challenges cooperation. In 
a European context, a negative link between ethnic diversity and cooperation has been 
confirmed both at attitudinal and behavioral measures of cooperation. Further, it has 
been confirmed that the willingness for cooperation varies in accordance to several 
relevant variables such as the diversity composition of the region, the composition of 
social networks and the quality of the inter-ethnic contacts (Sturgis, Brunton-Smith, 
Kuha & Jackson, 2014; Ulsaner, 2012; Veit, 2015). The decline of social cohesion and 
cooperativeness in multi-ethnic societies is explained in several ways and one of the 
most plausible seems to be that it is mediated by the anxieties of the unknown (e.g. 
Islam & Hewstone, 1993). On the other hand, in a meta-analysis of several existing 
studies, Schaeffer (2014) claims that the debate of the associations between ethnic 
diversity and social cooperation is yet rather inconclusive.  
                                                          
189 These results relate to the multiethnic composition of immigrant residence areas in Denmark 
and most closely resemble the conclusions from a study conducted in New Zealand (Sibley et al. 
2013). 
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In line with these findings, it was hypothesized that ethnic Albanians (minority) 
have lower social trust and personal feeling of security than ethnic Macedonians 
(majority). In addition to the effect of the status of minority vs. majority at the national 
level, we will examine the effect of this status on a local level, with the expectation that 
it also reflects on the social trust and personal feeling of security in the same direction. 
However, our expectation is that the two status levels have different effects on the 
examined dimensions of social trust. As per perceived willingness for cooperation (H1), it 
was hypothesized that the main effect of minority/majority status will appear only at 
the national level (with ethnic majority scoring lower). The reason of proposing that 
being majority on a national level is associated with decrease in perceived willingness 
for cooperation is the well documented 'fear of otherness' which is more typical for 
groups that are majorities. On a local level, the status will not produce significant 
difference, but following the same line of reasoning, the lowest average is expected in 
ethnic Macedonians who live in cities where they are majority.  
 In regards to respect for diversity (H2), it was expected that the first main 
effects will be significant (status on a national level) and that ethnic Albanians who are 
minority on a local level demonstrate the lowest scores because the outcome will be 
fortified due to the "double" minority status.  A similar reasoning applies for perceived 
personal security (H3) It is expected that both main effects will make difference in 
lowering the means of minorities and in addition, that ethnic Macedonians will have 
lowest feeling of being secure (interactive effect).  
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
The convenient sample used in this study consists of 764 participants, 48.3% 
ethnic Macedonians and 51.7% ethnic Albanians (52.2% females) from 19 towns in the 
country that differ in the minority/majority status of the two ethnic communities, 
depending on their ethnic composition190. Their minimal education level was 12 years of 
schooling and the age range was 18-58 (M=34; SD=10.3).  
                                                          
190 For instance, according to the proportion of inhabitants, Skopje is a place of living where 
ethnic Macedonians are majority, whereas in Debar they are minority.  
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They participated voluntarily in the study and were recruited on the basis of 
fitting into the following required criteria: ethnic background, age group, place of living 
and gender. They were answering the questions anonymously in a presence of 
previously trained questioners.  
Measurements 
 De Rivera (2007) constructed a 24-item scale aimed to measure the collective 
feelings related to security, insecurity, confidence, depression, anger, love, fear, and 
trust. The construct has 5 facets organized in respective subscales. In this research, 
only the social trust subscale has been taken into account. This questionnaire consists 
of 6 items that are responded on a 7-point Likert type scale. For this particular group of 
respondents it has a reasonable internal consistency of Cronbach alpha r=0.60. Further 
analysis of the items performed by factor analysis (principal components with Varimax 
rotation) has shown that five of them fit into a two-factor model that explains 52% of 
the variance. In this study these two factors were treated as separate dimensions of 
social trust: perceived collective respect for diversity (3 items) and perceived collective 
willingness for cooperation (2 items191). For simplicity, in the further text they will be 
referred to as "respect for diversity" and "willingness for cooperation".  
In order to measure the personal feeling of security, the study employed a 
simple approach of asking participants how secure they feel in the country and having 
them assess it on a seven-point scale ranging from 1=not at all to 7=fully, with 4 being 
a neutral position (neither secure not insecure). All included questions were translated 
by the forward-backward method from Macedonian in Albanian by two bilingual 
persons. Thus, each participant could respond in their mother language.  
 
 
Results 
 
Variables included in the study are described in terms of mean averages, 
standard deviations and their correlations with gender and age (Table 1). Table 2 
contains information on the mean averages and standard deviations for each of the 
relevant subgroups that are included in the further analysis. The averages for the two 
                                                          
191 Taking into account that one item has equal loadings on the two factors, it has been removed 
from the further analysis. 
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dimensions of social trust are around or below the neutral point. In other words, on 
average, participants feel neither safe nor unsafe (M=3.76), and perceive that there is a 
little respect for diversity (M=10.15/3=3.38) and willingness for cooperation 
(M=5.88/2=2.94). These three variables, as it could be expected, correlate significantly. 
Whereas gender does not appear to be associated with any of the examined variables, 
age is positively connected to willingness for cooperation (r=0.11; p<0.01) and security 
(r=0.36; p<0.01).  
 
Table1. Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for the variables 
  M SD Xmin Xmax 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Collective respect for 
diversity 
10.15 3.36 3 21 - .    
2. Collective willingness 
for cooperation 
5.88 2. 15 2 14 .88** -    
3. Personal feeling of 
security 
3.76 1.96 1 7 .44** .13** -   
4. Gender 
(1=male;2=female) 
1.52 0.50 - - -.03 -.40 .03 -  
5. Age 34.1 10.20 18 58 .03 .11** .36** ,02 - 
**p<.01; *p<.05 
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Table2. Descriptive statistics for the included variables for the subgroups 
Local level Majority  Minority  Total 
Collective respect for 
diversity  
 N M SD  N M SD  N M SD 
Ethnic Macedonians 341 11.02 3.40 28 10.85 3.63 369 11.00 3.42 
Ethnic Albanians 230 9.58 3.29 160 8.98 3.56 3.41 9.33 390 
Total 571 10.43 3.43 188 9.25 3.62 3.51 10.10 759 
Local level Majority  Minority  Total 
Collective willingness 
for cooperation 
 N M SD  N M SD  N M SD 
Ethnic Macedonians 341 5.61 2.44 28 5.43 2.21 369 5.59 2.33 
Ethnic Albanians 231 6.17 2.31 163 6.34 2.55 394 6.23 2.48 
Total 572 5.83 2.35 191 6.20 2.61 763 5.92 2.43 
Local level Majority  Minority  Total 
Personal feeling of 
security 
 N M SD  N M SD N M SD 
Ethnic Macedonians 341 4.53 1.87 28 3.89 2.80 369 4.49 1.85 
Ethnic Albanians 231 3.22 1.82 164 2.91 1.70 395 3.09 1.81 
Total 572 4.00 1.95 192 3.05 1.79 764 3.76 1.96 
 
For testing the hypotheses, two-way ANOVA was performed192, with 
minority/majority on national level, i.e. ethnicity (MIN/MAJ-NAT) and minority/majority 
on local level (MIN/MAJ-LOC) treated as independent variables.  The results are 
presented in Tables 3-5.  
 
  
                                                          
192 All performed Levine tests for homogeneity of variances allowed the further comparisons.  
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Table 3. Analysis of variance for Willingness for cooperation 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p 
Corrected Model 81.56 3 27.18 4.66 .003 
Intercept 11290.70 1 11290.70 1936.81 .000 
MIN/MAJ-NAT  43.68 1 43.68 7.49 .006 
MIN/MAJ-LOC .005 1 .005 .00 .977 
LOC * NAT 2.56 1 2.53 .43 .510 
Error 4424.61 759 5.83   
Total 31330.000 763    
 
The hypothesis that the status of minority on national level is associated with 
lower perceived willingness for cooperation is supported by the findings. The significant 
main effect (Fnat(1)= 7.49; p<.01)  of ethnicity means that the minority status on a 
national level is accompanied with higher social trust that stems from perceived 
willingness for cooperation on a societal level, which is confirmatory finding for the first 
part of the proposed hypothesis. The expected absence of significant differences on a 
local level is also confirmed. The post–hos test conducted to examine whether ethnic 
Macedonians who live in cities where they are minority have lowest average on this 
variable, did not fully support the expectation. The only significant difference (p<0.05) 
has been found between them and the ethnic Albanians who are minority at both levels. 
Thus, H1 is mostly, but not fully confirmed. 
 
Table 4. Analysis of variance for Diversity respect 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p 
Corrected Model 566.74 3 188.92 16.18 .000 
Intercept 33189.85 1 33189.85 2843.24 .000 
MIN/MAJ-NAT  224.03 1 224.03 19.19 .000 
MIN/MAJ-LOC 11.84 1 11.84 1.02 .314 
LOC * NAT 3.98 1 3.98 0.34 .559 
Error 8813.31 755 11.67   
Total 87496.00 759    
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The hypothesis H2 that the status of minority on both national and local level is 
associated with lower social trust from perspective of perceived respect for diversity on 
a societal level was only partially accepted. Results presented in Table 4 show that 
there is a significant difference (Fnat(1)= 19.19; p<.01)  only between ethnic Albanians 
and Macedonians (main effect1) and that the status on a local level does not contribute 
to the dependent variable (Floc(1)= 1.02; p>.05)  . Considering that ethnic Albanians 
perceive less respect for diversity than ethnic Macedonians, but minorities do not differ 
from majorities in general (absence of main effect 2), H2 is partially confirmed.  
 
Table 5. Analysis of variance for Perception of security 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F p 
Corrected Model 392.87 3 130.96 39.31 .000 
Intercept 4312.36 1.00 4312.36 1294.50 .000 
MIN/MAJ-NAT  108.35 1.00 108.35 32.53 .000 
MIN/MAJ-LOC 18.18 1.00 18.18 5.46 .020 
LOC * NAT 2.32 1.00 2.32 0.70 .404 
Error 2531.78 760.00 3.33   
Total 392.87 3.00 130.96 39.31  
 
The analysis has shown that both main effects are significant (Fnat(1)= 32.53; 
p<.01;  Floc (1)= 5.46; p<.05 ) and they are not accompanied with an interactive effect. 
Being minority both at national and local level is associated with feelings of being less 
secure, but there is no effect of interaction as it has been hypothesized. Thus, H3 is 
partially confirmed as well.  
 
 
Disussion 
 
Taking into account that all tested hypotheses were partially confirmed, it is 
very hard to make general conclusions, especially because the issue of social trust is 
largely underexplored in this particular region. The only indication that appears to be 
quite clear is connected with the absence of significant interaction effects across all 
tested variables More precisely, it seems that the impact of being minority or majority 
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generally is the strongest one and that the experiences on a local level do not 
contribute much towards the cohesion, especially not in a way that it changes the 
direction of the effect. These finding are not in full congruence with the other studies 
where it is claimed that mere exposure to others decreases social trust (Aizlewood, & 
Pendakur, 2005; Dinesen & Sønderskov, 2015; Schaeffer, 2014; Veit, 2015). However, it 
has to be stressed that the comparison cannot be made without special caution 
regarding the context. Vast majority of studies were conducted in countries or regions 
where ethnic minorities are immigrants with no significant involvement in the political 
realm of the state.   
Generally, results suggest that being majority on national level is linked to 
perceiving that the society respects diversity less and to feeling less secure. In most 
studies these links are explained with experienced or anticipated discrimination, as well 
as to lower socio-economic status and lower education which often overlaps with the 
ethnic categorization (Achbari, 2016). This might be a case in the Republic of 
Macedonia, but that does not mean that there are no alternative explanations. Another 
plausible interpretation might be that the group identity of minority collectives is built 
upon the narrative of being less powerful and under threat of oppression (Merino & 
Tileaga, 2010; van Dijk, 1993).  
Last but not least, it should be stressed that this study has serious limitations 
that should not be ignored. Firstly, although planned in a way that resembles quota 
sampling, the sample is convenient. Along with that, very important factors that proved 
to be salient (Sturgis, Brunton-Smith, Kuha & Jackson, 2014) were not controlled: the 
extent of possibilities for contact that provides cooperation and whether some inter-
ethic social networks were established or not193. In addition, the instruments that were 
used are very limited in the number of items and the measurements are very robust 
and even not easily comparable with other similar studies. Another important 
methodological reminder is that the results are sensitive to the way in which social 
trust is operationalized and measured194.  
                                                          
193 Therefore, although our findings are in line with the conflict theory (Blalock 1967) which 
claims that social environments induce a feeling of threat in minority and majority groups, that 
does not necessarily means that they oppose the competing contact theory. 
194 In this particular case, ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians demonstrate differences in 
opposite directions when the variable is decomposed into two dimensions. Having been 
measured otherwise, these differences might have been blurred. In this context, it made sense 
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There are several general approaches proposed in relevant literature on how to 
increase the level of trust in social relationships and the feeling of security. Bar-Tall 
(2009) proposes reconciliation among groups which have experienced tensions, 
mistrust and conflict that might begin by institutionalizing values, beliefs, attitudes and 
practices of culture of peace mainly through education. Another way of building trust in 
inter-ethnic context is by investing into providing personal contact among individuals 
from different ethnic backgrounds based on the need for mutual cooperation (Lemmer 
&Wagner, 2015) as well as by addressing all kinds of structural inequalities (Portes & 
Vickstrom, 2011). This analysis however, once again points to the need of in-depth 
research of ethnic diversity and its effects on social cohesion that takes a more into 
account the nuances of the context as well as the perspectives of different groups.  
Having this in mind, it should be considered as an initiation of further relevant research 
(preferably both qualitative and quantitative) and debate on this important issue in the 
region rather than as a conclusive study. 
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Abstract 
 
Security culture, as a relatively new and still insufficiently developed concept 
within security studies, has a wide range of meanings and interpretations, allowing us 
to view the application of this concept in different socio-political and security contexts. 
Multiculturalism is another phenomenon that does not have a long history, although it 
is very important in the contemporary world and manifests itself in various fields such 
as politics, culture, economy, education and, of course, security. The cultural diversity of 
every modern society is multidimensional and includes not only biological/sex 
differences, culturally translated into gender differences, but also generational 
differences as well as the socially conditioned ones which concern national, religious 
and regional affiliation and membership in a language community.  
One of the many interpretations and explanations of the concept of 
multiculturalism at the beginning of the 21st century, particularly bearing in mind social 
practices, is that it poses a threat to security. Such a perspective on multiculturalism 
involves applying the concept of security culture in order to identify different forms of 
cultural pluralism, each of which can present a challenge with its specific 
characteristics, manifestations, and forms of (non-)acceptance by the wider social 
community.  
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Although societies and countries of the Balkans can be shown to be extremely 
multicultural, multiculturalism as a politico-ideological concept has not been given its 
rightful place in these very societies and countries. For that reason, in this paper we will 
try to show that development of security culture within different social subjects and 
institutions, such as educational, is a precondition for a better understanding of the 
contradictions and developmental prospects of multicultural societies (in the Balkans). 
 
Keywords: security culture, multiculturalism, cultural pluralism, Balkans. 
 
 
Multiculturalism 
 
Multiculturalism is emerging as a possible response to the problem of 
multicultural reality of modern societies. This concept involves various forms of cultural 
pluralism, each of which can present some kind of challenge. The issues and challenges 
of multiculturalism and cultural diversity are increasingly becoming major talking points 
at global political forums and within academic circles. As a policy, philosophy or social 
and intellectual movement, multiculturalism refers to the acceptance of different 
cultures in a society and entails active support for these cultural differences by various 
groups. While multiculturalism is increasingly recommended as effective intervention at 
a social level, above all at a local level, it is a debatable and emotionally fraught term 
(Verkuyten, 2004). The problems and dilemmas surrounding multiculturalism are 
addressed, among others, by political scientists, (moral) philosophers and sociologists 
(Taylor 1992, Goldberg 1994, Kymlicka 1995, Favell 1998, Barry 2001, to name a few). 
Some of them highlight the positive sides of multiculturalism (this concept offers a 
solution for the management of cultural differences), while others focus on the 
negatives (it aggravates the causes of conflicts, incites separatism and jeopardises 
social unity and cohesion).   
The most commonly held view is that a state is multicultural if its citizens 
either belong to different nations (multinational state) or have emigrated from different 
nations (polyethnic state) and if this fact represents a major aspect of personal identity 
and political life. Some authors, political officials and civil society representatives use 
the term “multicultural” in a broader sense, so that it encompasses a wide range of 
non-ethnic social groups which are, for different reasons, marginalised or excluded from 
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the dominant social matrix. Others include enclaves, social movements and voluntary 
associations in the term (Kymlicka, 2004).  
This diversity gives rise to a host of questions which can become points of 
contention in a state and society at a regional, national or local level. Establishment of 
regional autonomy, exercise of language rights, political representation, immigration 
policy and national symbols are only some of the issues that lead to conflict between 
national minorities and national majorities. The biggest challenge facing today’s 
democratic countries, regardless of where they are in the world, is precisely how to 
resolve these problems in the most acceptable way.   
If we were to go back in time and observe different historical periods and 
epochs, from the Roman Empire to the modern age, we would see that all the 
populations in these epochs were made up of linguistically, culturologically and 
religiously heterogeneous groups and that there was always the question of how to 
manage these different groups and negotiate their everyday practices and the 
interactions that surround them. The time of mass migrations in the second half of the 
19th century brought with it some new issues concerning diversity management, but 
expectations for assimilation, on one hand,and public rejection of social and cultural 
differences, on the other, were largely responsible for keeping the government in power 
in certain countries. The second half of the 20th century is famous for the emergence of 
different civil rights movements, which called for, among other things, public measures 
for reducing discrimination, as well as different challenges facing social, political and 
public services that arose from the new wave of immigration. The period saw the 
adoption of policies, structures and programmes designed to tackle the new differences 
and integrate them into the existing social structure.      
In order to respond to multiculturalism adequately different institutional 
initiatives were launched, opening up numerous possibilities such as group 
representation in local and national authorities, restructuring of public services, 
introduction of measures for the promotion of equality, respect and tolerance, 
especially the dominant population’s tolerance of the minorities, and provision of funds 
to aid continuity of tradition and identity among immigrant groups (as opposed to 
assimilation). As Steven Vertovec states in his text, in many countries multiculturalism 
required actions in the following areas:        
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• public recognition: supporting ethnic minority organisations, facilities and 
activities and creating public consultative bodies incorporating such 
organizations; 
• education: often addressing dress, gender and other issues sensitive to the 
values of specific ethnic and religious minorities; creating curricula reflecting 
the backgrounds of ethnic minority pupils; offering mother tongue teaching 
and language support and establishing own schools (publicly financed or not); 
• culturally sensitive practices, training and information established within social 
services and among healthcare providers, police and the law courts; 
• public materials: providing public material (such as health promotion 
campaigns) in multiple languages; 
• law: recognising cultural exceptions to laws (such as Sikh turbans instead of 
motorcycle helmets); permitting oaths on sacred books other than the Bible; 
recognising other marriage, divorce and inheritance traditions; 
• protecting cultural practices from discrimination and incitement to hatred – 
religious accommodation: permitting and supporting the establishment of 
places of worship, cemeteries and funerary rites; allowing time off work for 
worship; 
• food: allowing ritual slaughter; providing proscribed foods (halal, kosher, 
vegetarian) in public institutions; 
• Broadcasting and media: monitoring group images to ensure non-
discrimination or to avoid stereotypes; providing own media facilities for 
minority groups (Vertovec, 2010:84). 
 
As we have already mentioned, developed, western societies (democracies) 
approach multiculturalism differently from the rest of the world, which is why this issue 
has been developed and accepted to varying degrees as a political and ideological 
concept. A recurrent dilemma in all societies is how to achieve, by means of democratic 
multiculturalism, a rich pluralist culture that includes society as a whole rather than 
have a mere assimilation of minority cultures. Balkan countries and societies find this 
issue/problem even harder to resolve, seeing as they have not even reached the 
appropriate degree of democracy, that is, of democratic and political culture. Another 
dilemma that stems from the discussion about multiculturalism and the failure of some 
ethnic communities to integrate into a majority society is whether that poses a threat 
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to (national) security and how to strike the right balance between safeguarding cultural 
diversity and maintaining national cohesion in times of war or a state of emergency. In 
other words, is it possible to reach a compromise between multiculturalism and security 
and, furthermore, how can this be achieved in the Balkans?195 
Namely, the Balkans is a region with an undefined and unstable political 
identity. Adding to this observation a new one – that one should renounce one’s 
national identity and nationalism in order to embrace liberal, European and Western 
principles – only causes more frustration for all Balkan peoples. Most Balkan nations 
see themselves as peoples living at the crossroads where roads between Europe and 
Asia both converge and diverge. In addition to being the historic birthplace of numerous 
civilisations, the Balkans is also a zone characterised by ethnic heterogeneity, on one 
hand, and the meeting place of three major religions, i.e. Western Christianity, Eastern 
Christianity and Islam, on the other. This ethnic, religious and cultural heterogeneity is 
often cited as the main cause of conflicts, historical turmoil and interethnic wars, as 
well as an impediment to the region’s complete self-identification and preservation of 
an established cultural identity. Under the influence of a dynamics determined by 
ethnic and religious heterogeneity, thus established identity of the entire region or 
individual peoples inhabiting it is subject to changes and internal transformations 
(Štrbac, 2007). 
Lack of intercultural communication in the Balkans, which is a prerequisite for 
cultural convergence, is the result of interethnic relationships being burdened with past 
events, hostility and prejudice. Terms such as European “powder keg” and 
“balkanisation” were coined in late 19th and early 20th centuries to denote the events 
and relations between Balkan countries. Some authors identify culture as the trigger for 
hatred and wars in the Balkans, which was particularly evident in the 1990s. Today, 
those who support this view also claim that culture emerged almost intact from these 
                                                          
195This is not an easy question to answer not only in connection with the Balkans but more 
generally, especially when other categories are factored into the analysis. Namely, it is said that 
freedom is a key factor in security, and both are significant for multiculturalism. Everything, 
then, can be considered in terms of how much freedom, what kind of freedom, who should be 
given freedom, why and how freedom should be restricted, and who should have their freedom 
restricted, etc. in society and in the states that are rich in various cultural and national 
identities whose needs for an adequate degree of freedom is often in conflict with each other. 
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wars and that it is ready, if the need arises, to once again serve the same purpose: to 
ignite (Stanarević, Dimitrijević, Milenković, 2013). 
On the other hand, establishment of a multicultural public sphere in the 
Balkans seems impossible due to its heavy politicization which prevents minority rights 
emerging from the obscurity of intimacy and privacy. “Conflicts and war ideologies in 
the Balkans can only partly be explained by internal contradictions, as they almost 
always appear in tandem with interested political elites” (Milošević, 2007:13). Even when 
talking about the concept of public recognition of minority identities, that is, their 
protection by a special legal status, we can see how difficult it is to consider it outside 
the political framework.   
This is because the state is not neutral about differences, and its institutions 
could be said to favour “some languages, majority cultural practices or national 
symbols, at the expense of others” (Pešić, Novaković, 2010:150). This is particularly 
pronounced in the process of creating a national state on the following principle: one 
nation, one language, one culture, one territory. The consequence of such a process in 
the Balkan region is domination of the social majority, that is, assimilation and lack of 
recognition of minority groups and their cultural identities. There is a huge gap 
between civil rights and national identity seeing as members of minority groups in the 
Balkans feel marginalised due to their different social and cultural identity, despite all 
the common citizenship rights they enjoy. For, as one of the founders of the concept of 
multiculturalism, Will Kymlicka, points out: “citizenship is not only a legal status, 
defined by a set of rights and responsibilities. It is also an identity, an expression of 
one’s membership in a political community” (Kymlicka in: Pešić, Novaković, 2010:150). 
The liberal model, according to which cultural minorities will be protected if 
basic civil and political rights are guaranteed to all individuals regardless of their social 
and cultural affiliation, has proved to be somewhat flawed in multicultural societies in 
the Balkans. Civil rights cannot be said to be ethically neutral, since cultural affiliation 
determines the outcome of political decisions and, as a result, the state is not “blind to 
differences” (Puzić, 2004). What is more, consciously or unconsciously it promotes some 
languages, cultural practices or national symbols while inevitably ignoring or 
suppressing others. However, such coexistence is hard to forge in the Balkans and, 
consequently, instead of finally working towards a “culture of peace”, Balkan societies 
are once again engaging in ideological mobilization of the masses. So here we are, 
reproducing the discourse of “balkanization” all over again. 
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Security culture and multiculturalism  
 
Without wishing to delve deeper into all that multiculturalism is and is not, 
that is, into all of its manifestations and varieties observed, for example, in the USA, 
Canada, Australia or Great Britain, we would like to show how better to understand the 
many contradictions and development potential of multiculturalism and multicultural 
societies (for instance, in the Balkans). There have been numerous attempts to prevent 
cultural diversity in a society from becoming a serious threat, which can easily disrupt 
social relations. The concept of multiculturalism has revealed both its advantages and 
disadvantages in an attempt to solve the problems that may arise from cultural 
diversity. By developing different policies and programmes in political, social, 
educational or other spheres, this concept managed to partially solve some problems 
while creating new ones. In response to the threats of terrorism and political violence or 
the big wave of migrations in recent years, security has come into a sharper focus, 
coinciding with the attack on multiculturalism and the suitability of multiculturalist 
policy. 
For this very reason, we have come increasingly to perceive multiculturalism as 
a challenge, as an ideological and political response which creates problems, disrupts 
unity or the form of community achieved in a society. In the wave of migrations 
sweeping Europe in recent years, there is more and more talk about securitization of 
migrations and, by extension, of multiculturalism. In a bid to determine whether it is 
appropriate to securitize migrations and, by extension, multiculturalism, we must look 
for those concepts and practices that will provide a suitable solution for situations in 
which it is (il) legitimate to talk about securitization and representation of migrations 
and multiculturalism as security problems, as well as for the factors that can be 
necessary prerequisites for a proper understanding of these phenomena. It seems to us 
that security culture is one of those factors.  
From a modern standpoint, security culture refers to the way in which certain 
ideas about the security system and structure are developed, as well as about what is 
perceived as a danger to our lives or a threat to our values, and is at the same time our 
most obvious defence against them. It is a factor in shaping what is invaluable or 
important and it regulates our moral, security, economic and political priorities 
(Stanarević, 2012). In addition to defining the possibilities and limitations of what is 
considered important, valuable or not valuable, security culture determines what does 
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and does not deserve protection and how to go about providing it. We have already 
stated that Balkan peoples lack democratic and political cultures or, more precisely, a 
full manifestation of these cultures, but before these cultural forms are fully developed, 
it might be more worthwhile to develop a security culture.   
Security culture is also manifested in the way we understand the environment 
in the broadest sense, show an understanding for the dynamic of social relations (both 
at an individual and general level, between different social groups, different cultures, 
etc.), perceive the importance of absolute control over one’s own goods (the principle of 
sovereignty) as well as in the way in which we perceive and define dangers and/or 
threats, determine interests and choose means or instruments of action (Stanarević, 
2012). 
It is a well-known fact that culture, as a collective heritage, offers guidelines to 
its members and produces a wealth of ideas and practices, rules and norms which 
indicate what is right and what is wrong. Also, culture shapes the lives of its members, 
not only as individuals but also collectively. Like traditional culture, security culture 
selects values, in this case those which are relevant to survival (of an individual or 
community) and which should assume a leading role in society, particularly when the 
values of different groups are in conflict or threaten to provoke conflict (Stanarević, 
Gačić, 2014).   
In that case, there are many possibilities and many values to be chosen, even 
when they are not necessarily key to survival but are only a token of respect for some 
human or minority rights. So, for example, if we must choose between freedom and 
security, or between freedom, security and multiculturalism, we need to introduce some 
principles that will help us more easily to resolve potential contradictions which arise 
from favouring one of the aforementioned values. In his text The Challenges of 
Multiculturalism, the author Malory Nye discusses the principle of recognising and 
acknowledging diversity, the study of differences – a multicultural society is unstable if 
it is based on the isolation of certain groups and the different groups’ unfamiliarity with 
each other – the principle of tolerance and understanding, as well as the strengthening 
of general shared identity which goes beyond but at the same encompasses 
singularities (Nye, 2007). The European Union and the Council of Europe advocate an 
alternative to multiculturalism – intercultural dialogue – and it is the above principles 
that these institutions promote in the process of establishing new frameworks of soft 
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policy measures as support to strategies for opening dialogue between different 
cultural groups in a society196.   
The European Union also defines standards with which the legal systems of all 
new member states must be aligned. Minorities are a major issue as far as organization 
of political, cultural and economic life is concerned, rather than a lesser phenomenon 
which can solved by technical means. Tackling the issue of minorities on legal bases is 
aimed at integrating minorities into society – into its political, economic, cultural and 
other forms and institutions. This would help avoid assimilation and ghettoization, and 
harmonise the relations and cooperation between the majority and all the minorities in 
keeping with the principles of the rule of law and the democratic social system. 
Difficulties arise out of the vast differences in the economic position, the infrastructure 
of the education network and the level of education of some minorities, as well as in 
their material and human resources. Difficulties are also due to the failure of the 
national education system to adequately deal with these issues. Even when laws and 
regulations are in place, their enforcement lacks appropriate activities and results. 
Since the modern world is full of contradictions, the inevitable question is how 
and to what extent education can help avoid conflict and develop awareness of “the 
other” and of the interdependence, challenges, risks and threats which put a strain on 
everyday life and which will encourage people to face them and respond appropriately; 
also, it can help inspire people to cooperate. Level of education, quality of education 
and academic achievements all have an impact on how a person treats themselves, 
other people, members of different ethnic groups, mankind (Irvine, 2003). For this 
reason it is very important how curriculums and syllabuses are designed and developed 
at all the levels of the national education system, what personnel should be trained to 
pass on knowledge, and how and under what circumstances knowledge is passed on. 
Unified national education programmes must be created so as to promote 
values which are important for a future shared life and ideas which will bring stability 
and, above all, security for the entire community; furthermore, they must fulfil 
conditions that involve traditional values connected with the life of all the groups living 
                                                          
196 In 2008, at the Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign Affairs 118th Ministerial Session, the 
White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue was adopted, and it was presented as a model for cultural 
diversity management aimed at future. The basic idea of this concept is "Living Together as 
Equals in Dignity". (White Paper, 2008). Dimitrijević, Branko, ed. Bela knjiga o interkulturnom 
dijalogu “Živimo jednaki u dostojanstvu”. Beograd. Ministarstvo kulture Republike Srbije 2009. 
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in this space, appeal to all social strata, respond to challenges responsibly and appeal 
to neighbouring countries, with which they primarily cooperate and develop good-
neighbourly relations. This further implies that multiculturalism is understood not only 
as cultural diversity but also as a need to ensure equality as well as other components 
such as social equality and inclusion (Berry, 2012).  
Ideas about culturally responsive teaching, multi-cultural education and the 
like are already established in the literature and the education programmes of many 
countries. As the author Geneva Gay stated back in 1972:  
“Education must be specifically designed to perpetuate and enrich the culture 
of a people and equip them with the tools to become functional participants in society, 
if they so choose. This education cannot progress smoothly unless it is based upon and 
proceeds from the cultural perspectives of the group of people for whom it is designed. 
Since all Americans do not have the same set of beliefs, attitudes, customs, values, and 
norms, a single system of education seems impossible to serve everyone. . . . 
[Educators] must accept the existence of cultural pluralism in this country and respect 
differences without equating them with inferiorities or tolerating them with an air of 
condescension” (Gay, 1972: 35). 
 
Or expanded on her views in 2010: 
 
“Culturally responsive teaching is the behavioural expressions of knowledge, 
beliefs, and values that recognize the importance of racial and cultural diversity in 
learning. It is contingent on . . . seeing cultural differences as assets; creating caring 
learning communities where culturally different individuals and heritages are valued; 
using cultural knowledge of ethnically diverse cultures, families, and communities to 
guide curriculum development, classroom climates, instructional strategies, and 
relationships with students; challenging racial and cultural stereotypes, prejudices, 
racism, and other forms of intolerance, injustice, and oppression; being change agents 
for social justice and academic equity; mediating power imbalances in classrooms based 
on race, culture, ethnicity, and class; and accepting cultural responsiveness as endemic 
to educational effectiveness in all areas of learning for students from all ethnic groups” 
(Gay, 2010:31). 
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While it may be common knowledge, it bears repeating that education is 
charged with tasks of a wider social importance – to guide people and instil in them 
human rights, aesthetic, moral, ethnic, national, cultural and universal humanistic 
values, and teach them to understand the necessity of international cooperation and 
preservation of world peace and security as the prerequisites for human existence. In 
modern society, increasing importance is attached to education not least because of the 
ever-growing complexity of all forms of life and the introduction of high technologies, 
which also carry with them certain security risks. In that sense, raising the level of 
security culture through a national education system is instrumental in saving the 
human community from (self-) destruction, in which process the power of the human 
intellect and culture is relied upon the most.  
Namely, let us recall a definition given by Ljubomir Stajić, who says that  
“security culture is a set of accepted attitudes, knowledge, skills and rules from 
the field of security, manifesting themselves as behaviour and process, about the 
necessity, ways and means of protecting personal, social and international values from 
all sources, forms and agents of threat, regardless of the time or place of their 
realisation”  (Stajić, 2013). 
If we lay emphasis on knowledge, considering the context in which Stajić 
provided his definition, then it refers to theoretical, practical, professional and personal 
knowledge (learning) that helps to identify correctly and explain the phenomenon of 
threats as well as the knowledge that serves to remove and suppress or, at the very 
least, mitigate them. This kind of knowledge is acquired through education in the field 
of security and other social, technical or natural disciplines. 
Security culture as a body of knowledge can be represented and examined 
through a modern, humanistically conceived curriculum which is meant to offer a 
possibility of creating a general sociocultural climate conducive to the exercise and 
respect of basic human rights, non-violent behaviour and development of soft skills and 
hard skills for the application of these principles in day-to-day life. The concept of 
security culture looks at the factors which fall within the scope of analysis, contributing 
to greater security, and at the socio-political and economic relations which are most 
likely to generate maximum security for individuals, groups, nations-states and the 
world as a whole. Furthermore, it is necessary to develop the ability to understand and 
respect the role of culture and its influence on politics, strategy and security, this being 
a key skill of security thinking. Cultural knowledge involves the capacity to examine 
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history, values, ideology, politics, religion and cultural and other dimensions, as well as 
to assess their potential impact on security policy. It is worth pointing out that not only 
knowledge about security and security phenomena (as stated in some definitions) but 
also cultural knowledge, if only as a context in which a security phenomenon takes 
place, are significant for the development of new perspectives on security culture. One 
of the new perspectives is multiculturalism, that is, multicultural societies and 
environments which experience some kind of security issue that needs to be 
understood, explained and resolved taking into account the different cultural practices, 
cultural patterns, and traditional, religious or ethical systems of the social groups living 
in that space.  
Unlike traditional curriculums, which essentially entailed students learning the 
content of a syllabus by rote, modern curriculums are aimed not only at developing 
critical thinking, research skills and problem-solving skills in students, but also at 
enabling them to make decisions that are important for leading a successful life in a 
fast-changing society which is going through crisis cycles and in which the acquired 
knowledge fast becomes obsolete. In other words, what we need is knowledge about 
constructive human behaviour and skills which can be used to prevent the harmful 
consequences of fast changes for every individual, social group and society as a whole. 
These skills derive from knowledge about gender equality and human rights principles 
and non-violence as well as from the ideas about why and how these principles should 
be upheld, elaborated and applied in practice. These principles should be discussed with 
all the actors in the educational process (both the formal and informal dimension) in 
the context of the characteristics of these actors, their immediate and broader social 
environment, dominant religion and cultural traditions.  
All the above can once again be confirmed by the views expressed by Geneva 
Gay, who argues that culturally responsive teaching 
“simultaneously develops, along with academic achievement, social 
consciousness and critique; cultural affirmation, competence, and exchange; . . . 
individual self-worth and abilities; and an ethic of caring. It uses [different] ways of 
knowing, understanding, and representing various ethnic and cultural groups in 
teaching academic subjects, processes, and skills. It cultivates cooperation, 
collaboration, reciprocity, and mutual responsibility for learning among students, and 
between students and teachers. It incorporates high-status, cultural knowledge about 
different ethnic groups in all subjects and skills taught. . . . Thus, [it] validates, 
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facilitates, liberates, and empowers ethnically diverse students by . . . cultivating their 
cultural integrity, individual abilities, and academic success.” (Gay, 2010: 45–46). 
In addition to the foregoing, all the experiences, ideas and issues that appear 
in the meantime should be analysed, directed and encouraged in such a way as to foster 
the development and dissemination of security culture as a new manifestation of the 
knowledge that should contribute to survival, development and well-being. This must 
also entail measures for greater equity in access to education (at all levels) of all social 
strata, greater education coverage, greater efficiency and access to education, and, of 
course, curriculums and syllabuses suited to future needs and tailored to the needs of 
different groups.   
The development and application of the concept of security culture based on 
education involves transmitting and cultivating knowledge, abilities and specialised 
skills, forming opinions and broadening the horizons of individuality. Like other social 
institutions, formal institutions in the field of education and upbringing have manifest 
and latent functions. Manifest functions include, for example: teaching and learning 
(foreign) languages, mathematics and natural sciences, and knowledge from the fields 
of economy, geography, history and law. Latent functions include cultural codes, 
maintenance of social control and social hierarchy, and promotion of social integration, 
all of which are instrumental in supporting multiculturalism.    
As cited in the literature that deals with this problem matter, there is an 
ongoing historical attempt to construct a new set of educational practices in response 
to turmoil and violence and, by extension, to security concerns. In this context, the idea 
of the individual subject, which was the object of much calculation in a material context, 
was also part of a related series of practical transformations, an attempt to rearticulate 
both identity and epistemology in the service of new social practices which lead to 
peace and civil order.  
We live in a time of innovations and breakthroughs in the very techniques for 
conducting culturological research into matters of peace and security. Educational 
institutions, particularly institutions of higher education, need to be part of a wider 
surge of interest in cultural research as well as issues of conflict and other security 
problems. Major advances in the overcoming of cultural barriers concerning the 
challenges of global governance can be made if a range of changes are implemented, 
from cultural education to culturological research, as well as in situational drafts and 
local actions. This must be done with dedication, expertise and creative exploitation of 
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available resources and demonstrated through modelling, simulation, experiments and 
various forms of play. In other words – new problems, new parameters, new measures, 
new models and, finally, new approaches to developing and applying security culture. 
The acquired knowledge and skills must be applicable and usable in economic and 
practical life. They represent the wealth of all the members of a community and, as a 
shared value, serve the interests of the entire community.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Just like in the distant past, the modern state also tries to exert powerful 
centralising forces in order to achieve cultural homogeneity, which essentially equates 
unity with homogeneity and equality with uniformity. However, modern multicultural 
societies are a unique historical phenomenon which opens up new questions and calls 
for new concepts for a better understanding of its contradictions and development 
perspectives. The notion of multiculturalism is one of these concepts, and it is often 
explained as a political and social response to a social situation where there is no 
longer a consensus on a unified national culture which is meant to integrate a 
multicultural society. 
However, despite people’s hopes, multiculturalism has not produced a unified 
community in which groups with different cultures and traditions live together in 
harmony. It has been shown to cause segregation and lead to the division of 
communities with very little solidarity between groups. If not properly governed, it can 
eventually become a threat to security and stability within states, as well as within the 
international system. This is why we have tried to point out the importance of security 
culture as a precondition for a successful multicultural society, i.e. multiculturalism, 
which is supposed to be a valid political response to the challenges of globalisation, 
migration and other modern security challenges.  
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Abstract 
 
Building on several findings on the relationships among collectivism and 
orientations toward authoritarianism on one hand and collectivism and ethnocentrism 
on the other, the authors examine the possibility of predicting ethnocentric attitudes 
on the base of these variables by taking into account the potential moderating role of 
membership to the ethnic group that has majority or minority status.  
The study was conducted with a sample of 777 participants (49.3% ethnic 
Macedonians and 50.7% ethnic Albanians) from different urban areas in the Republic of 
Macedonia (34% from Skopje) at the age range from 18 to 58 (M=34.0, SD=10.3). All 
participants responded to self-report questionnaires on ethnocentric attitudes (15-item 
scale by Neuliep, 2002), right wing authoritarianism (22-item scale by Altemeyer, 2006) 
and collectivism (10-item scale by Yamaguchi, 1994).  
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A three-step hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was performed 
among ethnic Macedonian (as majority group) and ethnic Albanian study participants 
(as minority group) separately. In the first block, gender was controlled for; in the 
second and in the third block authoritarianism and collectivism, respectively, were 
entered in the model. It was found that gender explained small, but significant part in 
the variability of ethnocentrism among ethnic Macedonian participants (F(1, 355)=5.30; 
p<.05).  Authoritarianism accounted for significant 10.6% in the variance of 
ethnocentric attitudes (F(1, 354)=42.79; p<.01), while collectivism was not statistically 
significant predictor of the explored attitudes in this subsample. Analysis conducted 
among ethnic Albanians revealed that gender was not significant predictor of 
ethnocentrism, whereas both authoritarianism and collectivism significantly predicted 
ethnocentric attitudes (F (1, 332)=7.26; p<.01 and F(1, 331)=8.27; p<.01, respectively). 
The results were discussed from the perspective of the finding that these studied 
associations were moderated by majority/minority status. 
 
Keywords: authoritarianism, collectivism, ethnocentrism, majority/minority 
status 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A considerable body of literature shows that there are empirically proved links 
among ethnocentrism, authoritarianism and inclination towards discrimination, 
prejudice, and hostility for ethnic or national outgroups (e.g., Altemeyer, 1981; 
Altemeyer, 2006; Duckitt, 1992; Radkiewitcz, 2016). Based on these findings in the 
sphere of social psychology, numerous authors have initiated rich debates about these 
links in the realm of public policy and politics (e.g. Biro, Mihic, Milin, & Logar, 2002; 
Kuzio, 2015; McFarland, 2003).   
Knowledge about these links has an immense value in predicting important 
societal outcomes and creating adequate policies in today's growingly diverse world. 
There are many indications though, that policy makers need more contextualized data 
instead of generalized findings. This study is an attempt to provide information on 
these relevant linkages in a country where the two biggest ethnic groups have a history 
of relations that could be described as tensed, distrustful and distant (Hislope, 2007; 
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Maleska, 2010; Petroska-Beshka & Kenig, 2009). In doing so, we are considering the 
social identity theory (SIT) as being a main theoretical frame (Tajfel, 1978). This theory 
claims that the maintenance of positive group identity results in in-group/out-group 
bias. These positive in-group (we/us) perceptions versus negative perceptions of out-
groups (they/them), produce an opportunity for strengthening social identity and 
enhancing the own self-esteem. Ethnocentrism might be seen as an element of the in-
group favoritism when the identity group is the ethnic/national one, because it is a net 
of attitudes expressing the belief that one’s own ethnic group is superior to other 
ethnic groups and that one’s cultural standards should be applied universally (Hooghe, 
2008).  
According to the social identity perspective, when people categorize 
themselves as members of a group (in our case an ethnic group), their social (ethnic) 
identity is made salient, they experience depersonalization and perceive themselves as 
compatible with other ingroup members (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987). In that way, their personal identity generally dissolves and they act as members 
of the group, not separate individuals. In these circumstances, people discriminate in 
favor of the ingroup because they see their ethnic group as more important than 
outgroups and want to achieve a sense of positive group distinctiveness or relative 
group superiority. Therefore, self-categorization as an ethnic group member, 
subsequent depersonalization, and needs for relative group superiority are perceived as 
prerequisites for emerging ethnocentrism. 
There are two major lines of defining ethnocentrism. One describes it as a 
tendency to view other groups or cultures from the perspective of one's own and to 
evaluate them according to preconceptions originating in the standards and customs of 
one's own culture. The other view focuses more on the outcomes of such perception and 
sees ethnocentrism as tendency to believe in the inherent superiority of one's own 
ethnic group or culture (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dansen, 2002). On the other hand, 
there is empirical evidence that ethnocentrism has intergroup as well as intragroup 
expressions (Bizumic, Duckitt, Popadic, Dru, & Krauss, 2009). While intergroup 
ethnocentrism derives from the belief that the ingroup is more important than 
outgroups, intragroup ethnocentrism is related to the view that one’s own group is 
more important than its individual members. In whatever way it is conceptualized, 
ethnocentrism is of great importance for peace scholars because it largely contributes 
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to direct and/or structural forms of violence (Christie, Tint, Wagner & Winter, 2008; 
Galtung, 1985). 
The constructs described by Hofstede (1980) as dimensions of culture, gain 
increasing attention not only in the area of cross-cultural psychology, but also in the 
sphere of organizational sciences, sociology and political science. It is assumed that the 
cultural differences across a variety of social phenomena, such as political structures, 
shared preferences and norms and typical behaviors are directly influenced by this 
dimension (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995). The most scrutinized 
dimension, especially in relation to ethnocentrism, is the one identified as 
individualism-collectivism. Collectivism is defined as preference for a tightly-knit 
framework in society in which individuals can expect members of a particular in-group 
to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede, 2011). In his 
voluminous research, Hofstede proposes a simple way of measuring the extent to which 
cultures are collectivistic or individualistically oriented. In 2006, ethnic Macedonians 
and ethnic Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia have been ranked among the 
cultures that are highly collectivistic (Кениг, 2006). 
Triandis (1998) has argued that members of collectivist cultures are expected 
to display obvious ethnocentric attitudes.  Individuals who live in collectivistic societies 
are expected to endorse higher ethnocentric attitudes simply because in comparison to 
individualists, they make sharper distinctions between in-groups and out-groups, 
whereas among individualists, this distinction is typically weaker (Gelfand, Bhawuk, 
Nishii & Bechtold, 2004). One of the consequences is that collectivists are less prone to 
establishing contacts with out-group members and are more 'anchored' in the position 
of the group(s) where they belong (e.g. Toharudin, Johan, Jaak, & Billiet, 2008).   
The link between collectivism and authoritarianism has been empirically proved 
as well. Collectivistic homogenization supports authoritarianism by stressing the 
interdependence between the self and one’s group or community. In addition, 
collectivistic societies prioritize goals that are based on group norms and articulated by 
traditional authority figures (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002).  
Ethnocentrism is usually defined as a psychological disposition with twofold 
outcome. On one hand, usually seen as the "positive" consequence, ethnocentrism helps 
“patriotism and willingness to sacrifice for one’s central group” (Neuliep & McCroskey, 
1997: 389) and serves as a building block in construing and maintaining one’s 
cultural/ethnic identity. On the other, ethnocentrism largely contributes toward 
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developing ethnic prejudices and decreases acceptance of out-groups. This is the 
outcome that provides direct link to authoritarianism.  
In his influential theory on authoritarianism, Altemeyer (1981) expressed strong 
belief that authoritarian individuals, defined as those who adhere firmly to conventional 
norms and are uncritically submissive to authorities and approve punishing violations of 
norms, at the same time are "incredibly ethnocentric" (2006: 30). Empirical studies 
have largely confirmed that authoritarians (high-RWA people) are at the same time 
highly prejudiced. They accept negative attitudes towards women and LGBT population 
(e.g., Ekehammar, Akrami & Araya, 2000; Radkiewicz, 2016; Whitley, 1999) and various 
ethnic groups (e.g., Akrami, Ekehammar, & Araya, 2000; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002) 
and approve penal code violence and wars (Benjamin, 2006). 
It is considered that the link between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism is 
established through the underlying preferences for conservative values. Thus, the 
attitudes of authoritarians regarding their own nation are loaded with exclusiveness 
and tendency to preserve the desired homogeneity and purity of the in-group 
(Radkiewicz, 2016). 
Studies have also shown that ethnocentrism may be mediated by different 
other personal and social variables. For instance, women are less ethnocentric than men 
(Neuliep, Chaudoir & McCroskey, 2001; Tordjman–Nebe, 2010) and younger tend to be 
less ethnocentric too. Lin, Rancer & Trimbitas (2005) found that historical events and 
culture may as well mediate differences in the level of ethnocentrism and Swenson and 
Visgatis (2012) proved that media attention increases ethnocentric attitudes.   
Conventionally, the literature of intergroup relations focuses solely on 
examining the ethnocentrism of the dominant (majority) group. One reason for that is 
that the consequences of such attitudes in majority groups are treated as more 
problematic. However, neither theory nor experience offers solid ground to expect less 
ethnocentrism from minority groups. This study attempts to examine the possibility of 
predicting ethnocentric attitudes on the base of collectivism and right-wing 
authoritarianism by taking into account the potential mediating role of membership to 
the ethnic group that has majority or minority status.  
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Method 
 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 777 participants (50.8% ethnic Macedonians and 
49.2% ethnic Albanians) from different urban areas in the Republic of Macedonia (34% 
from Skopje) at the age range from 18 to 58 (M=34 and SD=10.3). Half of the 
respondents were women (52.1%) and all have completed at least secondary education. 
The recruitment was on a voluntarily bases. Previously trained psychology 
students (ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians) were seeking for participants who 
would accept to participate and were eligible in accordance with the set of criteria 
regarding age, ethnicity, place of living and education. The paper and pencil 
questionnaires were responded anonymously in presence of a field worker responsible 
for gathering the data.   
 
Instruments  
All participants responded to self-report questionnaires on ethnocentric 
attitudes: 15-item Ethnocentrism scale (Neuliep, 2002), 22-item Right-wing 
authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 2006) and 10-item scale on collectivism (Yamaguchi, 
1994). All of them were administered as 7-point Likert scales. The higher the score, the 
higher is the presence of measured variable.  
Neuliep's Ethnocentrism scale (ETHN) was designed to measure the concept 
defined as perception that one's own group is superior to others and that it is a central 
point of reference. The author claims that the items relate to the cultures of different 
parts of the world and that the expected consistency should be in the range of r=.80-
.90. For the purposes of our study this scale was adapted to refer to relations between 
“our” culture and the cultures of the “other” ethnic groups living in the country. 
Cronbach alpha coefficient for the adapted Ethnocentrism scale for our sample was 
α=0.70. 
Altemeyer has developed several versions of the Right-Wing Authoritarian 
scale (RWA) which were successfully and widely used to measure a concept that he 
describes as the closest covariate to (1) submission to the established and socially 
legitimized authority; (2) intentional desire to cause harm to other persons in the name 
of that authority; and (3) conventionalism and acceptance of law as the basis for 
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morality (Altemeyer, 1981). The instrument has fairly high internal consistency of 
α=0.68, yet beyond the most usually reported values in the literature.  
The 10–item Collectivism scale (COL) proposed by Yamagutchi (1994) has been 
chosen among several well-known instruments that measure the same concept because 
of its practicality. It is aimed to identify the extent to which individuals endorse 
collectivistic values, practices and identities. High values in collectivism mean 
prioritizing group as opposed to individual goals and focusing on things such as fitting 
into the group, behaving in ways that are line with social norms, group solidarity, and 
gaining a sense of identity from being part of the group. Considering the number of 
items, the internal homogeneity of α=0.61 is acceptable. 
All instruments were prepared both in Macedonian and in Albanian language. 
The semantic equivalence of these two versions was checked and confirmed by using 
forward-backward translation performed by two independent Albanian native speakers. 
The averages on separate items and the inter-item correlations have not detected 
substantial dissimilarities in how participants with different ethnic backgrounds 
included in the study responded, suggesting that the same concepts were measured in 
both groups.  
 
 
Results 
 
A three-step hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was performed 
among ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian study participants separately197 by using 
the SPSS 17 software. In the first block participants’ gender was controlled for; 
predictor variables authoritarianism and collectivism were entered in the second and in 
the third model, respectively. The criterion variable was ethnocentric attitudes. The pre-
assumptions for performing regression analysis were tested and confirmed as proper for 
the both research subsamples.  
Basic descriptive statistics of ethnocentric attitudes, authoritarianism and 
collectivism among ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians are presented in Table 1. 
On average, ethnic Macedonians are less ethnocentric and reported lower level of right-
                                                          
197 The analysis was performed with a total number of 692 cases with valid responses provided 
for all included items.  
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wing authoritarianism compared to ethnic Albanian counterparts (t(736)=5.64;p<,01 and 
t(745)=3.46;p<,01). The level of collectivistic orientation is equal in both groups.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and differences of means of study variables in the two 
subsamples 
 ethnic Macedonians 
(N=378) 
ethnic Albanians 
(N=377) 
t p 
 M SD Xmin Xmax M SD Xmin Xmax   
Ethnocentric 
attitudes 
48.49 11.70 22 84 53.03 10.81 26 80 5.46 .000 
Right-wing 
authoritarianism 
94.09 14.68 54 133 97.30 11.03 57 137 3.46 .001 
Collectivism 50.30 5.99 31 65 49.10 8.06 27 68 -1,84 .065 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis 
revealed that gender explained small (1.5%), but significant part in the variability of 
ethnocentrism among ethnic Macedonian participants (Model 1; F(1, 355)=5.30; p<.05). 
Females scored lower on ethnocentrism in comparison to males (Mf=47.36 vs. 
Mm=50.04; β=–.121, p<.05). Authoritarianism accounted for significant 10.6% in the 
variance of ethnocentric attitudes (Model 2; F(1, 354)=42.79; p<.001) indicating that 
study participants with Macedonian ethnic background who reported higher tendency 
for authoritarianism, have stronger ethnocentric attitudes (β=.325, p<.001). Collectivism 
was not statistically significant predictor of the explored attitudes in this subsample 
(Model 3; F(1, 353)=.024; p>.05).  
 
Table 2. Hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis performed on the two 
subsamples 
 Ethnic Macedonians Ethnic Albanians 
Model β t R ∆R2 β t R ∆R2 
1 Gender -.121 -2.30* .121 .015* -.009 -.17 .009 .000 
2 Gender -.107 -2.14*   -.006 -.11   
RWA  .326 6.54*** .348 .106*** .146 2.69** .147 .021 
3 Gender -.107 -2.14*   .000 .01   
RWA .325 6.43***   .127 2.34*   
Collectivism .008 .16 .348 .000 .156 2.88** .213 .024 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Results obtained in the ethnic Albanian subsample (Table 2) showed that 
gender was not significant predictor of ethnocentrism (Model 1; F(1, 333)=.030; p>.05). 
Authoritarianism significantly predicted ethnocentric attitudes accounting for 2.1% in 
the variation in this variable (Model 2; F (1, 332)=7.26; p<.01). Additional significant 
2.4% of the variability in ethnocentric attitudes was explained by collectivistic 
orientation (Model 3; F(1, 331)=8.27; p<.01). These findings demonstrated that both 
strongly expressed tendency to authoritarianism and higher collectivistic orientation 
were related to higher level of ethnocentrism among ethnic Albanian respondents 
(β=.127, p<.05 and (β=.156, p<.01, respectively). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The research highlighted the necessity of understanding the social and cultural 
context of intergroup relations and the importance of differentiating between individual 
versus cultural level of analysis in related research. First of all, the obtained results 
provide evidence that the ethnic Albanians (the minority group) are more ethnocentric 
than the ethnic Macedonians (the majority group). From the social identity perspective, 
this finding indicates that, compared to ethnic majority group members, the ethnic 
minority group members tend to discriminate even more in favor of the ingroup 
because they see their ethnic group as more important than outgroups and want to 
achieve a sense of positive group distinctiveness or relative group superiority (Turner et 
al., 1987).  
Additionally, this higher ethnocentrism among ethnic minority group members 
can be explained as a consequence of the existing competition over resources (LeVine 
and Campbell, 1972) or even less tangible perceived threats, like group rank, prestige, or 
status (Tajfel, 1982) that, due to the power difference, is more common for minority 
than for majority ethnic groups. This finding can be related to the research evidence 
indicating that people who identify more strongly with a group are more likely to 
display defensive reactions to social identity threats that make their group look better 
and make outgroups or the source of the threats look worse (Branscombe & Wann, 
1994; Hewstone, Rubin, &Willis, 2002). Moreover, this conclusion is supported by 
results obtained in a previous research carried out by Petroska-Beshka & Kenig 
(Петроска-Бешка и Кениг, 2005) that has demonstrated that ethnic Albanians evaluate 
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the ingroup as better, more powerful and more active than the outgroup (ethnic 
Macedonians), whereas the ethnic Macedonians evaluate the ingroup as better, but less 
active and equally powerful as the outgroup (ethnic Albanians). 
Based on the obtained results, it could be concluded that associations between 
ethnocentrism and the other variables in the study were moderated by 
majority/minority status. Thus, even though right-wing authoritarianism can predict 
ethnocentric attitudes of both ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, its predictive 
power is evidently higher within the majority than within the minority group. That is, 
those who tend to be obedient to authorities, to follow them and to respect/admire 
social norms and traditions, have stronger belief of superiority of their own ethnic 
group and this relationship is strengthen by affiliation to the majority group in the 
society.  
Collectivism was weak, but significant predictor of ethnocentrism only among 
participants belonging to the minority ethnic group. In other words, giving importance 
to group coherency, group goals, significant others’ opinion and stronger group 
identification leads to stronger ethnocentric attitudes in the minority group members, 
which is not the case among the ethnic majority members. This finding indicates that 
the intragroup expressions of ethnocentrism, which involve need for group cohesion and 
ingroup devotion (Bizumic et al., 2009), are more present in the ethnic minority group 
than in the ethnic majority group.  
On the other hand, gender appears to be weak but significant predictor of 
ethnocentrism in the majority ethnic group where men are more ethnocentric than 
women, which corresponds with the existing research findings (Neuliep, Chaudoir & 
McCroskey, 2001; Tordjman-Nebe, 2010). This is not the case in the minority ethnic 
group where ethnocentric attitudes are equally dispersed among men and women, not 
because the ethnic Albanian males are less ethnocentric than the ethnic Macedonian 
males, but because the ethnic Albanian females are more ethnocentric than the ethnic 
Macedonian females. 
The research has revealed different models for predicting ethnocentrism 
mediated by the minority/majority status, but did not succeed in detecting the most 
significant predictors of ethnocentric attitudes in the ethnic minority group that fall 
beyond the social identity perspective. It suggests that there might be a need to test 
more potential variables that determine the level of ethnocentrism in ethnic minority 
groups and further investigate the effects of ethnocentrism in the conflict-dynamics.   
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Having in mind that the minority/majority status is determined not only by the 
share of the ethnic group in the overall population but by the social status of the ethnic 
group also, the findings of this study cannot be easily generalized outside of the 
country context. Even though the Albanian ethnic group can be considered as minority 
in terms of their representation in the country population (25% according to the last 
Census of 2002), their social position as determined in the legislation and political 
reality exceeds the status of the minorities in most of the other countries. Additionally, 
even in terms of numbers, ethnic Albanians are minority at a national level, but at the 
same time they are majority in certain regions on local level, as well as on the regional 
level.    
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Abstract 
 
The New Silk Road initiative represents a very important trade and cultural 
communication line connecting the two ends of Eurasian continent - PR China and 
Europe. This initiative concern various aspects - political, economic and cultural as well 
as the security aspect. Balkans security architecture has been significantly transformed 
over the last 20 years, but it is still challenging. This paper analyzes a local security 
challenges and threats in the Balkans that may endanger the New Silk Road. Balkan 
security identity is complex category and understanding of local security conditions is 
necessary condition for the functioning of the Silk Road in this part of Europe. Through 
the Silk Road China gets a new role in the Balkans, which this paper is dedicated to 
mention. At the same time the New Silk Road could bring a new security threats in the 
Balkans. 
 
Key words: New Silk Road, 16+1 initiative, security of the Balkans, Balkan 
security identity, security threats 
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1. Introduction 
 
The goal of „One belt, one road“ project is the strengthening of political, 
economic, monetary and cultural ties between China, Central Asia and Europe. The 
realization of this project includes political, economic, trade and cultural elements. The 
integral part of this project is 16+1 initiative that gather states from Central and East 
Europe, including Balkans countries.  
During the realization of 16+1 initiative, China is going to confront to many 
challenges from different areas. The most important questions of which will depend on 
the ultimate scope of these initiative will arise in the sphere of security. The initiative 
goes through many areas burdened by political turmoil, ethnic conflicts, 
underdevelopment, and events in those areas will directly be reflected on success of the 
initiative. One of those problematic places is the Balkans, which is marked as a 
particularly neuralgic area with frequent political turmoil and crisis. 
The Balkans is characterized by different phenomena: political fragmentation, 
economic decline, the proliferation of weak states and the growth of organized crime. 
Also, the Balkans is an excellent example of the idea that security is indivisible, because 
instability in one country often cause instability in the whole region. For this reason, 
the Balkans is considered as one of the most vulnerable points along the Chinese 
initiative. 
The assessment of security challenges, risks and threats which have the 
potential to jeopardize the "New Silk Road", and 16+1 initiative as its integral part, 
include: identification of security challenges, risks and threats, analysis of Balkan 
security identity, as well as the assessment of changes that may occur as a result of 
implementing the Chinese initiatives.  
With a good understanding of the Balkans security identity and the impact on 
its positive development, we can improve the security of the Balkans, which will be 
directly reflected on the security China's 16+1 initiative in this part of the world. 
 
 
2. Security identity 
 
For the analysis of the Balkans security constellation, we can use different 
theoretical approaches. Extending of the security concept has renewed interest for 
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culture and identity issues in security studies. That is why the analytical concept of 
security identity is particularly interesting, as it represents a comprehensive approach 
through which we can explore different aspects of the security of the observed 
phenomena. The security identity, as part of a collective identity, in focus of scientific 
research puts not only a "traditional" understanding of security based on material 
factors that determine the existence of the state, but also the constructivist approach. 
Constructivists believe in the importance of identity in construction of security. Actors 
define their interests during the evaluation of the situation. In the constructivist 
approach, the recognition of the importance of identity for security leads to a more 
general assumption: that the immaterial and ideational factors are essential to the 
development and practice of security in global policy (Ćurčić, 2014:11). It is important to 
explain how, not why, actors educate and modify their identity and how do they 
understand the world, or in which way they define their interests in the field of security. 
Security identity represents an important starting point in the analysis of 
contemporary reality. Foreign policy is linked to the construction of identity, since 
identity is always being formed by drawing clear boundaries between ’Us’ and ’Other’. 
Feeling in danger of external threat promotes a shared identity and homogenization of 
social group.  
The concept of security identity implies that identity construction is influenced 
by certain security settings. It is a kind of collective identity that is based on relevant 
responses the actors (group, society, state) makes in relations to its internal and 
external security environment (Vorotnyuk, 2013:109). Vorotnyuk considers that the key 
notions to determine security identity are ’image’, ’role’ and ’discourse’ - attributes that 
actors possess and assign to themselves in relations to other actors. Rieker also 
believes that the core of the concept of security identity is security discourse. According 
to him, the nation-state security identity can be identified by uncovering the dominant 
security discourse undertaken by the political leadership in a given nation-state. By 
dominant discourse Rieker means the general understanding of security shared by the 
majority of the political elites at a given point in time (Rieker, 2006: 9). This approach 
is too 'state-centric oriented', because there are other security actors than states. But 
we can agree that establishing a dominant security discourse contributes to the 
understanding of security identity, although security identity is not limited to it. 
With further operationalization of the term security identity we find that, when 
we talk about security identity of a community, state, region or other entity, the main 
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task is to recognize the leading security challenges, risks and threats, as well as the 
capacity of the analyzed collectives to face with threat, or to avoid them, or find other 
models to respond to the security challenges. Security identity of each region is 
composed of specific security problems, which make it different from other regions that 
have the same or a dissimilar type of security problems. However, the core of security 
identity doesn't pose a security problems, which in the era of globalization become also 
global, but the ways in which each community responds to security challenges, risks 
and threats (Dragišić, 2013:144).  
Thus, the security identity of an entity is made by the totality of security 
challenges, risks and threats that jeopardize the a given entity, on the one hand, and 
capacities with whom entity can provide a response to perceived security challenges, 
risks and threats, on the other hand. An essential element of the security identity is the 
social perception of security. That is a perception of members of social groups on their 
own security, and the degree of recognition of certain types of endangerment as a real 
threats. Also, the security identity includes perceptions of members of social groups on 
the scope and quality of the resources that are necessary to confront to threats and 
protect them. In this way, by using security identity as an analytical concept, we can 
understand why is society inclined to some threats see as primary, while others are 
qualified as less important/dangerous. As part of the collective identity, security 
identity affects the formation and upgrade the other subgroups of collective identity, 
such as national, ethnic, cultural, religious identity.  
There is an imperative that the concept of security identity should be included 
in security studies for several reasons: 
1. The security identity is not the same as state of security. 
The state of security of an entity is defined as a synthetic conclusion on the 
state and nature of the security phenomena, that evaluates the totality of threats that 
endanger a given entity in the analyzed period, and assessment of available capacity to 
provide an adequate response to individual forms of threat. The state of security refers 
to the presence/absence of a certain threat at given moment. Giving an answer to this 
threat, whether it is about a social, natural and technical-technological processes, 
requires appropriate, timely, systematic and continuous guidance of security activities 
in order to eliminate negative security phenomena. Those activities should be applied 
from the moment when they are registered (when they are securitized, or when there is 
a potential for transformation this challenge into a threat, or if increase the frequency 
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or impact of a risk). Social structure must possess the power of adaptation to the 
security threat through institutional and organizational changes. The state of security 
shall be determined by applying the method for risk assessments. Adopting the 
conclusions of the state of security assessment represents a synthesis of all security 
problems and the definition of security indicators. The evaluation of the state of 
security include the assessment of all working parts of the security system 
(Milosavljević, 2012:148). Security identity of an entity include previous state of security, 
current state of security and prediction of developments of state of security in the 
future. However, in addition to the state of security, security identity include the social 
perception of the security by members of a given entity. 
2. Security identity is not the same as the security policy. 
Security policy, in the narrow sense, is the sum of all measures, activities and 
procedures intended for the establishment and functioning of the security system 
(Keković, 2009:127). The aim of security policy is to create mechanisms and means for 
providing internal and external security of society. One of the basic constituents of the 
security policy are security interests. Security Strategy, as a form of strategic security 
assessments, is shaping ways, forms and methods of achieving security. In analysis, the 
starting point of creating the security strategy is research on the previous security 
threats and answers that are given to them. The current state of security of analyzed 
entities is the framework for taking operational security measures, and it is an essential 
element of strategic planning. Dominantly, strategies are oriented towards the future, 
they represent a landmark for all security stakeholders in one entity, but they are also a 
means by which an organization communicates with the environment (Mintzebrg, 
2000). The goal of security strategy is to provide the survival of a given entity, through 
the implementation of internal and external security, and by giving effective answer to 
security challenges, risks and threats. Security identity, as we have noted, assume the 
capacity which an entity can use to respond on current challenges, risks and threats. 
This is predominantly related to the available political, social, economic and security 
mechanisms which society has for responding to security challenges, risks and threats. 
In addition, the security identity is defined by the particular political culture and 
tradition - in the existence of stable and functional community and government 
institutions and their mechanisms for solving social conflicts (Dragišić, 2013:144). 
Therefore, an important component of the security identity is the perception which 
society has on the security of an entity, ie the level of recognition of some threat as a 
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real danger. For this reason, understanding of the security identity represents the 
starting point for the development of security strategies. As Rieker noticed, a stable 
and durable change in security policy, depends on a change in security identity (Rieker, 
2006:9). For this reason, it is necessary to influence the positive development of 
security identity by increasing the capacity for reducing security threats. It is possible 
to increase capacity through following activities: increasing military, intelligence and 
security capabilities, creating dissuasive mechanisms, improving methods for peaceful 
resolving conflicts etc. At the same time, there is necessity for monitoring and 
analyzing changes in the social perception of security from the members of that 
entities. In this way the security identity can affect on positive change in the security 
policy of a given entity. 
 
 
3. The entrance of China into Europe 
 
China become interested in Balkans during the Cold War, when she started 
building strategic friendship with comunist countries: first with Albalia, later with 
Yugoslavia and Romania. After the dramatic political changes in the region that have 
begun with the replacement of Ceaucescu regime in Romania and culminated with 
violent breaking up the Yugoslavia, Beijing remained outside of developments in 
Balkans. The realization of the project "One belt, one road", ie the 16+1 initiative, as an 
infrastructure connection among Europa and Asia, once again put Balkans in focus of 
China's interests. 
China’s President Xi Jinping has made the policy of „New Silk Road by Land and 
Sea“, which connect China with the West, a key part of China’s international relations. 
On 7 Semptember 2013, President Xi proposed to bild a „Silk Road Economic Belt“ 
during his speech at the Kazakhstan’ Nazarbayev University. On 3 October 2013, he 
proposed to bild a „21st Century Maritime Silk Road“ during his speech at the Indonesian 
House of Representatives (Nolan, 2016:8). “New Silk Road” will begin in Xi’an in central 
China before stretching west through Lanzhou (Gansu province), Urumqi (Xinjiang), and 
Khorgas (Xinjiang), which is near the border with Kazakhstan. The Silk Road then runs 
southwest from Central Asia to northern Iran before swinging west through Iraq, Syria, 
and Turkey. From Istanbul, the Silk Road crosses the Bosporus Strait and heads 
northwest through Europe, including Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, and 
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Germany. Reaching Duisburg in Germany, it swings north to Rotterdam in the 
Netherlands. From Rotterdam, the path runs south to Venice, Italy-where it meets up 
with the equally ambitious Maritime Silk Road. The Maritime Silk Road will begin in 
Quanzhou in Fujian province, and also hit Guangzhou (Guangdong pronvince), Beihai 
(Guangxi), and Haikou (Hainan) before heading south to the Malacca Strait. From Kuala 
Lumpur, the Maritime Silk Road heads to Kolkata, India then crosses the rest of the 
Indian Ocean to Nairobi, Kenya. From Nairobi, it goes north around the Horn of Africa 
and moves through the Red Sea into the Mediterranean, with a stop in Athens before 
meeting the land-based Silk Road in Venice (Tiezzi, 2014). In this way, these two roads 
should include Europe, Asia and Africa, along with all seas nearby. 
Through investment in infrastructure and by creating networks of ports, 
logistics centers, roads and railways, China wants to create a favorable conditions for 
the diversification of China's freight transport and energy, expanding market, to 
distribute products and improve trade between East and West. In this way, Beijing 
accomplishes its basic national interests - increases energy security, opens the market 
for Chinese construction companies and ensures food security for 1.3 billion Chinese. On 
the other hand, Balkans states get funds for modernizing their energy systems, 
infrastructure, shipping and transportation (Arežina, 2015:172). 16+1 initiative reflects 
China's need to ensure stable partnership with the Central and Eastern Europe 
countries, through a number of joint projects, in order to achieve two goals: long-term 
and sustainable presence of China in the European market and investing in the 
economy of the countries affected by the economic crisis. 
China's entry into Europe via the Balkans and Central European countries 
represent a great historical novelty, because China emerges as a non-European country 
with a potentially large impact on developments in Europe. Large Chinese investments 
will affect the economic recovery of this countries, but also it will help in the 
establishment of China's political influence. The future of 16+1 initiative and the destiny 
"One belt, one road" will be determined by reaction of the US on the growth of Chinese 
influence in Europe, but also by an attitude that Germany, France, Great Britain and 
other European countries will have on this point. 
The United States is, convincingly, the most powerful country in economic, 
political and military terms and successfully project soft power to Europe. China is the 
second most powerful country in the world with the fastest growing economy. The 
biggest trade exchange is taking place between the US and China, which indicates a 
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significant association between the two most powerful country in the modern world. 
Over the last eight years, Chinese President Xi Jinping (and his predecessor, Hu Jintao) 
and U.S. President Barack Obama managed to create momentum for bilateral ties that 
has withstood the impact of the 2008 international financial as well as U.S. domestic 
politics. The two countries managed to build and maintain “new type major country 
relations,” which has brought tangible results for both sides. The two leaders made a 
point to meet regularly via bilateral visits as well as regional and international summits. 
These talks allowed them to make strategic and political decisions on some tough 
issues. As of January, the two countries have established 94 bilateral dialogue 
mechanisms, facilitating conditions for both sides to address tough issues through 
dialogue and negotiations (Youfa, 2017). The future of US-China relation depends on 
what policy will the Trump administration pursue. The current development of China 
and the United States relations gives grounds for optimism about the success of the 
16+1 initiative, because China shows no interest to confront the existing policies of the 
countries in the region, nor to impose them her own political views.  
Chinese investment of 10 billion dollars, which is provided for the 
implementation of projects, is going to help the economically weakest region of Europe 
to strengthen its economy and contribute to the stability of the whole of Europe. At 
this level, the main security challenge can be fear of a strong China and doubts about 
the sincerity of China's intentions in Europe (Dragišić, 2017). 
„The New Silk Road“ represents infrastructure link between China and 
European countries, which will provide a shorter time and faster transportation of 
goods. Also it will allow distribution, market and technological positioning of Chinese 
companies on the European continent. For this reason, a special group of global 
security threats that can compromise Chinese projects originate from large 
multinational companies. Those companies may see the development of projects in the 
framework of the "New Silk Road" as serious competition and sources of threat to their 
interests. The power of large corporations shouldn’t be underestimated, because they 
have large capital and a number of legal and illegal means to oppose, and even 
eliminate, competition. The risk of negative impacts can be increased by possible 
merger of multinational companies with organized crime groups, terrorist organizations, 
or with countries which China's projects see as an instrument of its own geopolitical 
marginalization. 
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4. 16+1 Initiative and the Balkans  
 
The Balkans, in terms of security, is one of the most sensitive areas along 16+1 
initiative. All Balkan countries, except Greece and Turkey, are members of the 16+1 
initiative. Greece participated at the Summit in Suzhou as observers, which makes 
Turkey the only Balkans country that is out of this process. Turkey, although is not a 
part of this initiative, has significant bilateral relationships with China and many 
important roads in the framework of "One belt, one road” passes through Turkish 
territory, or a territory and province of countries in Central Asia which are under strong 
Turkish influence. It means that each security assessment of the Chinese initiative 
needs to take into consideration Turkey as an important factor of (in) stability (Dragišić, 
2017). China clearly shows desire to improve relations with Balkan states, which have 
been proven with significant investments and intensification of trade and other 
relations with countries in the region. 
It was necessary to invest capital in completing existing projects and the 
launch of new highways, railways and related facilities of capital importance in order to 
Balkan become well integrated and transport efficient area. In addition to investment in 
transport infrastructure, a lot of China's capital flows into the energy sector, especially 
in the construction of power plants and the sector of ’green energy’. 
 When it comes to Serbia, three Chinese projects are in progress. Serbian and 
Chinese officials signed in December 2014 a loan agreement for the second phase of a 
renovation process at ‘Kostolac’ thermal power plant complex, which includes the 
construction of a new 350MW unit and increase of capacity of the adjacent open-pit 
coal mine ‘Drmno’. Chinese companies have already constructed the ‘Mihailo Pupin’ 
Bridge over the Danube River, in Belgrade, plus 21 km of access highway. China 
Shandong International Economic & Technical Cooperation Group Ltd.–SIETC signed 
with the Serbian government contract to build a section of road on Corridor 11. This is a 
section from Obrenovac to Ub and from Lajkovac to Ljig and ‘Morava Corridor’ from 
Pojate to Preljina. These sections of road are part of the future highway from Belgrade 
to the Montenegrin border, as well as part of Corridor 11 which will stretch from a 
Timisoara via Belgrade to the Montenegrin city of Bar on the Adriatic coast.  In addition 
to these projects in Serbia is opened Chinese trade center "Dragon", the first wholesale 
center in the Western Balkans. In early 2012 JP EPS signed with Canadian-Chinese 
consortium Lavalin and CNPEC a Memorandum of understanding on the development of 
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the project reversible hydropower plants "Bistrica" on Lim River. In July 2013 Chinese 
company Huawei and the Serbian Railways signed an agreement to modernize the 
entire telecommunications of Serbian Railways. In June 2015 Everrest Production 
Company opened a factory in Ruma for the production of memory foam mattresses and 
pillows (Arežina, 2015:176-177). 
Zeijanf Chinese provinces has signed an Agreement with Bulgaria on the 
establishment of a joint Bulgarian-Chinese industrial zone in Bozhurishte near Sofia. In 
October 2009 China's largest metal trader, China Minmetals Corporation, signed the 
800 million dollar contract with Aurubis Bulgaria, one of the biggest copper smelter in 
Europe. At the beginning of 2010, Chinese company Polar Photo-voltaics and Wiscom 
proposed to build a solar plant in Ihtamanu, near Sofia. Great Wall Motor, a Chinese car 
manufacturer, signed an agreement with Litex Motors worth 80 million Euros in 
November 2009 (Szczudlik-Tatar, 2010:358). Production in China's car factory Great 
Wall Motors-Litex Motors in Bahovici started in February 2013. Lifan Group Group 
opened a factory for assembling air conditioners, and Huawei and ZTE were given 
shares in the Bulgarian telecommunications market. China Luoyang Float Glass group 
started negotiating on the production of glass with Visa Glas. China’s National Nuclear 
Corporation has expressed interest to build a new reactor of 1000MW nuclear power 
plant at Kozloduy. It has been given priority to Chinese companies in realization of 
projects for the second nuclear reactor power plant "Belane" (Arežina, 2015:178). 
For many years, China is the largest Asian trade partner of Romania, with a 
significant volume of trade in which China invested mostly private capital. There are 
more than 8 thousand Chinese companies in Romania (Szczudlik-Tatar, 2010:357). In 
May 2012, China Huadian Engineering Co. was selected to build a 500MW coal-fired 
plant worth €1 billion at the Rovinari thermal power station. China National Electric 
Engineering Construction Corporation will conduct a modernization works at Romania’s 
Mintia-Deva thermal power plant, under a contract worth about €250 million, as agreed 
in September 2014. The winning bidder for expansion of Tarnita-Lapustesti hydropower 
plants will be a Chinese company. Chian General Nuclear (CGN) is going build two new 
reactors at the Cernavoda nuclear power plant (Levitin et al., 2016: 11-12). Also, it is 
notable increasing presence of Chinese multinational companies such as Lenovo, ZTE i 
Huawei. 
There is ongoing implementation of several projects in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Autoputevi Republike Srpske (RS), has signed preliminary agreement with 
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Chinese firm Sinohydro for the construction work for a 93km long section of a 186km 
long motorway linking the Entity’s capital of Banja Luka with Croatia’s Adriatic city of 
Split. In December 2014, government of the Federation of B&H signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding with a consortium led by China's Gezhouba Group for the construction 
of the 450MW unit at Tuzla thermal power plant. China Development Bank is financing 
construction of the Stanari thermal power plant. Also, China is financing construction 
thermal power plant Banovici, with capacity of 350MW (Levitin et al., 2016:9). 
The interest of Chinese investors hasn’t bypassed Macedonia. In 2010 China 
started with negotiation with Government of Macedonia about the project in the valley 
of the river Vardar, which involves the construction of 12 hydroelectric power plants. In 
2011, China International Water and Electric Corporation signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the government of Macedonia about this half billion worth project, 
wherein 85% of the investment is provided by China Development Bank (Filijović i 
Kilibarda, 2013:52). The Chinese Exim Bank is providing most of the funding for two 
stretches on the highways linking Kicevo-Ohrid and Miladinovci-Stip (Levitin et al., 
2016:11).  
Albanian government and China's Exim Bank signed in December 2014 a 
Memorandum of cooperation under which Exim Bank will finance the completion of 
construction of Albania's Arber motorway towards FYR Macedonia and further to 
Bulgaria, linking the Albanian Ionian Sea coast and the Bulgarian Black See coast. Also, 
it was announced that Albania has obtained Chinese support for the development of an 
industrial park in coastal city of Durres (Levitin et al., 2016:11). 
Chinese companies have been interested in realization of project thermal power 
plant Plomin C in Croatia, as well as for the construction of a nuclear power plant in 
Osijek. Beijing has also expressed interest in the port of Ploce and Rijeka, as well as for 
the development of railway infrastructure (Arežina, 2015:179). In mid-2017 are expected 
the first Chinese investments in Croatia-invest in the development of tourism in 
Krapinske Toplice. 
In Sept 2014 China Exim Bank approved $875 million loan to Montenegro for 
the construction of the first priority section (Podgorica - Kolasin) of the major motorway 
project connecting the country’s port of Bar (Adriatic Sea) with its border to Serbia. 
China is interested in construction of hydropower plants on the rivers Moraca and 
Komarnica, and building the new unit at Pljevlja thermal power plant. China is also 
interested in construction The Blue Corridor, a project that will stretch along the entire 
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eastern shore of Adriatic and Ionian seas, from Trieste in Italy to Greece via Croatia, 
Montenegro and Albania (Levitin et al., 2016:8). 
A review of projects in the Balkans shows that China invests in all Balkan 
countries regardless of whether with some countries have better political relations 
(Serbia and Romania) or does not support the politics of the State concerned (Albania 
regarding the attitude towards Kosovo and Metohija). China is guided by economic 
interests, and doesn’t favor any country, which reduces the possibility of harmful effects 
of existing political disputes. 
5. Security and  the Balkans security identity 
The Balkans is a region with turbulent history which is marked with a number 
of crises, war and conflicts. When we look at the twentieth century, we notice that the 
only period of relative peace in this region, paradoxically, was during the Cold War. The 
conflicts in the Balkans tended to spill over into the rest of Europe (The First World 
War began in the Balkans, while in the Second World War one of the bloodiest zone was 
in this area). In the last decade of the twentieth century in the former Yugoslavia 
started fratricidal conflicts which resulted with political fragmentation, economic 
decline, proliferation of weak states and the growth of organized crime. The term 
"balkanization" is based on the perception of the Balkan security identity, and it is 
created to denote an endless crisis, chaos, irrationality, without a sustainable solutions 
for the existing conflicts and mechanisms based on real interest.  Precisely, when we 
talk about the Balkan security identity, this region has been synonymous with crisis 
situations, wars, barbarism, the absence of stable and functional state, the lack of legal 
mechanisms and political will for peaceful resolving of conflict. It is noticeable a great 
influence of foreign powers on the local political leaders and chronic economic 
underdevelopment (Dragišić, 2013:145). Thus, the Balkans is used to describe the image 
of defragmentation state, ethnic conflict and rivalry forces which are fighting for control 
of a territory. 
Today, the security of Balkans has been transformed from conflict formation, in 
which he was during the end of XX century, into security regime. The main security 
problems can be classified into two groups: classical threats and asymmetric threats. 
The classical security challenges involve conflicts between states or different entities 
within the state, so we talk about challenges that are located at the intersection of 
societal and political sphere, or about the ethno-territorial disputes. As the most 
important classical challenges stand out problems with the recognition of the status of 
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Kosovo and Metohija, the constitutional reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as 
well as the situation in Macedonia in the context of the creation of the co-called 
Greater Albania. The second group of challenges are asymmetric challenges, whose 
stakeholders are non-state actors in the Balkans. Among the asymmetric challenges, 
the most important are the organized crime, terrorism and a various types of crime, 
ethnic and religious extremism as a consequence of bad social and economic conditions 
and high unemployment. 
All Balkan countries except Greece, Romania, and Serbia (which proclamation of 
the so-called Republic of Kosovo directly threatens the national and state interests) 
recognized the so-called Kosovo. Old historical aspirations of Albanians to create so-
called Greater Albania is the most dangerous political project that threatens the 
national interests of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Greece and can directly create 
instability in the region. On the other hand, having in mind primarily hers national 
interest, China hasn't recognized the independence of the so-called Kosovo, and as a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council she opposes on attempt of violent and 
illegal secession. China doesn’t agree with the establishment of a precedent in 
international law, because it could be reflected on the questions of Taiwan and parts of 
China such as Tibet or Xinjiang. Also, using that precedent, any of the 56 recognized 
minorities could go footsteps of unilateral action and self-proclamation. In the 
perception of Albanians and other ethnic groups who support the secession of Kosovo 
and Metohija, China can be seen as "pro-Serb oriented", and the entire 16+1 initiative 
can be recognized as an instrument to strengthen the position of Serbia in the Balkans. 
But, the fact is that China shows no aspirations to favors any country at the expense of 
the interests of other members of the initiative, which is proven by active Chinese 
projects in all Balkans countries. Therefore, we don't expect that such kind of perception 
of China-Serbia relations can seriously jeopardize the projects within the initiative. 
Macedonia is facing with a lot of problems in the field of security: name dispute 
with Greece regarding the use of the name Macedonia, Bulgaria's territorial claims, but 
also territorial claims by Albania. Situation in Macedonia is particularly problematic 
because of the aspirations of Macedonian Albanians to create their own entity within 
the so-called Greater Albania. Existing tensions have the capacity to grow into ethnic 
conflict between Macedonians and Albanians, and security experts this situation see as 
the consequences of bad influence of international community. As a potential scenario 
they predict transformation of Macedonia into binational state, with the aim of creating 
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cantons, and at the end the federalization of Macedonia. The consequences of political 
turmoil can be reflected on the security situation in southern Serbia198. If the political 
situation doesn't consolidate it is possible to happen an escalation of violence which will 
affect on neighboring countries, and jeopardize the projects within the Chinese 
initiative. 
The Balkans has been burdened by constant crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
since the end of civil war in 1995. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the most fragile part of 
the Balkans, can be misused in order to jeopardize Chinese project. In that country 
Wahhabi movement is very active, and its members may connect with Uighur 
separatists from China's Xinjiang province. As the result, Bosnia and Herzegovina can be 
misused in the context of the Global Jihad in order to obstruct of Chinese projects. 
Another threat comes from a possible Russian involvement in this area. The Russian 
politicians believe that the initiative "One belt - one road" is detrimental to Russia's 
global interests, and Russia seems to be increasingly aggressive in defending its 
spheres of interest originating from the former Soviet empire (Brauner, 2014). For this 
reason, the Russian influence in Republika Srpska can be misused in the context of 
Russian resistance to the Chinese initiative. Also, resolving internal issues of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina can result with threats to the Chinese initiative. Constitutional 
reconstruction process moves between the demands of extreme Bosniak political circles 
for full centralization, and demands from Banja Luka for greater autonomy or even 
separation of the Republika Srpska. Such a situation could lead to new conflicts, and 
armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina could jeopardize the 16+1 initiative, because 
it would draw Serbia and Croatia into conflict (Dragišić, 2017). Great powers could 
exploit the political disagreements in this country as a means to stop 16+1 initiative 
and expel China from this part of Europe. 
A specific group of security threats are made by asymmetric threats originating 
from the non-state actor. Among them organized crime stands out in particular. Armed 
conflicts in the past, the institutional weakness of the countries in the region, transition 
issues, system corruption caused the emergence and spread of organized crime in the 
region. Organized crime in the Balkans doesn't recognize neither state nor ethnic 
boundaries, because those who are involved in the smuggling of narcotics, prostitution 
                                                          
198http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/379410/Dragisic-Moguc-etnicki-sukob-u-Makedoniji 
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and human trafficking are only interested in profit (Barišić et. Al., 2014:84). Today, 
organized crime represent permanent security challenge for several reasons: first of all 
there is a close link between organized criminal groups and groups of extreme 
nationalists. Also, domestic and international criminal organizations work closely and 
apply violence to the commission of offenses, and in each other's accounts for market 
dominance. In addition, at leaders of organized crime activity occurs a political 
aspirations, other than the pursuit of financial gain and power. Through cooperation 
with the political elites, organized crime have linked with state structures, improving its 
strategic position for the future, taking control of some parts of the state apparatus, 
primarily over the repressive structures (Fatić, 2005:74). Taking the most profitable 
industries and legalization of illegally acquired capital lead to further devastation of the 
economic base of the state and to corruption in all spheres of social life: civil society, 
educational and health institutions, political parties, religious organizations. 
16+1 initiative represents a serious threat to the interests of organized crime, 
because the most lucrative economic activities will be placed under strict control and 
will be taken over by a large Chinese company in cooperation with local governments. 
Having in mind the political impact and international character of these groups, we can 
safely say that they will try, through corrupt activities and blackmail, to impede the 
implementation of projects under this initiative. The Chinese initiative will contribute to 
strengthening the institutional capacities of the Balkans countries and improving their 
ability to resist organized crime. If they fail to undermine this initiative, we can expect 
that organized criminal groups will try to redefine criminal activity in order to adapt to 
new circumstances. Organized crime is a social phenomenon that is constantly 
transforming, so we can expect that organized criminal groups even try to find a way to 
take benefits from initiative. Therefore, organized criminal activity, associated with the 
activities of the countries that oppose this initiative and large corporations, may 
represent a significant security problem in the future. In security assessments a special 
attention should be given to analysis of organized crime activity, although its capacity 
can't jeopardize the initiative in general. 
Terrorism, as a form of asymmetric threats, is another way of the potential 
threat to China's initiative in the Balkans. In most of Balkans countries the Wahhabi 
movement is active, and fighters from this area have been recruited, trained, and some 
of them went to Syria and Iraq. Individuals and groups from this region may be 
instrumentalized to take a terrorist act against the Chinese initiatives within global 
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jihad. Also, a special threat comes from China's internal enemies who can estimate that 
the Balkans is the weakest link for endangering China's initiative. Some of China's 
internal enemies who conduct activities around the world are: Uighur separatists 
(related to the international jihadist network), Falu Gong sect (they tried to organize 
protests against Chinese President in Belgrade), the Chinese Catholic Church, the so-
called Front of National Liberation and groups associated with Taiwan (Trifunović, 2016). 
These threats must be taken seriously and there is a need for coordinated operation in 
the monitoring of this phenomenon by states who are members of initiative. Prevention 
requires the exchange of intelligence between China and states who are members of 
initiative in the context of this threat, since holders of terrorist attack in the Balkans 
can be external factors, and there is a possibility of cooperation between internal and 
external holders 
In the analysis of security challenges, risks and threats in the Balkans, 
challenges that come from political, economic and social spheres have a special place. 
Balkans countries are trying to consolidate their politics, however they are accompanied 
by a heavy legacy in building a modern democratic society, especially in the socio-
economic sphere. The transition from the socialist to liberal democratic order and 
market economy, have been followed by an extensive privatization and restructuring of 
economy, which has led to an unprecedented level of unemployment and systemic 
impoverishment of whole branches of the economy. High unemployment in the Balkans 
countries may affect the perceptions of citizens that the initiative will threaten small 
businesses and bring Chinese workers in this area, which will result in a higher degree 
of competition in the labor market. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze and evaluate 
the potential subversion activity that can be undertaken with the aim of jeopardizing 
the initiative. Quality response to this potential threats is strengthening intelligence 
and security system of a countries that are members of initiatives, raising their 
integrity and creating conditions for high-quality and timely exchange of information. 
Particular attention should be paid to the so-called situational threats that are 
a result of natural disasters, technical and technological disasters and accidents, which 
may seriously jeopardize the initiative. Tracks of new roads, railways and other 
infrastructure will pass through areas that were often affected by floods, earthquakes, 
landslides, forest fires and other natural disasters. In order to proactively work with the 
aim of diminishing the effects of natural disasters, it is necessary to do a risk mapping, 
high-quality design and construction of large infrastructure projects. In the framework 
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of 16+1 initiative, a special attention should be given in responding to emergency 
situations. As a result of sabotage, terrorist and cyber-attacks it can arise a 
endangering of human health and life, environmental degradation and destruction of 
critical infrastructure. It is very important to influence on strengthening existing and 
building new mechanisms for joint action in responding to emergencies between 
countries that are members of  16+1 Initiative. 
The first step in finding ways of achieving security in the Balkans in context of 
Chinese initiative is identification of potential threats and holders. As a next step it is 
necessary to form a special working body that will deal with monitoring threats and 
coordinating action among members of the 16+1 Initiative. That working body should be 
organized through organizational units that cover specific threat. Some of necessary 
organizational units should be: units for emergencies, terrorism, organized crime, cyber 
threats, subversion, social and economic threats (Dragišić, 2017). In that way, this 
working body will represent an optimal response to Balkans security challenges, risks 
and threats in the context of the Chinese 16+1 initiative. 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The Chinese presence in Europe through the project "One belt - one road", ie 
initiative 16+1, is a historical novelty that will be reflected in a number of areas of social 
life - political, economic, infrastructural, cultural, and especially in the sphere of 
security. This initiative could potentially face with many challenges at global and 
regional levels. From global strategic challenges stand out those that may arise from 
global and regional powers who may view the initiative 16+1 as infringing on their areas 
of influence, driving competition rather than cooperation. The second global challenge 
to 16+1 initiative comes from multinational companies that realization of this project 
can see as a direct threat to their interests.  
Each region has a specific security dynamics which create the overall image of 
the security in a given area. The Balkans is neuralgic area with frequent political turmoil 
and crisis and with a number of unresolved issues at the intersection of socio-economic 
sectors. Such security constellations can be directly reflected on the security of the 
initiative and to jeopardize its realization. 
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The concept of Balkan security identity represents a good starting point and 
high-quality analytical framework for the study of security challenges, risks and threats 
in the Balkans that might compromise the realization of Chinese projects. Analyzing the 
Balkans security identity and by understanding of its constituent elements, we can get 
the picture of the major security challenges, risks and threats in this area, the scope 
and quality of resources for countering security challenges, as well as the social 
perception of the security by the citizens of the Balkan states. 
Events in Kosovo and Metohija, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia show 
that the impact of external factors on the political and security processes in the 
Balkans is very big. That is a significant determinant of the Balkan security identity, 
which must be the starting point for any analysis of the security of the region, 
particularly in the context of the New Silk Road. Regional and global powers can 
interfere in the policy, security, economy and other area at this region in order to create 
a conflict with a goal to stop the 16+1 initiative and expel China from this part of 
Europe. 
Positive development of Balkan security identity is imperative because it 
contributes in improving security situation in the region. As the development of identity 
can go in both directions, it is important to proactively respond to new threats to the 
region. The Chinese presence in this area will bring new threats which can affect on 
change of the Balkans security architecture, as well as on the security identity. State 
member 16+1 initiative need to be prepared on this new security situation. 
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Abstract 
 
From its beginning (1949) NATO was an inclusive international organization 
(Article 10 of The North Atlantic Treaty). In the post-bipolar international relations the 
enlargement of NATO has been one of the most successful NATO’s internal policy. 
Russia Federation has been strongly opposed to its enlargement but NATO managed to 
calm down its objections. After the accession of Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Georgia are the main aspirants for the full-fledge membership to 
NATO. But today, in the time of the new resetting United States/West-Russia 
Federation relations, the leaders of NATO are much more conscious about its open-
door-policy. It goes to the NATO’s enlargement to the Eastern as well as to the South 
Eastern Europe. The process of further enlargement of NATO should definitely be 
slowed down in the near future.  
 
Key words: NATO, Russia Federation, NATO enlargement, Western Balkans  
 
 
Introduction  
 
The NATO Summit in Warsaw represents a cornerstone in adaptation of the 
Alliance to the new complex security scenario in the international relations. NATO's 
essential mission is not changed and has stayed the same: to ensure that the Alliance 
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remains a community of freedom, peace, security and shared values ,including individual 
liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law, with the accent on Europe, 
keeping the transatlantic ties strong and important for NATO's global role. The Warsaw 
Summit was also a confirmation of NATO’s decision on enhancing military capabilities 
especially on its eastern border, with Russia being active again. It is important to stress 
that it was repeatedly stated in Warsaw that the Alliance does not seek any 
confrontation and poses no threat to Russia, if the safety and security of Europe and 
North America is not endangered.  
By inviting Montenegro to participate in the Warsaw summit, the Alliance 
confirmed that it is on its way to full-fledge membership. However, NATO said a little 
about the future of its ‘open door’ policy. The Summit made a caution nod in the 
direction of Ukraine’s and Georgia’s aspirations for membership as well as those of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. On the other side, influenced by the so-called 
Russian factor, Sweden and Finland are moving closer and closer to NATO, though 
without seeking full-fledge membership to the Alliance.  
The paper is devoted to the future of NATO’s open-door-policy. The author’s 
main thesis is that because of the new crisis in the relations between NATO and Russia 
Federations, after the accession of Montenegro as 29th member of the Alliance, the 
further enlargement of NATO in near future is not going to be really on the agenda of 
this organization. Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two counties from the 
region of the South Eastern Europe, who are willing to join the Alliance, and specially 
Georgia and Ukraine, despite how much they are performing their internal reforms in 
order to join the NATO, will not in the near future become a full-fledge members of that 
Alliance. That is not god for NATO. But what is even more important it is not good for 
the whole process of post-socialistic transformation and democratization of these 
aspirant countries. Generally, it is not good for the overall stability and security in 
Europe.  
 
 
The importance of NATO’s open-door policy for the Alliance  
 
In 1997 at its summit in Madrid NATO has announced that the first three post-
socialistic countries: Chech Republic, Hungary and Poland will become a full-fledge 
members of the Alliance  at its next summit in 1999 in Washington D.C. It was not well 
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accepted in some academic and political circles. Immediately critics of the enlargement 
of NATO, the most quoted in that time was a famous George F. Kennan, claimed that 
extending NATO it would be the most fateful error of the American policy in the entire 
post-cold war era.199 Despite such scenario the proponents of the enlargement of NATO 
claimed that the enlargement of NATO will have a beneficial impact on stability and 
security in Europe. Adams Daniel Rotfeld from SIPRI wrote that it should be seen as 
natural process and as an adequate response to new needs and challenges in Europe 
and whole international community (Rotfeld, 2011). In the post-bipolar world NATO 
become more than just a defence alliance: it is now the centre of gravity in the search 
for a security order in Europe. So the NATO enlargement decisions are basically 
expressions of political will of its members. The enlargement of NATO affects the 
security interests of members and applicants as well as the interests of countries 
outside the alliance. Enlargement of NATO is seen by both NATO members and 
aspirants as  an extension of the zone of stability. The fundamental role of NATO is the 
politico-military integration of Europe (Rotfeld, 2011:23). 
With  the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO chose 
not  to remain an exclusive organization, with a limited membership and  tight focus on 
the security of Europe’s western half. The enlargement become the means to extend 
NATO’s democratic security community to the former eastern socialist part of Europe. 
But geopolitics presents a limit to NATO’s east enlargement. Russian intervention to 
Georgia in 2008  and its annexation of Crimea in 2014 were a Russian way of making 
Georgia and Ukraine an unattractive candidates for inclusion in the NATO. The process 
of enlargement is still seen as a vehicle for advancing security and stability across 
Europe but more and more as a case of unfinished business (Webber, Hallams, Smith, 
2014). 
Enlargement is a permanent feature of the NATO’s summit conclusions. But 
somehow, NATO’s mantra of creating a Europe whole and free often sounds hollow, if 
not insincere (Dempsey, 2016:25)  
NATO's open door policy is not a peripheral issue, it is Alliance's founding 
principle In The North Atlantic Treaty that created NATO in  April 1949, enlargement 
was enshrined as a fundamental element.  Article 10  of the Treaty states that by 
unanimous agreement the alliance may invite to membership “any other European 
                                                          
199 Porter, P.(2000) „Hooked on security“, The World Today, The 5th November 2000, p. 13.  
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State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the 
security of the North Atlantic area.”200 
In the NATO Strategic Concept  document of 2010 is  written that NATO's enlargement 
has contributed substantially to the security of Allies and the prospect of further 
enlargement, and the spirit of cooperative security have advanced stability in Europe 
more broadly.   The goal of NATO; Europe whole and free, and sharing common values, 
would be best served by the eventual integration of all European countries that so 
desire into Euro-Atlantic structures.201  
In  his Annual Report 2016 Secretary General of NATO , Jens Stoltenberg stated that 
NATO's door is open to all European democracies that share the values of the Alliance, 
and are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership  
(Stoltenberg, 2016:62).   
In the post-bipolar American foreign policy strategy, NATO enlargement, is a bipartisan 
effort that has spanned the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations, and has been 
seen as one of the most successful U.S. foreign policy achievements of the past two 
decades. As a result of that NATO’s policy, more than 100 million Central, Eastern and 
South Eastern  Europeans in 12 nations from Estonia to Albania can freely elect their 
own governments and pursue national priorities without fear of foreign invasion. 
Moreover, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the alliance has benefited from the 
contributions of the new members, even if few of them are yet spending at 
least 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, the NATO target. 202  
The enlargement of NATO has progressed significantly over a period of the last 
two decades and has arrived at a point of near complete realization of its principal 
objectives. The core aim and intent of the enlargement agenda is to incorporate the 
entire region of post-socialistic Europe into the command and control structure of the 
military alliance. NATO has strategically encapsulated its core geospatial command 
                                                          
200 The North Atlantic Treaty (2001) NATO Handbook, Brusseles, NATO Office of Information and 
Press, p.529. 
201 Active Engagement, Modern Defense.. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the 
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (2010) Brusseles, NATO Public Diplomacy 
Division, p. 25. 
202 Haltzel M. (2014), „Extend NATO's umbrella to Montenegro and Macedonia“, The Washington 
Post,  The 27th June  2014th 
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area, and therefore a successful conclusion of the enlargement process is a matter of 
the highest priority. (Milinkovich, 2017) 
Southeastern Europe and the Balkan Peninsula are an essential component  of 
this framework owing to their geopolitical and geostrategic significance. The entire 
Balkan Peninsula practically serves as a forward operating platform from which NATO’s 
military force projection capability can be readily launched in the direction of the 
Middle East, Northern Africa, the Black Sea region, Eastern Europe, as well as Western 
Europe. This would  signify the consolidation of NATO military supremacy in the entire 
hemisphere surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. For the establishment of NATO 
military pre-eminence in that region successful completing the enlargement process is 
a crucial necessity. 
NATO is therefore tasked with affirming the position of the Western 
hemisphere, or North Atlantic axis, within the immediate environment that 
comprises the former sphere of influence of the Soviet Union (Milinkovich, 2017:1)  
Today there are three main groups of countries as a potential candidates for the 
membership to NATO: 
 - the two Nordic countries, Sweden and Finland  
- the countries within so-cold Russian sphere of influence, Ukraine, Georgia, 
maybe Moldova  
- the countries from the region of the South Eastern Europe/ Western Balkans, 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, maybe Kosovo.    
 
 
Rapprochement of Sweden and Finland to the NATO  
 
In the recent years the policy dialogue between NATO and the  two Nordic 
countries, Sweden and Finland has been much  more intensive  and fruitful than ever 
before in the history of their relations.  In the framework of the format 28 + 2 (28 
members of NATO plus Sweden and Finland) representatives of this two countries are 
seating at the same table with NATO representatives discussing contemporary political 
and security situation in the international arena.203 The first meeting in the new format 
                                                          
203 The format has been tried before with Central Asian countries but with limited success and 
little concrete follow up.  
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28+2 between NATO, Sweden and Finland took place in the deputy ambassador circle in 
January 2015. Denmark initiated a military assessment of the security situation in the 
Baltic Sea region. The next meeting was on 22 April 2015. Secretary General Jens 
Stoltenberg chaired a meeting of the North Atlantic Council with Sweden and Finland. 
For the first time the Council discussed the security situation in the Baltic Sea region. 
NATO and two new partners, Sweden and Finland, concluded that Russia has been 
intensified its activities to secure its access to the Baltic Sea. It was perceived that 
Russia  was testing NATO’s  determination to stand up for security in that region. Three 
partners; NATO, Sweden and Finland have agreed that in the following area they are 
going to intensified their mutual cooperation in the future: 
- The exchange of situational awareness in the region 
- The exchange of information about hybrid warfare 
- Connection with NATO’s rapid reaction forces 
- Coordination of training and exercises in the region of Baltic Sea (Wieslander, 
2016:140)  
From year 2016, Swedish and Finnish representatives took part in the meetings 
of foreign  affairs ministers and defense ministers of the members of the Alliance. 
Naturally, Sweden and Finland, as a non-members of NATO are not engaged into all 
decision-making processes and do not have the full access to NATO planning 
structures.  
Military cooperation between NATO and Sweden and Finland has constantly 
been expanded too. The  armed forces of this two Nordic countries are relatively small 
but  technically  very well equipped and highly developed. Besides that, the level of 
interoperability of their armed forces with NATO standards in military terminology, 
military routines and procurement is very high because since 1994 they have worked 
together with NATO within the framework of its partnership programmes Partnership 
for peace and Planning and Review Process. Sweden and Finland have joined this two 
NATO’s program  to contribute to the building of a common European security 
architecture  (Čehulić, 2002) and to improve  conduct of international peace operations. 
Both countries gave their military contributions to the NATO operations in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, Sweden’s forces have  been deployed in Libya in 2011.  In the Baltic Sea 
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region the Partnership for peace program  became a vehicle  for transparency and 
confidence building activities. 204 
At the Wales summit of NATO in  2014 the  Enhanced Opportunities Program 
(EOP) for Sweden and Finland was introduced.  In the following it is argued that, due to 
the high degree of security interdependence in the Baltic Sea region, and the degree of 
interoperability gained by Sweden and Finland, regional cooperation between NATO, 
Sweden and Finland should be deepened further, thereby strengthening security and 
stability in a strategically crucial region for the Alliance (Wieslander, 2016:134). 
In the framework of so-cold extended cooperative security Sweden and Finland 
have been  intensifying  their partnership with the Alliance particularly in the Baltic Sea 
region since the crisis in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia have  
accoutred. From that time, both, the governments in Sweden and Finland and the 
leaders of NATO are stressing that all of them share a strategic interest in security and 
stability in the Nordic-Baltic region. Such cooperation includes not only the military 
dimension, such as common exercises but also a political dimension of cooperation. 
Both countries have taken part as a partner nations in maneuvers BALTOPS in June 
2015 and Crisis Management Exercise in March 2016. In the latest, Sweden and Finland 
were able to participate in a NATO’s collective defense scenario for the first time.     
On May 2016 the Swedish parliament ratified  the Host Nation Support 
Agreement permitting NATO to use the Swedish territory, air space and waters in the 
event of a crisis or military attack on Swedish territory. Since 2014 a similar agreement 
NATO has got with Finland. Finland supports the NATO Centre of Excellence for Cyber 
Security and Strategic Communication in Tallinn and Riga and Sweden recently decided 
to join them both. Moreover the cooperation between NATO and  Sweden and Finland 
has been strengthened in military training and in the defense industry. 
Full-fledge membership of Sweden and Finland to NATO will have a significant 
strategically importance for the Alliance and its possibility to defend its northeast 
members and borders. Nowadays  Russian system of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD 
system) - air defense system and anti-ship missiles) in Kaliningrad restrict NATO’s 
access to the strategically important Baltic Sea region, impending the defense of the 
                                                          
204 Such kind of cooperation often included the participation of Russia Federation, including  
search and rescue exercises open to all NATO partners, as well as scientific research on mine 
disposal and handling of dangerous chemicals in the sea. (Mackey, 2016) 
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Lithuania, Latvia and  Estonia in the event of an attack to their territory (Kroenig, 2015) 
As a members of NATO, Finland could provide important information about Russian 
activities in the wider region, and Swedish airspace could be used automatically. 
Furthermore , on the southern coast of Sweden (Island of  Gotland) NATO could create 
an air force base. Thus NATO could strengthen its position throughout the Baltic Sea 
region.  
Sweden and Finland are members of the Nordic Defense Cooperation 
(NORDEFCO). Its goal is to promote defense policy cooperation among its members: 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Since 2014 three Baltic states 
(Lithuania, Latvia and  Estonia)   have been able to cooperate in its projects. But, as a 
members of NATO, they are thinking that their involvement in the NORDEFCO  and 
their cooperation with the non-NATO members is going to, eventually to  jeopardize 
their position within the Alliance. With  Sweden and Finland as a full-fledge members of 
NATO NORDEFCO will lose its importance.  
Last, but not less important, is the fact that the accession of Sweden and 
Finland to NATO should  send  a political signal to Russia that NATO is still relevant 
and  desirable  international organization. It can improve NATO’s own image, 
particularly  its  soft power, because both, Sweden and Finland, are democratic 
countries,  committed to respect  all kind of human rights and  supporting worldwide 
United Nations peace  missions. Also they are economically the richest countries in 
Europe. 
Despite all of that, Sweden and Finland are very hesitant  concerning their  
full-fledge membership to NATO. Their governments  face public opinion  that tends to 
reject NATO. While NATO remains its open door policy, resistance among Sweden and 
Finns to join NATO remains high.  In the time of the highest crisis in Ukraine the survey 
showed that only 41 % of Swedish and less than one quarter of the Finnish population 
were in favor of the accession of their country to NATO (Domisse,2016:5). Both 
countries are hesitant regarding the delicate topic of NATO nuclear strategy and 
nuclear  program. Finland is strongly against any kind of nuclear  materials and 
weapons on its territory. 
Neither Sweden nor Finland is likely to apply for NATO membership any time 
soon. As a senior NATO official stated “NATO partnerships are a largely unseen, but 
hugely important part of the Alliance today” (Appathurai, 2014:46). Today Sweden and 
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Finland have earned the status of gold NATO’s partners meaning they had become 
recognized as contributors to security and as interoperable as most allies.205   
 
 
NATO’s  open-door - policy towards Eastern Europe  
      
NATO is no longer a crisis manager and an agency of political transformation, 
as it has been in the past, but an instrument of national and collective defense.  This 
means that for the time being, countries will only be able to join the Alliance if the 
Alliance is able to defend them. It is  therefore unlikely that Ukraine, Georgia and 
Moldova will become a member of NATO in the foreseeable future ((Kamp, 2016).  
Because of Russian aggression in Georgia in 2008 and the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, one 
might think that NATO  would unanimously agree on the need for the Alliance to do as 
much as possible  not only to project stability along its eastern borders but also to 
eventually have Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova become members of NATO. But NATO 
does not  want to inherit border disputes, precisely they are bound to lead to further 
conflicts with Russia Federation (Dempsey, 2016:26.) Added to that is Russian 
intimidation of NATO, as former  Russia's permanent representative to NATO, Alexander 
Grushko, made clear. "Any political game concerning NATO expansion into Georgia and 
Ukraine is filled with the most serious, most profound geopolitical consequences for all 
of Europe," Grushko told the Life News television channel (Dempsey, 2015:3) 
 
 
The Ukraine Question 
 
Even though NATO stated in its summit in Bucharest  in  2008 that someday 
Ukraine would be invited to join the alliance, until recently, the Ukrainians made little 
effort to help make this invitation a reality. 
Once an aspiring NATO ally under the leadership of President Viktor 
Yushchenko (Čehulić Vukadinović,  242-246)  Ukraine’s previous pro-Russia government 
under President Viktor Yanukovich blocked membership progress. In 2010, the 
                                                          
205 International Defense Cooperation Efficiency, Solidarity, Sovereignty (2016)  Stockholm, 
Report from the Inquiry on Swede's International Defense Cooperation,  p. 42.  
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
562 
Ukrainian parliament passed a bill that barred Ukraine from committing to “a non-bloc 
policy which means non-participation in military-political alliances.” (Pop, .2010). 
The crisis in Ukraine in 2014 is forcing NATO to rethink the strategic benefits 
of its overall further enlargement. For many NATO members the crisis in Ukraine has 
had the two positive effect. It has return the attention of NATO  back to Europe and 
force some NATO member allies do decraese their defense spending .206 But the 
attitude of further enlargement policy of NATO is definitely changing. This issue become 
very sensitive inside NATO.  
Although nowadays leader of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko see the future of 
Ukraine in the West (not under Russian domination and influence), the country has a 
long way to go before NATO membership becomes a serious possibility. 
NATO defense ministers agreed to work on a comprehensive package  of long 
term measures in support of the Ukrainian armed forces, but this remained within the 
ambit of existing arrangements geared principally to defense  reform and military 
modernization of Ukraine.207 Of a piece with this approach , NATO has also refrained 
from renewing its commitment of membership to Ukraine. NATO’s pledge to these 
states in 2008 now seems mistaken. 
 
 
Georgia 
 
Like Ukraine, Georgia was promised eventual membership at the NATO summit 
in Bucharest in 2008. Since then, not all members of the Alliance have been supportive. 
This is especially true of France and Germany, which have an uncomfortably close 
relationship with Russia 208 
                                                          
206 Among  others,  NATO has  established si command centers in Eastern Europe with the aim 
of supporting its new deployed  6000 forces in the Baltic and some Central European member 
states to protect that part of Europe from Russia influence. Second all NATO members finally 
will confront their decline in defense spending (Dempsey, 2015)   
207 NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, press conference, Brusseles, NATO Public 
Diplomacy Division, 3rd June 2014th  
http://www.nato.int/cps.en/natodrive/opiniones_no618.htm, (visited on 11.06. 2014). 
208 Erlanger S, Myers S. Lee, (2008) „NATO Allies oppose Bush on Ukraine and Georgia“ , New 
York Times, 3rd January 2008th , p.4.   
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Georgia has done everything possible to meet the criteria for joining NATO. 
Apart from reforming its armed forces to a very high standard, the country has been 
actively engaged in several NATO missions. Yet for all that, NATO as a whole is opposed 
to admitting this country, which is strategically located between the Black Sea, Russia, 
Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. 
The reason is that several NATO countries are not convinced that Georgia 
would add to NATO's security, despite its strategic location. Bluntly, countries such as 
Germany and France but also Poland fear that Georgia might at one stage invoke 
Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which obliges the allies to come to the defense of another 
ally under threat. 
Georgia is vulnerable. Russia's occupation in August 2008 of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia-together comprising about a fifth of Georgian territory-has made it 
increasingly difficult for Georgia to persuade NATO to grant it a Membership Action 
Plan, which would put the country on the road to accession. Even though Georgia has 
not been given a Membership Action Plan (MAP), it has a relationship with NATO that 
far exceeds the traditional MAP; such as the Annual National Program, the NATO–
Georgia Commission, and the Substantial NATO–Georgia Package . 
Some NATO diplomats have argued that the more NATO procrastinates over 
admitting Georgia , the more Russia will see this as a NATO's  weakness and a 
vindication of its policies of recognition and support for Georgia's breakaway territories 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Endless procrastination will only embolden  Russia 
further to bully its neighbors and try to restore the Soviet Union de facto , if not de jure 
(Demspey, 2016:26)  
Georgia has transformed its military and has been steadfast with its support 
for overseas security operations. Georgia has contributed thousands of troops to Iraq, 
and hundreds of peacekeepers to the Balkans and Africa. Perhaps Georgia’s greatest 
contribution is found in Afghanistan. Georgia currently maintains 860 troops in the 
country. This is the third-largest contribution after the U.S. and Germany. Moreover, 
Georgia contributes an infantry company to the NATO Response Force (Coffey, Kochis, 
2016:2) 
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Moldova 
 
On Moldova’s sovereign territory in Transnistria, over the last two decades 
Russia has been able to impose  a sort of area denial policy on Moldova’s constitutional 
authorities, propping up a separatist regime and building up a de facto military base 
less than 40 kilometers from Moldova’s capita. Conceived as a way to force Russia to 
withdraw its troops  Modlova’s self-imposed “constitutional  neutrality” has failed to 
keep Russia out of its sovereign territory and has fallen short in preventing the 
transformation of Transnistria into a Russia active military and intelligence outpost 
(Munteanu, 2016). 
Leading voices of  the civil society are calling on Moldovan politicians to stop 
pretending that the countries neutrality is a viable solution and increase efforts in 
strengthening ties with NATO, expand bilateral form of military-to-military cooperation, 
while also stressing that this does not conflict with constitutional neutrality.   
Relations with NATO started when Moldova joined the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace program. The country’s programme 
of cooperation with NATO is set out in an Individual Partnership Action Plan which is 
agreed every two years. 
Through participation in Partnership for Peace  training and exercises, Moldova 
is developing the ability of the 22nd Peacekeeping Battalion’s forces to work together 
with forces from other countries, especially in crisis management and peacekeeping 
operations. These units could be made available for NATO peace support operations. In 
March 2014, over 40 Moldovan troops were deployed in support of the NATO-led peace-
support operation in Kosovo, comprising an infantry manoeuvre platoon and an 
explosive ordnance disposal team. 
Defense and security sector reforms are core areas of cooperation in which 
NATO and individual Allies have considerable expertise that Moldova can draw upon.  
At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, Moldova was invited to take part in the 
newly launched Defense and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) Initiative, which 
offers expert advice and assistance to interested partners.. Based on the request 
received from the Moldovan authorities, a tailored package of measures was endorsed 
by NATO defense ministers in June 2015 to assist in strengthening and modernizing the 
country’s armed forces and reforming its national security structures. 
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Moldova is also participating in the Building Integrity  Program. The defense 
ministry completed the NATO BI Self-Assessment and Peer Review Process in January 
2016.  The ministry receives tailor-made assistance and advice for strengthening 
integrity, accountability, transparency and good governance in the defense and security 
sector. 
But, the more Moldova and NATO cooperate , the more military drills Russia 
conducts with the forces of the separatist  regimes in Transnistria 
NATO has no direct role in the conflict resolution process in the region of 
Transnistria. However, NATO closely follows developments in the region and the Alliance 
fully expects Russia to abide by its international obligations, including respecting the 
territorial integrity and political freedom of neighboring countries. But for sure Moldova 
will not be invited as a full-fledge member of NATO.   
  
 
NATO enlargement to the South Eastern Europe/Western Balkans 
   
The only de facto direction of NATO enlargement in recent times has been to 
the South Eastern Europe/Western Balkans.  Three  post-socialistic countries from that 
part of Europe have already joined the Alliance: Slovenia in  2004, Albania and Croatia 
in 2009. Two of them, Croatia and Slovenia were part of  former Yugoslavia, and Croatia 
is the only post-socialist and at the same time post-conflict country which has 
managed to became the full-fledge member of NATO.  
Very soon the process of ratification in all 28 members of NATO of the 
Accession Protocol  of Montenegro to NATO is going to be finished, so Montenegro will 
be the 29th member country of that organization. But unfortunately Macedonia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina will have to wait for their membership to  the Alliance.  Kosovo 
is the specific case and Serbia will try in the future to keep its military neutrality (but 
within NATO's partnership program Partnership for Peace). Serbia is the only Balkan 
nation to have opposed NATO expansion in the region, because the bombings in 
Republic Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the mid 90s of the last century, and in 
Yugoslavia during the Kosovo conflict in 1999, affected territories inhabited and 
administered by Serbs. 
The United States is in favor of the Balkan states’ accession to NATO, although 
it does not act in pursuit of this goal as intensively as it did in the case of the Central 
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European countries. From the perspective of the U.S., the situation in the Balkans is 
stable, and enlargement should be preceded by the resolution of disputes between the 
neighbors. 
On the  other side, NATO's expansion to Montenegro and its potential 
expansion to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia is seen in Russian Federation  as 
a provocation. Asked about the integration of this three Balkans counties into NATO 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, during a news conference on the sidelines of 
the 69th U.N. General Assembly at U.N. Headquater  in New York in 2014 told the 
Bosnian daily Dnevni Avaz  „With regards to the expansion of NATO I see it as a 
mistake , even a provocation..... this is an irresponsible policy that undermines the 
determination to build a system of equal and shared security in Europe, equal for 
everyone regardless of whether a country is a member of this or that bloc.“209     
 
 
Montenegro 
 
Despite widespread support  from the NATO members states for enlargement 
to the South Eastern Europe only Montenegro will join the Alliance. Immediately after 
the reestablishment of its statehood in 2006 Montenegro has expressed its formal 
interest in joining the Alliance. The same year Montenegro has joined the NATO’s 
program  Partnership for Peace and in 2009 the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was 
offered to it. On May 19 2016 NATO foreign ministers took the final step toward inviting 
Montenegro to join the Alliance by signing NATO’s formal accession protocol. As stated 
by NATO “Montenegro will now  participate in all NATO meeting as an observer. Once 
all allies have ratified the Protocol, Montenegro will be invited to accede to the 
Washington Treaty and become 29th member of the Alliance”.210  
                                                          
209 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov speaks during a news conference on the sidelines of 
the 69th U.N. General Assembly at U.N. Headquater in New York, 26th  September 2014th,. 
http//www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-balkans-russia-idUSKCNOHO11W20140929, (visited on 
14.04. 2017). 
210 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44550.pdf, (visited on 17.04l 2017).  
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Some critics maintain that the Montenegrin government has yet to adequately  
address long-standing concerns about judiciary and corruption.211 They also note that a  
majority of Montenegrins appear to oppose NATO accession. But speaking in May 2016 
Montenegrin Defense Minister Mrs Pejanović - Đurišić highlighted Montenegrins 
readiness to join the Alliance stated that Montenegro has the required capacities, 
recognized the true values of democracy  and has sufficient dedication to be a credible 
and reliable partner within NATO. She has admitted that requirements for joining the 
NATO have proven to be critical catalysts for all kind of reforms , particularly reforming 
the military and strengthening the role of law in Montenegro (Pejanović - Đurišić, 2016).    
Montenegro is a small but geopolitically important Balkan nation. Its inclusion 
to NATO would make the entire northern shore of the Mediterranean NATO territory, 
from Turkey to Spain.  Montenegro is also close to important U.S. bases, including 
Naval Air Station Sigonella in Italy, which hosts P-8 sub-hunting planes that patrol the 
Mediterranean, and the U.S. Naval Base at Souda Bay, Greece, which hosts the NATO 
Missile Firing Installation, the only location in Europe where the alliance can test-fire 
missiles (Goure, 2016).  
Montenegro’s military is relatively small, but it has already proven itself a 
worthy partner for the U.S. Montenegrin troops took part in NATO’s International 
Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan from 2010–2014, and its men and 
women in uniform continue to contribute to the follow-on Operation Resolute Support, 
helping to advise, train, and assist Afghan security forces. Montenegro has donated 
1,600 weapons and 250,000 rounds of ammunition to the Afghan National Army.212 In 
November 2016, Montenegro hosted a NATO civil-emergency response exercise, code 
name  CRNA GORA 2016.  
                                                          
211 „Key Founding of the 2016 Report on Montenegro“, Brusseles, fact sheet European 
Commision, 9th November 2016th,   
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3638_en.htm (visited on 10.11.2016). 
212 “Relations with Montenegro,”, Brusseles, North Atlantic Treaty Organization,   26th May  
2016th  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49736.htm (visited on 10.01. 2017). 
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Montenegro’s new Prime Minister,  Duško Marković, reiterated that Montenegro is 
committed to joining NATO, telling a session of parliament in November 2016 that the 
“Cabinet that you will vote for today will take us to NATO.”213 
As to whether Montenegro, a small and not very wealthy country, would 
enhance NATO's overall security, the added value is questionable. But Montenegro's 
strategic location in this part of the Balkans, combined with its government's Atlantist  
outlook and commitment to joining the EU, could serve NATO's interests. Moreover, 
Montenegro's NATO accession would quash plans by Russia to build a naval base in that 
republic. Russia, which has a sizable economic influence in Montenegro, coupled of 
times was  warned the government in Podgorica against moving closer to the NATO,214 
advice that Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Đukanović has brushed aside.  
So the accession of Montenegro would be a tangible proof that Article 10 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty is still alive and it can demonstrate that Moscow does not 
exercise a hidden veto over NATO membership (Sikharulidze Vasil,  Bakhtadze Rati, 
2016:48) Also it can encourage other potential aspirants by showing that the door to 
NATO membership remains open.  
 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
In April 2008, Bosnia and Herzegovina stated its desire to join NATO, and the 
country was offered its MAP in 2010. Bosnia and Herzegovina has made some progress 
in defense reform and has even deploy troops to Afghanistan, but the country is still far 
off from joining the alliance. 
First and foremost, Bosnia and Herzegovina must register all immovable 
defense properties as state property for use by the country’s defense ministry. Little 
                                                          
213 “Montenegro’s Parliament Endorses New Cabinet,” Reuters, 28th November 2016th 
, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-montenegro-politics-idUSKBN13N1OT (visited on  10.01. 
2017). 
214 NATO’s Planned Balkan Expansion a ‘Provocation’: Russia’s Lavrov,” Reuters, 29th 
September  2014th,  
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-balkans-russia-idUSKCN0HO11W20140929 (visited on  
11.01. 2017). 
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progress on this has been made. In addition, the internal politics of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina make NATO membership controversial. 
Reforms of the security and defense sector have been delayed, modernization 
of army has been slowed and a common vision of three constitutional peoples 
(Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) of the country’s membership to NATO is lacking. The main 
political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina support NATO membership, and it is 
officially still one of the main political  foreign policy goal of that country but a common 
vision of three constitutional peoples (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) of the country’s 
membership to NATO is lacking. In practice, more than 80% of the support  for NATO is 
coming from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and less than third of 
population in Republic of  Srpska  supports integration to NATO ((Žornaczuk, 2012:3).   
The President of Republic of Srpska  Mr Milorad Dodig  stated that if Bosnia 
and Herzegovina will be invited to full –fledge membership to NATO, Republic of Srpska 
will organize a referendum for it. Due to the peculiar constitutional arrangements set 
up under the Dayton Agreement in 1995 Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be fully 
integrated within  the Western political and military system without the agreement of 
the Republic of Srpska. That makes it essential to have in Banja Luka a cooperative 
regime that would be receptive to the Western strategic objectives and willing to place 
the resources of the Serb Bosnian entity at their disposal, even to the point of self-
extinction (Karganovich, 2017:7)  
 
 
The Republic of Macedonia 
 
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, Macedonia became an independent 
state under its new constitutional name: Republic of Macedonia. Greece quickly 
protested on the baseless grounds that the name Macedonia, which is the same as that 
of Greece’s northern province, implied regional territorial claims by the new nation. 
In 1993, Macedonia joined the United Nations under the provisional name “the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”Macedonia was one of the first former 
Yugoslav republic which has  joined NATO’s program Partnership for Peace in 1995. The 
same year Macedonia and Greece agreed to a U.N.-brokered interim accord in which 
Athens agreed not to block Macedonia’s integration into international organizations, 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
570 
such as NATO, so long as it called itself “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, 
until both sides agreed on a mutually acceptable name. 
In year 1999 Macedonia has  received NATO’s program Membership Action Plan  
and completed it in 2008—meaning it had met all requirements to join the Alliance. 
Thus, Macedonia was certified by the Alliance as qualified for membership But at NATO 
summit in Bucharest in 2008, when everybody was expected that together with Albania 
and Croatia (as three members of the Adriatic Charter) Macedonia will be invited to full-
fledge membership to NATO in 2009, it has been vetoed by Greece because of a dispute 
over its constitutional name. Macedonia did not  get close to joining NATO despite the 
favorable verdict of the International Court of Justice in December 2011. The court 
pointed to the violation of the agreement between Macedonia and Greece (signed in 
1995) by Greece because the Greece was obliged not to block Macedonian’s membership 
to any international organization. Even so, Greece continues to clock Macedonia’s 
membership, not only  to the NATO but also to the European Union.  
Despite of that, in its intention to join the Alliance, Macedonia still very  
enthusiastically participates in NATO operations. Relative to the size of  population, and 
its  military expenditures which  range from 1,2 to 1.9 of its GDP , its contingent was 
one of the largest in Afghanistan, where its troops acquitted themselves well in combat. 
Macedonia is still very active member of NATO’s program  Membership Action Plan 
(MAP) , the last stage of cooperation between the NATO and applicant country before 
the full-fledge membership to NATO.   
The ethnic conflict  in Macedonia in 2001, and the deployment of the NATO 
contingent afterwards, influenced the perception of the NATO in the country  as a 
guarantor of the stability and integrity of Macedonia.  
But faced with the constant political instabilities,  ethnic tensions between the 
two major ethnic groups: Macedonians and  Albanians, and very poor economic and 
social situation, Macedonia is indicated as a country of high level of risk of internal 
conflict and a potentially subject for spreading instabilities to its neighborhood. In the 
times when EU and NATO are not willing to involve stronger in Macedonia, the Russia is  
offering  to Macedonia to join its economic and even security arrangements (Bugajski, 
2017). So it seems that Macedonia, like was Montenegro,  in the near future will be the 
collateral victim of the new  re-setting of relation between the United States/West  and 
Russia Federation.  
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Kosovo 
 
Kosovo is not currently considered as a future member of the NATO within the  
nowadays NATO’s members countries but the government of Kosovo declares its 
willingness to join the Alliance in the future. But Kosovo is not recognized as an 
independent state by some NATO members. At the same time Kosovo is still an object 
and the subject of international political relations. Because of its internal instability, 
and the absence of its functional  security forces, NATO troops, together with the forces 
of the EU, are still deployed in Kosovo. Progress in Kosovo’s European integration 
(Stabilization and Association Agreement was offered to Kosovo), and its dialogue with 
Serbia, could also prove favorable.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
NATO has underpinned European and North America’s security for almost 
seven decades. It is not surprise that many countries in the transatlantic region that 
are not already members wish to join the Alliance. In that contests NATO’s open door 
policy is critical in mobilizing Europe and its allies around the collective transatlantic 
defense.  Besides that, NATO has done more than any other organization, including the 
European Union, to promote democracy, stability, and security in the Euro-Atlantic 
region. For all  that reasons NATO should keep its open door policy and take measures 
to help aspirant countries reach their  membership (Coffey, Kochis, 2016:1). These two 
authors very enthusiastic are suggesting to the NATO’s leaders, especially to the U.S. 
policy the following: 
 
Keep the door open 
- Show support for Macedonia. The U.S. should pressure Greece behind the 
scenes to allow Macedonia to join NATO under the terms of the 1995 interim 
accord. 
- Make clear that Russia does not have a veto right. Russia should never be 
seen as having a veto over a potential country’s membership in NATO. Just 
because a country was once occupied by the Soviet Union or under the 
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domination of the Russian Empire does not mean it is blocked from joining the 
alliance in perpetuity. 
- Ensure that NATO meets with the three aspirant countries (Georgia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia) at the heads-of-government level 
not  to the level of foreign minister, as it is now. 
- Establish realistic expectations for Ukraine. She U.S. should seek to improve 
relations between NATO and Ukraine while recognizing that NATO membership 
is not currently a realistic option. 
- Support Bosnia and Herzegovina. The U.S. should help NATO keep Bosnia 
and Herzegovina on track for eventual membership once MAP requirements 
are completed. 
- Ensure that the alliance is clear on Georgia’s future membership (Coffey, 
Kochis, 2016:3) 
There are now three official candidate countries to join NATO: the Republic of 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia. Some are making better progress 
than others. 
We can safely assume that the process of enlargement of NATO normatively  
will continue but besides the open door policy of NATO ‘on the papers and documents’  
we will face more and more the willingness of some NATO’s members to slow down the 
whole process. The only de facto direction of NATO enlargement in recent times has 
been to the Western Balkans. So the NATO should seek consensus to accept the other 
countries aspiring to membership, including Macedonia from that region. Further 
enlargement of NATO to the region of the Western Balkans will not definitely strongly 
strengthen the capabilities of that organization. All previous rounds of NATO’s 
enlargement has shown that from a security point of view, membership was a huge 
psychological  benefits for the new countries but from the NATO’s point of view, the 
short-terms benefits were questionable until  serious defense  reforms took hold among 
the new comers and they can put their weight. But the open door policy of NATO can 
serve to consolidate the overall security in the Western Balkans, still very turbulent 
European  region.  
And it can put additional impact on the process  of the European integration. 
In the times of decreasing concrete American involvement in the region, and Europe in 
general, and the ineffectiveness of the United Nations representative’s missions in 
resolving the main disputes, European members of NATO in particular should seek 
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solidarity with regard to enlarge the NATO. In that process the neighboring countries of 
the region (Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, even Turkey) have already shown their 
interests. Poland, a strong member of Visegrad group of countries is also in favor of the 
enlargement process of NATO , not only to the region of the Western Balkans.  
Despite this calls, there are some voices within the so-called old NATO’s 
member countries (especially in Germany and France) strongly opposing the further 
enlargement of NATO over the next several years.  
They are stating that NATO was enlarged too quickly and with all its internal 
problems connected with the adaptation to the new international reality and security 
challenges, the NATO’s leaders have  instead  firstly to   agree on how to resolve that 
new challenges, including managing its relations with the Russia Federation. After that 
NATO can consider a next round of its open door policy.  
Today NATO members have to deal with two competing considerations about 
its further enlargement. One is strategic values of admitting new members. The other is  
how Russia Federation would react to that NATO’s policy. Some members states of 
NATO are more often raising the questions whether membership of any new country in 
the NATO can contribute to the overall security and stability of the Alliance in the 
future. If not, they are suggesting that NATO leaders will have to think twice about 
admitting it. Ongoing territorial disputes with Moscow  in Ukraine and Georgia has 
shown that the process of further enlargement of NATO should definitely be slowed 
down in the near future.  
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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes Croatia's policy towards NATO enlargement in the Western 
Balkans. After the Cold War, NATO has undergone major changes, which included 
organizational and strategic adjustments to new conditions in international relations, as 
well as the expansion to new countries. These processes can be viewed as an effort 
aimed at positioning NATO as inevitable actor in global security processes on the one 
hand, and at widening the trans-Atlantic security community on the other. Its actions in 
the post-Cold war period have not been limited to the territory of the Member States 
only (collective defence), but have been predominantly carried out in the wider 
environment in which conflicts occurred (collective security). One such area was the 
Western Balkans, where NATO had decisive impact on stopping the conflict and the 
establishment of peace and stability. This was particularly true in the case of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Kosovo. NATO enlargement to the countries of Southeast Europe 
has significantly affected the improvement of the security situation in the region. NATO 
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membership of Croatia, Albania and eventually Montenegro serve as the case in point. 
Croatian position is specific, not only due to its geo-strategic position, but also because 
of its special interest in stability and Euro-Atlantic perspective of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The paper is based on the hypothesis that the expansion of NATO to the 
countries of the Western Balkans has had positive impact on the stability and security 
of the region, which is why Croatia strongly advocates further NATO enlargement to the 
rest of the countries of the region (to those which declared NATO membership as their 
foreign and security policy objective). This hypothesis will be elaborated through the 
analysis of NATO strategic documents and Croatian foreign and security policy, 
especially those parts that are related to the Western Balkans. 
 
Key words: NATO enlargement, Croatia, Western Balkans, security community, 
security policy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The end of the Cold War has led to a significant shift in global security 
processes, whereby those processes have been partly related to the redefinition of the 
role of certain actors in international relations. The range of actors on the international 
political scene in the post-Cold War era has expanded considerably, and today it 
encompasses a number of subjects that can have either a positive or negative impact 
on the international security environment. Among the actors that started the process of 
redefining their character, mission and scope of their tasks in the post-Cold War period 
were both the EU and NATO. These two regional organizations (whose geneses of 
development during the Cold War were clearly functionally distinctive) are the main 
actors of the (pluralistic) security community that encompasses the trans-Atlantic area 
since the late 1950s (Cottey, 2014: 168). For both organizations the end of the Cold war 
marked the turning point and the beginning of the new formative period, in which both 
the EU (EC at that time) and NATO began to build new mechanisms and take on new 
functions, while at the same time intensively searched for ways of their mutual 
functional harmonization. 
Building up of the EC’s security component was almost a complete novelty in 
the development of the Community, whereby Common Foreign and Security Policy has 
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been developing only since the Maastricht Treaty (1992) as one of the aspects of deeper 
integration between the Member States. On the other hand, NATO, which had clearly 
defined its security role during the Cold war (collective defence), was primarily faced 
with the need of defining and justifying its further existence in the new strategic 
environment. Given that the non-integrated part of the European continent sank into 
negative security processes and conflicts (former Yugoslavia) in the early 1990s, the 
space for the use and testing of NATO's redefined capacities was opened. The NATO’s 
task of defending the territory of its member states was thus complemented with the 
increased focus on out-of-area operations and enlargement as the model for improving 
security conditions. “Enlargement of NATO and the European Union has been the way 
towards a Europe whole, free and at peace” (NATO, 2017a).  
Starting from such orientation, NATO has actively participated in putting an 
end to the conflicts in the Western Balkans, primarily in resolving conflicts and later in 
the institutional development of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. From the NATO 
perspective „the Western Balkans is a region of strategic importance “where NATO 
„…remains fully committed to the stability and security, as well as to supporting the 
Euro-Atlantic aspirations of countries in the region. Democratic values, rule of law, 
domestic reforms, and good neighbourly relations are vital for regional cooperation and 
for the Euro-Atlantic integration process.  The Alliance will continue to work closely 
with the Western Balkans to maintain and promote regional and international peace 
and security“(NATO, 2016a). 
The Western Balkans is a region marked by political and institutional 
weaknesses and disturbances, undefined interethnic relations, corruption and organized 
crime. This is also the area of interest for non-regional entities that are often of a 
destabilizing character and the area of proxy confrontation of the most important 
actors of international politics, which further destabilizes and makes the area unsafe. 
Due to these reasons, this area has specific security significance and is of a special 
interest for NATO. The NATO enlargement process in the Southeast Europe, as well as 
the membership of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, is important from the aspect of 
establishing territorial connection between Greece and Turkey and the rest of the 
Alliance. Subsequent membership of Croatia and Albania in the Alliance has turned the 
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Western Balkans215 into some kind of security-undefined "island" surrounded by NATO 
members. However, this is not the final state. The prospects of the Western Balkan 
states for joining the Alliance are open, as was confirmed by the declaration of „Open 
door“ policy at the NATO Summit in Warsaw (NATO, 2016a), as well as by the expected 
membership of Montenegro in the near future. Serbia, which has declared the principle 
of military neutrality, is also encouraged to strengthen its partnership and cooperation 
with the Alliance (NATO, 2014).  
Such an approach in which Western Balkans, although still burdened with 
security challenges and destabilization processes of internal and external character, 
primarily stemming from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, is not left 
aside is particularly important since it enables the parallel development of security and 
stability processes, additionally promoted by the EU. It is often stated that “the 
enlargement perspective has played and continues to play a crucial role in the regional 
stabilisation and pacification processes“ (Grimm, 2007). 
As a NATO member located near the Western Balkans region, the Republic of 
Croatia considers this area extremely important and thus is very interested in regional 
processes. This interest stems from several reasons: apart from the historical ones, the 
most important are geostrategic, because Croatia, as well as Hungary, simultaneously 
leans on the territory of the Western Balkans and on the territory of other member 
states and the depth of the area of the Alliance. Through Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Western Balkans is deeply embedded in the territory of the Alliance and almost divides 
the northern and southern parts of Croatia. Additionally, Croatia has specific relations 
with individual countries of this region, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is 
extremely important in terms of regional security.  
Membership of the Western Balkans countries in NATO and the consequent 
security integration of this area with other member states, is thus of utmost 
importance for the Croatian national security. This is also the starting point of Croatia's 
policy towards NATO's enlargement to the Western Balkans, which will be analyzed in 
this paper. Authors have set the following hypothesis: The expansion of NATO to the 
countries of the Western Balkans has had positive impact on the stability and security 
of the region, which is why Croatia strongly advocates further NATO enlargement to the 
                                                          
215 Western Balkans encompasses Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, 
Macedonia and Serbia. 
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rest of the countries of the region (to those which declared NATO membership as their 
foreign and security policy objective). 
 
 
Western Balkans countries in the NATO enlargement process 
 
 All Western Balkans countries, except Kosovo, have established 
institutionalized cooperation with NATO. In addition, all countries in this region, apart 
from Serbia, consider membership of the Alliance as a desirable framework for 
improving their own security, but also for the confirmation of their own statehood and 
independence. The three Western Balkan states are candidates for NATO membership 
(Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia), and Montenegro is expected to 
become a full member soon after the ratification process has ended. 
 Western Balkans countries have established different forms of cooperation or 
integration with NATO. Albania has been a member state since 2009 and therefore it is 
not the subject of this analysis, which focuses on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia - that is, the states surrounded by NATO members and 
still undefined in terms of their security status. In addition, these countries have 
numerous individual characteristics that determine and significantly hamper a coherent 
approach to regional security through the process of integration into NATO 
membership. These are states that were exposed to military actions of NATO at some 
point: the 1993 operation “Deny Flight”, which had the task of imposing a no-fly zone in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, was the first NATO out-of-area operation; or the operation 
“Allied Force”, which was the bombing campaign of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
primarily Serbia, during 78 days in 1999, the aim of which to stop the violence of 
Serbian authorities in Kosovo. 
In some countries of the region, NATO was or still is engaged in peacekeeping 
operations. Signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995 was followed by NATO engagement 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina through Implementation Force (IFOR), which transformed 
into Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996 and lasted until 2004. Operation Allied Force 
has led to the separation (and independence) of Kosovo and the deployment of 
peacekeeping forces Kosovo Force (KFOR), which are still operational under the 
auspices of NATO.  
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Numerous contradictions and the character of its political system, which are 
the consequence of the 1990s conflict, have determined the dynamics and the content 
of activities related to the NATO integration processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Namely, political representatives of Serbs in this country, in solidarity with Serbia on 
the one hand and still calculating the final state organization and possible secession of 
their entity on the other hand, are obstructing the progress of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
towards NATO. That is why Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet made a further step 
towards the Membership Action Plan after joining the Partnership for Peace in 2006, 
despite the appeals from NATO216. 
Unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, which also joined the Partnership 
for Peace in 2006, has currently been in the final phase of the process and is expected 
to enter the Alliance during 2017. It should be emphasized that the Republic of Croatia 
provides significant support to Montenegrin membership, including through the 
development of security cooperation and the transfer of experience gained within NATO 
missions in Afghanistan, ISAF and Resolute Support. Since 2010, members of the 
Montenegrin contingent have been deployed within the ISAF (currently Resolute 
Support) together with the Croatian military forces. 
Kosovo's independence is largely a result of NATO's action. Since some NATO 
members have still not recognized Kosovo, it’s not possible to start formal integration 
processes. However, other than those within the KFOR mission, NATO has additional 
tasks in Kosovo. Since 2008, NATO has been supporting the establishment of the 
Kosovo Protection Corps and the subsequent transformation of the Kosovo Security 
Force (KSF) and structures for the civilian oversight of KSF (NATO, 2017b)  
Macedonia, which had formalized its path to membership already in 1995 when 
it joined the Partnership for Peace, is in a specific situation. It was expected that this 
country would join the Alliance in 2009 together with the Republic of Croatia and 
Albania. However, this did not happen because at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest 
Greece made its membership conditional on a change of name, and consequently NATO 
adopted the decision that Macedonia would receive an invitation to the membership 
                                                          
216 In 2010 Bosnia and Herzegovina received an invitation to join the Membership Action Plan 
(MAP). The condition was to transfer  the prospective military property owned by one of the 
entities to the Bosnia and Herzegovina as the state. (NATO, 2017d). See also: Secretary General: 
NATO is committed to peace and stability in the Western Balkans, 2 Feb. 2017. (NATO, 2017e). 
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after these two states had reached an agreement on the name (NATO, 2017c). At that 
point the accession process was completely stopped, while the solution to the dispute 
over the name of Macedonia is still not certain. 
Finally, it is necessary to include Serbia into this analysis, as the country which 
was a direct object of NATO's activities in 1999. Due to this fact, as well as the 
subsequent NATO’s engagement on Kosovo, which is not recognized as an independent 
state by Serbia, this country has adopted a resolution that, among other things, 
declares military neutrality (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2007) and 
defines the substance of its relation with the Alliance. NATO certainly does not look 
with approval the Russian influence in Serbia, although this is not publicly pronounced. 
Serbia, at least for the time being, does not aspire to membership in NATO and the 
Alliance accepts this. However, considering that Serbia will not be able to continue this 
policy of “sitting on two chairs at the same time” in the long run, NATO constantly 
develops its cooperation with this country. The result of this development was the 
admittance of Serbia into Partnership for Peace program in 2006, and the cooperation 
was further deepened in 2015 through the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) 
(NATO, 2016b).    
 
 
The Development of the Croatian policy towards the NATO enlargement to 
the Western Balkans 
 
 There are several events, which represented major turning points in defining 
regional security in Southeast Europe, such as: termination of the Homeland War and 
the peaceful reintegration of the Eastern Slavonia and the Danube region in the 
Republic of Croatia; the end of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the overthrowing of 
Slobodan Milošević regime in 2000 in Serbia. These changes significantly influenced the 
shift in the Croatian security paradigm. Therefore, the year of 2000, when the seventh 
Croatian government came into power,217 will be taken as the starting point for the 
analysis of the Croatian policy towards the NATO enlargement to the states of the 
                                                          
217 Seventh government under the Prime Minister Ivica Račan took the office on 27 January 
2000.  
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Western Balkans. It is also the moment when the mentioned changes in the security 
paradigm were initiated. 
 The explanation of Croatia's policy on this issue in this paper consists of the 
analysis of the Croatian governments’ programs as their fundamental political 
documents since 2000 as well as the analysis of the still valid National Security 
Strategy (2002). New security paradigm was based on a shift towards strengthening 
cooperation in seeking solutions for further stabilization of the region and enhancing 
national and regional security.  
The Kosovo crisis in 1999 prompted the international community to reassess 
its engagement in this area and to adopt a more comprehensive approach to fostering 
security and stability in the region. This was reflected in launching the NATO Initiative 
for South East Europe, as well as the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. Since then, 
NATO's contribution to building security and stability in South-East Europe has 
expanded from peacekeeping operations to promoting security cooperation in the 
region (NATO, 2006: 245). 
It should be borne in mind that the Republic of Croatia defined its approach to 
NATO enlargement to the region from two essentially different positions: from the 
position of the aspirant to NATO membership until 2009, and then from the position of 
the member state since 2009. The basic elements of the first approach can be found in 
the 2000 Government program, which estimated that "the regional environment of 
Croatia was still unstable ..." (The Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2000: 30). The 
section that defines the fundamental objectives states that "strengthening relations 
with neighbouring countries and joining the European Union and NATO will 
demonstrate the commitment to Euro-Atlantic policy and the readiness of Croatia to 
accept the role of the most stable partner in the region" (The Government of the 
Republic of Croatia, 2000: 5-6).  
These statements provide the necessary elements for determining the 
approach to national security: 
1. Joining the membership of the EU and NATO and commitment to their 
policies 
2. Strengthening relations with neighbouring countries 
3. Positioning of the Republic of Croatia as the most stable partner in the 
region.  
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A clear commitment of the Republic of Croatia to act in its neighbourhood is 
also confirmed by another statement in the Government program, that “... the 
government will encourage all the forces of peace and cooperation and encourage good 
neighbourly relations” (The Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2000: 30), and 
“improve stability by acting in line with the EU and NATO policies, even before the 
formal membership”.218 Such approach is complementary to NATO's approach to 
stabilization of the region. Additionally, an active approach to regional cooperation and 
strengthening regional security and stability was also encouraged by the EU criteria in 
the Croatian negotiation process.219 However, at that point Croatia did not identify 
stabilization of the Western Balkans with the membership of the states of the region in 
the NATO. Instead, its policy towards the region was defined at two complementary 
levels: the national one, and the level of NATO approach.  
Such an approach was a prerequisite for the institutionalization of relations 
with NATO, which started with the accession to the Partnership for Peace program in 
2000.220 Another significant step in joining NATO occurred in May 2002, when Croatia 
was invited to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Immediately before 
that, Croatia adopted its first National Security Strategy. This fundamental national 
security strategic document has confirmed that the accession to the EU and NATO are 
among the most important national goals, and that Croatia fully shares and supports 
the values and goals underlying the EU and NATO (National Security Strategy, 2002: 2). 
This strategy extensively deals with security threats, which are stemming from 
unconsolidated transition countries of the Western Balkans. It also emphasizes that 
Croatian security actions will keep the regional focus, since “security challenges and 
                                                          
218 Ever since 1996, the EU acted through the prism of regional approach, which also 
encompassed the Republic of Croatia. At that period, Croatia was politically defined as part of 
the „Western Balkans“.  (The Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2000: 10 
219 Among other things, EU requirements towards Croatia included promoting regional 
cooperation, development of good neighbourly relations, fulfilling the obligations under the 
international law, strengthening security and stability in Europe, and especially in Southeast 
part of the continent, through cooperation in the areas which are integral parts of the CFSP. 
(Božinović, 2003: 111 
220 Along with the accession to the Partnership for Peace in 2000, Croatia was also admitted to 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and obtained the status of Associate Member of the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly. 
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threats in the region, regardless of their scope, are more important for the national 
security of the Republic of Croatia than regional challenges and threats in other parts 
of the world” (National Security Strategy, 2002: 9). Stabilization of the regional 
environment is perceived through national activities, which should be coordinated with 
NATO policies and standards and not through the membership of the region in the 
Alliance, although it states that “...the NATO enlargement would also expand the area of 
rule of law, democracy, human rights and other shared values.”221 Thus, it can be argued 
that Croatia defined its national security concept in redefined security environment at 
the beginning of the 21st century by focusing on the NATO (and EU) accession and 
active engagement in building regional security.  
Such orientation was additionally confirmed in the program of the ninth 
Croatian government, 222 which also expressed that “the government welcomes the EU 
decision reached at the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, which opens a clear perspective for 
all countries in this part of Europe for full membership in the European Union” 
(Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2003: 36). The permanent stabilization of the 
region was thus linked to European integration processes. 
The program of the successive tenth government kept the same tone. It 
contained some very indicative statements, which repeatedly confirm that the 
membership of NATO and the EU stand as the primary foreign policy goals, as well as 
that Croatia aims to act as the actor of lasting peace, stability and security “in the 
stable environment of the countries of the region which share identical efforts in their 
individual paths towards membership (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2008: 7). 
Moreover, the program reflects strong belief that only European and trans-Atlantic 
perspective provide the only framework and stimulus for resolving remaining open 
issues in the Southeast Europe. Finally, it states that “Croatia will continue to promote 
                                                          
221 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, Official Gazette, No. 32/02, p.10. 
222 “In a changing world that is entering a new era of international relations, Croatia has 
important place and role. It cannot and will not be left out in creating a new European political, 
economic and security landscape. Its contribution to shaping lasting peace, stability and 
development in the Southeast Europe is also indispensable. Permanent regulation of the system 
of security and stability in this part of Europe is possible only in accordance with the principles 
of justice, law and equality, with the respect for interests of all the countries and peoples, and 
with the consensus of the international community. (The Government of the Republic of Croatia, 
2003: 1). 
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policy of good neighbourly relations in Southeast Europe, which stems from the 
European vision and principles, as well as addressing the remaining open issues in order 
to secure the Euro-Atlantic perspective for this region” (Government of the Republic of 
Croatia, 2008: 105).  
In this way, the Republic of Croatia created a consistent security concept based 
on an approach that strengthens national, regional and European security through the 
integration of Western Balkans into NATO and the EU. This government program was 
ongoing at the time of the NATO Summit in Bucharest 2008, when the Republic of 
Croatia received an invitation for NATO membership and became the member of the 
Alliance on April 1, 2009. Subsequent government programs continued to support the 
region's inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic political and security framework.223 
Finally, the policy of the recent fourteenth Croatian government is 
unambiguous in that it contends that one of its fundamental foreign policy principles is 
providing support to Bosnia and Herzegovina and other states in Southeast Europe in 
their efforts to join the membership of the EU and NATO. The Government program 
emphasizes that Croatia is positioning itself as a key creator and promoter of the 
European and trans-Atlantic policy in Southeast Europe and that its actions towards 
non-integrated states of the region “will support their efforts in fulfilling necessary 
standards for the EU and NATO membership, whereby the European perspective of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina presents the key foreign policy goal and strategic interest for 
the Republic of Croatia” (The Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2016: 36).  
The foreign policy section of the election program of the current Croatian 
president states that “Croatian foreign policy has specific tasks and national interests 
in Southeast Europe”, that Croatia “will help international community and the countries 
of the region, which are currently not members of the Euro-Atlantic integrations, in 
reaching the necessary standards” and that it will “take over the implementation of the 
integration policy towards the countries in its neighbourhood”.224 This commitment was 
confirmed in the President’s speech at the Munich Security Conference 2017, when Ms. 
                                                          
223 “Croatia has greater and more specific interests than the EU member states in achieving 
sustainable political and economic stability in Southeast Europe, which is our immediate 
neighbourhood. The benefits of our membership in the European Union will not be complete 
until other countries in the region become members of the Union.” (The Government of the 
Republic of Croatia, 2011: 43). 
224 Kolinda Grabar Kitarović, The Election program “For Better Croatia”, p. 34-35. 
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Grabar-Kitarović emphasized the issue of NATO’s and EU’s interest for the states in 
Southeast Europe. The loss of interest for Southeast Europe was accompanied by the 
revival of old nationalist and expansionist visions, strengthening of radical Islamism and 
the involvement of third countries, especially Russia, whose interference threatens the 
integration of the countries of the region into the EU and NATO.225  
There are at least three reasons why Croatia supports the strengthening of 
cooperation between its neighbouring states and NATO:  
1. Strengthening political relations involves the implementation of reforms that 
are directly related to democratization and transparency of the armed forces 
systems;  
2. Strengthening cooperation involves a wider range of reforms (minority issues, 
human rights, justice affairs ...), which are also associated with the criteria for 
the EU membership; 
3. Commitment to regional cooperation reduces the risk of regional tensions 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).  
For all of these reasons, and due to NATO’s reduced interest for Western Balkans, 
Croatia needs to continue its active approach in promoting NATO enlargement in this 
region and to help these countries to fulfil all the membership requirements. As a NATO 
member state, Croatia actively participates in the implementation of the Alliance's 
cooperation with the countries of the Western Balkans, which covers five core areas: 
1. Security cooperation226 
2. Defence and security sector reforms, which are the core of cooperation 
                                                          
225 Russia’s involvement is a threat to EU and NATO enlargement [Miješanje Rusije je prijetnja 
proširenju EU i NATO-a], 16. 02. 2017. Accessible at:  
http://hr.n1info.com/a179968/Vijesti/Grabar-Kitarovic-Mijesanje-Rusije-je-prijetnja-prosirenju-
EU-i-NATO-a.html (23 February 2017). 
226 Security cooperation primarily focuses on developing military forces’ capabilities to work/act 
together with the forces of NATO countries and other partners, particularly in peacekeeping 
operations and crisis management operations. Participation in joint planning, training and 
military exercises within the Partnership for Peace program is considered particularly important. 
One of the obvious obligations of the aspirant states was the obligation to engage in the NATO 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and later Resolute Support mission in 
Afghanistan. All the countries of the region, except Serbia, participated or have been currently 
participating.  
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3. Planning for emergency situations 
4. Facilitating public access to information on cooperation with NATO 
5. Scientific security cooperation.  
Croatian Armed Forces have been participating in the KFOR227 peace support 
operation in Kosovo since July 2009 and have made a practical contribution to NATO's 
efforts in maintaining security, as well as in developing Kosovo's security system in line 
with NATO standards, which is an essential prerequisite for future cooperation and 
integration of Kosovo into NATO.   
Therefore, all of the above mentioned implies that Croatia applies 
comprehensive approach to NATO enlargement to the Western Balkans. Such an 
approach is founded upon the previously mentioned three specific interests, whereby 
the progress of these states towards the membership of NATO is not seen only as the 
result of the Alliance’s unilateral effort or bilateral cooperation. Sustainability of 
stability and security cooperation in the region requires a wide range of adjustments in 
order to overcome the obstacles that exist at the national, bilateral and regional levels, 
and which go beyond the framework of NATO's action. This refers to numerous 
weaknesses that endanger the stability and security of the region, such as unresolved 
inter-ethnic relations affecting the stability of individual countries (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia), open bilateral issues (Kosovo-Serbia, Greece-
Macedonia), and the activities of non-regional actors (Russian Federation), which 
negatively affect the integration processes. In other words, states in the region must 
develop good-neighbourly relations and establish and maintain functional regional 
cooperation if they want to become members of NATO and the EU (Čehulić Vukadinović, 
2014: 702). 
For this reason, it is important to apply complementary approach in which 
NATO's efforts are complemented with the process of cooperation between these 
countries and the EU, as well as with regional cooperation, which articulates the 
specificities of individual states and the region itself. In the consideration of Euro-
Atlantic and regional cooperation, it is important to keep in mind bilateral relations 
between the Western Balkan states. Very often, these bilateral relations and different 
forms of cooperation were developed under the external pressures, which resulted in an 
illusion of far better relations than they actually were. Therefore, it seems that the 
                                                          
227 According to the decision of the Croatian parliament (15 July 2008).  
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wider community, such as NATO, can provide a good framework for resolving regional 
disputes and security threats. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 As a NATO member, but also for the reasons of its own national security, the 
Republic of Croatia has been continuously pursuing a constructive policy towards the 
region, especially in the case of providing support to Bosnia and Herzegovina on its way 
to EU and NATO membership. Furthermore, Croatia develops partnership relations with 
Montenegro and is one of the key states on the Montenegrin path towards NATO 
membership. With the membership of Montenegro in the NATO, all the countries 
surrounding the Adriatic Sea, except Bosnia and Herzegovina, will be members of the 
Alliance, which is very important from the perspective of national security of the 
Republic of Croatia. 
 Considering its geopolitical position, the region of Southeast Europe is where 
the interests of key international political actors, such as US, the EU, Russian 
Federation and even China, are colliding. Therefore, it is important to apply appropriate 
policies as a means of mediation and harmonization of different interests.  
 In this process, relations between Croatia and Serbia, which are developed 
especially in the field of economy, have a crucial role, which creates a good prerequisite 
for the development of political and security cooperation. However, although Serbia 
declares that the EU membership is its strategic goal, it has to provide a clear response 
to its complex security paradigm. Namely, although Serbia had declared the policy of 
military neutrality, it also signed some contracts on military cooperation with Russian 
Federation,228 regularly conducts joint military exercises, and there are also some 
significant donations in Russian military equipment, which raises doubts about Serbian 
military neutrality. The existing military cooperation between these two states is 
inconsistent with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and can present serious 
                                                          
228 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Government of the 
Russian Federation on military cooperation (signed in Belgrade on 13 November 2013) and 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Government of the 
Russian Federation on military-technical cooperation (signed on 14 October 2014).   
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obstacle to Serbian negotiation process with the EU. In such circumstances, it is 
important to keep the continuity of compatibility between Croatian security policy and 
the EU and NATO partners.  
 Besides NATO which represents the “hard power, the analysis of the security 
position of the Western Balkans has to include the role of the EU as an entity which 
possesses significant “soft power” mechanisms. The roles of two actors are 
complementary, whereby the EU serves as very important actor for the stabilization of 
the region and in providing response to the influence of other non-regional actors.229 
Besides the EU, NATO, US and the Russian Federation, Chinese policy towards the 
region, embodied in the 16+1 initiative, has to be taken into account, as well as the 
increasing interest of Turkey for the regional matters. Turkish actions in the region are 
increasingly unilateral, based exclusively on Turkish national interests, uncoordinated 
with NATO partners, and very often quite opposite to EU and NATO policies in the 
region.230 
The result of the Western Balkans’ integration into EU and NATO (except 
Serbia) will depend on the readiness of all the external actors (US, EU, NATO, Russian 
Federation, China and Turkey) to encourage positive processes (in the area of economy, 
development of democratic capacities, etc.), whereby Croatia has to continue with the 
constructive and active contribution.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
229 The EU aims to promote peace, stability and economic development in the Western Balkans 
and open up the prospect of EU integration.  European Parliament, The Western Balkans, 
Accessible at:   
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuld=FTU_6.5.2.html  
(30 March 2017). 
230 Recent statements of the Turkish president Erdogan in which he accuses EU leaders for 
Nazism, the Crusader Alliance and threatens the security of the people from the West. 
See more at: http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/283957/erdogan-u-sukobu-s-jos-jednom-zemljom-iz-
eu-na-rubu-su-rata?url=clanak/283957/erdogan-u-sukobu-s-jos-jednom-zemljom-iz-eu-na-rubu-
su-rata#sthash.9WL6n0Wa.dpuf (30 March 2017). 
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Abstract 
 
Privatization of security started in Serbia in 1990s when first private security 
companies were established. Besides taking care of people and property in regular 
circumstances they have to perform security task also during emergencies and 
disasters, together with Sector for emergency management, police, military and other 
state actors and actors from civil society sector (Red Cross, Mountain Rescue Service 
etc.). Communication and cooperation between stakeholders is of crucial importance in 
crisis situations. Cooperation between the public and private sector and other entities 
can be built only in an atmosphere of trust in which the process of 
information sharing contributes to the raising awareness about the situation and with 
openness and transparency while protecting privacy and civil liberties. However, there 
are different interests, logic, motives and objectives among stakeholders in those 
relations. Also, important questions refer to the establishment of common terminology 
and harmonization of technical standards. In the paper the main obstacles for effective 
cooperation between state and public actors and private security companies in Serbia 
will be described and possible solutions proposed. 
 
Key words: Crisis management, private security companies, Sector for 
emergency management, communication, cooperation 
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Private policing and security231 constitute an integral (and even more and more 
present232) part of overall security system almost in every country. Organizationally and 
functionally this system involves rights, duties and responsibilities to build the security 
and stability essential for the successful functioning of the state/society.( Sotlar, ND).  
Actually policing is being reconstructed worldwide. "Its distinguishing features are:  
(a) the separation of those who authorize policing from those who do it and  
(b) the transference of both functions away from government." (Bayley and 
Shearing, 2001) 
This change in policing is often mischaracterized as “privatization”, but because 
the distinction between public and private domains becomes problematic in the new 
policing, the more appropriate description for what is occurring is “multilateralization.” 
(Bayley and Shearing, 2001) 
Private security companies (PSC) can be defined as clearly structured and 
hierarchical, registered corporate associations that offer services of a security based 
nature and which compete with other such firms on the open market. (Milošević, 2008). 
Private security companies are simultaneously economic agents subject to the rules of 
the market and security sector actors whose activity may contribute to either an 
increase or decrease in the feeling of safety among citizens at large. (Stojanović, 2008) 
The trend of privatizing security sector services has been prominent during the 
last few decades in the countries in transition as much as in the developed 
democracies. Besides performing their regular tasks, private security companies can 
also give significant contribution in all phases of crisis/emergency management 
(mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery). Necessary preconditions for this are 
establishing the appropriate legal framework and trust and cooperation among PSC and 
other actors in emergency management.  
                                                           
231 The terms "private policing" and "private security" are nowadays often used interchangeably. 
To be more specific - private policing usually refers to “contract security” (security services 
provided to organisations by commercial providers under contract, to secure and protect their 
clients’ assets and personnel), while private security more often refers to “in-house security” 
(security services provided by a company or organisation to meet its own internal security 
needs). (Sotlar, ND)  
232 Worldwide development of private security is being directly conditioned by the rise of liberal 
economies and by the processes of globalisation 
Introduction
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 Private security in Serbia
 
 The concept of private security in the Serbian security system is rather new as 
it emerged after the break of socialist order and stepping into pluralist democracy in 
early 1990s. Sudden growth in the number of private security companies began after 
the abolition of the Law on Social Self-Protection in 1993. From the outset, the 
development of the private security sector was moving in two directions:  
(1) towards establishing private security agencies that were engaged in 
protecting “new businessmen”, politicians, and celebrities, but also criminals and both 
former and current members of the secret services; and 
(2) towards establishing private security companies that inherited the role and 
jobs of former security services in public companies that were engaged in traditional 
roles of securing property, people, or businesses (Davidović, 2009). 
In a period of more than 20 years the private security sector was changing 
under the influence of different changes in the social, political and economic 
environment. Actually, the only constant was the lack of legal framework.
233
 Only in 
November 2013 the Law on Private Security and the Law on Private Detectives were 
adopted but they still have not been fully implemented.  
The Law on Private Security introduced important measures that aimed to 
define, regulate and professionalize the sector. It also prescribed mandatory vocational 
training and licensing of companies, employees and private investigators. In order to 
properly separate the business activities of private security companies from those of 
private investigators, two different types of licenses were introduced. The Law also 
regulates the powers available to private security personnel and private investigators, 
as well as how and by whom these elements of the sector will be overseen.  
Nowadays, the private security sector in Serbia employs between forty and fifty 
thousand people, matching the number of police officers and exceeding the number of 
Serbian Armed Forces personnel. The sector’s emergence and development was the 
result of various interlinked social, economic and political conditions and factors. Some 
of these were positive, such as the privatisation of state-owned and public goods, 
                                                          
233 It was only partially regulated and the different regulations were spread across 18 different 
laws. 
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increased investment, the influx of international companies into the Serbian market, 
legal regulation of the sector and so forth. Others were negative, however, such as the 
outbreak of a civil war, UN sanctions against Serbia, the rapid growth of the black 
market, corruption, criminality and the weakening of state institutions. These factors 
shaped the Serbian private security sector, which is today simultaneously a source of 
security and insecurity for the country’s citizens. After the year 2000, the Serbian 
private security sector became increasingly professional, and as some companies came 
to understand the importance of sector-wide organisation and cooperation, in 2005 
they formed the Private Security Association within the Serbian Chamber of Commerce. 
(Petrović and Milošević, 2015) 
Today in Serbian private security sector there are 600 registered companies234, 
but realistic assessments suggest 300 viable companies, almost half of them based in 
Belgrade with an estimated workforce of 40 to 50 thousand employees235 and 
unrealistically low hourly rates (around EUR 1) and market value of around EUR 140 
million annually. The market is dominated by two large multinationals: Securitas and 
G4S; while local areas usually contain two or three mid-size local companies and a large 
number of small firms that may not survive licensing. Domestic companies with links to 
political parties currently in power have a strong market position regarding the fact 
that around 50 percent of contracts are with public institutions or companies. Political 
connections are the key for winning contracts. Currently in Serbia there are no private 
military companies, but only private companies that provide so-called physical-technical 
security (PTS) - offering physical and technical protection for individuals, buildings and 
property and private detective agencies - small businesses with only a handful of 
employees offering missing person finding services, “rescue from sects”, “checks on a 
partner’s fidelity and even also physical-technical security. Main services PSC are 
offering are private security, security system services, investigative activities and 
protection and investigative activities (Petrović and Milošević, 2015) 
 
 
                                                          
234 Specific phenomena in the Serbian private security market are state-owned companies that 
offer commercial security services. These companies are the successors of the former in-house 
security services that operated within state-owned enterprises 
235 Around 30 percent of employees are not registered. 
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Serbian system of emergency management 
 
According to Law on Emergency Situations the Republic of Serbia shall ensure 
the establishment of an integrated civil security system. The Parliament is responsible 
for adoption of a National Strategy for Protection and Rescue in Emergencies (NSPRE) 
while the Government is responsible for all system aspects of civil security (adopting 
plans, risk assessments and other documents, ordering general mobilization of the civil 
protection units, supervision of crisis preparations etc.). 
The Sector for Emergency Management (SEM) is a specialized organizational 
unit of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) that coordinates the activities of all state and civil 
society institutions involved in emergency and disaster management at all levels of 
political territorial organization. Besides SEM, different ministries, other agencies and 
special organizations236 within their respective areas of responsibility have roles in crisis 
management and can even be key players in some specific crises (e.g. pandemic or 
CBRN threats. 
Looking top-down SEM has its organizational units for the territory of a district 
and city/municipality with a support (service) role in the district/local EMHQ as main 
operational and expert bodies for coordinating and managing crisis response. They are 
permanent bodies237 established for the territory of municipality and city by respective 
assembly, for the territory of administrative district by NEMHQ, and for the territory of 
autonomous province and republic by respective governments. EMHQ is comprised of: 
commander, deputy commander in the metropolitan and municipal HQ, head and 
members. If needed, EMHQ shall establish auxiliary expert and logistic teams to 
execute specific tasks related to protection and rescue. 
 
                                                          
236 Those ministries, agencies and organizations are shown in the Organogram cell on the right 
to the SEM Head. 
237 These are the bodies with permanent members – the heads of relevant institutions are 
automatically members of the HQs, but in cases of specific crises, besides regular members, the 
HQs may include other members, managers, experts and so on. This does not mean that they 
have employees that come to their offices each Monday morning. It is more like project 
organizations. During the cold phase of the crisis HQ is actually a kind of network with 
respective organizational unit of SEM as a main pillar. 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
600 
MOI
Minister
SEM
Head
Ministries (Defence, Health, Transport….)
Agency for Ionizing Radiation Protection
Red Cross, Mountain Rescue Service….
Public Companies, Utility Services
NEMHQ
Commander- Minister from Gvnt
Head – SEM Head
Members – ministers, head of 
agencies, Red Cross….
SEM
District level
SEM
City/municipal
level
local EMHQ
Commander – Mayor
Head / local SEM chief
Members – local chiefs 
of  administration, local 
companies directors, 
medical services, water 
management… 
district EMHQ
Commander – Chief of 
District
Head / distr. SEM chief
Members – distr. chiefs 
of  health, transport and 
other agencies, 
companies directors… 
Province 
EMHQ….
District branches of  Public administration 
(Defence, Health, Transport….)
Red Cross, Mountain Rescue Service….
Public Companies, Utility Services
Local branches of  public administration 
(hospitals , social care)
Red Cross, Mountain Rescue Service….
Public Companies, Utility Services
Source: MOI 
 
In the “cold phase” of crisis EMHQ is coordinating activities of all actors 
regarding risk assessment, planning, preparation and preventive measures (risk 
reduction), while in the “hot” phase HQ is responsible for the response, i.e. 
implementation of crisis plans and recovery activities.  
Figure 2: EMHQ structure 
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Following the Principle of gradual deployment of forces and resources (LES, a. 
5) in protection and rescue activities, forces and resources of the municipality/town 
shall be deployed first. In cases when, due to the size of a disaster or threat, the forces 
and resources of local self-governments are not sufficient, the EMHQ shall request 
deployment of forces and resources from the higher level of government 
(regional/provincial/national). The Police238 and Serbian Army shall be deployed when 
the available forces and resources are not sufficient for protection and rescue activities. 
Responsibility is delegated to higher levels of government through EMHQ. 
Upon the request of a commander of a lower HQ, a higher HQ is engaged in crisis 
management. A decision on declaration of an emergency situation, at the proposal of 
the relevant EMHQ, shall be passed by the president of the 
municipality/mayor/executive body of the autonomous province/ Serbian Government 
for the respective territory. The procedure is the same for declaring the end of an 
emergency situation. Exceptionally, it is possible that the NEMHQ, as the highest 
authority for emergency management, immediately assume control of an emergency 
situation if it deems necessary, based on the information and its own assessment, 
without waiting for the up-scaling procedure.(Kešetović, 2014). 
 
 
Possible role of private security in emergency management 
 
By performing their regular tasks regarding risk assesment and provision the 
physical and technical security of the companies/entities for whose protection they are 
responsible, employees of PSC undertake a number of preventive measures that raise 
the level of protection and strengthen the resеlience of the respective 
company/organization, and, consequently, raise the resilience of the whole local 
community in emergency situations.239 This is particulary the case when PSCs are in 
charge of the security of critical infrastructures/CI (like powerplants, water supply 
                                                          
238 Serbian police is national centralized organization within MOI. 
239 Тhe importance of training employees of private security for acting in emergencies is 
recognized in the Ordinance on the manner of implementation of programs and training to 
perform the duties of private security. This document contain topics such as Natural and other 
disasters risk assessment and Emergency procedures (Pravilniko programima i načinu 
sprovođenja obuke za vršenje poslova privatnog obezbeđenja, 2014) 
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sistems and similar). Particulary important is the role of private security regarding 
prevention of emergencies caused by malicious action of human beings like terrorism, 
diversion or sabotage. However, one should not forget that these tasks PSCs can 
perform successfully only if they have a proper cooperation with the police and other 
actors of the security system.  
Also, when monitoring the perimeter of the facility they are protecting and 
scanning its environment (neighborhood) using their equpment and metohds (detectors, 
sirens, electronic survelience, CCTV etc.), employees of PSC are in a position to notice 
early warning singns (prodromal symptoms) of a forthcomming crisis. Sharing this 
information with other actors in emergency management system can be of vital 
importance.   
During the emergency situations PSC can help in search and rescue efforts 
through sharing information, technical, communication, human and other resources in 
crisis response. Having in mind their capabilities, they can be very useful in certain 
activities of protecting peoples lives and property, evacuation and taking care of 
population, search and rescue activities (even using the use of trained dogs) property, 
preventing looting, securing the scene of event and security of evidence and so on.  
Finally, private security can also ease the crisis recovery in activities like the 
search for missing persons and family reunification, damage assesment etc. 
First necessary precondition for including PCS in emergency management is an 
appropriate legal framework, respectively recognizing PSC as an actor in emergency 
management network with clearly defined mandate, tasks, powers, responsibilities and 
relations with other subjects. This first precondition is missing in current Serbian 
legislature.  
Although the 2009 National Security Strategy acknowledged private security 
as an actor in the security sector, PSCs were generally not defied or regulated in the 
national regulatory framework. Role and involvement of private security in emergency 
management is not mentioned in the Law on Private Security nor in the Law on Private 
Detectives. On the other hand in the Chapter III of the Law on Police (Cooperation) it is 
stated that the Ministry of Interior cooperates with state security services, other state 
authorities and local self government units. Cooperation with private security sector is 
not even mentioned. In the Law on emergency situations, PSCs are mentioned in the 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
603 
context of the concept of “trained legal persons”240. Rights and responsibilities of 
companies and other legal persons are defined in Chapter IV of this Law. Law on 
emergency situations specifies in more detail the obligations of humanitarian 
organizations, Red Cross and Mountain Rescue Service, not even mentioning PSCs. In 
the new draft Law on natural and other hazard risk reduction and emergency 
management, there is again no mention of PSCs.  
The other important requirement for including private security sector in 
emergency management is establishing partnership with police and other actors in the 
state security sector. However in Serbia there is a serious lack of partnership between 
the private and state security sectors. A lack of communication and cooperation 
between public and private security sectors suggests that the MoI and Serbian 
authorities are torn between competing demands to re-define and organize modern 
policing, on the one hand, and demands to preserve the status quo, on the other. 
(Kesetovic and Davidovic, 2009). 
Relations between public security sector (in the first instance police) and 
private security sector cannot be described like cooperation, or competition. (Bayley and 
Shearing, 2001) Actually these two systems exist parallely, side by side. 
From time to time, on a case-by-case basis, on the ground there are certain forms of 
cooperation (sharing data or resources) during ongoing operations, but it depends on 
the personal relationship between the individual police officers and professionals in 
PCS. In any case, cooperation is the exception, not the rule. In contrast to the situation 
in developed countries, a real partnership between the two sectors is not yet in sight. 
The reasons for this situation and obstacles to establish effective cooperation are 
numerous and can be classified into the following major groups: 
1. systemic obstacles – State-centric understanding of security in Serbia is still 
prevalent. There is no willingness to share responsibility for security among 
stakeholders in the security arena. State (public) police is perceived as a major, 
                                                          
240  LES defines Trained legal persons – as companies and other legal entities trained and 
equipped for protection and rescue activities such as: public utility companies, construction 
companies, water management companies, forest management companies, catering companies, 
mining companies, transport companies and other legal entities, private security companies, 
commercial aviation, associations, alliances and societies and clubs related to fire-fighting, 
cynology, diving, nautical science, alpinism, speleology, radio-amateurism, mountain rescue 
service, scouts and other participants relevant to protection and rescue. 
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but not anymore as the sole provider of security, while companies that deal 
with private security are not recognized as such and not included in the 
security system. Also, it seems that there is not enough political will to address 
these issues. 
2. legal obstacles – the fact that relations between public and private security are 
not legally defined 
3. professional obstacles - Among the political actors in Serbia, the Police is not 
understood solely as a public service serving citizens, but partly as a source of 
power. For the individual policeman it is crucial to be seen as effective in the 
eyes of his immediate superior, while for the police managers the opinion of 
the political leaders in most important. Inherited police culture and values are 
changing relatively slowly, so policemen  think about police organization a 
single actor responsible for security. From this perspective, private security 
companies (let alone the citizens) cannot be treated as real partners. After all, 
one of the general characteristics of traditional police culture, which is 
described in detail in literature is a stereotype attitude of police officers "we 
are competent, we only know what the police is and the others, including PSC 
should only share information and resources with us and follow our 
instructions". From this position, "cooperation" is understood as a one-way 
street - PSC, citizens and operators assist police in solving those problems 
identified and defined by police managers as priorities. The majority of PSCs in 
general do not follow professional standards. In addition, an objective obstacle 
for this cooperation represents the background of some of these companies, as 
some were very close to organized crime and engaged in a civil war, and the 
fact that some of the employees in these companies have criminal records, 
and/or other previous experience of policing, all of which presents a barrier to 
mutual trust that is a prerequisite for genuine partnership and cooperation. 
 
 
Public private partnership in critical infrastructure protection 
 
In each society it is of utmost importance to protect the critical infrastructures 
in emergency situations. This can be done only with effective public private partnership. 
CoESS recognized some vivid examples of efficient  public-private partnership in 
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protecting critical infrastructure like Project Griffin in the United Kingdom, German 
cities in which private security companies have come  together with the local police to 
pool information and share it with the police and Spain where police recognizes that 
private security officers are a valuable resource. These examples clearly demonstrate 
that well-defined, well-managed and well monitored public-private partnerships are 
efficient, effective and, increase the security of critical infrastructure. CoESS researches 
concluded that, in order to be successful, these partnerships must comply with certain 
criteria. These include an open dialogue between responsible public authorities and 
private security providers, clear instructions regarding the role of each  partner, a clear 
legal or contractual framework, regular evaluation, and necessary corrections and 
improvements when and where needed. (CoESS, 2010). 
Most of the critical infrastructure in Serbia is protected by former in-house 
(state) security services. During the 90’s period of privatization, these security services 
became separate companies which now offer services to customers like any other 
private security company on the private security market. But for now, they primarily 
protect only public companies, that is, they protect the critical infrastructure from 
which they originated. This is particularly the case for the sectors of energy, water-
management, post office, telecommunications, and railways. Other critical infrastructure 
such as the health sector, water supply, river ports, airports etc. are protected by PSC 
private security companies, usually in a mixture with in-house security services.  
The key problems in critical infrastructure protection in Serbia are: (1) cases of 
severe economic crime within critical infrastructure; (2) absence of public-private 
partnerships in protecting critical infrastructure; and (3) dramatically politicized 
management. Speaking of the first of the aforementioned problems, it turned out that 
companies which are important and vital for the country and society are the favorite 
prey of “criminals protected by the state”. A recent investigation of crime committed 
during 8 years in the huge complex of the thermal-power plant Kolubara, by the 
management and managing board members, tentatively shows a paradoxical situation 
in that many critical infrastructures in Serbia are primarily endangered from the inside 
and not from the outside. The dossier consisting of more than 30,000 pages regarding 
the crime committed in this thermal power plant that caused the damaged worth more 
than €250 million, tells a lot about the size and severity of the problem.  
The second problem, the absence of public private partnership, is a chronic 
disease of internal security in Serbia. The research carried out in 1986 (Davidovic, D. 
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1993) by the Institute for Crime and Sociology Related Research showed that the 
partnership between the police and security service in public companies almost did not 
exist. This can be explained by the strong stereotypes about the omnipotence of the 
police in security-related activities, but also by the low level of democracy in Serbian 
society.  
The third problem is the joint problem of the majority of societies in transition. 
Such societies experience all the negative consequences of chaotic privatizations 
carried out in ways that tend to line the pockets of political, criminal, and economic 
elite from the former socialist governance. Indeed, critical infrastructure security in the 
systems that still have not been privatized, has become the prey of political parties that 
take considerable funds from these rich companies to finance their programmes and 
campaigns. That kind of management always has to ask its party top officials in the first 
place whether it may introduce a novelty/change in the company management, 
especially if those changes regard security policy within critical infrastructure.  
(Davidović, Kešetovic, and Pavicevic, 2012) 
In the establishment of the model of critical infrastructure protection (CIP) 
system in the Republic of Serbia researchers within RECIPE project found the following 
constraints:   
• The lack of legal and strategic framework  (i.e. non-existence of a Law on CI, 
Strategy on CIP etc)  
• The lack of an adequate definition of CI in Serbian literature; 
• Inconsistency of concepts similar to CI such as: mandatory protected facilities, 
objects of particular importance for national defence etc;  
• The lack of identification and classification of CI assets and facilities in the 
Republic of Serbia;  
• The Law on PPP has no CI related provisions and articles.   
• The lack of an adequate legal framework in the field of information security 
similar to the ones existing in the EU countries; 
• Non-existence of criteria for definition of sensitive data and mechanisms for 
their exchange related to national and European CI;  
Besides overcoming these constrains In line with the recommendations of the 
Directive 2008/114/EC there is a need for establishment of the National Centre for CI 
which would serve as the national contact point for the protection of ECI. The National 
Centre would be legally responsible for its activities in the field of CIP. Within RECIPE 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
607 
project the institutional position and functions of the National Centre are proposed. 
(RECIPE, 2016) 
The role of private security in Serbia is continuing to expand. There are three 
main reasons for this. After eighteen years, private security in Serbia has finally become 
legalized; a special law on private security is in the process of being adopted. Also, the 
Serbian Association of Private Security Companies and the Association for Private 
Security at the Serbian Chamber of Commerce are raising awareness of private security, 
and the need for professionalization and standardization. Finally, CoESS is providing 
important assistance in the processes of preparing Serbian private security to enter a 
European model.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Relations between the public and private security are very important for 
achieving a stable security situation in each country not only in normal circumstances 
but also in emergency situations. These relationships can take the form of co-operation, 
ignoring or obstructing each other. If between these sectors there is a real balance, 
clearly and precisely regulated relations and willingness for cooperation, defined 
jurisdiction, responsibilities and division of labor, their capacity will be multiplied. 
Sharing resources and information between these sectors reduces the adjustment costs 
and utilization of their capacity. Differences in operating mentalities and approaches 
that are represented in these sectors, enrich both police and private security companies 
during each other's meetings and joint activities. If there are no contacts and 
communications between these sectors, instead of synergy the result will be entropy, 
followed with the weakening of both sectors and a lower level of security and protection 
of citizens, companies and critical infrastructures in normal circumstances and in 
emergencies.  
Within the still prevalent state-centric concept of security and the unfinished 
reform of public police and state security sector it is hard to increase understanding 
and awareness of the need to build partnerships and cooperation for mutual benefit. In 
addition, there are significant systemic, legal and professional obstacles to establishing 
this cooperation. For a significant improvement in this area several processes are 
particularly important. It is, above all, the completion of the privatization process. It 
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needs to be followed with the accelerating of the completion of the police reform and 
the building of a proper legal framework for the activities of non-state security 
providers, as well as the regulation of their relations with the public police. 
Private security in critical infrastructure protection has clearly not reached its 
full potential in Serbia. Best practices discussed in the CoESS white paper seems like a 
distant goal for private security in Serbia. Public-private partnerships in the UK, 
Germany, and other countries could be very useful examples of practicing PPP not only 
for Serbia, but for the other countries in the region as well. In our view, the critical 
infrastructure protection strategy given in the ECI Directive, the coordination with 
private security in EU done by the CoESS, and the proscribed guidelines for enforcing 
public private partnerships, also by CoESS, must become “homework” for all key actors 
in the field of security. This include responsible decision makers (governments, 
politicians), owners and operators of critical infrastructure, and the private security 
services industry as a whole (Davidović, Kešetovic, and Pavicevic, 2012) 
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Abstract 
  
The Development strategy for the private security comprises concrete goals 
and measures of whose operationalization should contribute for the development of the 
private security activity. The scientific explanation in this effort is based on two 
approaches. First, the research is founded on the scope of the basic theoretical 
assumptions about the terminological divergent for the notion strategy and its use, and 
afterwards follows a perception of the Development strategy for the private security in 
the Republic of Macedonia through the prism of the strategic goals.  
 
Key words: strategy, strategic goals, development, private security, private 
protection.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
The creation of an appropriate strategy counterpoises a process throughout 
the efforts for building an internally complied, respectfully, non-contradictory 
performance by its bearer, which unifies the theoretic, experiential and intuitively based 
acknowledgements for the problem, on one hand, and regard on the partial interests’ 
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positions and views of the problem on the other (Hilsman, R., 1993, р.36-89). Hence, the 
term strategy itself implicitly presupposes the existence of the necessary interaction of 
theory and practice, knowledge and skills, in order to successfully apply the appropriate 
methods and means on all levels in the accomplishment of the planned goals. That is 
why the scientific and expert comprehension of the essence itself and the context of 
the strategy based on which the real plans can be brought has especially crucial 
significance. This conclusion leads us to the ascertainment that this process is 
exceptionally difficult and followed by certain specifics and factors which influence its 
shaping Maslesa R., 2001, р. 146). 
So, for an effective strategy it could be discussed if the same is based on 
scientific findings. They should be the basic substrate in the shaping of its frame, and it 
should create a relevant basis for an appropriate designation of the sole priorities and 
goals. Also, the findings should offer adequate means to approach and accomplish the 
designated goals. Likewise, it could be said that the strategy as a planning document is 
a framework through which the fundamental priorities are underlined as well as certain 
goals which are usually presented in an integrated single document. This document, has 
a present and future role, draws out the key development directions and defines the 
means for the approach and fulfillment.  
 
 
1. General outlooks    
 
Entering a debate for the discourse of the private security activity, it could be 
said that the development of the activity always depends from a well elaborated and 
clearly formulated strategy. The segment of issues related with the private security 
activity, are a challenge for the subjects involved in the private security, while various 
other segments of the issues are a concern for various institutions, respectfully, 
numerous different institutions in today’s conditions designated their own development 
strategy. Still, regardless the subject, or institution the strategy which is brought 
carries certain factors which significantly determine their policy for the development of 
the activity itself. 
In that notion, a double provocation for every organization, institution etc. is 
the respect of the elements with common significance, as well as the elements with 
national significance, because that process is conditioned with good knowledge for the 
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general and the special specifics which directly respond to the demands of the 
contemporary reality.  
In the approach of the creation of a certain strategy, the answers of the 
following questions should be consisted: “On which principles is the strategy based?”, 
“What kind of strategy is necessary?”, “What goals should be achieved?”, “Which is the 
most optimal method for achieving the goals?”, „Which means and how much resources 
are needed for achieving the goals?” etc. 
The answer of these questions is not easy, nor simple, yet it is intricate, 
complex and multidimensional because it depends from numerous factors, some 
objective, and some subjective. Hence, by default, the conducting of the goals demands 
a lot of effort, knowledge, energy, resources, and potentials. That is why it is important 
to prepare a comprehensive strategy in which all the relevant actors would be included 
and all the aspects in the development of the activity will be taken into account. Only 
this approach will give an opportunity to the subject to realize the concrete goals in an 
integrated and comprehensive way. 
It means that the process of guaranteeing an optimal degree of development 
of the private security activity is a complex process which demands a great amount of 
knowledge, and the strategic goals quoted in the Strategy for development of the 
private security as professionalization, providing a quality work force, public- private 
partnerships, protection of the critical infrastructure and building trust in the 
community should be based on the strict democratic principles ensuring transparency 
and accountability in the process.  
 
 
2. Strategic aspects and goals  
 
The Strategy for development of the private security in the Republic of 
Macedonia brought in 2016 should be in accordance with the contemporary trends in 
the regulation and practice in this sphere. It is necessary to emphasize the preventive 
character of the private security through building an optimal model of development of 
the private security and consequently, decrease the losses caused by human error, 
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negligence, criminal activities and natural disasters.241 Beside this general goal, the 
Strategy had designated several strategic goals which are expected to bring a concrete 
contribution in the development of the private security activity. The key strategic goals 
defined with the Strategy for development of the private security in the Republic of 
Macedonia are: professionalization, providing a quality work force, public- private 
partnerships, and protection of the critical infrastructure and building trust with the 
community.  
 
2.1. Professionalization as a strategic goal  
 
Basically, in none of the contemporary argumentations on security, defense, 
healthcare, administration, etc. the topic of professionalization is avoided, because it is 
an omnipresent phenomenon which occurs in every segment of society. The solution to 
this issue is a major concern not only for the institutions, organs and organizations, the 
business community, but also for the public safety and the country in general. Hence, it 
is not all the same what steps are taken in this plan and especially the issue how to 
achieve better professionalization in the subjects dominated by the security component, 
as a natural element of the security structure. 
From the aspect of achieving security there is no dilemma that the subjects 
responsible for security have to hold enough power and authority to perform their work, 
but not in an extent which would jeopardize the wellbeing of the society or the 
individual. 
Therefore, the normal response to this dilemma underlines three aspirations: 
legitimacy, professionalism and accountability. For this reason, the main goals are 
directed toward continuous legitimacy, permanent professionalism and constant 
accountability. All three conditions have to exist and be fulfilled in order to discuss a 
democratic governance. The professional behavior and accountability corroborates 
legitimacy, while accountability enables professionalism, and legitimacy enables the 
necessary degree of professional independency. (Bakreski, O., 2012). 
In general, accountability signifies a proactive approach for one self, protection 
for one self and others, responsibility toward the state, toward the values etc. 
                                                          
241 Development strategy for private security in the Republic of Macedonia, Chamber of Republic 
of Macedonia for private security, Skopje, 2016, p. 20.  
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Professionalism means also a participatory share and contribution, as well as an idea 
how to stimulate creativity which basically means innovation, determination and taking 
action in order to provide changes in a security notion of the term. 
Professionalism defines three charatceristics, which are: expertise, 
responsibility and corporacy.242 In that direction, the Oxford dictionary, when defining 
the professionalism these aspects are always taken into account: expertise and 
specialized skills, motivation (with a financial compensation), acquaintance with 
theoretic knowledge as well as connection with certain working matters (social status). 
Altruism, transparency, integrity, service, respect and honor are also a part of 
the characteristics of professionalism. The concept and the theoretical basis for 
professionalism during the performance of the work are implemented during the period 
of education and qualification (Wear, D, Bickel, J., 2000). 
It means that professionalism is a categorical feature regarding certain values, 
skills, orientation and management. The principles of fair behavior, integrity, human 
rights vigilance, accountability and adequate use of force are the basic elements in 
every concept of democratic rule. Professionalism must not be involved in 
discriminatory, corrupt and violent exploitation of its power. Independence (limitation) 
which the private security sector has is based on the trust of society that this sector 
will accept part of the values which are determined by the democratic equilibrium of 
ethical and professional rule (Fluri P., Hadžić M., eds., 2004). 
Getting out from the embrace of the professionalism will result with rough, 
corrupted and incompetent behavior, and in certain cases could even lead to public 
scandals, which imposes the need for serious regulation of this sector (Born H. Caparini 
M. and Cole E., 2007). 
 
2.1.1. How to achieve better professionalization  
Professionalization is a dynamic category which is conditioned by numerous 
factors and is in tight correlation with the development of the society. In general, it is 
achieved on a prolonged period and it is determined by the democratic ambience in the 
country and by the relations between the subjects themselves in the society, starting 
from the family, schools, religious communities, security institutions, etc. 
                                                          
242 Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives. East West Center. 
2001.  
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So, perceiving the problem of professionalization is solely possible only through 
detailed acquaintance of the complex, intertwined internal relations, as well as through 
consideration of the crucial elements which have the central role in the creation of a 
congruent working ambience starting from the environment, the achieved degree of 
education, the level of awareness243, the dynamics and the compexity of the relations in 
the sphere of security, social development, multi layer communication forms etc.  
Herefrom, the basic issue which is raised is not „Wether a profesionalization is 
needed?“but the question „“How to achieve better professionalization?“. In order to get 
to a greater profesionalization several conditions should be fulfiled, which are:  
The first condition is the designation of minimum standards which will 
contribute for the development of the profesionalization in this sector. Professional 
knowledge is the fundamental pilar which appoints the commencements, the goals and 
the development of the professionalization process.  
The second condition is the complete division of the work. With 
professionalization a complete division of the work is achieved. The strenghtening of 
the criteria for the internal organization and the systematization of the working 
positions should not only be considered for the managerial structures but also for the 
subordinate layers.  
The third condition is evaluation of the work and the working process. 
Everything done must be a subject of evaluation. This element can  be administered 
through strenghtening of the permanent measures for knowledge evaluation.  
The fourth condition is especially underlined in the Strategy for development of 
the private security and it refers to the quality of the service and working. This is 
actually a continuous battle on how to impose, or „nominally“, how to be sold on the 
market, but there is no doubt that it could be done only with a good and quality offer 
and work. 
The fifth condition is accountability which goes hand in hand with 
professionalization. Accountability pressuposes explanation for a certain behavior and 
to be responsible toward external crtic. Accountability demands the responsibilities, 
authorizations and functions of the authorized bodies to be defined so the work of the 
                                                          
243 Awareness has a crucial significance for the future of the man, and it contributes to the 
citizens with their behavior and engagement to give a better support for the respective which 
has to be experienced from a different aspect, becoming aware of their legitimacy.  
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subordinated could be successfully audited and evaluated. Accountability as a category 
is tied with performing the tasks in the anticipated time and in accordance with the 
prescribed standards. This leads toward a professional organization, which acts 
preventive with the purpose to preclude committing criminal acts.  
Also, accountability signifies that the police will not act solely on its own 
assumptions for efficient and rational functioning, but it will take into consideration 
every expectation the community has for it (Bakreski, O. 2010).  
The sixth condition is related with professional competences and obtaining 
them is conditioned by the practical performance of the tasks, and here it comes to the 
fore the acquired knowledge. 
This primarily means the subjects themselves to strive for an adequate 
personnel planning and to choose the best candidates due to the specification of the 
activity and the profession, and secondly, this concept has to comprise expert’s profiles 
which will be succumbed of a continuous expert improvement, their appropriate 
preparation for the comprehension of every day’s tasks and work etc. 
The seventh condition is the assurance for political neutrality. The employees 
in the private security, respectfully the Security agencies should be apolitical, which 
would mean that they are committed to the work and professional conduction of the 
tasks. Basically, professionalization will enable performance of the tasks on lawful 
foundation, and on the basis of someone’s wishes. It is a sort of guarantee that the 
employees will professionally perform their duties and that will be completely dedicated 
on their fulfillment which would mean a high degree of responsibility, which is in fact 
one of the elements required for their profession.  
  
2.2. Enabling a quality work force    
 
This concrete and undoubtedly priority goal is focused toward drawing a quality 
work force, due to the actual need of workers for the legal entities which perform the 
private security activity. It is a common impression that gradually this issue becomes 
troubling because the indicators speak that on the labor market there are less and less 
interested to work in the private security business. Here, several questions are raised: 
“What are the reasons?”, “Which factors contribute for this condition?”, “How to 
overcome this situation?”, “Which mechanisms should be engaged in order to motivate 
young people to choose this profession?” The answer is maybe simple, but yet 
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complicated because it is considered that attracting the interest of young people for 
engaging in the private security activity should not be tied solely for the financial 
motive, rather it should be a learning process for the importance of this segment, and it 
could be achieved in the educational process.  
Education is a key factor and along with the training and specialization will 
contribute for a better professionalization and development of the private security 
activity. The knowledge obtained in the educational process is a main determinant in 
development because it is based on comprehending and gaining a complex corpus of 
competencies, abilities and skills. Knowledge obtained in the educational process means 
acquiring the necessary expertise, integrity, morality, altruism and skills for promoting 
the public wellbeing. All of these elements are shaping the grounds for the social 
agreement among professions and societies, which in return ensures the professional 
autonomy in the practice and the privilege for self-regulation. Professions are founded 
on specialized knowledge which is a basis for receiving the necessary quality. (Oxford 
English Dictionary, 1989 Oxford: Clarendon  Press). 
It means that it is a vocation which requires a specialized knowledge, a durable 
and intensive upgrade is often necessary, which involves learning based on scientific, 
historical or theoretical principles. That specialized knowledge is maintained through 
the power of the organization or with adjustment with the standpoints for high 
standards for performance and behavior, as well as with the approval from the members 
of the profession, continuous research and that kind of activity, which primarily purpose 
is performing public service (Merriam Webster (ed.), Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, Unabridged. 2000 Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster). 
In contemporary conditions of labor market functioning, imposed above all 
because of the global specialization in the work, primarily for the companies and 
consequently transferred to the employees themselves, as well as because of the 
demand for educated, competent and qualified work force, an imperative counterpoises 
the expert knowledge, which prepares the candidate for a concrete profession, providing 
the necessary skills and knowledge for active work. In the spirit of such practices and 
experiences it is necessary to apostrophize that in the private security business there is 
a specific specialization, determined by the public authorities of the activity itself.244 
                                                          
244 Development strategy for the private security in the Republic of Macedonia, Chamber of 
Republic of Macedonia for private security, Skopje, 2016, р. 21-26. 
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In the context of provision of the necessary competent and qualified work force 
permanent steps should be made for improvement of the education and continuous 
attainments. The improvement of the education and the continuous attainment are in 
the direction toward improvement of the capabilities and obtaining new skills through 
knowledge absorption which are needed for new forms and modes for providing a 
balanced process of decision making, but also for other new solutions with which 
concrete problems related to the work will be resolved. This is especially important for 
the employees in the private security sector because the continuous education of its 
personnel creates capable cadre, which could deal with certain difficulties any timer and 
can find solutions for the concrete security concerns. 
So, a key factor for fulfilling this strategic goal is education. One of the 
solutions which is pointed out in the Strategy itself is consisted in the response for 
creation of educational- study programs. Of course, this step would mean a great leap 
and would be a solid basis for providing an adequate cadre which will be the bearing 
element in the above synthesized analysis.  
 
2.3.Public- private partnerships   
 
The achieved level of development and cooperation between the public and the 
private sector in a certain social- political system depends on numerous factors, among 
them: the place they hold in society, the method for deciding for the position and the 
role of these sectors in the country, their contribution and real significance, the 
financing mode for these sectors, the nature of the relations between the recipients of 
security and the providers, the working status of the employees providing services to a 
certain recipient etc. (Ahić J., 2009, р. 17-37).  
This would mean that the frontier between the private and the public sector, 
instead of getting clearer, it will become more vague, making it more difficult to 
separate the traditional public police forces from their private colleges. (Johnson Brian, 
2005, стр.419-420). Hence, the first crucial question is: “Is the sphere of action of public 
security equated with the private security?” respectfully “Can a comparison like this be 
made?” secondly, “For whose interest does this business serve?” and third: “Where is 
the line between private and public security?” If the answers to the questions is not in 
favor of the private security nor public security, then these thin lines could be described 
as “a grey” area which contours the margins themselves between those two subjects. It 
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signifies that it is the complexity of the private security that makes it so close yet so 
different from public security which produces additional difficulties in drawing the line. 
The following problem in the contouring of the borders of the public and the 
private security is the fact that there are many employees which perform security 
functions as part of their general duties, but to which these functions are not their 
main role and purpose. For example, a receptionist whose main duty is to accept guests 
and to answer questions, can also have a function in the part of the control of access 
and maybe even video monitoring. Would anyone consider this person working in the 
private security? Also, regular personnel such as janitors could be used to search for 
suspicious items if there is an alert for a bomb installment. Does that mean that if the 
janitor does that often is a part of the private security sector? Many citizens also do 
voluntary activities which can be interpreted as security functions, for example, 
schemes for monitoring the neighborhood, voluntary street patrols. Are these activities 
interpreted as a part of the private security sector? (Bruce George and Button Mark, 
2004, р.14-15). 
The comparison between the public and the private security, as well as the 
explication of the nature of the cooperation between these two sectors expressed 
through the actual public- private partnerships shows that there is a space for 
rapprochement of these two segments and that there is a clear need for their 
cohabitation in the achievement of the common goals although from a historical aspect, 
the relationship between the public and the private sector was not always the best. 
Sometimes the police underestimated the private security, which felt that the police 
has no interest in their domain of action. However, nowadays there is a tendency 
toward achieving these partnerships, whose main purpose is the progress and 
development of the public and the private security sector (Dempsey S.John, 2011, 
р.360).   
Basically, the most common activities of the partnerships and cooperation 
include:   
1. Establishing business and personal contacts; 
2. Expansion of resources (the police can assist the private securers in the 
performance of their work, including contracting for certain non- 
criminal and harmless tasks for which police authority is not necessary, 
but also private security could come in handy to the police in countering 
corporate crime); 
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3. Programs for crime prevention, joint participation in the security field, 
developing mutual methods for crime prevention and combining forces 
for achieving the common interests in countering video piracy, graffiti, 
false alarms and neighborhood watch programs; 
4. Sharing resources, respectfully, borrowing the technical and 
terminological competency; 
5. Enabling a legal framework which includes the support and draft laws; 
6. Joint action, for example, in investigation of complex financial frauds or 
computer felonies; bringing mutual security plans for protection from 
natural disasters, gunfights and school violence as well as violence on 
the working place, joint operations for violations, such as street theft; 
7. Investigation and creation of a guideline for preparation and review for: 
examination and protocols regarding false alerts, drug- related crimes on 
the working place, violence on the working place, internal info – 
television etc (Dempsey S.John, 2011, р.360-362) 
 
2.4. Critical infrastructure protection  
 
The critical infrastructure as a vital, complex and reciprocally structurally 
connected entirety has an exceptional importance and significance for the 
uninterrupted function of the country. It is clear dialectics and synergy which connects 
the industrial sector, communication systems, the energy sector, the education sector, 
the health sector, telecommunications sector and other sectors, systems and networks 
of utmost importance for the country because it enables the necessary stability. From 
hence, the interruption or the disruption of the work of certain sectors/systems could 
lead to serious consequences which can have a weakening effect on the security of the 
country, on the national economy, on the economic development and prosperity, on the 
stabile energy sector, respectfully, the interruption or the disruption of the work of just 
one from the above mentioned sectors could lead to serious consequences over other 
critical sectors. 
Basically, the segment of issues related with the critical infrastructure 
demands balance, common efforts and high level of cooperation between the key 
subjects. And that is way it is generally considered that the issues for critical 
infrastructure protection are one of the most hardest because they need to establish a 
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balanced system of relations between the subjects themselves which have to actively 
participate in this realm: the Ministry of interior, the Security agencies, the Chamber of 
the Republic of Macedonia for private security, the operators themselves and numerous 
other actors. All of it demands a serious anticipative approach and building an 
appropriate coherent policy.  
On account of the complexity and difficulty itself of these matters, the critical 
infrastructure should be perceived in its totality so there won’t be any one- sided, 
partial, segmented and insubstantial solutions, rather, it has to be approached 
systematically, thoroughly, completely pragmatic and through the prism of offering 
adequate solutions.  
Otherwise, the critical infrastructure of the Republic of Macedonia is relatively 
new realm which is still not legally regulated, respectfully, there still is not legal 
framework for defining, identification and protection of the critical infrastructure, and 
with that, there is no formally designated critical infrastructure register. Yet, it has to 
be emphasized that the identification of the critical infrastructure will not start from 
the very beginning because it is founded on some existing acts which recognize this 
realm. 
In particular, attention should be drawn on the Law for private security which 
singles out a specific Chapter 5 for the arrangement of the topic “Compulsory private 
security” which in Article 44, Paragraph 1 further delegates the obligation for 
designating the legal entities by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.  
It should be emphasized that not only in the Law for private security and other 
legal frameworks this segment is recognized in a sort of way. The issues are occurring 
only around the compliance and the terminological divergences about the notion and 
the use of this term. 
It remains to be concluded that the critical infrastructure is the pillar of the 
country. That is how it is connected with the citizens and the country.  
For the citizens it is the level of security of the crucial resources and 
capacities, having, respectfully, not having, food for survival, potable water, 
communication systems which are a fundamental need, healthcare, education, and 
other essential needs such as the necessary transportation: aerial, rail or road, 
widespread trade net, energy system etc. 
For the country the critical infrastructure is tied for the national security, for 
the welfare, the national economic security, the economic development and prosperity, 
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better health and public safety, better energy sector, better health sector, stabile 
energy sector etc. 
From hence, the protection of the critical infrastructure should be particularly 
apostrophized because it is well known that this is an essential segment, respectfully it 
is a core part of the national security of every country, so hence its protection is a top 
goal and priority of every state, especially if it known that every country is exposed to 
the social deviations (for example thefts, frauds, industrial espionage, sabotage, 
diversions, malicious damages etc), natural disasters, technological and technical 
accidents, human errors etc., all of them can cause massive human losses and material 
damage. If certain specific forms of imperilment are added up to these elements, within 
the framework of which subsides the use of contemporary weapons and advanced 
technologies, including nuclear material, chemical and biological weapons and similar, 
all of this is a clear signal that there is a serious security risk refueled with the 
possibility such weapon to be used in illegal acts over the critical infrastructure, it 
imposes the need for the creation of appropriate defense mechanisms for the critical 
infrastructure.  
It emanates from the above mentioned, that the critical infrastructure is an 
omnipresent phenomenon for which the complete effectuation of a large amount of 
knowledge, pragmatism and experience is necessary, and most importantly, an 
appropriate anticipative approach of the subjects engaged in the process in order to 
unify all of the resources. 
This in perspective should mean: 
√ The private security should impose as a serious player in this story because it 
has a crucial role in the protection and the securing of the critical 
infrastructure in our country, to that, its experience, position and function must 
be respected during the preparation of other legal acts in the realm of critical 
infrastructure protection in the future, and the good practice of the private 
security has to be a basis of practice in this sphere. 
√ A comprehensive public debate should be opened for all the segments, in order 
to initiate a legal regulation of the critical infrastructure protection in which 
the instigators of the activity will have a primary role. It means an existence of 
a better functional activity and existence of a better structural position in the 
state- social relations.  
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√ The subjects which will be involved in the process should urge for solutions 
which are in the context in the completion of the necessary framework for 
adequate protection; a better cooperation and coordination, efficient 
prevention and protection of the critical infrastructure from different shapes of 
imperilment. 
√ The specialized training for the critical infrastructure protection has to be a top 
priority for the instigators of the private security activity in order to create the 
fundamental assumptions for an adequate approach in the work and providing 
adequate protection for these objects.  
 
2.5. Building community trust  
 
Nowadays it is considered that a certain society is democratic if it has a space 
for a broader debate around the issues which have great social significance, and 
transparency can only be achieved through active participation of the citizens in all the 
spheres of interest which would mean shared responsibility, but also the ability for 
creating the policy and its implementation. 
The discussion around transparency is a relatively new appearance. It points 
out the need for an analytical approach which will take into consideration the especially 
complex relationship between the citizens as the uttermost recipients and users of the 
services and providers of the services which are directly focused on the provision and 
the quality of the service.  
Regarding the private sector the transparency is a complex concept and it is 
the only way to initiate a public debate for the issues form the private security. It 
means that transparency is not a purpose for itself, but it is the only way which enables 
the existence of a public debate for all the essential issues related with the activities of 
the Security agencies and how are their designated goals achieved. It is more than 
necessary in order for the citizens to create the fundamental perception for the work of 
this sector. 
Transparency is tightly connected with accountability. All the matters which 
are a public interest, including the activities performed by the private security sector 
have to be displayed for the citizens in the best possible way. It means that this sector 
has to work in accordance with the legal instructions and for their work they have to 
impart a complete revision, respectfully, account before the public for what has been 
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made, how it was done and whether the expected outcomes are achieved. It is 
anticipated that what is presented before the citizens, if it is exposed completely, 
articulately etc., that it will contribute for the expectations to gain a broader support 
and to gain greater trust. 
The central issue which is imposed here is the question “How to a greater 
transparency?” First, the openness of this sector toward the citizens would mean that 
its work is transparent, and its role demystified. 
Basically, the openness of the security sector would mean a kind of a 
confirmation that what is done is in the interest of the citizens and it is in the interest 
of protecting the fundamental values. 
It means that one of the democratic acquisitions in a certain society is for the 
citizens to know, respectfully, to be informed for the conditions in the private security 
sector. 
With that they will have the opportunity also to discuss for essentially 
significant issues which are related with the work of the Security agencies. Second, the 
social responsibility should mean that the employees in the Security agencies would be 
completely focused on the execution of the tasks in the objects and that they will 
enforce laws consistently on the demand on their agency and their profession. It would 
mean that they have a proactive attitude and high awareness in the performance of the 
tasks. This element is also connected with the high degree of security culture. Security 
culture is an important assumption in order to foresee what the general culture in the 
country is, and also what is the culture of the individuals (security workers) for matters 
which have a security character. The security culture is conditioned from numerous 
factors starting from the family, through science institutions, to security institutions 
etc., and it is not determined by some regulations, rather it has to be a result of the 
expression and the strive for a more proactive role of the individual – employed in the 
Security agencies in order to promptly identify the occurrences, the bearers, the causes 
and the consequences tied with the situation in a security context. It means that only a 
proactive attitude toward this concern will result with an accumulation of the security 
cultural capital which will enable to create positive prejudices for the security paradigm.    
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Abstract 
 
Detective activity is recent phenomena in post-authoritarian and post-conflict 
countries, which particularly applies to the region of the Balkans. Legislation of the 
Balkan countries faced similar challenges in the process of defining detective activity, 
and to an extent, in a similar way have addressed this phenomenon, with certain 
specifics related to the level of technological and cultural development. A significant 
impact came from the obligations in the process of accession of these countries to the 
European Union. In the Balkan countries, there is no unified opinion on whether 
detective activity should be regulated through specific laws or fit into a legislation 
applicable to private security sector as a whole. In these countries, detectives were 
given legal opportunity to perform the job independently or within the registered legal 
entity, with a tendency for similar authorizations. Prevailing opinion is that detective 
activity is fitted in the zone of responsibility of the ministries of interior, thus, in the 
zone of responsibility of the police department.  
Generally, in the Balkans, government regulations and executive are ahead of 
«market regulation». There are therefore several licenses, state training programs and 
other forms of state intervention in detective activity. It is also characteristic that the 
legislation in these counties differently recognizes required adoption of the Code of 
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private detective ethics. Detective activity in practice in the Balkan faces numerous 
concerns regarding the collection and processing of personal data without consent, 
given that the private detective is a product of the Anglo-Saxon legislation, and on the 
other hand, there is a universal right to the privacy, which includes a range of rights 
(right to the protection of personal data, the right to moral and physical integrity, the 
right to a private and family life – respect for correspondence, etc.). It is certain that 
the implementation of European standards in this area in the Balkans will not be an 
easy task, neither will always the regulations produce the expected outcomes. 
 
Key Words: detective activity, countries, the Balkans, legislation, practice.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Detective work reduces the police involvement in the cases that are not a 
priority, particularly in the scope of private and corporate investigations, and on the 
other hand, it relieves service users which find easier to cooperate with private 
investigators than with bureaucratic and overly work-loaded police officers. Experience 
in the practice shows that detectives can often be more successful than the state 
police, among other things, because they don't hassle with bureaucratic trivialities and 
because they are willing to pay for useful information.  
Although operating locally, private investigators are involved in wider range of 
security because their engagement often exceeds the state borders and for the purpose 
of efficiency and timely resolution of the case, a detective agency often takes over 
surveillance and data collection in their own country (Magerl Krivanek, 2014).  
Legal and effective detective job performance requires an appropriate legal 
framework governing the basics, including but not limited to job requirements, licenses 
and work permits, organizational forms, detective authority, etc. In addition, there's no 
doubt that encouraging entrepreneurial initiatives in the field of private security is not 
realistic without national legislation and implementation of current international 
standards (van Amstel, 2015). 
The necessity of legal regulation of detective activity comes from it, not always, 
clearly-defined relationship to operative work of the police department. Namely, it is 
necessary to draw a clear line between the scope of work of private investigators and 
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the jobs that are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the state police, which in practice may 
overlap. Here it should be highlighted that there are operational actions and measures 
applied by the police and which, by the nature of the business, can be applied by 
detectives in providing services for the service users (Šelih and Završnik, 2012). 
In post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies, the role of detective activities should 
be seen in the context of the dramatic changes in recent decades, i.e. through the 
prism of the reform of the security sector in these countries, in which weakened 
government institutions have not been able to preserve the monopoly of the state-
power, while the newly established private security entities were able to fill the 
resulting gaps by taking excess of personnel in the police, intelligence, and the military. 
Widespread corruption in these countries attracted individuals in the private sector, but 
also in the public sector to grab the opportunity to charge for provided security 
services. Security has become such a commodity like any other, regardless of who is 
offering it (Babikov, 2005). 
 
 
2. Standards and Practices of Contemporary Detective Activity  
 
The comparison of detective work worldwide shows a number of specific 
characteristics, starting with terminology, the position and role of private investigators 
in the security system, to the degree of legal regulations. The differences are 
particularly present among the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition and European continental 
states (Batelaan and Bos, 2006). 
Legal regulation of detective activity in Europe is also diverse. Most European 
countries in the last 30 years have passed the laws governing private security, and 
within that, the private detective activity. Only part of the national legislation contains 
specific regulation related to detective activity. In some countries, such as Austria and 
Germany, the entire sector of private security is regulated with the provisions of other 
laws, mostly in the field of general economic and industrial regulations. Some of the 
European countries do not regulate this field centrally, but on the cantonal, regional, or 
local level, such as Switzerland, Italy, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (George and Button, 
2000). 
Normative regulation of detective activity also remains a new subject for the 
national legislation of Member States of the European Union. At the EU level, there is 
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no even a unified standpoint if the field of private investigations in general needs exact 
legislation or all specifics can fit into the overall legal regime that applies to all other 
activities. It is though characteristic that the distinct laws on Detective activity was 
passed mostly by new Member States of the European Union (Button, 2007). It is 
obviously that this have taken place due to reforms in security sector, i.e. meeting the 
requirements for obtaining membership in international organizations such as the 
European Union or NATO (Yusufi, 2004). 
One of the most important initiatives in the field of private investigation is 
considered a "Minimum common standards of the European Union concerning the 
licensing of investigation in the private sector"; a document presented 2008 at the 
International Federation of Associations of Private Detectives (IKD). The Association, 
which operates since 1964 with the objective of establishing the highest standards in 
this area brings together the detective associations from 22 European and non-EU 
countries, has offered to the European Union institutions a proposal with analysis of the 
situation in the EU and suggestions of minimum common standards in the performance 
of private investigation. By IKD definition, private investigation includes surveillance, 
interrogation and investigation directed towards a specific person, for the purpose of 
obtaining information or data from records, relating to particular persons or their 
activities, as well as the circumstances and ways in which a particular asset or thing 
may have been damaged or lost. Accordingly, private investigators can provide clients 
with the following services: investigation of accidents; blackmail investigation; 
investigations related to accounting, forgery, intellectual property, family and marital 
relationships, missing persons and things; legal interpretation; litigation assistance; the 
gathering of evidence; returning a property; situation analysis; supervision; theft 
investigation and trace expertise (Travers, 2011). 
 
2.1 Detective Activity and Protection of Human Rights 
 
Current detective industry is faced with the question of the legal basis under 
which private investigators collect and process personal data without persons’ consent, 
taking into account that the private detective is a product of the Anglo-Saxon legal 
system, where there are private criminal investigations, and in the performance of 
private investigation, investigators may collect, process and use personal data without 
the consent and approval of that person (Hakala, 2008). 
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Contrary, there is a universal right to the privacy, including the right to respect 
of private and family life, home and correspondence, honor and reputation (Prenzler and 
King, 2002). In a democratic country, any restriction of human rights must be 
provisioned by the law, which means that deviation from standards in this area must be 
legitimate, so that it would not be in significant extent undermined. Restriction of these 
rights has to be explained with some of the recognized goals, which include the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others, public order, moral, prevention of 
conflicts and crime. This limitation is necessary and proportional, and not arbitrary, 
unfair, discriminatory or based on irrational perspectives (Trivan, 2014). 
For example, in the Republic of Serbia the protection of personal data is 
stipulated in the Article 42 of The Constitution, which demands that the collection, 
possession, processing and use of personal data is regulated by the law. Accordingly, it 
is forbidden and punishable use of the data beyond the purpose for which the data was 
collected, except for the purpose of conducting criminal proceedings or national 
security in a manner stipulated by the law. In addition, the right to privacy is 
constitutionally protected and guaranteed through a protection of human dignity, 
inviolability of physical and mental integrity, home, and correspondences. An exception 
to the constitutional protection is stated in the Article 13 of the Law on protection of 
personal data, by which a government staff can process personal data without consent, 
if the processing is necessary in order to carry out jobs within its competence 
determined by the law or other regulation, for the purpose of national security, public 
order; the country's defense; prevention, exposure, investigation and prosecution of 
crimes, economic thus, financial interests of the country, protection of public moral and 
health, protection of rights and freedoms and other public interests, and in other cases 
with written consent of the person whose data has been collected. In this regards, 
solutions contained in the Law on Detective Activity of the Republic of Serbia are 
characterized by restrictive relationship in terms of possibilities for personal data 
collection and processing, while the legal provisions themselves are quite obscure and 
incomplete. Namely, the Law on Detective Activity have tied detectives in performing 
their jobs by the legislation in domain of personal data protection and the free access 
to information of public importance. Therefore, it is provisioned that the detective who 
collects the personal data, on that person’s request, must show the detective badge and 
the power of attorney, and thus, the processing of data without consent is permitted in 
accordance with regulations governing the protection of personal data. It is also 
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stipulated that the detective will be denied information classified as secret (Petrovic, 
2014). 
On the other hand, part of the criticism of the provisions of the Law on 
detective activity about personal data processing in Serbia highlights their flexibility, 
with indications that the private investigators have gained a realistic opportunity for 
serious breaks in persons’ privacy. Also, per statutory formulation “the justified request” 
has to be considered on particular merits of the request.  Consequently, a question 
arises concerning criteria by which the "handlers of the records" (approximately 
350,000) will grade those merits, risking discrimination among petitioners of “the 
justified requests” and enabling effortless data access to some of petitioners on 
corruptive, political, family, friendly, or any other basis (Trivan, 2015). 
 
 
3. The General Status of Detective Activity Legislation in the Balkans  
 
In the recent decades, all the Balkan countries have enabled legal conduction 
of private investigation, with certain differences in normative regulations. Detective 
activity is nationally regulated with specific laws in the Republic of Croatia, Greece, 
Romania, Montenegro, Serbia, and the Republic of Macedonia. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina field of private investigation is not centrally regulated, while the laws have 
been passed in the Republic of Srpska and Brcko District. In the entity of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina there are some procedural problems (the Bill is 
blocked in one of the two parliamentary houses). In the Republic of Bulgaria, the 
Republic of Albania and the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo there are only laws that 
regulate the private security which individual provisions indirectly regulate questions 
concerning private investigations. On the basis of passed laws in these countries, the 
activity of private investigators is specifically regulated with bylaws (Bakreski and 
Associates, 2015).   
Almost all the states’ laws of the Balkans stipulate a similar scope of 
competences and powers. If you review the list of jobs of private investigators issued by 
UK Professional Investigators Network (UKPIN), restrictions in operation of private 
investigators in the Balkans are notable. In fact, by UKPIN private detective scope of 
work includes battling corruption, assistance in children adoption and custody, 
assistance in executions (confiscation of property) and bankruptcies, the search for the 
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invaders and persons that impose threats and blackmail, companies support in 
collection of payments, check in criminal cases, assistance in criminal procedures 
(complaint, appeal, defense), computer crimes, collection of traces for DNA analysis, 
GPS/GSM commodity tracking etc. (Draz and Associates , 2009). 
Comparative analysis of legislation shows that the detective activity is 
generally defined as the collection of data, their processing and delivery to the service 
user. Private investigators in the Balkans have been given the legal opportunity to 
perform their job independently or in joint private investigation office (the Agency, 
Office, Company). Control and inspection of detective activity is mostly conducted by 
the ministries of interior and/or by the authorized sections of the police department. 
Noticeable is also the trend of similar statutory powers in conducting job for a 
client/service user. Detectives, in general, are permitted to collect data and information 
from persons who are willing to provide such information, thus, directly from individuals 
whose information is collected, and from other persons who have awareness of such 
information (only on a voluntary basis), as well as through means of public information 
(Trivan, 2014).  
 
3.1. Standards and Practices of Detective Work in the Balkan Countries 
 
Detective activity in the Republic of Croatia is regulated in 2009 with the Law 
on private detectives. By then, work of private investigators was regulated with specific 
provisions of the Law on protection of persons and property. The law defines detective 
activity as collection of data necessary for determination of the facts, use and 
processing personal data and other information for service user. Hence, a detective can 
collect information about: missing persons or persons who are hiding from the service 
user, persons who have written or sent anonymous letters or persons who are 
slandering, insulting or disclosing something about personal, family, or professional life 
that can hurt someone's honor or reputation; persons who have caused a harm to a 
service user; items that are lost or stolen; evidence needed to a service user for 
fulfilment of the rights or privileges granted by judicial or other government bodies and 
committees or associations; effectiveness of the work performance; success and/or 
professionalism of the companies, entrepreneurs, and other legal entities; the facts and 
circumstances pertaining to the personal state of individuals and status of their 
property; employment applicants and employees only with their written consent and in 
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accordance to a special regulation governing employer authorization to collect such 
information; crimes and their perpetrators (private criminal proceedings), and violations 
of work duties or work discipline. Within stated above, a private investigator is allowed 
to perform surveillance, monitoring and photographing in public places (Joksić, 2013). 
The law also stipulates preventive role of private investigators, related to the 
protection of business confidential information, IT systems thus, protection of business 
and personal data and information. Authorization and work permits are issued by 
Ministry of Interior that also performs supervision and inspection of private detective 
activity. The law leaves the space that in Croatia, private investigation can be performed 
by professionals whom bodies of other Member States of the European Union or states 
that have signed the Agreement on the European economic area have issued private 
detective work authorization (Nađ, 2012). 
There are 120 licensed detectives, 11 licensed agencies, and 9 entrepreneurs 
operating in Croatia. 8 of them are members of Private Investigation Group in the 
Croatian Chamber of Commerce. Private investigation in Croatia is characterized by 
uneven regional distribution so that, for example, in the region of Slavonia there isn’t a 
single registered detective agency (Radić Ančić and Antolić, 2016). 
Private investigation in Romania is regulated by the Law on private detectives 
No. 328 from 2003. Private detective agencies and detective offices require necessary 
licenses for work, issued by the General Inspectorate of Romanian police (IGPR). 
Licenses are issued by the Ministry of Interior and Administration. Detectives in 
Romania are not allowed to conduct operations in sole jurisdiction of the state police, or 
apply secret surveillance of communication. Founding and operation is equally granted 
to domestic and foreign entities (from Member States of the European Union). Private 
investigation can be performed from detective agency, or an office. Private security 
companies are not allowed to conduct detective work. Detectives are not allowed, at the 
same time, to practice law-legal services, and they have to report to the police any 
awareness about committed crime. Also, private investigators must respect human 
rights in performing their job. (Prisacariu, 2010). 
Romanian detectives are legally authorized to collect data and information, 
perform investigation and surveillance concerning verification of conduct and moral 
character of persons, marital and family issues, solvency and reliability of the legal 
entities and business partners, fidelity of submitted Curriculum Vitae, insurance fraud, 
counterfeiting of trademarks and brands, missing persons, missing and stolen items, 
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family origin, and protection of data and information from unauthorized access and 
business espionage. 
In 2012 in Romania there were about 500 domestic and foreign legal entities 
and entrepreneurs with more than 2000 employed licensed detectives. About 50% of 
the resources have been located in the wider area of Bucharest. Detectives in Romania 
are voluntarily united in the Romanian Association of Private Detectives - AODPR 
(Mironov Banuta, 2012). 
In the Republic of Bulgaria there isn’t a specific law on detective activity 
neither are private investigators explicitly mentioned in the Law on private security 
from 2004, amended 2011 and in 2014, nor in any other legal act (Bulgaria Investment 
and Business Guide, 2016). 
Regardless of the absence of an adequate regulatory framework, in Bulgaria 
operate branches of EU detective agencies, and a significant number of private security 
companies for personal and corporate protection actually perform investigation for their 
clients. In addition, a wide range of detective services in Bulgaria take place in the 
widespread grey zone, where employees did not receive adequate professional training 
(Dzekova and Kojouharov, 2016). A number of legal entities and entrepreneurs engaged 
in private investigations are incorporated in national voluntary association – the 
Bulgarian Association of private investigators (Българска асоциация на частните 
детективи - БАЧД), that passed the Statute and Code of ethics and operates through 8 
regional subsidiaries. 
Before the adoption of a special law No. 3206 in late 2003, the activities of 
private investigators in the Republic of Greece were covered by certain provisions of the 
Law on private security from 1997. Term detective is not common in Greece, instead, 
they use a private investigator term to distinguish professionals in this field from 
others, which in comparison to the other Balkan countries has a wider scope of 
activities, with emphasis on private and corporate investigations, secret surveillance 
and monitoring (Travers, 2011). 
Private investigation in Greece, among other things, covers: finding missing 
persons and persons who are hiding from service user, marital infidelity, domestic theft, 
children deviant behavior, prevention of drug abuse, detection of sects, employment 
screening, tax fraud, DNA analysis, location of mobile phones. Private investigators 
must obtain work authorization issued by regional police directorates. 
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It is estimated that there are about 120 agencies and independent 
investigators in Greece, more than 80 of them operate in the area of Athens 
(Papanicolaou, 2006). Majority of private investigators are former police officers. They 
must be Greek citizens, or nationals of some of the Member States of the EU and with 
clean criminal record. Five years before applying for a work permit, they must not be 
employed by the police or other security service, customs, telecommunications company 
and/or the stock exchange. 
In the Republic of Macedonia legislation in domain of private investigations 
refers to the Law on detective activity from 1999, amended in 2007 and 2008. The law 
defines a private investigation as collection of data and information, its use and 
processing in a lawful manner (Bogunović, 2013). Law, stipulates a license for private 
detectives issued by Ministry of Interior. Detectives are not allowed to conclude 
agreements on matters that are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the government 
authorities, to work for domestic or foreign government bodies or political parties, nor 
to deal with affairs related to debt collection. Also, detectives are forbidden to use 
weapons and other means of coercion, as well as to use the means and methods that 
are prohibited by law or in explicit jurisdiction of government authorities (Bakreski and 
Associates, 2015). 
Detective activity is, in sort of a way, a new profession in Macedonia and we 
cannot get enough of the relevant data by now about detective agencies performance in 
practice. Problems faced by private investigators in Macedonia refer to financial interest 
in performing these activities, beside other, because of the expensive equipment that 
increases the price of services in a relatively poor society. One of the problems arises 
from the partially achieved reform of the security sector thus, unresolved questions of 
communication and information exchange between public and private sectors. Also, the 
difficulties are related to the facts that the evidence investigators collect, for example 
in marital infidelity or business espionage, are not valid in court proceedings. Problems 
also arise when it comes to obtaining the necessary professional competence for 
conducting private investigation (Slaveski and Bozinovska, 2016). 
Supervision over implementation of the Law on detective activity is performed 
by the Ministry of Interior. In this regard, detective is obliged to enable authorized 
representatives of the Ministry of Interior to conduct inspection, to provide with 
requested documents and to give necessary information and data, except about the 
content of concluded contracts. In the case of non-compliance with the legal provisions, 
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the Ministry of Interior can order detective to correct the observed deficiencies within a 
maximum of three months (Trivan, 2014). Hence, in the Republic of Macedonia, 
currently operate 7 detective agencies. 
In Montenegro, the activities of private investigators are regulated by the 
provisions of the Law on detective activity from 2005, amended in 2008 and 2011. This 
legal act governs founding and conducting private investigation, rights and 
responsibilities of detectives, as well as questions about control and supervision. 
Detectives in Montenegro are not allowed to apply the means of coercion, nor to apply 
means and methods that are in the exclusive jurisdiction of government authorities. On 
the basis of collected data, detective can submit a case to applicable government body 
on behalf of his client. The same can be done without the consent of the client in case 
of committed offences prosecutable ex officio (Rizmal and Vojinovic, 2014). 
Supervision and control over implementation of the Law on detective activity is 
performed by the Ministry of Interior; the Department for supervision of entities dealing 
with protection of persons and property, and private investigations (Trivan, 2014). There 
are 2 detective agencies and 8 detectives in Montenegro engaged in business of private 
investigation. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina doesn’t have an umbrella law about detective activity, 
which opens the opportunity for discrepancies and illegal activities in this field (Lakača, 
2014). In Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina there is a Law on agencies and internal 
sections for protection of people and property from 2008. This law does not cover 
detective activity at all. A draft law on private detectives of the Federation BiH was 
adopted by House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly in February 2010, 
but was never discussed in House of peoples (Ahić, 2015). 
The Law on agencies for security of persons and property and private detective 
activity of the Republic of Srpska from 2002 for the first time in BiH addresses 
detective activity, detective job performance, rights and responsibilities of private 
detective agencies and detectives, and supervision of their work. The National Assembly 
of the Republic of Srpska in 2012 has adopted a new Law on agencies for security of 
persons and property and private detective activity, by which detective activity involves 
tasks such are; data and evidence collection and processing performed by professionals 
authorized to do detective work (Bakreski and Associates, 2015). 
Detective activity in BiH, District of Brcko, is regulated by the Law on agencies 
for security of persons and property and private detective activity from 2004, which 
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provisions are almost identical to related legislation in the Republic of Srpska. Agencies 
authorized to conduct private investigation are prohibited to provide service for 
authorities of District of Brcko and its representatives, as well as for domestic or 
foreign defense, security, or counterintelligence agencies (Trivan, 2014). 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the demand for the private detective services is not 
as noticeable as in other countries in the Balkan region. In the Republic of Srpska there 
are 2 detective agencies – 1 in Banja Luka and 1 in Milići. In the absence of legislation 
in the Federation of BiH, in Sarajevo, there is only one business registered as agency for 
business security. 
Detective activity in the Republic of Albania is not legally regulated, and the 
business of private investigation is indirectly incorporated in the provisions of the Law 
on private security services from 2014, related to the area of personal and corporate 
security. In Albania, there are not licensed domestic detective agencies and private 
detectives, while private investigation services, not too demanded, are often taking 
place in the grey zone. Some private security companies in Albania offer private 
investigative services. Also in this area operate the branches of certain foreign 
companies that provide private investigative service, such as Greves Group or Eagle Eye 
Group (Dyrmishi, Çami, 2016). Very similar situation is in self-declared Republic of 
Kosovo, where in 2011, the Law on private security services was passed, which 
provisions do not include detective activity. This, however, does not mean that in 
Kosovo do don operate private investigators, but their activities are taking place or in 
gray zone of business, or within registered company for private security and protection 
(Blease and Qehaja, 2013). 
 
3.2. Detective Activity in the Republic of Serbia  
 
In November 2013, the Republic of Serbia passed the Law of detective activity 
that was the first legislation to deal with private investigations. The law regulates 
business entities, entrepreneurs and individuals that, in the Republic of Serbia perform 
detective work, licensing requirements, the nature of business operations and 
supervision over their work. Law stipulates that detectives cannot apply operational and 
technical means and methods which are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the 
government authorities. All competencies in regards to control and supervision over 
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implementation of the Law on detective activity are entrusted to the Ministry of 
Interior. 
Detective activity in Serbia includes collection and processing of data and 
information about: missing persons or persons who are hiding for the purpose of 
avoiding criminal prosecution; persons who have caused damage to clients if legal 
requirements for damage liability have been fulfilled; persons who anonymously and 
unlawfully act towards clients with a threat of harmful consequences; lost or stolen 
property; effectiveness of legal entities and entrepreneurs; protection of intellectual 
and industrial property. Detective is legally obligated to report a crime prosecuted ex 
officio in a case when he/she obtains an information about such crime while performing 
detective job (Trivan, 2014). 
Some professionals believe that detective data processing is not in accordance 
with the Law on personal data protection, and that certain provisions of the Law on 
detective activity authorize detectives to search for missing persons or personas who 
are hiding, placing them in the position of so-called para-police force. Accordingly, it is 
noted out that, for example, persons with criminal background could hire a detective to 
disclose protected witnesses (Petrovic and Milosevic, 2015). 
The Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia have passed 4 delayed bylaws 
to support implementation of the Law on detective activity. Therefore, there was a 
significant breach of terms for its application and implementation, thus, synchronizing 
the activities of business entities and entrepreneurs with legal provisions was overdue. 
This is especially notable in legal provisions regarding professional training and 
examination in the Ministry of Interior in the process of professional licensing. Else, the 
requirement for obtaining a license to conduct private investigation are the Act of job 
systematization and at least two employed detectives for legal/business entity, or at 
least one employed licensed detective for entrepreneur. 
The law stipulates that the license for detective activities shall be issued to an 
individual that is a citizen of the Republic of Serbia, has  at least higher education at 
studies of the first degree (undergraduate studies and basic vocational studies) and/or 
studies lasting up to 3 years, has passed corresponding security check, has 
psychophysical abilities for detective work, has completed training program and passed 
the exam for a detective before the Commission of the Ministry of Interior (Bakreski 
and Associates, 2015). 
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During 2016 Ministry of Interior carried out two training cycles and 
professional exams for employees in private detective agencies. In this regard, by March 
2017, 4 detective agencies and 28 individuals have obtained licenses for conduction 
private investigations. A disharmony of legislation and practices is notable, considering 
that the Group for detective activity, at the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, has 16 legal 
entities members, previously registered for this activity. In addition, it is estimated that 
in Serbia there are another twenty non-licensed legal entities that perform detective 
business. Else, according to unofficial estimates, between 3000 to 4000 thousand 
people utilize private detective services in Serbia.  
It is still unknown how many private security companies, business, insurance 
companies and banks, temporarily or permanently engage persons for providing private 
investigation services (Petrovic and Milosevic, 2015). 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
In all the Balkan countries, there is, to the greater or lesser extent, a detective 
activity, whose operators seek to gain their place in the market for private security 
services. It is characteristic that in most of these countries, because of decades of 
communism, for almost 50 years there was a disconnect when it comes to the 
performance of private investigations. 
Comparative practice in the Balkan countries shows that the scope of detective 
activities is quite similar, meaning that detective activity typically involves the search 
for missing persons and things, investigation of crime, surveillance and monitoring, 
preventive activities focused on detection of listening devices and undercover 
surveillance, polygraph, alarms and video surveillance implementation, corporate 
investigations, investigation of business partners solvency, security consulting, marital 
infidelity, employment screenings, preparation of participants in court proceedings for 
testimony, youth delinquency and drug abuse, ant-diversion protection, protection of 
property and persons employed abroad, identification of mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances in criminal proceedings, personal data and private information collection, 
and education and training of candidates for private detectives.  
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Supervision and control over the work of private detectives in the Balkan 
countries are primarily implemented by the relevant police sectors of the ministries of 
interior, while other forms of inspection are not noticeable in practice. 
Legislation in domain of private investigation in the Balkan countries is 
generally consistent with prevailing international trends in this field. Otherwise, even at 
the EU level unified standards about private investigation are not common. Also, there 
are no rounded regulations in all the Member States of EU; visible are different 
procedures and criteria, there is unequal crime tolerance, and there is no 
comprehensive model to serve as an example. 
On the other hand, EU Member States have started the process of downsizing 
in the police department, thereby decreasing the budget, while the number of 
authorizations and activities that can be performed by the private sector increases, 
providing the opportunity for new staff and for retired police officers who meet the 
criteria stated in the laws on detective activity. This also affects the social usefulness of 
the individual, while society gets experienced experts who can continue their activities 
in battling the crime.  
There's no doubt that the legislation of all the Balkan countries had similar 
issues, dilemmas and problems, and that the filed was addressed similarly, in some 
cases identically. This especially applies to the conditions for conducting private 
investigations, the rights and responsibilities of private investigators, that are in all the 
national laws of these countries almost exactly regulated, with some terminological 
differences coming from the level of achieved technological and cultural development. 
Private investigation practice in the Balkan countries frequently reveals 
information and evidence not relevant to the job for which they are engaged, but these 
require further investigation, for which reason the laws on detective activity of each of 
these countries stipulates an obligation of private investigators to report the crime.    
There has been a certain shift in these countries in regards to cooperation 
among private detectives and police officers in domain of evidence collection, especially 
in domain of surveillance and monitoring, thereby decreasing the work-load of the 
police in the field, that can, therefore, allocate its resources towards resolving more 
prioritative crimes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
644 
References 
 
1. Ahić J. (2015). „Harmonizacija zakonske regulative privatne sigurnosti u Bosni i 
Hercegovini u kontekstu evropskih integracija“. U: Zbornik radova 
Međunarodne naučno-stručne konferencije «Usklađivanje zakonodavstva sa 
Acquis-em». Sarajevo: Internacionalni Burč univerzitet, str. 163-178.  
2. Babikov V.G. (2005). ЧОП: От созданиа до успеха, Moсквa: НОУ ШО „Баярд“ & 
Школа охраньi Баярд. 
3. Bakreski O. et. Al. Privatna Bezbednost – teorija i concept. Skopje: Komora na 
Republika Makedonija za privatno obezbeduvanje.  
4. Batelaan H. Bos J.(2006). International Security Guards and Investigators: 
Survey of Regulations on Private Security and Investigation in Si EU Countries. 
Amsterdam NL: Regioplan. 
5. Blease D. Qehaja F. (2013). „The conundrum of local ownership in developing a 
security sector: The case of Kosovo“. In: New Balkan Politics, Vol. XIV, No. 14, 
p.p. 3-23. 
6. Bogunović N. (2013). „Industrija privatne sigurnosti u Republici Makedoniji – Od 
jednoetničkih podjela do evropskih standarda“. U: a&s Adria magazin, Vol. VIII, 
br. 83, str. 54-55. 
7. Bulgaria Investment and Business Guide (Vol. 1) – Strategic and Practical 
Informations. (2016). Washington DC: International Business Publications. 
8. Button M. (2007). „Assessing the Regulation of Private Security across Europe“. 
In: European Journal of Criminology, Vol. IV, No. 1, p.p. 109-128. 
9. Draz W.D. et. al. (2009). Introduction to Proffesional Investigations – Concepts 
& Strategies for Investigators in the Private Sector. San Clemente CA: LawTech 
Publishing Group. 
10. Dyrmishi A. Çami O. (2016). „The Evolving Functions of Private Security in a 
Small Community in Albania – The Case of Vaqarr“, In: Klopfer F. van Amstel N. 
(eds). Private Security in Practice – Case studies from Southeast Europe. 
Geneva: DCAF, p.p. 15-23. 
11. Dzhekova R. Rusev A. (2015). „Bulgaria“.  In: Klopfer F. van Amstel N. (eds), A 
Force for Good? Mapping the private security landscape in Southeast Europe. 
Geneva: DCAF, p.p. 31-59. 
12. George B. Button M. (2000). Private Security. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
645 
13. Hakala J. (2008). Why regulate manned private security?. Wemmel BL: 
Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS). 
14. Joksić I. (2013). ”Zakonska regulisanost detektivske delatnosti u Hrvatskoj“. U: 
Strani pravni život, Vol. LVII, br. 1, str. 255-271. 
15. Lakača S. (2014). „Poslovi privatnih detektiva u urbanim sredinama“, U: Naučna 
konferencija «Sigurnost urbanih sredina» - zbornik radova. Sarajevo: Fakultet za 
kriminalistiku, kriminologiju i sigurnosne studije, str. 27-35. 
16. Magerl Krivanek A. (2014). „Privatni detektivi i Adriatic regija“. U: a&s Adria 
magazin, Vol. IX, br. 96, str. 48-49. 
17. Mironov Banuta D. (2012). „Detectiv de România sau cum să filezi profilul”. In: 
Income Magazine, Vol. II, No. 21, p.p. 25-26. 
18. Nađ, I. (2012). Zbirka propisa iz djelokruga privatne zaštite. Zagreb: Hrvatska 
udruga menadžera sigurnosti. 
19. Papanicolaou G. (2006). „Greece“. In: Jones T.; Newburn Т. (eds), Plural Policing 
– A Comparative LOPerspective, London: Routledge, p.p. 77-97. 
20. Petrovic V. (ur.) (2014). Ljudska prava u Srbiji 2013 – parvo, praksa i 
medjunarodni standardi ljudskih prava. Beograd: Beogradski centar za ljudska 
prava.  
21. Petrovic P. Milosevic M. (ur.) (2015). Novi-stari izazovi privatnog sektora 
bezbednosti u Srbiji. Beograd: Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku.  
22. Prenzler T. King M. (2002). „The Role of Private Investigators and Commercial 
Agents in Law Enforcement“. In: Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, 
Vol. XVII, No. 234, pp. 1-6. 
23. Prisacariu, C. (2010). „Romania: New system, same players“. Organized Crime 
and Corruption Project – OCCRP. 
http://www.reportingproject.net/security/index.php/stories/7-romania. 
(pristupljeno 02.03.2017). 
24. Radić Ančić N. Antolić J. (2016). „U Hrvatskoj ih je 120: Detektivi otkrivaju kako 
uhode i prisluškuju bračne partnere!“. Riječanin. 2.3.2016. 
http://www.rijecanin.rtl.hr/u-hrvatskoj-ih-je-120-detktivi-otkrivaju-kako-uhode-
i-prisluskuju-bracne-partnere/ (pristupljeno 09.03.2017). 
25. Rizmal I. Vojinovic T. (2014). “Privatno obezbedjenje bez javno-privatnog 
partnerstva I sa njima”/ U: Svet bezbednosti, broj 3, str. 64-66.  
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
646 
26. Slaveski S. Bozinovska F. (2016) „Приватната детективска дејност во Репубика 
Македонија: искуства и перспективи“. У: Зборник „Приватна безбедност во 
XXI век – искуства и предзивци“. Скопје: Комора на Република Македонија 
за приватно обезбедување, str. 255-268. 
27. Šelih A. Završnik A. (eds) (2012). Crime and Transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe. New York NY: Springer Science & Business Media. 
28. Travers J. (2011). The Original Private Investigator`s Handbook and Almanac. 
Raleigh NC: Lulu.com.  
29. Trivan D. (2014). “Detektivska delatnost”. Beograd: Dosije studio.  
30. Trivan D. (2015). “Detektivska delatnost i zastita podataka o licnosti”. U: Svet 
bezbednosti, Vol. X, broj 1, str. 46-48.  
31. van Amstel N. (2015). „Understanding the Shared Context of Private Security 
regulation, In: Klopfer F. van Amstel N. (eds). A Force for Good? Mapping the 
private security landscape in Southeast Europe, Geneva: DCAF, p.p. 107-117.  
32. Yusufi I. (2004). ”Understanding the Process of Security Reform in 
Southeastern Europe“, In: Journal of Security Sector Management, Vol. II, No. 
2, pр. 1-18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
647 
351.746.3/.5-027.551(497.7) 
 
Challenges of surveillance of the private security sector  
in the Balkan countries 
 
Milan Daničić, PhD 
Faculty for law and business studies, Novi Sad 
E-mail: milandanicic58@gmail.com 
 
Dragomir Jovičić, PhD 
University of Banja Luka 
Faculty of Safety Sciences 
E-mail: dragomir.pravedna@gmail.com 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Private security sector on the Balkans has been getting stronger from the 
beginning of the 1990s, growing into the main carrier and employer in the field of 
private security services. In the last period of time, activities of private security in these 
countries, with more or less difficulties, have been developing according to certain legal 
frameworks and accepted codex of behaviour and management, in order to eliminate 
praxis that is not conducted by positive regulations and general social normative. On 
the other hand, there are different problems in the Balkans concerning functions of 
private security sector, which are often manifested in a very similar way, especially in 
the countries that did not get far in the process of European integrations. In the near 
future it will be necessary to completely harmonize legal regulations of the Balkan 
countries with the standards of international law in this field, which was already done 
by members of the European Union from this region – Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Croatia. Actual problems in the private security sector are usually related to informal 
connections of private security subjects to state security structures, criminal groups 
and political parties, insufficient financial support and inadequate education of 
executors, as well as imbalanced development of private security market, especially in 
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rural and less urbanised areas. The surveillance over the actions of private security 
sector in all Balkan countries formally exists, but its effectiveness and efficiency is not 
on the required level. There is no doubt that these questions that are related to the 
surveillance and the control over the industry of private security are directly connected 
to the actual condition of reforms of security sector in countries from this area. In 
praxis, the surveillance over the legitimacy of actions of private security subjects is 
done by municipal authorities in ministries of internal affairs (less often also by 
professional associations), while parliamentary surveillance and ombudsman actions are 
being neglected, which witnesses how the private security in the Balkans is still not 
considered as a priority to the system of national security.  
 
Key words: private security sector, surveillance, Balkans 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A privatization of security is primarily related to the need of satisfying the 
feeling of security, respect of human and citizen laws and freedoms and their more 
effective protection,while assuring that every individual can decide about his ways of 
personal protection from various types of endangerment. Process of security 
privatization is being influenced by specific security, historical, cultural and other 
conditions that are characteristic for one certain state community.  
Development of the market with commercial security services imposes 
necessity of an adequate normative setup, an appropriate supervision and a control of a 
private security sector, whose actors are trying to achieve legitimacy within the national 
security system and ensure their smooth actions (Richards and Smith, 2007). 
In the case, when subjects of private security are functioning without an 
efficient supervision or their activities are inadequately regulated, that can represent a 
significant problem for democratic states, and for the states in transition along with 
post-conflict societies, this development could mean harder establishment of peace and 
stabile order, interfere with bracing of democracy and disturb plans of a long-term 
development (Pavlović, 2011). When the private security sector is not controlled enough, 
it could lead to deepening of existing social conflicts and discrepancy, especially if 
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security becomes a good available just for the elite, while the most citizens could not 
afford them services of private security. 
A level of responsibility of the private security sector depends on a right legal 
frame, efficient supervision mechanisms and ways of control that are performed by 
certain institutions, while the national regulation is a key to efficient supervision over 
the private security market.  
Private security has been positioned for years on growth path in the whole 
world, starting from a relative anonymity, global popularity, all the way to a pluralistic 
model, in which public and private actors contribute to the social security (Manning, 
1999). According to this fact, a private security politics has following dimensions: legal 
legitimacy, related to activities performed according to the accepted legal frames, 
instrumental legitimacy, which is related to efficiency of actions of private security 
subjects and normative legitimacy, related to methods of harmonization of private 
security with present norms of the national security system. 
 
 
2. Types and ways of control and supervision of private security 
 
Control implies a comparison between real actions of state and non-state 
subjects and results of those activities, along with actions and results that are expected 
based on in advance established criteria (Tomić, 2002). Control and surveillance have 
common elements, related to the influence of organs that are supervising, i.e. 
controlling the one, who is a subject of the supervision, i.e. control. According to that, 
control represents a one-time or a long-term process within the process of surveillance. 
Surveillance without control is possible, but not efficient. 
 Control makes sense if it is performed before the occurrence of harmful 
consequences, includes all the relevant actors, not performed contrary to other 
missions, and if it is performed according to economic and legal principles, with 
sanctioning any deviation from legal procedures (Milosavljević, 1997).  
 It could be discussed about outer and inner formal means of control of private 
security. Formal assets of control include parliamentary control, government control, 
control of non-government organizations, court and prosecution control,while informal 
outer assets include public, media and non-government sector. Inner formal means of 
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private security control include hierarchy control, disciplinary responsibility and intern 
control organs (Born and Leigh, 2007). 
 
2.1. Inner means of private security control 
 
Hierarchy control represents a part of a leadership process in the private 
security system. It is characterized by wide authorizations of controller towards a 
controlled subject. Hierarchy control is performed in official way (contacts of higher and 
lower levels), or on the lower level, after complaints of displeased citizens (Тоmić, 2002). 
 Disciplinary responsibility, as a way of inner control, is under surveillance 
of the private security subjects. If it is predicted, it is established by a leader or 
special disciplinary bodies.  
 Possibilities of special intern services for control go beyond thehierarchy ones, 
when it comes to their conception and reach, and they are present in large and complex 
subjects of private security. Specificity of this control form is in a narrow specialisation 
for establishment of illegalities, such as the use of means of coercion and abuse of 
power, as well as its direct responsibility to management of private security subject.  
 Inner informal means of private security control include ways of self-control 
and interpersonal control, as well as control by syndicate and association (Van Steden 
and Sarre, 2007). 
 Self-control represents a mechanism of establishment of behaviour norms as a 
part of conscious reaction in certain situations. Mechanism of self-control is formed by 
establishment of grading system, development, responsibility and adoption of 
professional ethics.  
 Interpersonal control is a mechanism of mutual control in a joint action of 
more inner work teams within the private security sector, and the relation system of 
groups with common ideas, which are protected by the work of the mentioned group 
(Dapčević, Marković, 2010). Characteristics of these ideas are consciousness about the 
common responsibility, solidarity with consequences that result from the presence of 
the group and establishment of a special psychology of group behaviour, enabling in 
that way special programs of group control with principles of solidary responsibility.  
 In the most of the countries, union and professional associations within the 
private security sector are usually dealing with issues related to the protection of 
employee rights, i.e. social and economic position of employees in the private security 
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sector. Professional control is usually performed by organizations of private security 
subjects, either within business chambers or independently. Professional surveillance is 
manifested through issuing of certain certificates to candidates for admission to private 
security companies, while in the same time, control is possible in the cases of uses of 
force or subtraction of a company licence (Richards and Smith, 2007). 
 Inner control assets also include socialization. Namely, contact of private 
security subjects with citizens influence positively on their complete integration within 
a social community and their right behaviour. It is considered that close social contacts 
with the environment make private security subjects more responsible for their actions, 
because they ensure security culture and make work more transparent. On the other 
side, there are other opinions that support a limited level of relations between the 
private security sector with citizens, in order to prevent some certain negative events.  
 
2.2. Extern means of control and surveillance of private security 
 
A parliamentary supervision represents a mixture of politic and legal elements, 
with the predominance of politic one. Politic element of surveillance actually represents 
an audit that checks if an activity is performed according to a certain politic decision or 
a parliament opinion. Legal elements of parliamentary control are related to a 
validation procedure according to legal principles, aiming to achieve public interest and 
to correct illegal actions (Dapčević, Marković, 2010). There are two types of the 
parliamentary supervision of the private security sector. One of them are legal 
authorizations of parliament, i.e. operations of competent bodies within the parliament. 
What is more, an important way of control of the private security sector is related to a 
special independent ombudsman institution, which is chosen by the parliament.  
 Government influence on the private security sector is achieved by normative 
authorizations. In that context, government accepts sublegal regulations in order to 
implement the law that will regulate a certain area (Tomić, 2002). Using ministries, i.e. 
from central, regional and local government level, government directly controls private 
security subjects. That control includes issuing of work permits, permits for carrying 
firearms, inspection surveillance of private security subjects and similar. 
 Control of the private security sector by ministries of inner affairs is the most 
common way of the extern control and is present in the most of the countries that have 
an organized legal regulation in this area. This way of control includes testing if all 
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conditions, which are needed for private security subjects to start with their activities, 
are achieved, and what are the reasons for a withdrawal of the approval. The same 
refers to permits that allow individuals to perform all these activities, legality of the use 
of authorization and the use of coercion, fulfilment of conditions for acquisition and 
possession of weapon and munition, and for keeping proper records.  
 Court control of the private security sector is performed within a usual 
procedure of competent judicial authorities, related to establishment of illegality in 
activities and use of authorizations by private security members. That control includes 
resolving disputes for compensation of damage, a procedure in criminal situations with 
provision of evidence by private investigators, and a procedure in the cases of criminal 
and violation responsibility of private security members, related to acts done by 
performing their normal job activities (Krahmann and Abzhaparova, 2010). 
 Advisory bodies that are by the rule established on the level of local 
communities and do not have control authorization, which would possess a mandatory 
character for private security subjects; but in contrary they act by giving 
recommendations, proposals and advices in order to achieve public influence onsecurity 
in communities.  
 Informal extern supervision of the private security sector is performed by 
public opinion, media and non-government sector. A relation between private security 
and public is complex because of several reasons: specificity of actions of private 
security members (use of coercion, limitation of individual freedoms and rights in 
situations that are legally determined, use of discrete authorizations); the main target 
of private security subjects cannot be achieved without public support and cooperation; 
the private sector gets more trust from citizens when it opens itself to public (Lopes, 
2014). 
 Меdia represents an inevitable way of informing citizens and protection of 
their rights, and an independent instrument of control of legislative, executive and 
judicial power. By the time, media is winning more and more social power, which is 
often misused (tabloids, disguised ownership, control by hidden centres of power, 
manipulations). Media has a great influence on the general picture of private security, 
i.e. on building image of private security services (Ignjatović, 2008). 
 Non-government sector achieves its most important activities in systems that 
are characterized by freedom of speech and opinion, and where this activity is realized 
in order to win over the general public. When it comes to domain of activities belonging 
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to the private security sector, non-government sector has a relatively significant control 
mechanism that functions through the influence of different interest groups.  
 
 
3. State of control and supervision of the private security sector in the 
Balkans 
 
3.1. Actual control of the private security sector in Balkan states that are 
members of the European Union 
 
As a part of a process of admission to the European Union, the new Law on 
Private Security has been approved 2003 in the Republic of Croatia. In 2010 it was 
changed and supplemented. Administrative, i.e. inspection surveillance of the 
implementation of the Law on Private Security is done by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. Beside that, the MIA is also responsible for approval of jobs that are related to 
personal and property protection, and for issuing work permits for guards and security 
operators. Activities of the professional association “Croatian security guards (Hrvatski 
ceh zaštitara)” have a certain significance, as well. (Page and Associates, 2006). 
Changes in the Law from 2010 enabled a possibility that jobs in the Croatian 
private security sector are also available for companies and businessmen from the 
European Union and from the states that signed the Contract about European Economic 
Space. As well, relations between the police and the private security sector have been 
better organized. With the same law, limitations of certain activities of private security 
companies were withdrawn. The most important change is related to a possibility to offer 
an adequate private protection to state institutions and local governments (Nadj, 2012). 
Detective activities in the Republic of Croatia are defined by the Law on Private 
Detectives, dating from 2009. The procedure for approval of detective activities and 
control in the area according to the Law is performed by competent organs of the 
Ministry of Inner Affairs. 
Furthermore, the Law on Private Detectives offers a possibility that private 
detectives perform their duties also in the case when they have job offers that are 
issued from some state in the European Union or from a state that signed the Contract 
about European Business Area. (Nadj, 2012). 
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It is estimated that a bit more than 150 licensed legal entities (including 20 
detective agencies) perform private security and investigation activities in the Republic 
of Croatia, with over 13 000 employees (almost 35% less than 2009). Private security in 
Croatia is characterized by grouping trends, a certain monopolisation of this type 
business (two largest companies- Sokol Maric and Securitas Hrvatska include 47% of 
employees and 64% of the overall income) and a lot of cases, where licensed security 
guards go to work in the states of the European Union (Najman, 2016). 
Parliamentary supervision over private security subjects in Croatia does not 
exist, as problems concerning protection and investigation activities are not being 
mentioned in the scope of working bodies within the Croatian Parliament. 
Functioning of the private security sector in the Republic of Greece is 
regulated by the Law on Private Security from 1997, changed and updated in 2008. 
Services of private security companies include: general protection, security of airports 
and diplomatic-consular representative offices, maritime security, transport of values 
and money, surveillance and long-distance control, design, installation and maintenance 
of alarm systems, personal protection, convoy escort, security consulting and private 
investigation activities (CoESS, 2012). Nowadays, private securitycompanies have been 
offered to protect camps that are used for a temporary accommodation of migrants in 
border areas (Gebrewoldand Bloom, 2016). 
Control and inspection of private security companies in the Republic of Greece 
areperformed by the Government along with its competent organs on the national level. 
The parliamentary control of private security subjects is neither legally organized, nor 
present in the practice. Authorized organ for initiation of implementation and change of 
legal regulations in this area is the Ministry of Public Order and Citizens Protection, 
while work licences are being issued by the Ministry of Inner Affairs. Special licences for 
weapon use by private security companies are being issued by the Ministry of Public 
Order and Citizen Protection, which is also a competent organ for criminal and 
misdemeanour prosecution, and pronouncement of administrative sanctions to private 
security subjects (CoESS, 2014).  
Employees in private security companies have their representatives in 
associations and syndicates, such as the Greek Federation of Employees in the Private 
Security Sector (OIYE), theAssociation of Security Companies (ENEA) and theGreek 
Federation of Employees in the Personal Security Sector (OMYPAE).  
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In the Republic of Greece in 2013 around 1.100 private security subjects were 
operating, with almost 60.000 licensed security guards. As the economic crisis in the 
country got deeper, overall incomes and profits of private security industry has been 
going downwards for years. Even in Greece there is a concentration of power in the 
private security sector, so that three largest companies earn more than third of overall 
profit in the sector (CoESS, 2014). 
In Romania, the position of the private security sector is organized by the Law 
on Protection of Objects, Goods, Values and People from 2003, changed and updated in 
2010, and by the law on Private Detectives from 2003. Legal regulations also allow use 
of weapons by private security subjects. Private security services include physical 
protection of certain objects, persons and manifestations, security of water and air 
traffic, technical supervision, escort of money and goods in transit (CoESS, 2014). 
According to legal possibilities, even the state security sector is enabled to offer 
commercial services, which all together leads to conflict of interests and corruption.  
Private investigation activities in Romania is regulated by the Law on Private 
Detectives from 2003. Private detective agencies and detectives have to possess 
licences, which are issued by the General Inspectorate of the Police. Detectives in this 
country are not allowed to perform activities that are under the jurisdiction of the state 
Police, or to perform activities related to secret supervision of comunnication(Gallagher, 
2009). 
Establishment and changes in legal regulations that organize the private 
security industry are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Inner Affairs, while control 
and inspection surveillance of private security subjects is performed by the authorized 
General Inspectorate of the Police. For all employees in this sector, the Police and 
Romanian informative service (Serviciul Roman de Informatii – SRI) perform security 
checks first. Services of the national security that keep these authorizations are 
considered as a relic of the past(Born and Associates, 2007). In Romania there is no 
additional control, which would be performed by parliamentary and ombudsman 
associations(Page and Associates, 2006). 
Development of the private security sector in Romania was related to the rapid 
transition and inefficient activities of the post-authoritative state. The practice lead to 
the situation, where a part of members of politic-security structures of the former 
regime, including Securitate, through privatization of security kept the existing 
privileges and earned a great fortune. Step by step it came to the fragmentation of 
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security functions, due to the liberal model of services provision in the private security 
sector and unfair concurrence of public and private actors (Gheciu, 2015). 
Private security jobs in Romania 2013 were performed by approximately 1.860 
registered subjects with more than 120.000 employees. Three largest private security 
companies cover 43% of the market(CoESS, 2014). 
 Conditions for grounding and way of functioning of private security companies 
in the Republic of Bulgaria, as well as the control of their performances, are regulated 
by the Law on Private Security Services from 2004, changed and updated in 2011 and 
2014. According to the Law, private security subjects can offer various types of services 
to their clients, including physical and technical personal protection, providing security 
of meetings and properties, transport of values, protection of critical infrastructure, 
detective services (Bulgaria has no special law on detective activities), installation and 
maintenance of alarm systems and systems of electronic surveillance. The Law on 
Private Security Services enables use of weapons for private security subjects 
(DzekovaandKojouharov, 2016). 
Any additions or changes in the law that regulates the private security industry 
in Bulgaria are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Inner Affairs. According to the 
law, a subject has to possess a licence in order to perform private security services, and 
the companies have to be registered in the Police. Control and inspection of private 
security industry is done by the Ministry of Inner Affairs. Administration sanctions are 
proposed by the MIA, the National Tax Administration and Work Inspectorate, while 
criminal sanctions are under the jurisdiction of the competent courts (CoESS, 2014). 
Police along with the National Inspectorate checks the activities of private security 
companies with the accent on work permits, permits to carry weapon, security plans, 
personnel education, vehicle checks and similar(Page and Associates, 2006). 
Significant activities in the private security sector are entrusted to the two 
trade associations: the National Association of Companies for Industrial Security and 
the National Organization of Individuals and Associations That Provide Private Security 
Services. The ethic codex has also been introduced to the private security sector, 
insisting on the respect for the law, cooperation with the police and professional 
provision of services. 
Even though there are legal authorizations of the Parliament and the Office of 
the National Attorney for supervision of the private security sector, activities on this 
plan are not yet visible. A state of control and supervisionof the private security sector 
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in Bulgaria is on the low level, accompanied by overall corruption, grey business zone, 
conflict of interests and coalition of private security subjects with criminal and para-
politic structures (Dzhekova and Rusev, 2015). 
According to the data of the MIA from 2014, in Bulgaria there was 2.688 
licensed private security companies, while only 500 of them were actually active. The 
State Institute for Statistics declares that around 67..000 persons were employed in 
the private security sector (in contrast to 28.000 policemen). However, syndicalist 
associations from this area claim that number of employees in the sector is impossible 
to estimate correctly, because including the grey business zone and self-protection 
activities, this number of employees could also easily be around 200.000(Dzhekova 
andRusev, 2015).  
 
3.2. Control of private security in other Balkan countries 
 
A legal regulation related to private security on the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
does not exist, while its entities have unevenly arranged regulations. The private 
security sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina was formally established in 2002, by 
implementation of the law in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the 
Republic of Srpska. In this way, the Federation implemented the Law on Agencies for 
Protection of Citizens and Properties, while the Law on Private Detectives has not been 
accepted yet. In the Republic of Srpska, the Law on Agencies for Personal and Property 
Safeguarding and Private Detective Activities from 2002, changed and updated in 2005 
and 2006, regulates the overall sphere of private security. The District of Brčko 
regulated this area by the Law on Agencies for Personal and Properties Safeguarding 
and Private Detective Activities in 2004, which was changed and updated in 2005. On 
the level of both entities later on two new laws in this area were accepted, the Law on 
Agencies and Inner Services for Personal and Properties Protection in the Federation of 
BH, dating from 2008, and the Law on Agencies for Personal and Properties 
Safeguarding and Private Detective Activities in the Republic of Srpska, accepted in 
2012. 
In entities of BH, a lot of questions in this sphere are legally regulated, such as 
conditions for establishment and work of private security subjects, rights and 
obligations of private security subjects, professional educations, inner and extern 
controls and surveillances over the private security sector, authorizations of employees 
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in the private security sector, use of force and weapon, relations between the private 
security sector and the police or other. (Nikač and Associates, 2013). 
At the central government level, there are no mechanisms of supervision and 
control of the private security sector. On the entity level, this function is done by police 
services of ministries of inner affairs of the Republic of Srpska and the District of Brčko, 
while in the Federation of BH the police performs supervision at the cantonal level 
(Pavlović, 2011). The cooperation ways between police services and the private security 
sector at the entity level are not institutionalized, and the cooperation is achieved from 
a certain case to other case.  
According to some data, in Bosnia and Herzegovina there are 164 private 
security companies, with around 4.200 licensed members (CoESS, 2014). In the private 
security sector there are still numerous problems, including the fact that a certain 
number of the companies and agencies do not harmonize their activities with the valid 
regulations, while in the same time they also do not bear any sanctions for thiskind of 
behaviour. (Ahić and Associates, 2013). 
The actual stage of the private security sector in BH is reflected in a long-term 
post-conflict division of the country, causing a longer period of time for revitalization 
and modern standardization of the private security sector (Nikač and Associates, 2013). 
Functioning of the non-state security sector in Montenegro is regulated by 
several laws, among which the most important are the Law on Personal and Properties 
protection from 2014 and the Law on Detective Activities, established in 2005 and 
changed and updated in 2008. Services of the private security sector in Montenegro 
include: protection of persons, properties, nature wealth, goods and environment; 
maintenance of order on public meetings; escort of cash and values; designing, 
installation and maintenance of alarm, video and other technical systems (Rizmal, 
Vojinović, 2014).  
Issuing of work permits in the private security sector is under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of Inner Affairs. Protection jobs in Montenegro are done by safeguards, 
protection technicians, bodyguards, employees in escort sector and guards. Each of jobs 
demands a work permit (Nikač and Associates, 2013). 
Detective activities in Montenegro are regulated by the Law on Detective 
Activities, including conditions and types of detective activities, rights and obligations 
of private detectives, and supervision of detective work. Detectives are not allowed to 
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use means of coercion or any other specific operational-technical means (Rizmal and 
Vojinović, 2014). 
Control and inspection supervision of the implementation of the Law on 
Detective Activities is performed by the Division for Supervision of the Private Security 
and Private Investigations Sector within the Ministry of Inner Affairs. In this country 
there is no professional association of private security subjects. The parliamentary 
supervision of the private security sector does not exist, as the parliamentary 
Committee for Security and Protection has none of these questions under its 
jurisdiction (Radević and Kalač, 2012).  
75 legal entities in Montenegro owe a permit to work in the private security 
sector, and over 2.800 individuals possess a permit to work as a personal or property 
safeguard. Detective activities are performed by two detective agencies.  
The private security sector in the Republic of Macedonia is regulated by the Law 
on Private Security from 2012, and the Law on Detective Activities from 1999, changed 
and updated in 2007. The Chamber of the Republic of Macedonia for Personal and 
Properties Security was established in Skopje in 2007, having as a target to implement 
the legal regulations.  
The private security sector in Macedonia offers following services: physical and 
technical protection of properties, persons and manifestations, escort of values, security 
evaluations and consulting, design of security systems and similar (Nikač and Associates, 
2013). 
Supervision of the private security sector is done by the Ministry of Inner Affairs 
of the Republic of Macedonia and the Chamber of the Republic of Macedonia for Personal 
and Properties Security. Legal entity that performs security jobs is obligated to enable 
the supervision and to put at the disposal all the needed documentation to the 
authorized persons, as well as to provide any needed information or notifications 
(Bakreski and Associates, 2015).  
Supervision of the implementation of the Law on Detective Activities is done by 
the MIA. Detectives are forbidden to perform detective jobs for national and foreign 
countries or for political parties. During detective activities, they are not allowed to 
carry weapon or use any other means of coercion, or some other means that are in the 
exclusive jurisdiction of state institutions. Detective activities in Macedonia are still 
being developed, and at the time seven detective agencies are in function (Slaveski and 
Božinovska, 2016). 
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According to the data of the CoESS and the MIA from 2012,over 4.000 
individuals possessed licence for security jobs, while only 2.900 of them were 
professionally engaged. In the same time, 139 legal entities were actively performing 
security jobs (CoESS, 2014). However, according to the data of the Chamber for Personal 
and Properties Security, during 2012 only 57 private security companies were performing 
their tasks in harmonization to the valid Law. These imbalances show how changeable 
legal regulations and market conjunctures are, but also highlights the presence of illegal 
business and weaknesses in the supervision system of the private security sector 
(Vankovska, 2015). 
After the stabilization of the situation in the Republic of Albania, which was 
facing the citizen war and chaos in 1997, conditions for establishment of the private 
security sector were made. This sector is rapidly developed, so that the number of 
employees is almost equal as the number of the people working in the police sector 
(close to 11.000). However, a number of active private security companies (265) is being 
kept constant over the years (Dyrmishi, Madhi, 2015). 
According to the Law on Agencies for Private Security from 2014, private 
security services in Albania include personal protection (also private detective jobs), 
physical-technical security, security on various manifestations, protection of critical 
infrastructure, escort of money and values. Employees in this sector must be Albanian 
citizens and they should not be convicted or fired from the Police for breaking the law 
(Bakreski and Associates, 2015). 
Work permits in the private security sector are being issued by the Albanian 
Police. Depending on the scope and type of services that are offered by agencies, they 
are categorized into three groups: A includes companies that provide security of private 
and public buildings; B refers to agencies that perform physical security services; and C 
category include companies that do escort of money and values (Bakreski and 
Associates, 2015). The Law does not regulate use and storage of weapon or munition, 
but the same regulations for military and police are being obeyed. 
Supervision of the private security sector is done by the General Directorate of 
the state police within the Ministry of Inner Affairs. Work permits are being checked 
once a year, and if some irregularities are noticed, permits are not being prolonged. 
Certain control authorizations over the private security sector are possessed by the 
Ministry of Inner Affairs and the Ministry of Finances. Parliamentary supervision in this 
sphere does not exist.  
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The main problem of the private security sector is referred to a weak and non-
efficient supervision over the mentioned sector by institutors of executive and 
legislative authorities, absence of self-control in the private sector, grey market, 
corruption and politicization in this sphere (Dyrmishi, Madhi, 2015). 
Republic of Serbia was until 2013, when the Law on Private Security and the 
Law on Detective activities were implemented, the only state on the Balkans that did 
not have legal regulations refered to private detective activities. The deadline for 
implementation of the Law was extended until the 1st of January 2017, because of the 
late implementation of sublegal acts and licencing of legal entities and individuals in 
the sector. Namely, until the November 2016 the Ministry of Inner Affairs issued work 
licences for only 21 companies and to 3.570 security employees (from estimated 300 
companies and 30.000 employees on the day of the law adoption). Beside that, the 
quality of professional education was rated as weak (Petrović, 2016). Professional 
education for less number of employees in detective agencies has been performed 
according to the plans.  
The private security sector in Serbia include activities in physical and technical 
protection, planning, projecting, technical surveillance, montage and maintenance of 
technical protection systems, money and value escort, monitoring services, self-
protection and detective activities (Nikač and Associates, 2013). The process of 
monopolization is evident, so that the greatest companies in the sphere cover over 70% 
of the market. What is more, there is a non-transparent connection between the private 
security management companies and political structures (Trivan and Associates, 2015).  
The Association for Private Security within the Commerce Chamber of Serbia 
has 119 business societies as members (The Association for Physical security has 37, 
The Association for Technical Security has 36, The Association for Self-Protective 
Activities has 30, while the Association for Detective Activities has 16 legal entities as 
members).  
The Ministry of Inner Affairs performs inspection and administrative 
supervision over subjects in the private security sector, but in general the extern 
control of private security is not satisfying. Parliamentary control of private security 
does not exist, unless if it is considered that the parliamentary Committee for 
Protection and Inner Affairs is constantly monitoring the sector, as it is legally 
monitoring the work of the MIA of the Republic of Serbia.  
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A cooperation between the subjects of the private security sphere with 
competentauthorities and local government in Serbia is on the very low level, which is 
the same case with prevention and suppression of criminal (Trivan and Associates, 2015) 
A process of professionalization of private security in Serbia is performed 
slowly, whereby there are structures within the state and the companies that are 
trying to block it. What is more, demands for these are fewer because of the bad 
economic situation. All of this leads to lower prices with higher business costs, which 
questions the survival of the most private security companies (Petrović, 2016).  
Private security in the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo has started to 
develop rapidly later than other countries from the former SFRY. Only after introduction 
of international administration in 1999, first agencies providing security services start 
to operate. There were no greater administrative obstacles for them, and the 
privatization process and high numbers if foreign investments have increased a demand 
for these type of services (Qehaja, 2009). 
The Law on Private Services from 2011, which exchanged the former Regulation 
UNMIK from 2000, has created normative conditions for establishment and activities of 
private security subjects on Kosovo.  
According to the data from 2015, there are 90 licensed private security 
subjects on Kosovo, including some foreign companies. More than a half of the 
companies have their representative centre in Priština (Emmi, Vrajoli, 2015). The most 
of the registered agencies are owned by Albanians from Kosovo, with some exceptions 
where employees from other ethical communities are employed(Qehaja, 2009).  
In 2015 on the area of Kosovo, around 4.900 individuals were licenced in the 
private security sector, and it is estimated that in general there was over 7.000 
workers, who were engaged. It is evident that a certain number of employees is not 
registered in order to avoid certain obligations that are predicted by the Law on 
Employment, what witnesses the absence of certain control mechanisms. Beside that, a 
certain number of persons is engaged in the grey business market for a short period of 
time or ad hoc, depending on demands for these types of service on the market.  
Supervision of the implementation of the Law on Private Security Services is 
done by the Ministry of Inner Affairs over the Commission for Complaints on the work 
of private security companies, while licencing and inspection control is under the 
jurisdiction of the Division for Private Security Companies within the Police of 
Kosovo(Emini, Vrajolli, 2015) 
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4. Conclusion 
 
Private security today represents a realistic force, which includes more and 
more activities, gaining characteristics of power. A level of assigning of traditional 
business and authorizations, which have been for centuries under state monopoly, to 
the private sector represents in the same time a level of democracy in a certain society. 
The private security sector is differently organized in the Balkan countries. 
Republic of Croatia, Romania, Montenegro, Republic of Serbia and Republic of 
Macedonia have two laws related to the area of private security, while Republic of 
Greece, Republic of Bulgaria, Republic of Albania, Republic of Srpska and District Brcko 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina) have the unique law that defines the area. The Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has only the law about protection of citizens and their 
property, without organization of detective activities. There is a visible lack of 
standardized European law related to companies that provide private security services. 
The private security sector in the Balkan countries has developed significantly 
in a professional way over the last few decades. However, problems related to 
functioning of the sector are present in all countries, even in the European Union 
members from this area, such as Romania and Bulgaria. In Romania there is a constant 
conflict of interest between the public and the private security sector, accompanied by 
a strong corruption. What is more, even though the private security sector in Bulgaria 
is one of the most developed in the region, there are cases where this sector is 
connected to organized criminal, illegal private security services, and concurrence 
between state and non-state sector in this area.  
In all Balkan countries there are competent institutions that regulate activities 
of the private security sector, accompanied by general legal conditions for 
establishment and action of private security subjects. Control and inspection 
supervision over the work of private security subjects exist, mostly by ministry of inner 
affairs, i.e. competent police services. In none of these countries there is no direct 
parliamentary supervision over the private security sector, but only indirect one 
(through legal supervision over the work of ministry of inner affairs), while 
authorizations of ombudsman and their use in practice is not sufficient.  
These arethe reasons why, along with retaining and strengthening of 
authorizations of executive institutions when it comes to control and inspection 
supervision, more interest of public and media, development of mechanism of inner 
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control within private security subjects, it is necessary to activate more ombudsman 
and parliamentary committees, which need more precise defined duties. When these 
private security services achieve the certain professional level, control function should 
be taken over by professional associations in the private security sector, while the state 
organizes the certain needed level of supervision.  
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Abstract 
 
The private security has developed significantly throughout the world in the 
past few decades. The technical security has also flourished, bringing new technologies 
of surveillance and control that became the landmarks of our security everyday life. 
Various systems of video surveillance, alarm systems and access control systems have 
overwhelmed the private households, commercial objects as well as almost every public 
building.  The security science, sociology and philosophy scholars have already accepted 
and widely used the new term of banopticon, coined by the French scholar Didier Bigo.  
In actual fact, this term is intended to explain that contemporary technical private 
security has become symbol of a new powerful surveillance and control mechanism that 
functions in a way of keeping the people who have not authorization to enter to a 
certain secured place out of that place. In some wider scientific context, the term 
banopticon has been different from the terms panopticon and synopticon, used 
tremendously by the scientific scholars for some other aspects of surveillance and 
control.  The term banopticon is interesting because it has been widely associated with 
the growth and development of private security, especially technical private security.  
Within this paper we’ll analyse the meaning and importance of this term in the 
contemporary private security debates as well as in the contemporary Macedonian 
private security context.  The paper will also point to some human and ethical dilemmas 
of usage of the technical private security in securing certain persons, objects and 
places.  Considering this, the author of the paper will give some proposals and 
recommendations as to where and to what extent the use of technical private security 
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could be useful and where it could be considered controversial and interfere the sphere 
of ethics, humanism and basic human rights and freedoms.   
 
Keywords: private security, technical security, surveillance, control, banopticon 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The private security is considered to be a phenomenon of contemporary way of 
living, penetrating our everyday lives with constant awareness about the present 
security risks around us and the urgent need to fight them on a daily basis.  We are 
literary flooded with security risks everywhere around us since as it is well known and 
affirmed that we are living in a risk society and with culture of fear (Bek, 2001; Furedi, 
1997).  The proliferation of risks is caused by the dynamics of society and life, which is 
not stable at all, but intertwined with liquid relations, in an atmosphere that everything 
changes and is out of real control (Bauman, 2000: 2; Bauman, 1992).  Probably, most 
stark evidence of the omnipresence of private security in our everyday existence is to 
be found in the realm of the technical private security and all sophisticated technical 
systems, devices and networks that comprise it. We are simply overwhelmed with the 
constant feeling of the imminent danger posed by security risks and the constant 
efforts of the private security industry to convince us in the inevitability of the private 
security omnipresence. This omnipresence is not so seen in the presence of the so 
called physical or manned security, but, more evidently, in the overall presence of 
technical security.  Although the private security industry, its professionals and most of 
the scholars agree on the fact of inevitability of technical security in carrying out the 
preventive functions of private security, mostly associated with surveillance and control, 
at the same time, there are fairly grounded opinions, mostly coming from the scholars 
and some of private security professionals, who call for much more careful and 
restrained approach towards this sort of technical security omnipresence.   
The first and most important goal of private security is to prevent the security 
risk from happening, i.e., to insure security environment where all security risks, threats 
and endangerments could be detected and prevented from happening.  The private 
security could prevent security risks by using its various preventative strategies, 
measures and activities, which are mainly consisted of physical or technical security or 
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their combination.  Although there can be no ideal substitution for physical (manned) 
security, in terms of its capabilities to detect, survey and control the security risks, 
nevertheless, technical security can, in many cases, substitute or complement the 
physical security.  Considering the development of the private security so far, the 
technical security has proven to be quite helpful in prevention of different sorts of risks, 
threats and endangerments, especially those related with crime.  Thus, the science and 
practice of private security has introduced numerous and various technical strategies, 
methods and means, which have affirmed their preventive role, by carrying out different 
preventive functions, mainly seen in surveillance and control.  Also, the technical 
security has affirmed the so called proving function, which comprises the use of 
recorded materials in clarifying the crimes.  All these positive functions of technical 
private security, coupled with the fear of crime as one of the reasons for the abrupt 
growth of technical security, have justified the unprecedented growth and development 
of the whole private security industry in the last few decades.  So, nowadays, it is 
entirely normal and not unusual at all to be living in a security environment filled with 
sophisticated, numerous and various technical security systems and devices.  Among 
them, those who perform surveillance and control functions of prevention are dominant, 
such as technical systems and devices for video surveillance, alarm and access control.  
The practical need for technical private security has also been theoretically grounded 
within the theories of so called secondary or situational prevention, mostly associated 
with secondary crime prevention.     
However, we always have to keep in mind that there can be no ideal or absolute 
security, or, the tendency to attain maximum security always threatens some other 
human values, such as freedom.  This, in some cases, could even lead to heightened 
feeling of insecurity, sometimes more problematic than real insecurity (Спасески, 
Аслимоски, Герасимоски С, 2008: 41). Or, as Zygmunt Bauman wisely puts, the more 
freedom we enjoy the less secure we are and vice versa.  It seems that there has to be 
some kind of balance between them.  Sadly, the contemporary way of living is one filled 
with constant, numerous and latent security risks, which makes us prone to increasing 
use of different security services, mostly associated with private security, and, within it, 
with technical security.  This situation opens up a lot of dilemmas, predominantly 
ethical, social and human, since technical security systems, means and devices do not 
always follow strict legislation concerning the protection of privacy as they should 
(Даничиħ и Пилиповиħ, 2015: 211).  Also, we must not forget that toо much technology, 
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in one or another way, makes us more alienated and means fragmentation of our lives 
(Бауман, 2005: 338). We will try to give an overview of these dilemmas and concerns 
regarding the surveillance and control of technical private security and to give some 
answers and solutions on how they could be addressed and resolved. These dilemmas 
and concerns could be summarized within the following questions: 
• How much technical security do we need? 
• Is the omnipresence of technical security always indispensable? 
• Is the very presence of technical private security proof of insecurity? 
• Does the private security create fear of security? 
• Does the technical security industry maintain and incite the need for 
security? 
• Is it possible to find balance between freedom and security? 
• Where is the usage of technical private security justified? 
• Where the usage of technical private security could be reconsidered? 
 
 
2. Surveillance and control between panopticon, synopticon and 
banopticon  
 
In order to explain the nature of surveillance and control as crucial preventive 
functions of private security, we will discuss the three notions which will help us 
understand them better.  All, of them came from security and social sciences and were 
part of some of the most profound ideas that shaped security, sociological and 
philosophical thought in the last decades of previous and first decades of this century. 
These three notions are panopticon, synopticon and banopticon.   
The term panopticon was originally coined by British philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham, but was fully developed by the famous French philosopher and sociologist 
Michel Foucault.  The very term panopticon was actually a kind of prison, which was 
firstly invented and explained by Jeremy Bentham, in which he explained the different 
technology of imprisonment that this kind of prison offered compared to the previously 
known prisons.  The whole idea was that the punishment was shifted from the realm of 
physical punishment, to the realm of spiritual and social punishment.  And, it was much 
more than punishment.  The very essence of panopticon actually lied in the surveillance, 
control and power mechanism through which the discipline, control and power were 
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maintained and thus the prison authorities had full assurance that no prisoner would 
escape them.  The whole concept was developed around the technology of watching, 
based on the idea that the guardians could always see what the prisoners were doing, 
while they could not be sure at any time where they were being watched and controlled 
or not.  In other words, only watchers (guardians, surveyors) could watch others 
(prisoners), but, the others (prisoners) could not watch the watchers (guardians).  The 
panopticon worked as a kind of order where to see and to be seen were split apart; the 
prisoners were fully visible, but they could not see whether they were watched over, 
and, on a contrary, the guardians could see and watch over the prisoners knowing that 
the prisoners do not know about them (Фуко, 2004: 208).  Later on, Michel Foucault 
elaborated these ideas and used them to criticise the normalizing, hierarchical and 
disciplining mechanisms of modern state and society as being oppressive and effective 
way of getting obedience.  Panopticon relied on usage of natural (human) surveillance 
and control as powerful tools for disciplining the soul instead of disciplining the body.       
In the last decade of previous century, Danish political scientist Thomas 
Mathiesen, closely analysed the idea of panopticon, and subjected this notion to detail 
reconsideration, mainly within the context of the postmodern society.  He developed 
the notion of synopticon, or also called “the viewer’s society” (Mathiesen, 1997: 215-
232). Actually, he claimed that the surveillance and control do not work anymore as 
Bentham and Foucault suggested, but they were changed thanks to the new technical 
and technological developments in postmodern and globalized societies.  He uses the 
contemporary technical and technological achievements (such as Internet, mobile 
phones, reality TV shows etc.) and tries to explain in what way they are used as 
surveillance and control mechanisms.  Thus, says Mathiesen, unlike the panopticon who 
uses the power of threat and punishment and thus insures that the obedience will be 
attained, in synopticon the obedience is insured on a voluntary basis, simply with the 
help of forces of temptation and seduction.  In other words, the people voluntarily 
accept to be watched over and controlled, only because they want that.  They are driven 
by the seductive and tempting forces of sophisticated contemporary soft power 
technologies and technical devices. As Zygmunt Bauman insightfully adds, in 
panopticon, the few watch the many. In synopticon, the many watch the few.  In 
synopticon the people voluntarily and eagerly participate in their own watching and 
controlling, without been really aware of that.  The reality shows (so called Big Brother) 
or Facebook, are the most striking examples of synopticon, where we all enjoy watching 
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over other’s lives, but also enjoying our lives being watched over.  In synopticon, it 
seems that there is not a thing in our private lives that remains intimate.  Everything is 
at disposal, offered to the public and everybody enjoys this mutual surveillance and 
control game.  The final result of synopticon is that the separation of private and public 
life has been wiped out at a large extent (Köse, Han & Bakan, 2010: 525). 
Another brilliant social thinker, the French sociologist Didier Bigo, has 
introduced the notion of banopticon as another concept that should grasp the complex 
changing nature of surveillance and control (Bigo, 2006: 33-35).  He thinks of it as a 
concept that was directly created by the processes of individualization and privatisation 
within society. The term and notion of banopticon refer to surveillance and control as 
ways of insuring that only certain people are allowed to be part of certain secured 
environment, while the others are denied the access by using the surveillance and 
control mechanisms of contemporary technology.  In actual fact, the banopticon 
suggests banning something or prohibiting something or somebody from something 
and is about keeping people outside, instead of panopticon which implies keeping 
people inside.  Here, under this notion, we can recognize the technical private security 
and all surveillance and control that are being done by using various technical systems 
and devices, such as video surveillance, alarms and access control.  The surge of 
banopticon can be seen nowadays in the desperate need to feel safer, but, paradoxically 
enough, that is being happening simply because we are experiencing more and more 
freedom in our lives.  The so called open society has created so much freedom that 
reached the point where the infinite freedom of choice is felt as uncertainty and 
insecurity, and that is what throws the people back to reaffirmation of security instead 
of freedom, but this time, in terms of the negative globalization, as privatised security 
(Бауман, 2016: 11).  Banopticon serves quite a lot purposes, but the major purpose is 
commercial, such as with privatization of security services, private security and 
technical private security in specific.  It can be seen in establishing the so called gated 
communities both with natural and technical surveillance and control mechanisms; 
CCTV (closed circuit television) as complete technical system that constantly supervises 
and controls the secured areas and is used both as control, as well as proof in case of 
security events; the alarm systems that prohibit and signal every attempt of 
unauthorized entry inside the secured areas or places; and, access control systems, that 
use different technologies of validation of the right of entrance (such as coded locks, 
magnetic cards and biometrics), thus keeping those people who do not have the right of 
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entry out of that secured areas and places.  The existence of complex and detail 
technical devices and procedures at airport security is one striking example of how the 
surveillance, control and proof mechanisms of banopticon function in real life.  Detail 
and in some cases nerve-racking preventive procedures that imply use of metal 
detectors, X-rays, scanners and multiple controls, are reminders that we are living in an 
age of banopticon (Даничиħ и Пилиповиħ, 2011: 215; Jovanovič, 2008: 10). In order to 
ease understanding of the three concepts of surveillance and control explained above, 
we are giving a graphical representation of differences between panopticon, synopticon 
and banopticon in the graph no.1 below:  
 
                                                Few watch many             
Panopticon 
                                                                                                            Selected in          
    
                                                                            Many watch few                
Synopticon 
                                                                                                    Selected in and out        
 
 
                                                    Few watch many              
Banopticon   
                                                                                                               Selected out              
 
Graph No. 1. Graphical representation of differences between panopticon, synopticon 
and banopticon 
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3. Dilemmas about the role of private security in surveillance and control 
 
The private security sector (subsystem) and private security industry have 
reached a significant level of development and also have made vital contribution 
towards security within the last few decades.  Frankly speaking, the private security has 
become an all-present phenomenon (Бакрески, Даничиќ, Кешетовиќ, Митевски, 2015: 
50).  Considering Europe only, it reached total yearly turnover in 2013 of almost €35 
billion, which is a staggering fact of the development of a powerful industry (Co ESS, 
2013: 251).  Considering the main function of private security, the preventive function, 
we can undoubtedly conclude that private security exerts very positive influence in the 
overall societal effort of prevention, and due to its status and character, this 
contribution of the private security can be seen mostly in what is called secondary 
prevention, or, situational prevention.  This secondary prevention is to a great extent 
carried out through the technical private security, using the technical systems, means 
and devices of surveillance and control.  There are lot of studies and researches done 
within the couple of decades that confirm the contribution and positive preventive 
effects of technical private security and its mechanisms of surveillance and control.  
They can be seen mainly in some valuable contributions towards prevention and 
security, such as: increased secondary crime prevention, reduction of crime rates, 
fostering of cooperation between different security entities (such as private security 
entities and police), increase in crime control, increased usage of technical devices 
recordings as proof in criminal investigation processes and strengthening of mutual 
trust and to some extent feeling of security between people where technical security 
has been installed (Potokar & Androić, 2016: 160; Haggerty, Wilson & Smith, 2011: 231: 
237; Wakefield, 2005: 529-545; Hemsley, 2013: 229-238).  There are some studies which 
claim that electronic means used in technical security are also increasingly replacing 
informal social control (Koskela, 2003: 294).  Also, the studies and researches have 
shown greater success in implementation of technical private security when it was 
introduced through some projects within public-private security partnerships than when 
it was done separately (for instance, private security or police on their own). 
On a contrary to that, there is considerable body of scholars who view the 
contribution of private security and especially technical private security with scepticism 
and point out to some negative aspects of its wide usage and omnipresence.  They are 
especially criticizing the technical means of surveillance and control which can be both 
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used and abused, which could produce increase in feeling of insecurity instead of the 
opposite, which could not mean decrease in crime rates in every case of their usage, 
which can turn out to be used in abuse of power and in breaching of the privacy and the 
basic human rights and freedoms, particularly the freedom of movement.  We can see 
that some of the critics are being headed towards security issues, while some others 
are being headed towards certain ethical, humanistic, societal and even philosophical 
issues.  Thus, for instance, the renowned Norwegian theorist Lars Svendsen complains 
that “the point of the development of private security is that its market logic creates a 
need for security that goes beyond the actual need through sowing fear of the presence 
of new and more dangerous security risks. This leads to a constant increase in the 
resources of the private security industry, which when once absolved one are looking for 
other risk and fear of it and so it goes indefinitely, as long as it increases the economic 
benefit from the growth of the industry. Therefore, concludes Svendsen, the world has 
become preoccupied with ever new and more sophisticated methods, techniques, tools 
and measures for physical and technical security, whose application, especially in 
situational crime prevention experienced an unprecedented scale”.  He stresses the fact 
in Norway itself, the number of households that installed systems of technical security 
(video surveillance, access control or alarm systems) is extremely high and reaches over 
70% in some parts of the country, but that researches have not confirmed in full the 
justification of this massive usage of technical security. Svendsen, summarizing this 
issue ironically concludes that the alleged progress of modern society to create a safer 
social environment for living is seen in the fact that “the wall (meaning medieval walls 
erected to protect the medieval towns from threats) which is supposed to protect us 
from threats 'outside', has moved up to the walls of our homes". In addition, "alarms 
and security locks in our houses confirm the image of the dangerous world in which we 
live (Свендсен, 2010: 109)”.  
The British scholar Stephen Whattam believes that the researches conducted 
in Great Britain in this field show that in recent decades after applying the situational 
prevention of crime, especially through private security, in fact, the Great Britain 
became a place of heightened uncertainty, anxiety and fear of crime. Paradoxically, he 
sais, “the visible signs of security hardware (technical security) made considerable part 
of the people more frightened, and with a feeling that the higher level of security in 
certain place or area must indicate a higher security risk”.  The official statistics shows 
that between 1992 and 2000 there were 4.2 million security cameras installed in Great 
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Britain, which means one security camera was installed on every fourteenth British. 
Again paradoxically, “unprecedented growth of the private security industry cannot take 
place without, in one way or another, creating a need for security services many times 
greater than the actual needs. These needs are accompanied by fear of threats, which 
themselves represent the ‘industry of fear’”. The studies that were done, admits 
Whattam, do not dispute the fact that the introduction of techniques and measures of 
situational crime prevention through technical private security contributed to actual 
reduction of crime rates, and that they led to crime control, but also undeniably 
increased the fear of crime and insecurity. Common example frequently stated within 
this context, is the installing of video surveillance, which, when used as recorded 
evidence, contributes to the efficient identification, capture, conviction and 
imprisonment of the perpetrators, but when assessed through the possibility of 
immediate protection of people from physical assault, then proves useless, even on a 
contrary, reminds people of an unsafe place with high security risk and makes them feel 
insecure (Whattam, 2011: 1-52). 
The private security in Republic of Macedonia developed both in size and 
quality of services within the last two decades.  Technical private security, together with 
physical private security, is the most frequently used sort of private security by clients.  
According to the official statistical data, by the end of 2015 there were 38 private 
security entities that were registered for providing technical private security out of 112 
total registered private security entities (for physical security and private detective 
agencies), which employed 1134 persons  (Комора на Република Македонија за 
приватно обезбедување, 2016: 13).  Moreover, there are almost no clients who do not 
require technical private security within the contracts with the private security 
companies (agencies) or within their security services as part of the organizations 
(proprietary security).  The systems, means and devices installed within the technical 
security are various and can be found in various objects and even in public spaces.  The 
dilemmas that were mentioned could be stated in the case of technical private security 
in Republic of Macedonia, with some reserve considering the lesser usage of technical 
private security compared to some Western countries for example.  Nevertheless, we 
will try to point out to some sensitive questions and dilemmas concerning the 
surveillance and control function of private security in Republic of Macedonia.  
In most of the cases where we have private security in Republic of Macedonia, 
the physical and technical security are used together, but there are cases where only 
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technical private security has been provided.  Sophisticated technical security systems 
such as video surveillance, alarm systems and access control systems can be found both 
in economic entities (for instance in shopping malls, factories, hotels and restaurants, 
banks and savings banks etc.), as well as non-economic entities (for instance in cultural 
buildings such as museums, galleries, protected religious objects, archeological sites 
and so on, than in educational institutions, in healthcare institutions, public institutions 
such as municipality buildings, as well as public spaces such as streets, parks, squares 
etc.).  According to the Macedonian legislation, the usage of technical private security is 
regulated with provisions in the Law on private security, but considering the video 
surveillance, protection of personal data and privacy, the provisions from the Law on 
protection of personal data must also be observed (Бакрески, Герасимоски, Ванковска, 
Стојановски, Деаноска-Трендафилова, Славески, Кузев, 2014: 114-119; Комора на 
Република Македонија за приватно обезбедување, 2013: 19).  The places or areas 
must be clearly marked with signs that the areas or places are under video surveillance.  
But, in reality there are cases when this is not fully and consistently observed.  Namely, 
due to various reasons, sometimes there are no signs; in some cases they are not 
visible or have been worn, blurred or damaged and are unclear; in some other cases the 
signs have been put on wrong places and are not identifiable nor visible etc.  Also, there 
are cases where abuse of the data from video surveillance has been noted, which clearly 
indicate possible breach of privacy of clients or other persons.  The question of 
effectiveness of video recordings have been less questioned, compared with possible 
surveillance and control abuses that tackle or more seriously, endanger somebody’s 
privacy.  This is especially case when video surveillance has been installed in public 
spaces or on the border of private and public spaces.  Some complaints from clients and 
other people also go to unprofessional installation of technical devices of surveillance 
and control, thus causing breach of privacy (for instance, the camera of video 
surveillance partly overlooks neighbors’ courtyard besides the courtyard of the client 
who required camera or video surveillance). 
Another important issue referred to surveillance and control functions of 
technical security could be encompassed within the questions of how much technical 
security do we need and is there any criteria that could help us determine the optimal 
level of presence and usage of technical private security?  Not an easy questions to 
answer at all, even an intriguing and challenging ones.  But, nonetheless, it seems that 
we have to be strongly aware of the fact that too much technical private security 
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around us could bring us a lot more problems and could make our lives uneasy and 
much more stressful.  That is because of the absolved fact that it could create an 
atmosphere where everyone have to feel as potential offenders of deviance or crime, 
that could make the places and areas with over-surveillance and control suspicious in 
terms of security from the very start, it could also penetrate our right to privacy and at 
last, but not least important, it could mean an unjustified spending of money in an 
attempt to create an all-supervised society.  That is why, we have to consider the so 
called optimal level of technical private security and with that, the optimal level of 
surveillance and control that will prevent deviance and crime, and will not produce any 
undesired side effects, in terms of instigation of deviance and crime or increase in fear 
of crime, insecurity or any breach of right to privacy.  We believe, that the right thing to 
attain this is through implementation of comprehensive, thorough and science based 
risk assessment as part of wider risk management process, which has to be done every 
time prior to risk treatment and installation of any kind of technical private security 
systems, means and devices in certain areas or places (Фишер, Хелибозек и Грин, 2013: 
148-149).  Within that, we have to encourage the private security entities mostly, to 
seriously consider the necessity of implementation of scientifically based methods of 
risk assessment prior to bringing decisions concerning the need of technical private 
security, its scope and types of technical security systems, means and devices that have 
to be put in place.  This is a kind of must, both within the Republic of Macedonia and 
wider, since, especially in Republic of Macedonia, the private security entities rely 
heavily on personal experience rather than on usage of scientifically based methods of 
risk assessment prior to installation of technical private security.  Among many 
scientific methods that could be of use in risk assessment of technical private security 
usage, we could mention the integral method of risk assessment by Zoran Keković and 
its associates, Kinney method and AUVA method (Gerasimoski, 2016: 327-338; Кековиќ, 
Бакрески, Стефановски, Павловиќ, 2016: 190-197).                              
And finally, we come to the issue that also deserves our due attention, and that 
is the adequacy of usage of technical security surveillance and control functions within 
different areas, objects and institutions.  According to the experiences so far, we can 
say that the use of surveillance and control through technical private security has 
proven to be very useful and successful in crime prevention when applied in economic 
kind of institutions (such as manufacture, trade, tourism, finance and so on).  But, the 
real question is what about the adequacy when applied in non-economic kind of 
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institutions.  The answers here could be much more stratified and we cannot give so 
much positive answer.  In some cases, such as in securing healthcare, cultural and even 
some political and governing institutions, the technical private security has proved to 
be useful in crime prevention, reduction and control, so to say indispensible.  But when 
applied in some other institutions, primarily educational, it proved to be not so much 
adequate, since it contradicts some ethical, human and societal norms, as one recent 
study in Republic of Macedonia has shown (Ванковска, 2016: 45-46).  Namely, the 
educational institutions are expected to be environments in which primary prevention 
will be focus and that there’ll be no need for secondary and situational crime and risk 
prevention which is characteristic of private security. The private security deals with 
potential offenders and no one wants to see and treat the kids and youngsters as 
potential offenders. If it is so, than it shows the defeat of primary prevention policies 
and their substitution with secondary prevention policies can never give a desired 
effects.  On a contrary, they can even worse the situations and can develop a society 
where kids and young people will be treated as criminals from their young age. In these 
terms, the surveillance and control functions of technical private security can create an 
inadequate, artificial and potentially detrimental atmosphere for future development 
and maturation of pupils and students.  It could produce fear, unease feelings and 
wrong understanding of security and could even foster some types of deviant and 
criminal behavior.  In other words, if we are to apply the technical security measures 
and devices on children and youngsters, we are treating them as potentially deviant and 
crime suspects at the very beginning, or so to say, we are labeling them. To say the 
least, all of this is considered as inhuman, unethical and unsocial environment in which 
the socialization process has to be carried out.    
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The private security plays active role in carrying out of surveillance and control 
functions of prevention nowadays.  Though we can give a positive assessment of this 
role in general, there are also much grounded critics addressed mainly to some ethical, 
humanistic and social dilemmas that emerge due to the all-encompassing and 
inadequate use of technical systems, measures and devices, such as video surveillance, 
alarm systems and access control.  These dilemmas go louder and are more justified if 
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analysed within the paradigms of panopticon, synopticon and especially banopticon.  
The positive effects of surveillance and control functions of technical private security 
could be seen primarily in so called secondary and situational prevention strategies, 
measures and activities, which result in: reduction and control of crime rates, increased 
usage of technical devices’ recordings as proof in criminal investigation processes, 
fostering of cooperation between different security entities, and to some extent in 
increased feeling of security between people where technical security has been installed 
or decreased fear of crime, but only in certain cases.  On the other hand, criticism and 
negative attitudes are mainly seen in: breaching of the privacy and the basic human 
rights and freedoms (particularly the freedom of movement), increase of insecurity and 
fear of crime when technical security is being massively used without prior appropriate 
risk assessment, confirmation of the image of the dangerous world in which we live and 
inadequacy of technical private security when used in securing certain areas, places or 
institutions, such as in the educational institutions.  
In order to overcome the weaknesses of surveillance and control functions of 
technical private security, we believe that these recommendations could prove to be 
helpful in strengthening the strong and eliminating or reducing the weak sides of 
technical security: 
• Optimization of surveillance and control functions through installation of 
technical security only in areas, places and institutions where it is 
necessary and does not contradict some ethical, human or moral 
dilemmas; 
• Making out of risk assessment analysis based on usage of scientific 
method of risk analysis and adequate measures and activities of security 
treatment prior to implementation of technical security; 
• Consistent respect and implementation of the rules regarding 
installation, maintaining and use of technical security systems and 
devices; 
• Avoiding too much technical security in cases and situations when 
security can be reached using physical security or other primary 
prevention strategies, policies and measures, related to possible increase 
of fear of insecurity; 
• Balancing freedom and security in order to avoid the banopticon effect, 
only when this is possible and not at the detriment of minimal security.     
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Abstract 
 
This article presents an overview of the progress in implementing anti-
corruption framework in four candidate countries in Western Balkan: Albania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The objectives of this paper are to determine what 
are the main obstacles in implementing these reforms. 
Despite having made positive steps towards EU accession, these four candidate 
countries are still plagued by pervasive corruption and captured political systems. 
As the future of the EU becomes increasingly uncertain, Balkan leaders are 
more inclined than ever to push the limits of their authority while still vying for EU 
acceptance. If the downward trajectory of the past six years continues, this generation 
of Western Balkans rulers could potentially reverse the region’s democratic progress. As 
Western Balkan leaders take advantage of EU instability to increase their authority, 
they will continue to weaken democracy while continuing to seek EU membership. 
As a result, the region holds a very poor track record for prosecuting 
corruption, especially among high-level public officials. Even when such cases are 
investigated, they generally suffer long delays and often end in acquittals or result in 
light and inconsistent sentences. 
 
Key words: corruption, democracy, Western Balkans EU candidates, 
whistleblowing. 
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1. Introduction 
 
At the 2003 Thessaloniki summit, the European Council declared that the 
future of the Balkans is within the European Union. However, apart from Croatia that 
entered the EU in 2013, thirteen years after the Thessaloniki summit, Albania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia remain excluded with no foreseeable accession date 
in sight. The political messages coming from Brussels, which have largely been 
influenced by the perceived enlargement fatigue from inside the Union itself and the 
growing impact of Member States on the accession process, point to the conclusion 
that European integration of the Western Balkans is being slowed down rather than 
accelerated. 
In the latest edition of the Nations in Transit report presents a record of 
backsliding and stagnation in all key governance indicators across all the countries of 
the region (Nations in transit, 2015). While liberal democratic Western Balkan 
governments seem to identify with the EU, they often remain overshadowed by the high 
number of domestic formal and informal ‘gate keeper’ elites that continue to control 
the state in an effort to preserve their private economic interests and their grip on 
political power (Kmezic, 2014). 
In the Western Balkans the responsibility for investigating and prosecuting 
corruption is spread out among numerous judicial, law enforcement and anti-corruption 
bodies. The fragmentation of punitive functions across institutions is not problematic 
per se, as long as these institutions can operate free from undue political interference 
and are able to cooperate and coordinate activities effectively. Unfortunately, 
experience in the region demonstrates that this is not the case, making these bodies 
more susceptible to manipulation and less able to perform their functions. Key 
problems include institutional overlap in fighting and preventing corruption (Kosovo, 
Serbia, Turkey), limited cooperation between the prosecution and police (Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia) and regular infighting between key judicial and law 
enforcement actors (Albania, BiH). The region also suffers from widespread political 
interference in appointments, transfers and removals of judges, prosecutors and police, 
as well as unwarranted interference in the day to-day operation and decision-making 
processes of anti-corruption and judicial bodies. 
As a result, the region holds a very poor track record for prosecuting 
corruption, especially among high-level public officials. Even when such cases are 
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investigated, they generally suffer long delays and often end in acquittals or result in 
light and inconsistent sentences (Albania, BiH, Montenegro, Serbia). Indictments are 
often poorly written and inadequately investigated, while complex corruption cases are 
poorly understood by prosecutors and judges (Albania, Kosovo) (McDevitt, 2016). 
 
 
2. DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION 
 
The origin of ‘corruption’ comes from the Latin terms corruptus, or corrumpere 
which mean spoiled or break into pieces, accordingly. Corruption occurs at all levels of 
society and at all forms – public, private, locally, nationally and internationally. In an 
age of globalisation, transactions often transcend national boundaries, which increase 
the opportunities for corruption. Nonetheless, an international definition of ‘corruption’ 
does not exist, as this would raise legal and political complications. Consequently, 
different interpretations of ‘corruption’ are given by multiple jurisdictions according to 
their own cultural conceptions. 
OECD explains corruption as “the abuse of a public or private office for 
personal gain. The active or passive misuse of the powers of Public officials (appointed 
or elected) for private financial or other benefits” (OECD Glossaries, 2008). 
The World Bank defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private 
gain” (Bhargava, 2006). 
Transparency International (TI) defines it as the “misuse of entrusted power for 
private gain. It hurts everyone who depends on the integrity of people in a position of 
authority” (Transparency International). 
The genealogy of the definition of corruption in the European Union, as Patricia 
Szarek Mason demonstrated in her book is more complicated (Szarek-Mason, 2010). In 
1995, the European Parliament defined corruption as “the behaviour of persons with 
public or private responsibilities who fail to fulfil their duties because a financial or 
other advantage has been granted or directly or indirectly offered to them in return for 
actions or omissions in the course of their duties” (European Parliament, 1995). After, in 
1997, the definition was changed to “Any abuse of power or impropriety in the decision 
making process brought about by some undue inducement or benefit” (Commission of 
the European Communities, 1997).  In 2003, the European Union returned to the most 
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simple definition: ‘abuse of power for private gain’ and including thereby both the entire 
public and private sector” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003). 
 
Definition in Criminal Law 
The OECD, the Council of Europe and the UN Conventions do not define 
“corruption”. Instead they establish the offences for a range of corrupt behaviour. 
Hence, the OECD Convention establishes the offence of bribery of foreign public 
officials, (OECD, 2007) while the Council of Europe Convention establishes offences such 
as trading in influence, and bribing domestic and foreign public officials. In addition to 
these types of conduct, the mandatory provisions of the UN Convention also include 
embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official and 
obstruction of justice. The conventions therefore define international standards on the 
criminalisation of corruption by prescribing specific offences, rather than through a 
generic definition or offence of corruption.  
 
Definition for Policy Purposes 
On the other hand, international definitions of corruption for policy purposes 
are much more common. One frequently-used definition that covers a broad range of 
corrupt activities is the “abuse of public or private office for personal gain”. This 
definition can be a useful reference for policy development and awareness-raising, as 
well as for elaborating anti-corruption strategies, action plans and corruption 
prevention measures. Apart from this general definition, there are as many different 
definitions of corruption as there are manifestations of the problem itself. These 
definitions vary according to cultural, legal or other factors. Even within these 
definitions, there is no consensus about what specific acts should be included or 
excluded. 
For the further specification and definition of the term corruption is the paper 
are presented three behavior-focused definitions developed by Heidenheimer (2009) 
and that are standard in the current corruption and political science literature: market-
centered, public-interestcentered and public-office-centered definitions. Although, they 
are not completely clear-cut, they are intended to provide orientation in the field of 
corruption and allow researchers to identify its patterns from a comparative point of 
view (e.g. Johnston, 2001). 
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  Market-Centered Definitions 
From an economic perspective, market-centered definitions (or functionalistic 
definitions) focus on markets and view corruption as a non-legal instrument used by 
individuals or collective actors to influence politics and administration. Following a 
rational-choice logic, corruptive civil servants understand their positions to obtain 
maximum profits (Klitgaard, 1988). 
 
Public-Interested-Centered Definitions 
In contrast to market-centered definitions, public-interest-centered definitions 
address both the nature of corruption and its consequences and allow, thus, for broader 
interpretations (Johnston, 2001). They emphasize the moral aspect of corruption and 
take into account the harm done to the public by corruption. As a result, corruption is 
seen as an erosion of public interest. 
 
Public-Office-Centered Definitions 
Public-office-centered definitions are based on the bureaucratic ideal types of 
modern administration of and implies to its concept of public office. They describe 
corruption in terms of deviations from the norms to which professional office holders 
are usually bound. Here the standards defining abuse are the law or regulations that 
have the force of law. Proponents of these definitions suggest that laws in most 
countries are more precise and stable than public opinion or conceptions of public 
interest (Johnston, 2005). 
 
 
3. EU anti-corruption framework 
 
For a long time the European Union did not effectively combat corruption, as 
there was no legal ground and no rules to enforce. This changed with the launch of the 
set of anti-corruption criteria, entitled ‘The ten principles for improving the fight 
against corruption in acceding, candidate and other third countries’ which the 
Commission presented to the candidate countries in 2003. Moreover the European 
Commission developed a so-called anticorruption package, which came into place in July 
2006 and which consists of: (European Commission, 2011): 
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 - A Communication on fighting corruption in the EU, which presents the 
objectives of the EU Anti-Corruption Report and the practical aspects of its functioning. 
The Communication also explains how the EU should place greater emphasis on 
corruption in all relevant internal and external policies; 
 - A Commission Decision establishing this EU anti-corruption reporting 
mechanism; 
- A Report on the implementation of Council Framework Decision 
2003/568/JHA on combating corruption in the private sector; 
 - A Report on the modalities of EU participation in the Council of Europe 
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). 
The last point of the anti-corruption package is an important one: “Report on 
the modalities of EU participation in the Council of Europe Group of States against 
Corruption (GRECO)”. The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) was established 
in 1999 by the Council of Europe to monitor States’ compliance with the organization’s 
anti-corruption standards. Currently GRECO comprises 49 member states (48 European 
states and the US). “GRECO’s objective is to improve the capacity of its members to 
fight corruption by monitoring their compliance with Council of Europe anti-corruption 
standards through a dynamic process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure. It helps 
to identify deficiencies in national anti-corruption policies prompting the necessary 
legislative institutional and practical reforms” (Council of Europe). Besides the fact that 
the candidate countries have to comply with all documents in the anticorruption 
package, each candidate country has its own specially formalized requirements which it 
has to comply with. These requirements differ per country, because already existing 
legislation in place may differ from country to country. These requirements are stated 
and analyzed in the respective Progress Reports of every country. This is how the 
current EU framework for fighting corruption looks like. 
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Table 1: Summary of the Participation of Istanbul Action Plan Countries in Anti-
corruption Conventions (as of February 2007) /Other Members of the Anti-Corruption 
Network 
 OECD 
Convention 
on 
Combating 
Bribery of 
Foreign 
Public 
Officials in 
International 
Business 
Transactions 
Council of 
Europe 
Criminal 
Law 
Convention 
on 
Corruption 
United 
Nations 
Convention 
Against 
Corruption 
Council of 
Europe 
Convention 
on 
Laundering, 
Search, 
Seizure and 
Confiscation 
of Proceeds 
of Crime 
United 
Nations 
Convention 
on 
Transnational 
Organized 
Crime 
Albania  Ratified 19 
Jul. 2001. 
Entered 
into force 1 
July 2002 
Signed 18 
Dec. 2003. 
Ratified 25 
May 2006 
Ratified 31 
Oct. 2001. 
Entered 
into force 1 
Feb. 2002. 
Signed 12 
Dec. 2000. 
Ratified 21 
Aug. 2002. 
Macedonia  Ratified 28 
Jul. 1999. 
Entered 
into force 1 
Jul. 2002 
Signed 18 
Aug. 2005 
Ratified 19 
May 2000. 
Entered 
into force 1 
Sep. 2000 
Signed 12 
Dec. 2000. 
Ratified 12 
Jan. 2005 
Montenegro* 
As Serbia 
and 
Montenegro 
 Ratified 18 
Dec. 
2002*. 
Entered 
into force 
6 Jun. 
2006. 
Signed 11 
Dec. 2003. 
Ratified 20 
Dec. 2005* 
Ratified 9 
Oct. 2003*. 
Entered 
into force 6 
Jun. 2006. 
Signed 12 
Dec. 2000. 
Ratified 6 
Sep. 2001*. 
Serbia  Ratified 18 
Dec. 
2002*. 
Entered 
into force 1 
Apr. 2003. 
Signed 11 
Dec. 2003. 
Ratified 20 
Dec. 
2005*. 
Ratified 9 
Oct. 2003*. 
Entered 
into force 1 
Feb. 2004. 
Signed 12 
Dec. 2000. 
Ratified 6 
Sep. 2001*. 
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3.1. Whistleblowing as effective way to curb corruption 
 
Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia have all made superficial efforts 
to fight corruption and decrease authoritarianism. In reality, these facades merely 
improve their leaders’ international reputations without helping the lives of everyday 
citizens. Under present circumstances, these countries must explore alternative ways to 
meet EU accession criteria. One of the most effective ways to curb corruption and 
weaken authoritarian regimes is by encouraging whistleblowing. In situations where 
bribery and corruption are prevalent in private and public sectors, individuals must feel 
safe to report offenses they may witness.  
Successful whistleblowing often requires two main conditions: 
1. effective safeguarding legislation and 
2. widespread public education (Transparency International). 
 
As Agnes Batory explains, “whistleblower protection can also be considered as 
a way of influencing the cost–benefit calculus of individuals (whether public officials or 
ordinary citizens), to report corruption-related crimes[…] Rather than imposing a duty 
to report and punishing offenders, it tries to remove, or at least ameliorate, the 
negative consequences that would otherwise likely follow the decision to speak out” 
(Batory, 2012). For many potential whistleblowers, the choice to report corruption is not 
just one of morals or conviction. Whistleblowers often risk their careers, reputations, 
and even lives in order to expose wrongdoings, and it is up to legislators to make sure 
these individuals are protected. 
For EU candidate countries, enacting whistleblower protection laws is a 
tangible step towards decreasing corruption, thus helping those countries meet EU 
accession criteria. Chapter 23 of the EU Acquis states, “Member States must fight 
corruption effectively, as it represents a threat to the stability of democratic 
institutions and the rule of law. A solid legal framework and reliable institutions are 
required to underpin a coherent policy of prevention and deterrence of corruption” 
(European Union Conditions for Membership). The EU recognizes whistleblower 
protection as a key element of this deterrence. In their yearly assessments of candidate 
countries, EU officials take note of whether or not the country has passed whistleblower 
protection laws. Because of this, all four Western Balkan candidates have attempted to 
improve their whistleblower protection legislation, but these laws alone have yet to 
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create any meaningful culture change. In situations where whistleblower legislation has 
been passed, but not enforced, corruption can easily go unchecked. 
 
Table 2: Functions of the primary anti-corruption bodies in the Western Balkans 
Function Policy 
Coordination 
Prevention Education Political 
Finance 
Oversight 
Investigation Prosecution 
Albania: High 
Inspectorate 
for the 
Declaration 
and Audit of 
Assets and 
Conflicts of 
Interest 
(HIDAACI)   
No Yes Partially No No No 
Macedonia: 
State 
Commission 
for the 
Prevention of 
Corruption 
(SCPC) 
Yes Yes Yes No Partially No 
Montenegro: 
Agency for 
Prevention of 
Corruption 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Serbia: Anti-
Corruption 
Agency 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Partially No 
 
In the European Commission’s 2016 reports on all four Western Balkan 
candidate countries, they acknowledge progress in the realm of whistleblower 
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protection. Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia have all passed rudimentary 
whistleblower protection laws in the last two years. Serbia adopted a Whistleblower 
Protection Act in November 2014, Macedonia in November 2015, Montenegro in 
December 2015, and Albania in June 2016. Despite these advancements, the EU is still 
not happy with the region’s progress in decreasing corruption. In Albania, it was noted 
that “corruption remains prevalent in many areas and continues to be a serious 
problem” (European Commission, 2016). The Commission is not yet satisfied with 
Macedonia’s legislation, concluding that “substantial legal, institutional, and practical 
preparations are still needed for effective implementation of the law” (European 
Commission, Macedonia Report, 2016).  In Serbia, they saw “limited results from the 
implementation of adopted legislation”, (European Commission, Serbia Report, 2016) 
and in Montenegro, not only did the Commission report evidence of corruption, but they 
uncovered one case in which the Anti-Corruption Agency was criticized publicly for their 
reactive and contentious interpretation of the law (European Commission, 2016). As 
these reports illustrate, merely passing whistleblower protection laws is not sufficient. 
Although the EU reports did not explain whether this shortcoming is specifically the 
result of a law enforcement failure or lack of public education, it is presumably a 
combination of the two. Some individuals may argue that laws like this simply need 
time to create change, but positive change is unlikely to happen on its own considering 
the political situation in the Western Balkans.  Just like the leaders of these countries, 
the current whistleblower laws may appease EU stakeholders, but they are not doing 
enough to benefit the lives of citizens domestically. 
Given these four countries’ current regimes, it is unlikely that their 
governments will do much to ensure that whistleblower protection laws are effectively 
enforced. If the EU wants to prioritize candidate countries’ progress, then the European 
Commission should ensure that whistleblowers in the Balkans are adequately protected. 
Unfortunately, this may be a difficult feat, seeing as whistleblower protection is rarely 
enforced even within EU member states. There are no consistent whistleblower 
protection laws across member states, and many countries regulate whistleblowing 
simply through labor, commercial, or criminal law (Eisanen, Kaisa, 2016). This strategy 
may make sense for individual countries, but it creates confusion when examined 
holistically.  Additionally, EU institutions themselves lack necessary whistleblowing 
regulations. The European Parliament adopted their first internal whistleblower 
protection rules in January 2016, but these laws fail to protect MEP assistants- 
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individuals who would be best positioned to expose wrongdoings within the European 
Parliament (Hanot and Associates, 2016). If EU institutions expect candidate countries 
to protect whistleblowers, they should hold their members to the same standards. 
As Western Balkan leaders take advantage of EU instability to increase their 
authority, they will continue to weaken democracy while continuing to seek EU 
membership. Whistleblower protection laws are a key way to expose corruption in these 
regimes, but only if they are actually enforced. In order to ensure optimum EU 
expansion, EU authorities must hold member states and candidates alike to the highest 
standards of whistleblower protection. 
Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia are facing critical junctures in 
their political development. These four Western Balkan nations, all current EU 
candidates, have made efforts to adopt whistleblower protection laws, an important 
step towards curbing corruption in the region. However, these regulations are rarely 
enforced and have had little impact. If the EU is committed to keeping Balkan 
authoritarianism in check, it must ensure that candidate countries adequately 
implement these laws and make efforts to encourage whistleblowing. 
  
Table 3: Anti-Corruption Institutional Framework 
 Corruption 
Perception 
Index by 
Transparency 
International: 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(from -2,5 to 
+2,5), 
World 
Governance 
Indicators by 
World Bank: 
Control of 
Corruption 
(from -2,5 
to +2,5), 
World 
Governance 
Indicators 
by World 
Bank: 
Index of 
Economic 
Freedom 
by Heritage 
Foundation: 
Corruption 
(1=best, 
7=worst), 
Nations in 
Transit by 
Freedom 
House: 
Democracy 
Score 
(1=best, 
7=worst), 
Nations in 
Transit by 
Freedom 
House: 
Albania 36/100 
(2015) 
0,03 (2015) -0,44 (2015) 65.9/100 
(2016) 
5.25 (2016) 4.14 (2016) 
Macedonia 42/100 
(2015) 
+0,13 (2015) -0,13 (2015) 67.5/100 
(2016) 
4.50 (2016) 4.29 (2016) 
Montenegro 44/100 
(2015) 
+0,16 (2015) -0,09 
(2015) 
64.9/100 
(2016) 
5.00 (2016) 3.93 (2016) 
Serbia 40/100 
(2015) 
+0,11 (2015) -0,24 (2015) 62,1/100(2
016) 
4.25(2016) 3.75 (2016) 
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4. Albania 
 
In Albania, no type of corruption risk assessment is provided as mandatory or 
recommended by law, but a risk assessment methodology to be used by institutions 
was prepared under the PACA project funded by the European Union and implemented 
by the Council of Europe (Council of Europe, 2010). It includes the risk assessment 
overview and draft examples of documents, with the emphasis on several sectors with a 
high risk of corruption.  
Recommendations from these assessments have been reviewed by the 
competent Albanian institutions and are now part of the measures in the Action Plan 
against Corruption. There is no systematic and nation-wide CRA (Corruption risk 
assessment) approach in Albania yet, but the efforts can be seen also in this area. 
International organisations and external experts are of great help to Albania as regards 
the corruption risk assessment. As a result of their activity, a tailored CRA methodology 
was developed for Albania and some concrete corruption risk assessments were 
conducted in different fields or sectors. Therefore, Albania has rather good possibilities 
for integration of a nation-wide CRA model in the near future and it is encouraged to 
upgrade existent knowledge and experience. 
In Albania, the most important human rights problems were related to 
corruption in all branches of government, particularly in the judicial and health-care 
systems, but also in the field of media freedoms. 
Widespread corruption, many forms of pressure and intimidation, combined 
with limited resources sometimes prevented the judiciary from functioning 
independently and efficiently. Moreover, persons holding high-ranking positions such as 
politicians, judges, and those with powerful business interests often were able to avoid 
prosecution (European Western Balkans, State Department, 2017). 
According to recent assessments, some of the greatest challenges 
compromising the country’s integrity are the implementation gaps in its anti-corruption 
legal framework, the lack of judicial impartiality and low professionalism of its law 
enforcement. 
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5. Montenegro 
 
In Montenegro, integrity plans have been introduced as the main corruption 
risk assessment tool (Directorate for Anti-Corruption Initiative of Montenegro). As 
regards the legal basis for the introduction of the integrity plans, Article 68 of the 
amended Law on Civil Servants and State Employees from July 2011 provides for the 
obligation of the Montenegrin public administration to adopt an integrity plan, the 
obligation of the administration authority in charge of the anti-corruption activities to 
prepare guidelines and the obligation of the entities to determine a civil servant 
responsible for preparing and implementing the integrity plan. 
The Directorate for the Anti-Corruption Initiative (DACI) is a supervisory body 
for development, adoption and implementation of integrity plans. Its role is consultative 
and educational as it provides: 
-guidance regarding adoption of guidelines for developing integrity plans; 
-consulting and assistance in preparation of integrity plans; and 
-training and teaching the responsible persons on the creation and 
implementation of integrity plans. 
Integrity plan is seen as an internal and anti-corruption preventive measure as 
well as an institution’s internal anti-corruption document which contains a set of 
measures of legal and practical nature. It is aimed at preventing and eliminating the 
possibility of occurrence and development of different forms of corrupt behaviour within 
the authority as a whole, certain departments and individual positions. It comes as a 
result of selfassessment of the exposure of an authority to the risks of occurrence and 
development of corruption, 
illegal lobbying, conflict of interest and ethically and professionally unacceptable 
behaviour. 
Purpose of the integrity plan is raising awareness of the institution itself on: 
-weaknesses of the organization’s work processes; 
-the necessity to eliminate them; 
-means for their elimination. 
Furthermore, capacity of the organisation is improved to protect itself from 
possible impact of corruption on the performance of its primary and secondary activities 
(Selinšek, 2015).  
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Montenegro is in the phase of implementation of the system of integrity plans 
into the practice of Montenegrin public sector institutions. Integrity plans are well 
developed in theory (and very transparent); however, Montenegro is advised to monitor 
closely the practical implementation of this CRA model and to make further 
improvements based on the indentified issues. 
The main issue considering the state of human rights in the Western Balkans 
has also prevailed in Montenegro. Corruption was among the country’s most significant 
human rights problems. It was present in health care, education, and other branches of 
government, including law enforcement agencies and the courts. The process of 
appointing judges and prosecutors remained somewhat politicised (European Western 
Balkans, State Department, 2017). 
 
 
6. Serbia 
 
Serbia adopted the integrity plan as a major corruption risk assessment tool 
(Agency for Fight against Corruption of the Republic of Serbia). It is understood as a 
preventive anti-corruption measure. It is a document created as the result of a self-
appraisal of the risks the institution may be exposed to in relation to the incidence and 
development of corruption and the risks of unethical and professionally unacceptable 
behaviour. It constitutes a group of legal and practical measures planned and 
undertaken in order to eliminate corruption and to prevent opportunities for it within 
an organization (work or activity) as a whole, individual organizational units/parts and 
work places. 
Serbia has already managed to identify some important obstacles and the 
issues in the integrity plans implementation. The Serbian system of integrity plans is 
well outlined; however, Serbia is encouraged 
to properly address the identified issues (including the sanctions for noncompliance 
with the obligation to implement the quality integrity plan) and to strengthen the 
capacity of its Anti-Corruption Agency given that it is the crucial institution for the 
success of the selected corruption risk assessment approach. 
An inefficient judicial system that caused lengthy and delayed trials as well as 
long periods of pretrial detention adversely affected citizens’ access to justice. The 
report adds that the courts remained susceptible to corruption and political influence. 
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Despite the government saying that it is fighting the corruption, it still provides a lack 
of transparency (European Western Balkans, State Department, 2017). 
 
 
7. Macedonia 
 
The Republic of Macedonia’ became the 38th member state of the Council of 
Europe on 9 November 1995. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with 
the EU is signed on 9 April 2001 and entered into force on 1 April 2004. Macedonia 
become a member of the United Nations on 8 April 1993, member of the OSCE on 12 
October 1995, and has gained a status of EU candidate member state in 2005. 
During this period, successive governments have committed themselves to 
fighting corruption and organized crime and as result the country has signed and 
ratified most of the relevant international and European conventions against organized 
crime and corruption. 
The country is member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) 
since 2000. Key important instruments in the upgrading of the legislative framework 
for the fight against corruption are represented by the ratification of two Council of 
Europe conventions – the Criminal Law Convention against Corruption (1999), the Civil 
Law Convention against Corruption (2002) and the Additional Protocol of Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption (2005) (Nuredionska and Associates, 2014). In 2007 Republic 
of Macedonia has ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). 
In Republic of Macedonia, State Programme for Prevention and Repression of 
Corruption and State Programme for Prevention and Reduction of Conflict of Interests 
with Action Plans for the period 2011 – 2015 recognized the necessity of more efficient 
and systematized measures for prevention of corruption on the level of public 
administration institutions. As a response, the proposed draft amendments and 
addenda to the Law on Prevention of Corruption contain provisions organized in a new 
chapter – Integrity System, where the integrity system is defined as a sum of all 
policies, standards and procedures that are established in the institutions which also 
include corruption risk assessment and strategy for risk elimination. 
However, corruption risk assessment is not a stranger to the system of 
Macedonia given that it is a part of the risk assessment that is carried out in 
accordance with the Law on Public Internal Financial Control whereby the entities of 
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central and local governments are obliged to adopt the strategies for risk 
determination. 
Republic of Macedonia has recognized the corruption risk assessment as one of 
the instruments that is expected to improve corruption prevention in the public sector 
institutions. It also plans to introduce the concept of the integrity system through the 
amendments to the Law on Prevention of Corruption. Republic of Macedonia is 
encouraged to adopt the adequate legal basis for a nation-wide concept of integrity 
with the corruption risk assessment, taking into account the existing legal and 
institutional framework already in place (particularly the Law on Public Internal 
Financial Control). Within its practical implementation, good practices in (corruption) 
risk assessment already developed in certain public sector institutions should be also 
considered (Selinšek, 2015).  
The corruption is a spread phenomenon in the Republic of Macedonia. Even 
77% of the people expect that in their interaction with the public institutions they will 
face corruption. More than one fourth of the people were asked for some form of 
bribery and one in five people paid bribery or gave some gift or counter-service. 
The citizens of Macedonia show high level of tolerance towards the corruption 
– 45% of them tolerate this practice in some form. Furthermore, only 27% are not 
susceptible to corruption if they are in position to take advantage of such situation. 
Although these are very general observations we can still come up with 
recommendations relevant for the stakeholders in the fight against corruption. 
 
 
8. Recommendations as conclusion 
 
Considering how spread is this phenomenon, it is necessary to continuously 
monitor and measure the situation in order to assess whether the corruption is raising 
or declining. This goes for all corruption indices, especially those showing the 
involvement, pressure and identification of the corruption. 
The practical implementation of the existing legal framework is also a 
challenge. Moreover, all countries from the region, including Macedonia are lacking 
comprehensive national strategies with little, if any, national specifics in order to reflect 
national circumstances in the generation and manifestation of corruption. 
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Extensive corruption and the government’s failure to respect completely the 
rule of law further deteriorated the state of democracy. The judiciary failed to 
demonstrate independence and impartiality. The outcomes of many judicial actions 
appeared predetermined, particularly in cases where the defendants held views or took 
actions in opposition to the government. With judges subject to political influence and 
corruption, political interference, inefficiency, favouritism toward well-placed persons, 
corruption in judiciary seems pervasive (Southeast Europe Leadership for Development 
and Integrity (SELDI, 2014). 
Despite having made positive steps towards EU accession, these four candidate 
countries are still plagued by pervasive corruption and captured political systems.  Last 
year, Freedom House reported that democracy in the Balkans has declined for six years 
in a row, in contrast to the region’s steady increase in democracy scores from 2004 to 
2010. The Balkan sub-region’s average democracy score is now the exact same as it was 
in 2004. More specifically, analysts have criticized the leaders of Serbia, Macedonia, and 
Montenegro for exploiting the EU’s volatility, “trusting that its longing for stability will 
outweigh clear evidence of individual politicians and parties capturing the state to 
promote their own interests”. (Schenkkan, Nate, 2016). If the downward trajectory of the 
past six years continues, this generation of Western Balkans rulers could potentially 
reverse the region’s democratic progress. 
These are tasks not only for the NGO sector which independently monitors the 
progress in the fight against corruption, but also for the public institutions which 
should implement these types of surveys and research in order to identify the areas in 
which they are successful and the areas in which they need to invest resources for 
improvement. It is therefore necessary to continuously survey the clients of the public 
institutions in order to monitor the eventual increase of the pressure and the presence/ 
inclusion of the corruption when interacting with the institution. Dealing with high-level 
corruption cases will initiate reduction of the lower-level corruption and will in the same 
time demonstrate that the corruptive behavior does not pay off on longer term. It is 
one of the several ways on how to change the enrooted beliefs of the people which, in 
fact, determine the high level of tolerance and susceptibility towards corruption. Having 
this in mind the public institutions in charge of corruption control will have to “identify” 
their independence and initiate the investigation of highest-level corruption cases. 
(Slagjan Penev, 2015). 
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The difficulties to identify corruption are clear signal towards the public 
institutions for developing information context on the various corruption forms that will 
be easily accessible (physically or online) in the space where there is interaction 
between the servants/ officers and the clients. 
This should not be understood only as time-bound campaign but as a long-
term education of the servants/ officers and the clients. 
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Abstract 
 
In this paper are analyzed the research results of several battery questions for 
the assessments on the work of the police from 2008 to 2017.  It is about field 
researches, conducted in all mountain regions in the Republic of Macedonia, among 30 
and 40 municipalities.  The number of the correspondents ranged from 1032 in 2017 to 
1440 in 2011. (By years that is: in 2008 1163 correspondents, in 2009 1318 
correspondents, in 2010 1309 correspondents, in 2011 1404 correspondents, in 2012 
1240 correspondents, in 2013 1138 correspondents, in 2014 1167 correspondents, in 
2015 1016 correspondents, in 2016 1044 correspondents and in 2017 1032 
correspondents. The sample is structured as multi-staged and it belongs to the group 
of intentional samples.  The paper through longitudinal approach shows the variations 
of the citizens’ perceptions about the police, its relation with the citizens and the 
realization of the functions they perform in the society.  Some of the results indicate 
that among the citizens’ perceptions dominate the thinking that the police are 
instrumentalized by the governing party.  Namely, more than one third or 
approximately 36,86% of the correspondents had that opinion.  Also the proportions of 
the correspondents with that perception vary from 31,71% in 2013 to 41,09% in 2016.  
In this indicator framework belong the answers about the attitude of the police in the 
process of exercising the right to equality. Checked through the answer about 
selectivity in the police actions.  The citizens’ perceptions from 2009 to 2017 in average 
38,43% had a positive attitude, and 61.57% negative attitude. 
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The research results offer a certain indicator framework about the image of the 
police and their actions in the decade development which is a subject of interest of the 
researches. 
 
Key categories: police, public, confidentiality, image of the police, citizens 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The police and the police organization are subject of research for many 
disciplines and sciences. The modern sociological and politico logical approaches toward 
the police are focused on the fact that it is a distinct entity and it has its own tasks and 
authorities, organizational structure, staff, means and specifications that on one or 
another way are its diferentia specifica. By its position and functions it has an 
important role in the society and the exercise of those functions makes it in constant 
interaction with the society. If we have on mind the fact that the surrounding of the 
police system, grosso modo, consists of the global society in which the central part 
belongs to the most organized part of it- the state. More and more louder are the 
attitudes that ‘’the society shapes the function of the police, or that function in bottom 
line comes from the needs, the conditions and the relations in a certain society, as well 
as that once confirmed content of the police function changes along with the changes 
in the society’’ (Milosavljević, 1992).  
Today is almost impossible to be built a consensus about the term police and 
about the scope of the use of that term. It is about many approaches, concepts and 
definitions, or one multi-defining situation. For the analytic needs of the paper the 
police is defined as :’organizational and functional term, formal and material, strategic 
and dynamic, the police as a state body and public service’ (Milosavljević, 1992).The 
poitica science observes the police as a political rarity that has a monopoly over the 
legitimate physical violence realized by the help of the police as an executive body.  
Formaly speaking the police is based on the authorities, the organizational forms, the 
authority in the society, it is an organ that by prescribed by law security situations 
prevents all the behaviours that can lead to unwanted consequences. 
 Contrary to the formal, the material approach prioritizes the fundamental goal 
of the police as keeping the internal security; it is about a legitimate function that 
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serves as a practical operation of the brought regulatory rules in the society.  It is 
considered to be an integral part of the society which by adjusting to the modern and 
the democratic changes is especially cautious in the treatment of individual conflicting 
situations with the purpose of construction of optimum interactive relationships and 
gaining confidence by the citizens.  The police also can be determined as a state body, 
as a public service, which depends on the shaping of the organization of the society.  
That is why the police is defined as complex, specific and dynamic executive body of the 
government, which according to the legal powers is in charge for keeping the internal 
security of the society, through legitimate use of the means for force accompanied by 
the ethical principles of the duties and the responsibilities (Masleša, 1999), (Masleša, 
2008).  
 The term police in the broadest sense means a system of separate bodies of 
the internal management which in the realization of its tasks is equiped with 
institutional pressures.  In an objective sense the police has protective function toward 
the public order and menatility that allows it to realize its protective function.  In 
functional sense mainly it is accepted the dision of administrative and criminal police 
(Modly, Korajlić, 2002,p. 455) . 
 The interaction is reciprocal (Bayley, 2006, p. 159). It means that the police 
system manifests positive (or negative) impulses and initiatives towards the 
environment. In the first case, the police is the factor that creates a positive 
environment, creates order and certainty in the environment, i.e. it is the factor that 
allows and progresses the prosperity of the society. Conversely, in the second case, the 
police manifests as hindrance of developing social trends. In certain cases, it can occur 
as a deterrent to the development of society, instrument of the party interests and 
instrument for the preservation of social relations. For this part of the functioning of 
the police system in the society there are numerous examples in the history. 
Here we will remind that the interaction between the police system and the 
environment doesn’t happen just on a level of the global society but also locally on a 
level of distinct segment of the society, connected to the execution of the regular police 
tasks. It’s about acting in the environment which structurally and institutionally is a 
complex whole and has its marks. They can be of different nature, like: nationality, 
religion, age, gender, economic, political party or other structure. In that context belong 
the numerous and diverse organizations, institutions and social systems, which in one 
way or another are in constant interaction (Barsamian & Čomski, 2004), (Habermas 
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2012) (Milosavljević, 1992).  Observed from the angle of the social structure can be 
concluded that the social environment toward the police reflects in numerous complex 
shapes, in contradictory requirements and conditions that require complex procedures 
and actions. Such complex and numerous events, conditions and forms established 
specific relations between the police system and the individual segments of the social 
environment. The specific relations of interaction manifest themselves as separate 
influences followed by different intensity, content and meaning. Given account to 
intensity, content and meaning of influences as especially important areas of 
interaction of the police system and the social environment can then be allocated a 
certain dominant and distinctive form of relationship as the relationship of the police 
and:  
 
 а) the citizens;  
 b) distinct social and ethnic groups;  
 c) the media (Milosavljević, 1992). 
 
The history knows numerous experiences about the relations between the 
police and the citizens. There were periods when the police had, so to say, limitless 
powers. Then ruled the attitude that everything which is good for the welfare and the 
safety of its subjects is allowed and that the interest of the state is above everything.Or 
it was about the uncontrolled use use of force and the reigning principle of advisability 
over the principle of legality. The social changes in the foreground have stressed the 
requirements for freedom of action and making the  state intervention to what is 
necessary (Гаћиновић , 2012). Then it was developed the concept that the security 
should not rely on the police, but the citizens are the ones that have to organize their 
own safety and protection expressed through the emergence of self-help groups, night 
guards of citizens, the arms of the citizens for the protection of their own security, a 
broad notion of the right of self-defense and other experiences, which indicate that care 
is the property and duty of the citizens (Masleša, 2001). 
 But along with the development of the modern society and the emphasized 
role and the importance of the state, applied in the forms of the state intervention, 
affected the undertaking numerous tasks and the police function have transformed in 
institution that is the most organized and most efficient.  In such circumstances has 
been emphasized the social function, which means that the police in the society has 
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been organized for preventing disorder and violence in order to be set up control over 
the conflict between the weaker and the stronger.  The strengthening of the state and 
the police contributes the citizen to be seen as a subject of the relations with the public 
administration and on that ground to enjoy certain rights.  So the general political role 
of the citizen is getting changed.  The citizen is an active subject in the political system, 
who decides through elections who is going to for a government and who is going to 
control the administration (Bayley, 1996). 
 Such social conditions contribute the relations between the police and the 
citizens to get new shapes and contents. The police, conceptually looking, orient toward 
the demands and the needs of the citizens, toward respecting of the freedoms and the 
rights and its readiness to promptly react to those requests (Bayley, 1996). The political 
function is complex. It basically covers the contents of preventing and managing 
conflicts, the application of regulations, especially those that one way or another mean 
restriction of certain individual freedoms and rights of citizens (Grabosky, 2009). 
Component parts of these contents are also the application of the physical coercion on 
behalf of the state against the entities that violate the law. Among the citizens there 
are such who consider themselves "prospects police" or have that been, and the officers 
for many are "bad co-news" and "visible reminder of the dark and repulsive side of the 
human behavior" (Milosavljević, 1992). 
 We should have on mind that the police have always been an epitome of 
powerful organization and the police officer of person with delegated right for arresting 
and even use of indirect force against the citizens (Crank, Murray, Irlbeck, & 
Sundermeier, 2011).  Of course, there are some misunderstandings especially when the 
police officers forget their true goal and the legal dimensions of its authorities.  The 
manifested shape of this kind of behavior is the emphasized reliance on the strength 
and in practices every citizen to be seen as potential criminal. That creates practices of 
unequal usage of the law.  The public is especially sensitive to the cases of unequal 
treatment by the police to certain categories of citizens, especially to the vulnerable 
categories (homeless, LGBT), sexual and other minorities, people with different political 
belonging etc. Here we come to two contradictions according to which the police 
organization sometimes more sometimes less successfully endeavors and acts as a 
closed system, conceal their weaknesses and does not address the courts to the public 
about its activities, especially those opinions which emphasize inadequate treatment 
and errors in its work. (Masleša, 1999) It is about the traditional model of police, 
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according to which it is not trying to establish closer relations with the citizens and the 
public (Held & McGrew, 2010). This attitude, as you can assume has a negative impact 
on the relations between the police and the citizens. These relations are generally 
satisfactory, sometimes solid. The perceived weaknesses of poor relations with the 
public are presented in the form of mutual mistrust, passive attitude of citizens toward 
crime events in their environment and failing to provide assistance to the police, then 
expressed criticism of the police, to manifestations of intolerance, open antagonism or 
to cases of conflict with the police. 
 The experiences show that in the whole functioning of the police, especially in 
its realization of the main tasks, can hardly be achieved more important success or be 
created efficiency in the acting if the police doesn’t have respect, support, collaboration 
and help from the citizens.  We should underline that the success of the police 
nowadays can’t be measured only by the number of solved criminal acts and undertaken 
actions, but also by how positive are its relations with the citizens. (Maljević, Datzer, 
Muratbegović, & Budimlić, 2006). That is particularly important to be stressed because 
in the divided societies, such as the Macedonian, it is crucial for the police to impose 
itself as a protector of the human rights, not as a government service or service of 
political and party nomenclature (Ideološki i politički konflikti (Osvrt na kulturu 
dijaloga), 2011). 
 The area of the relations of the police with the citizens has many mutually 
conditioned components.  The most important are : ‘(1) the relation to the citizens as 
users of the services and subject with personal rights and freedoms (human relations), 
(2) the relation to the citizens as subjects of the social control and collaborators of the 
police in its work and (3) the relation to the citizens as factor of the public opinion 
(public relations)’ (Milosavljević, 1992) 
 The research results that are subject of analysis refer to the attitude of the 
police toward the citizens as a factor of the public opinion, or how the citizens perceive 
the work of the police? Indirectly it should be given an answer to the question if and 
how the police manages to open itself to the citizens, or if the approach and the 
organization of the police has expected and most usually positive effect?  Actually, it is 
about the contents that include the activities of the police that aim to ensure the 
public is adequately to accept their action, i.e. to contribute towards the building and 
maintenance of the desired opinion about the police in public. It means, the police in 
the public should enjoy the reputation, respect and trust, and its activity enjoys 
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acceptance and approval. The realization of this goal is directly related to the question 
of the legitimacy of the police, i.e. with the positive attitude of the majority of the 
public towards the role and authority of the police. So, it should goal towards that the 
majority of the citizens to understand the role of the police and accept it as an 
important prerequisite for the personal and property safety, free life and work in the 
community and a factor for peace-building and common life in the society 
(Mirosavljević, 2006). 
 The main characteristic of the modern police working is the idea that the police 
and the citizens are working on achieving the common goals - safe and secure 
community lives. To affirm their successes and to strengthen the trust among the 
citizens, the police should constantly work on the approving by the public. A 
prerequisite for obtaining public support is the publicity in policing and fostering the 
communication and the mutual understanding between the police and the citizens. 
 
 
Methods and instruments 
 
 About what is like the perception of the citizens about the police we will 
present the results of the survey conducted on the territory of Republic of Macedonia in 
the period 2008-2017.  It is a field research, conducted in all mountain regions in the 
Republic of Macedonia, among 30 and 40 municipalities. The number of the 
correspondents ranged from 1032 in 2017 to 1440 in 2011. (By years that is: in 2008 
1163 correspondents, in 2009 1318 correspondents, in 2010 1309 correspondents, in 
2011 1404 correspondents, in 2012 1240 correspondents, in 2013 1138 correspondents, 
in 2014 1167 correspondents, in 2015 1016 correspondents, in 2016 1044 
correspondents and in 2017 1032 correspondents. The sample is structured as multi-
staged and it belongs to the group of intentional samples. (Mojanoski, 2015).  It is 
constructed by choosing municipalities in every mountain region that will later be a 
subject of the field activity.  In every inhabited place was constructed an urban or rural 
core and was chosen the principle of moving on the right side.  Every fifth family was 
visited in the individual places, or every 20th in the collective buildings.  The choice of 
the interviewee is based on the principle the closest birthday of an adult person living 
at that address. The instrument according to the method of filling is a structured 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
712 
interview. Each researcher is keeping a diary (Mojanoski C. T., 2012). The survey was 
conducted every year in the period from January 8 to 20. 
The instrument is constructed in a form of socio-demographic survey with certain sets 
of battery questions of closed type with answers from the Likerts scale (from I don’t 
agree at all to I fully agree and I cannot estimate), then battery of questions with 
dichotomy answers, questions with more choices and open questions.  Subject of this 
paper will be the questions regarding the perceptions of the citizens about the work of 
the police and its attitude toward them.  
 
 
Results and discussion  
 
The debate is directed to the actualization of certain dimensions of the 
research results for the attitude of the police towards the citizens as a stakeholder in 
the public opinion, i.e. how the citizens perceive the work of the police? In the analysis 
the previously was defined the question associated with whether the respondents had 
contact with the police? The answers to this question are the indicator that creates the 
assumption or may reference the fact that the views expressed by individual questions 
can be based on the empirical experiences of the respondent or, they more or less are 
results of the notions of the social reality. 
 
Figure 1 Have you had a contact with the police so far? 
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From the graphical view (Figure 1) can be seen that the respondents, or the 
citizens, that it moves within the framework of four fifths in 2008, to more than a half 
in 2009. It is specific that 64,93% or almost two thirds of the respondents said that 
they had a contact with the police. The answer is consequence of the insufficient 
specifies of the question on one hand, but also that in the services of the police were 
found a considerable number of services associated with the issuance of personal, 
traffic and other documents that are necessary for unimpeded traffic of the individual in 
society. 
 We should also keep in mind that in this period was carried out a change of the 
personal documents, especially in 2008 and 2009, when a significant part of the 
citizens were directed towards the state authorities, in particular to the services, even 
though they organizationally belonged to other organs of the administration, they, 
because of the longstanding practice were linked with the bodies of internal affairs, 
which more or less was perceived as "police".  
In the analysis we are not really interested in, whether and how the citizens are 
directed towards the Police station. The answers to these questions can be treated as 
indicators of how this form of organization and the police action is perceived as a 
structure that the citizen believes in and is willing to address to. 
 
Figure 2 Have you in the past three months attended a Police Station? 
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This question has been included in the research since 2009 when it was done a 
revision and amendment of the gathering data instrument.  From the graphical view it 
can be concluded that in 2009 a significant number of respondents had confirmative 
answer.  Such a deviation of the answer in 2009 compared to the other can be a result 
of the need for getting a form of help or information about the way of solving question 
related to personal and other documents. 
About the image of the police among the citizens the analysis will be based on 
several indicators. But first, please answer the question: whether the contact with the 
police contributes to change your attitude to the police? 
 
Table 1 „19. Whether the contact with the police contributes to change your attitude to  
the police? 
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
yes 52,39 50,79 35,40 38,50 37,52 45,52 43,26 38,40 34,29 32,56 
no 47,61 49,21 64,60 61,50 62,48 54,48 56,74 61,60 65,71 67,44 
 
100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 
 
The affirmative answers to this question show that they are rating from 52,39% 
in 2008 to 32,56% in 2017 year. On what is based this position? The answer is more 
complex. In addition, we will mention a number of answers to the questions whose 
function is to offer indicatory framework for the building of the paragraph or the 
offering of one of the possible answers. We will observe that through the two options. 
The first that "the police serves exclusively to the governing party", and the second 
"The police are unfairly criticized for the closeness with the ruling party". 
 
Таble 2 30.12. The police serves exclusively to the governing party 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
No 63,46 61,41 63,26 62,45 68,29 63,68 63,68 58,91 63,08 
Yes 36,54 38,59 36,74 37,55 31,71 36,32 36,32 41,09 36,92 
Total 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 
 
The answer to this question shows dynamic that goes from 31,71% in 2013 to 
41,09% in 2016.  It is visible that more than one third or approximately 36,86% of the 
respondents yearly think that the police is instrument of the governing party.  Does this 
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type of attitude can be treated as an indicator of the politicization of the police?  The 
answer will be seek through analysis of a different attitude that has a function of a 
controller of the previous.  Namely, in the same research the citizens were asked to 
express their degree of agreement with the attitude that "the Police are unfairly 
criticized for the closeness with the ruling party". The answers of this question (which 
also are measured from 2009) are given in the following table. 
 
Table 3 30.15.The police is unfairly criticized for its closenest with the governing party  
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
1 I don’t 
agree at all 9,31 8,49 10,86 8,10 8,47 14,58 8,56 12,45 9,40 
2 I don’t 
agree 24,89 24,10 25,12 26,80 26,38 27,19 27,07 27,49 27,91 
3 I can’t 
rate 40,46 40,78 37,37 38,62 36,01 27,62 42,42 34,29 39,24 
4 I agree 18,93 20,89 19,49 20,24 22,73 20,75 17,03 19,16 17,54 
5 I fully 
agree 6,41 5,74 7,17 6,23 6,42 9,86 4,92 6,61 5,91 
Total 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 
 
The distribution of the answers shows that in the past period approximately 
26,23% of the respondents have agreed with the attitude that the police is unfairly 
criticized, 36,35 don’t agree and 37,42% have undefined attitude or they say that they 
can’t rate it.  The positive answers in Table 2 and the negative answers in Table 3 are 
almost identical. 
To this indicatory framework we will add the answers of the question what is 
the attitude of the police in the realization of the right to equality.  We will illustrate 
that claim through the answer about the selectivity as a characteristic.  From the 
answers’ distribution from 2009 to 2017 we can conclude that 38,43% of the 
respondents have positive and 61,57% negative attitude. 
 
Table 4 30.13.The police arrests selectively 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
No   59,79 60,61 60,39 61,67 68,09 61,81 61,71 58,24 61,82 
Yes   40,21 39,39 39,61 38,33 31,91 38,19 38,29 41,76 38,18 
Total 
 
100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
716 
If we look at the dynamic of the positive answers in 2010 it declines for -2,04% 
in relation to 2009, in the next year it increases for 0,56%,  in 2011 declines for -3,23% 
and during the next two years it keeps the tendency for 0,26% and 9,06%, and in 2017 
that number declines to -8,57% in relation to 2016.  The most elementary analysis 
indicates that in the notions of citizens on the work of the police, the impact have the 
events and the proceedings of the police, especially for certain events such as is for 
example the case with the events in the country after the events in the parliament 
during the adoption of the budget and the work and the removal of deputies from the 
hall. That event caused a particular media attention and was the subject of a serious 
and fierce partisan and media calculation, which more or less influenced the shaping of 
the awareness and attitudes towards the police and police work. Also here you need to 
have and incident cases of unequal access and speed in solving the problems connected 
with the events and individuals in the society. In this context, the illustrative are the 
data presented in the Table 5. 
 
Table 5 30.14. The police arrests only those who are not close to the governing party 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
No 66,18 65,49 70,40 71,88 74,11 69,45 73,23 68,97 68,70 
Yes 33,82 34,51 29,60 28,12 25,89 30,55 26,77 31,03 31,30 
Total 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 
 
Namely, approximately 30,18% of the respondents in the past nine years had 
the attitude that the police arrests only those who are not close to the governing party, 
which along with the previous attitude that arrests selectively show difference of 8% 
approximately.  The both data refer to the fact that during the police actions there is a 
certain number of acts and contents that are not sufficiently convincing and do not talk 
about the professional status and access to the police. Actually it comes to perceptions 
that more or less are under the pressure of the media presentation of events, but also 
insufficiently clear and transparent terms of police and law enforcement structures to 
the public. This is about perceptions that are complex of legal and moral obligations 
and responsibilities of the police with regard to the proper performance of its duties, 
respect for human dignity and respect for all citizens and their freedoms and rights. 
Also, we need to have on mind that the attitude of the police toward the 
citizens is in complexed relations of the society and the struggle against the criminal 
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and corruption, and the lack of more visible results from the citizens’ tries to be 
partners in the care for the community.  In that role the citizens can contribute to the 
security of the community and by that to the whole exercise of the police tasks 
(Mojanoski, 2011).  From the research results can be seen tendencies that there is a lack 
of willingness of citizens for timely reporting to the police, especially in cases of 
detecting anything suspicious in their neighborhood, while providing necessary 
information to the police and willingness to testify in court, and taking measures for 
personal reliability and security of their property, especially for participation in 
programs and activities to improve safety, protect the citizens themselves in the youth 
and children. We should mention that it is the resultant reduction of the concept of 
community policing media project in which certain institutions, as well as senior 
managers in police appear in the role of "charity" and teach foreigners or citizens of the 
dangers of certain activities. In that sense, no lag and various councils and other bodies 
whose task is to develop relationships and establish partnerships with institutions and 
individuals tasked with safety concerns and unimpeded life in the community. This 
means that the activities are directed towards the prevention and suppression of crime 
on the provision of the public order and peace. Despite the undeniable importance of 
such achievements and resources, the citizens are the main actors of the prevention of 
crime, and an important factor in the cognition about committed crimes, and often in 
their disclosure (Milosavljević, 1992). 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 The so far analysis shows that in the perceptions of the citizens dominate 
certain attitudes attitudes which more or less mirror the social relations in the 
timeframe in which is conducted research. They are only an indicator of the notions and 
sections of the awareness in civility for the position and the relation of the police 
towards them. We need to keep in mind that on the formation of the public trust in the 
police has stakeholders who are not directly onto associated with the degree of 
integrity of the police towards the citizens. It especially affects the general conditions 
with corruption, but with the image of how it effectively performs the tasks in its 
combat, then the characteristics of the social structure, cultural traditions, the 
relationship of the citizens according to the norms, especially the law and the legal 
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consciousness and a special capacity of the institutions of government and the manner 
of the exercise of their functions. All the listed factors influence on the attitude of the 
citizens towards the police and for their trust towards her. 
The research results point to the fact that the police should set more concrete 
and realistic goals in terms of aspiration to gain the trust of the citizens, to win the 
favor of the public behind him and to the promotion of common interests: the better 
security of citizens and their property and fewer problems in the area of maintenance of 
public order and peace. In such cases, the critics of the public to the police or to the 
exercise of police functions in the society will be aimed at strengthening relations with 
the community. Police leadership and police are more oriented towards avoiding actions 
and behaviors that are typical of any democratic community. 
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Abstract 
 
Although corruption is often mentioned as a key factor in human trafficking, so 
far only a few studies have challenged the lack of data available in this field to dig into 
the relationship between these interrelated crimes. This paper carries out an analysis of 
real cases of trafficking-related corruption in Europe, which had been reported in 
academic sources as well as various institutional documents, in order to offer an 
overview of the various patterns of this phenomenon. This analysis shows that 
corruption can reach public officials in different positions, be used in every stage of the 
trafficking process, and in every kind of exploitation. Subsequently, the paper briefly 
examines the main legislative and institutional measures for combatting this specific 
form of criminality at the international and European level. It is important to highlight 
the role of the Programme against Corruption and Organised Crime in South-eastern 
Europe (PACO), created by the Council of Europe, which pioneered the elaboration of 
proposals to address this specific problem. Overall, both the analysis of the patterns of 
public officials’ involvement in human trafficking as well as the response to this crime 
serve as a basis to consider the convenience of approaching trafficking-related 
corruption as a challenge to security.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Although the first measures against human trafficking date back to the 19th 
century and the fight against the so-called “white slavery traffic”, it was not until recent 
years that an internationally accepted definition of this crime was reached. The Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
adopted on 15 November 2000245, defines human trafficking as a process that requires 
three elements: act, means and purpose. The act can be the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons. The means are threats, the 
use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or 
of a position of vulnerability, or giving or receiving payments or benefits to achieve the 
consent of one person having control over another. The purpose is the exploitation of 
the person, including, at least, sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.246 Since the adoption of 
the Palermo Protocol, many countries have modified their national legislations to 
implement this and other supranational anti-trafficking instruments. Human trafficking 
has also become a matter of growing importance in academic literature. However, the 
challenge of putting an end to what has been described as “modern slavery” still 
remains (or perhaps is even growing). 
When trying to identify the key factors that contribute to the existence of 
human trafficking, governmental corruption is often mentioned as a relevant predictor, 
together with other macro-level conditions such as poverty and the lack of economic 
opportunities (Bales, 2005; Zhang & Pineda, 2008). So far only a few studies have 
challenged the lack of data available in this field to dig into the relationship between 
these interrelated crimes. Most of them have tried to confirm the hypothesis that 
corruption impedes the correct implementation of anti-trafficking strategies and 
                                                          
245 Hereinafter referred to as “Palermo Protocol” and “UNTOC” respectively.  
246 It is necessary to clarify that, although the definition of human trafficking provided by the 
Palermo Protocol has served as the basis for European and national anti-trafficking instruments, 
this initial concept has been expanded. For instance, Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and 
combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims adds the exchange or transfer 
of control over persons among the actions of human trafficking; and the exploitation of criminal 
activities and begging to the types of exploitation foreseen in the Palermo Protocol. 
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facilitates trafficking by finding correlations between levels of perceived corruption and 
the extent to which a country makes efforts to combat trafficking (Liday, 2001; Van Dijk 
& Van Mierlo, 2011; Cho, Dreher & Neumayer, 2014). These analyses tried to show that 
those countries that are seen as more corrupt are also those that have lower levels of 
compliance with international anti-trafficking policies, and vice versa. 
This paper illustrates the links between those crimes from a different 
perspective, by means of reported experiences of trafficking-related corruption in 
Europe, particularly in South-Eastern countries. It is important to clarify from the 
beginning that this study is not suggesting by any means that corruption is prevalent 
or that it exclusively affects this region. Most public officials carry out their tasks 
following the rule of law. However, even if they are a minority, trafficking-related 
corruption cases have been reported in many countries within and outside Europe. The 
analysis and classification of data on these cases helps to offer an overview of their 
diversity and complexity. After describing the general patterns of public officials’ 
involvement in human trafficking, this paper studies the main legislative and 
institutional measures on this issue at the international and European level. In this 
section, the proposals for combatting this specific form of criminality suggested by the 
Programme against Corruption and Organised Crime in South-eastern Europe (PACO), 
created by the Council of Europe, are subject to special attention. Finally, this paper 
addresses the convenience of dealing with trafficking-related corruption as a threat to 
national and/or human security.  
 
 
2. EXPERIENCES OF TRAFFICKING-RELATED CORRUPTION IN SOUTH-
EASTERN EUROPE 
 
2.1. Sources and methodology 
 
In order to give an overview of the different patterns of trafficking-related 
corruption in South-Eastern Europe, a wide range of academic literature and 
institutional reports have been analysed so as to gather together and classify all the 
data available for this purpose. It is important to note that the collection of data on 
trafficking-related corruption is very limited all over the world. Most reporting 
mechanisms “routinely fail to mention the link between public corruption and human 
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trafficking” (Kendall, 2011, 40), and only a few governments study the problem (Gounev 
& Bezlov, 2010, 33), despite its importance. For this reason, specific reports on cases 
going to court and leading to conviction are very rare. However, in spite of these 
difficulties, it is possible to collect some data through studies on human trafficking that 
do mention corruption, even if it is only tangentially.  
One of the analysed sources is the report released by the so-called “PACO 
Networking” project, launched in 2001 by the Council of Europe, as an activity under the 
PACO Programme against Corruption and Organised Crime in South-eastern Europe. 
Among the various activities organised within the PACO Networking project, a regional 
seminar was held from 19 to 22 June 2002 in Portoroz, Slovenia, in which the specific 
problem of corruption in connection with trafficking in human beings was addressed. 
Representatives of anti-trafficking organisations provided information on corruption 
related to trafficking on each of the participating countries: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, and Macedonia, 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro since 2003). 
Another source that expressly addresses trafficking-related corruption is the 
United States Department of State Annual Report on Human Trafficking (TIP Report), 
which assesses countries’ efforts to combat human trafficking by evaluating the extent 
to which each country’s policies comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
(TVPA). The TIP Report places countries into one of three categories: Tier 1 States, 
which met minimum anti-trafficking standards; Tier 2 States which did not meet such 
standards, but were taking active steps to do so; and Tier 3 States which neither met 
such standards, nor were taking active steps to do so. Precisely, official complicity in 
human trafficking is one of the factors considered to determine if a country is placed in 
Tier 3. 
Cases of trafficking-related corruption in the area of study were also disclosed 
in other sources such as country reports by the special rapporteur on trafficking in 
persons, academic literature on corruption and organised crime, and reports by various 
institutions like the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime, DCAF Brussels and 
Transparency International, among others.  
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2.2. Results 
 
The analysis of the data contributes to the confirmation of the hypothesis held 
by previous studies: corruption and human trafficking are closely related. It is necessary 
to avoid generalisations and assume that all (or even the majority) of public officials are 
corrupt, but it is also important to identify areas presenting opportunities for 
corruption. The reported experiences show that corruption can be present in every 
stage of the trafficking chain: recruitment, transportation and exploitation. Corruption 
was also reported to be used in trafficking for different types of exploitation: sexual, 
labour exploitation or “newer” modalities, such as exploitation in begging or in criminal 
activities. Moreover, the collected data illustrate how opportunities for corruption may 
arise not only during the commission of the crime, in the trafficking chain, but also in 
the criminal justice chain, and in the protection and support to victims. 
In order to provide a more precise picture of the different modalities of 
trafficking-related corruption. The collected data has been classified into the following 
categories: 
1. Corruption of migration and border authorities 
2. Police corruption 
3. Administrative corruption 
4. Corruption at embassies 
5. Judicial corruption 
6. Political corruption 
 
2.2.1. Corruption of migration, border and consular authorities.  
Perhaps the most obvious example of trafficking-related corruption is that of 
border guards who are solicited to turn a blind eye to improper documentation or to 
avoid scrupulous checking of vehicles holding victims. In Europe, the removal of 
controls over internal borders as a consequence of Schengen and the strengthening of 
migration policies, has increased the need for corruption to allow human trafficking at 
the external borders of the EU. Thus, although in some countries the need to bribe 
migration, border and consular authorities to obtain forged identification documents or 
visas under false grounds has been reduced, corruption is still an important modus 
operandi for trafficking people from East Europe, Africa and Asia (Rusev, 2013). 
Transparency international (TI) has reported the existence of several cases involving 
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high-level officials at embassies found to be issuing numerous visas to organised crime 
networks in return for payments (TI, 2011). For instance, in 2015, a Bosnian consular 
official, based in Paris, was charged with sustained abuse of position for issuing travel 
documents to facilitate the movement of potential labor trafficking victims in exchange 
for money (TIP, 2016). In Kosovo, several public officials, including in the Ministries of 
the Interior, Social Affairs and Labour, and Commerce and Industry were investigated 
for visa fraud rings (TIP, 2015). Moreover, allegations of border guards’ involvement in 
human trafficking were also reported in Moldova (Kara, 2010).  
 
2.2.2. Police corruption 
The majority of trafficking-related corruption cases involved police officers 
(PACO, 2002; Special Rapporteur, 2005; Gounev & Bezlov, 2010; Antonopoulos & 
Tagaroy, 2012; Rusev, 2013; TIP 2015; TIP 2016). Several reports include cases of police 
officers turning a blind eye to places where exploitation is taking place. The PACO 
project informed of situations like this in Bosnia and Croatia (2002). In other occasions, 
authorities may obstruct investigations, for instance, by warning about imminent raids. 
These experiences were reported in Bosnia (Special Rapporteur, 2005; TIP, 2015), 
Bulgaria (TIP, 2016), Romania (TIP, 2016) and Croatia (PACO, 2002). A case was 
reported in Moldova in which a police officer accepted a bribe to convince their 
colleagues to close the investigation (TIP, 2016). The analysed data suggests that the 
cooperation with traffickers often occurs in exchange of money or sexual services 
(PACO, 2002; TIP, 2015). It is also possible that police officers who have a second job at 
bars or clubs where sexual exploitation occurs might face a conflict of interests that 
leads to complicity in trafficking (PACO, 2002; Special Rapporteur, 2005). Sometimes 
corruption is much more subtle than a payment of money in exchange of services that 
facilitate trafficking, and it has more to do with longstanding relationships of mutual 
favours, which makes it more difficult to detect (Webb & Burrows, 2009). 
Cooperation with traffickers might go beyond failing to act or obstructing 
investigations. Cases of police officers prosecuted for actively engaging in human 
trafficking rings themselves have been reported in Bosnia (PACO, 2002; TIP, 2015; TIP, 
2016), Bulgaria (Gounev & Bezlov, 2010; TIP, 2015; TIP 2016), Greece (Antonopoulos & 
Tagarov, 2012), Kosovo (TIP, 2015; TIP, 2016), Macedonia (TIP 2015; TIP, 2016), Moldova 
(TIP, 2016), Romania (TIP, 2016) and Montenegro (PACO, 2002). For instance, in 2009 
four police officers were arrested for their alleged participation in a sex-trafficking ring, 
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believed to have brought hundreds of women to Greece from Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans (Antonopoulos & Tagarov, 2012). In January 2015, a police officer was 
sentenced to seven years of imprisonment for trafficking in Moldova (TIP, 2016). More 
recently, in March 2016, prosecutors issued an arrest warrant to two police officers 
accused of forcing a university student to sell drugs and recruit his female classmates 
to prostitute themselves and sell drugs in Bulgaria (TIP, 2016), which may be a case of 
human trafficking for the purposes of sexual and criminal exploitation.  
When studying the socio-economic background of traffickers, Atanas Rusev 
points out a particularly interesting situation that occurs in Bulgaria. According to this 
study, security officials who were fired during the restructuring of the public sector in 
the early nineties can use their social and professional background to enter corruption 
networks, employ their former colleagues and active officers, and thus engage in 
criminal activities like trafficking whilst securing protection from investigations (Rusev, 
2013). 
Cases of police corruption were reported not only during the commission and 
prosecution of the crime, but also regarding victims’ protection. Although no 
information about particular cases in the area has been disclosed, anti-trafficking 
institutions warn that official cooperation with traffickers can perpetuate situations of 
exploitation and guarantee re-victimisation of any person trying to escape, since 
corrupt police officers would bring them back to their traffickers or deport them before 
testifying (PACO, 2002; UNODC, 2011). 
 
2.2.3. Judicial corruption.  
Although the judiciary is much less targeted by organised crime than the 
police, judges and prosecutors might facilitate human trafficking by avoiding 
investigations, influencing trials, or giving less harsh punishments. For instance, there 
have been allegations of judges who imposed sentences on convicted traffickers that do 
not correspond with the severity of the crime, like fines alone, or that have reserved 
convictions on appeal on weak grounds in Moldova (TIP, 2016).  
 
2.2.4. Political corruption. 
Access of traffickers to politicians has been reported to be relatively common 
in South East Europe and former Soviet republics (Rusev, 2013). Given the large profits 
from trafficking laundered in the legal economy, it is not uncommon for ring leaders to 
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become wealthy local businessmen with influence on local political elites or even to 
obtain political positions themselves (Rusev, 2013). For instance, a sitting member of 
parliament of Albania had prior convictions for trafficking-related offenses (TIP, 2015); 
and a former municipal councillor in Bulgaria was charged with leading an organised 
group involved in human trafficking (TIP, 2016). The most flagrant example is the 
amendment to the Bulgarian Penal Code provisions related to human trafficking in 
2006 introduced by certain MPs who allegedly had relationships with two well-known 
convicted traffickers, who in turn received minimal punishment (Gounev & Bezlov, 
2010).   
 
2.2.5. Administrative corruption.  
This category comprises other reported cases of public officials’ involvement in 
human trafficking, different from those reported above. It includes labour inspectors 
who are approached to obtain work permits in order to legalise the status of the victims 
so as to facilitate and perpetuate exploitation (Rusev, 2013), as reported in Kosovo (TIP, 
2016) and Macedonia (TIP, 2016). It also refers to municipal officers who are bribed to 
obtain licences for establishments that facilitate trafficking and exploitation. For 
instance, in September 2015, Greek authorities arrested three municipal employees who 
had allegedly accepted bribes in exchange for issuing permits to clubs and bars where 
trafficking victims were sexually exploited (TIP, 2016). Finally, this category embraces 
allegations of corruption in governmental institutions specifically created to fight crime 
and protect trafficking victims, such as the former head of the interior ministry’s 
division to combat organised crime and officers of the Centre for Combating Trafficking 
in Persons in Moldova (TIP, 2016); the head of a Moldavian human rights agency for 
forcing children to beg in Russia (TIP, 2015), and workers of state-run orphanages in 
Ukraine accused of enabling the sex and labour trafficking of children housed there 
(TIP, 2016).  
 
 
3. INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN RESPONSES TO TRAFFICKING-
RELATED CORRUPTION 
 
Despite the existence of important links between both crimes, a brief analysis of the 
most relevant European and international legislation shows that corruption has been 
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generally mostly overlooked or completely ignored in most anti-trafficking policies. The 
first international treaties for the abolition of the so-called white slavery did not 
mention public officials’ involvement at all. They were mainly focused on protecting the 
interest of the States in controlling migration and the abolition of prostitution. 
It is not until 2000 that we can find the first connection between human 
trafficking and corruption in international legislation. This connection indirectly appears 
when both crimes are associated with organised crime. Thus, Article 8 of the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime criminalises corruption in 
relation to organised crime and these provisions may apply to human trafficking cases, 
since according to Article 1 they apply mutatis mutandis to the Protocols hereto (the 
Palermo Protocol being one of them).  However, there is no explicit reference to the 
participation of public officials in trafficking. 
The need for an international commitment to recognise the crucial role of 
corruption in anti-trafficking strategy was consolidated in the 2010 UN Global Plan of 
Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons (A/RES/64/293, 2010). In this resolution, 
States Members of the UN manifested their political will to “investigate, prosecute and 
punish corrupt public officials who engage in or facilitate trafficking in persons and 
promote a zero-tolerance policy”, and to “strengthen or continue to strengthen 
coordination and cooperation among States in combatting crimes that might be 
connected with trafficking in persons, including money-laundering, corruption, 
smuggling of migrants and all forms of organized crime”. 
 At the European level, the most recent anti-trafficking instruments have also 
begun to explicitly recognise the important role of corruption in human trafficking. The 
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings of 2005 
(Art. 24.c) and Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combatting trafficking in human 
beings and protecting its victims. (Art.4.3) envisage the commission by an agent or 
public official in the performance of their duties as an aggravating circumstance. This 
provisions have been implemented by most national legislations.  
 Precisely, as stated above, the PACO Networking Project, launched by the 
Council of Europe, constituted a forum of great importance to address the specific 
problem of corruption in connection with human trafficking in South-Eastern Europe. 
Within this project, not only the risks were identified, but also several measures to 
prevent and prosecute these practices were suggested. Officials responsible for mutual 
legal assistance from ten countries established networks among themselves to offer 
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specific training for judges, prosecutors and other law enforcement authorities and, 
above all, to increase the exchange of experience and cooperation between judicial and 
investigative authorities from different countries.  
 In particular, in order to prevent trafficking-related corruption, they 
suggested increasing awareness by means of media reports and campaigns that 
publicise cases, as well as encouraging research on the issue, with the final objective of 
mobilising public opinion. The elaboration of codes of conduct and guidelines for public 
officials, which include initiatives to reduce conflict of interest by regulating the 
possibility of having a second job, were also recommended. Moreover, the PACO project 
recognised the need to increase financial support and provide training to provide 
officials with specific skills to avoid and identify trafficking-related corruption.  
 Regarding prosecution, enhancing cooperation, both nationally and 
internationally and between anti-trafficking and anti-corruption units was considered 
crucial for achieving fruitful investigations. The adoption of multidisciplinary units that 
also collaborate with non-governmental organisations was highlighted. These 
multidisciplinary units are supposed to collect and share information on trafficking 
experiences and the roles played by corrupt officials. Moreover, the PACO project 
underlined the need to ensure that financial investigations are carried out in parallel to 
criminal investigations to identify and confiscate the proceeds of crimes. 
 Several years after this project, the risk still persists. Most countries in the 
region do not report any investigation, prosecutions or convictions of government 
officials in human trafficking, despite allegations of existing cases (TIP, 2016). However, 
it is fair to say that some governments are demonstrating efforts to combat this 
problem. For instance, the TIP Report highlights the case of Belarus, where the 
government drafted a 2016-2018 State Program on Countering Crime and Corruption 
that includes anti-trafficking activities (TIP, 2016).  
 
 
4. FINAL THOUGHTS: APPROACHING TRAFFICKING-RELATED 
CORRUPTION AS A SECURITY CHALLENGE? 
After the analysis of some reported trafficking-related corruption experiences, 
it is possible to conclude that both crimes are strongly related, to the extent that it is 
even possible to affirm that corruption is one of the multiple elements that make 
human trafficking possible. Trafficking-related corruption constitutes a threat to several 
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values that have traditionally been associated with national security, such as the 
defence of national interests and the constitutional system, because it undermines the 
public’s trust in those who are supposed to protect it. In transnational cases, 
particularly when consular staff is involved, trafficking-related corruption can also be 
damaging for foreign relations. Nevertheless, trafficking-related corruption constitutes 
above all a human security risk, since it affects peoples’ freedom to live with dignity, 
meeting their basic needs and without fear (Tăbușcă, 2015).   
Despite the importance of this problem, corruption has been a historically 
forgotten element in anti-trafficking policies. Only very recently, the links between both 
crimes are slowly beginning to be recognised, although mainly in terms of prosecution. 
Traditionally, the legal response to these crimes followed a national security approach. 
National security solutions to human trafficking prioritised the interests of the State in 
reducing migration and crime (Lobasz, 2009). This is mainly the perspective followed by 
the Palermo Protocol. Even if it also includes measures to protect victims’ human 
rights, securitarian issues surrounding trafficking are the true driving force (Gallager, 
2002). This approach has had benefits, and has even been embraced by activists, 
because it increases the attention and resources devoted to that issue (Lobasz, 2009), 
and allows for the conviction of traffickers and complicit corrupt officials. However, 
focussing simply on protecting the national interest in controlling borders also has 
unsatisfactory consequences. National security approaches involve the tightening of 
migration controls, which, as explained above, increases the need for corruption; and 
the deportation of victims, which intensifies opportunities for re-trafficking.  
For this reason, to reduce trafficking-related corruption it is necessary to move 
beyond a state-centred to a people-centred notion of security (Kreindenweis & Hudson, 
2015). Reframing human trafficking (and related corruption) as an issue of human 
security shall provide the means to “holistically describe what trafficking is”, taking into 
account elements that were overlooked before, which will improve the identification of 
factors of victimisation and the establishment of effective anti-trafficking policies 
(Kreindenveis & Hudson, 2015). Ultimately, if trafficked people were not considered a 
threat to the State, but victims of human rights violations, counter-trafficking policies 
would focus more on social policies, which would contribute to the emancipation and 
empowerment of victims. 
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Abstract 
 
The organized and serious crime a serious socio-negative phenomenon, which 
threatens the security of the country, the economy, the rule of law, democracy and 
endangering the basic and essential human rights and freedoms established by the 
Constitution as the highest legal act of the state. The organized and serious crime is 
dynamic, flexible, includes a variety of forms of organized criminal activity and 
association with legitimate businesses. The organized crime groups are characterized by 
loose structure, adapting to new requirements and participating in that form of 
organized crime that is current at the moment and brings the greatest profits. Unlike 
the organized criminal groups in the wider international community who specialize and 
perform only one of the forms of organized crime in the country organized criminals 
easily fluctuate and are involved in various forms of organized crime, subject to 
availability and needs someone of high-quality forms of organized crime. 
 
Keywords: modus operandi, organized criminal groups, forms of organized 
crime 
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Introduction 
 
The problem of the organized crime in the Republic of Macedonia in the past 
26 years since its independence is a subject of interest of the scientific and professional 
public.  There are several phases in the emergence and the modus operandi of the 
organized criminal groups.  In the last decade of the previous century it was evident the 
denial and the ignorance by the state organs, through shy and modest appearance of 
themes referring to the organized crime and the organized criminal groups in the 
Republic of Macedonia.  In the scientific literature can often be seen contents under the 
title ‘Is there an organized crime in Republic of Macedonia?’, with vague standards that 
directs to the elements of that type of criminal activity.  At the end of the previous 
century the awareness for the dangers of the modus operandi of the organized criminal 
groups had strengthen.  More and more, the organized crime becomes a challenge and 
a field of interest of many theoreticians that investigate this socio-negative 
phenomenon.  The pointing at the necessity for changes in the legal-normative sphere 
would make conditions for dealing with the sophisticated ways of committing criminal 
acts from the area of the organized crime by the organized criminal groups. 
The conditions that led to the emergence and development of the organized 
criminal groups can be located in the radical changes in the area of the political, 
economic and security system.  In the autocratic, totalitarian and undemocratic systems 
the organized crime cannot be developed in the same manner and to the extent that 
today we meet in the developed democratic countries. After the independence of the 
Republic of Macedonia and the changes primarily in the economy system by introducing 
the market economy, the political pluralism, the parliamentary democracy, but also 
such radical changes at the same time are an essential condition for the emergence and 
development of the organized criminal groups, which is particularly evident for the 
former socialistic countries such as the Republic of Macedonia. The liberalization of the 
visa regime, the free flow of people and goods, skillfully was used by the members of 
the organized criminal groups to carry out high profitable forms of crime in several 
countries in cooperation with the other transnational organized crime groups. 
That period of transition is accompanied by expansion of crime, action of 
organized crime groups, certain forms that first occur in this region. Of course in 
addition to the action of the organized criminal groups is the unfavorable economic, the 
political and the security situation in the neighboring countries followed by the acts of 
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war, the economic sanctions from the International Community to certain countries of 
our environment, tolerating the actions of some criminal groups of its profits and 
infiltrate legal financial system which enables the survival of the system in such crises. 
One of the ways of the subsistence of the organized criminal groups is through 
corruption of certain individuals from the political life that have an influence in the 
functioning of the institutions, how they have been avoiding the investigations against 
the members of the organized crime groups and their release from criminal 
prosecution. Members of organized criminal groups who try to corrupt officials at lower 
levels, how enable its safe environment for a variety of criminal activities, they 
represent less of a threat in terms of organized crime groups dealing with the impact of 
the senior executives of the institutions responsible for tackling crime (police, justice 
officials, politicians and official government representatives). 
 
 
Organized criminal groups  
 
‘The organized criminal’ is very important term that has become part of the 
dictionary of many scientific workers, politicians, and of the general public.  It is very 
often used without a clear referent point and actually it is very unspecific and unclear. 
247  This lack of clarity also influences on the relevant academic debates. 
In the world literature can be found hundreds of definitions for the organized 
crime and the organized criminal groups, from authors 248 249250of various provenance 
and different areas. However, the emergence of the organized crime doesn’t date back 
so close. Organized criminal groups have existed in the middle Ages (in the 17th century 
gangs have attacked major cities). The criminal organizations with a broad action 
                                                          
247 Michael Woodiwiss and Dick Hobbs, ‘Organized evil and the Atlantic Alliance: moral panics 
and the rhetoric of organized crime policing in America and Britain’ , во British Journal of 
Criminology, Vol. 49, 2009, pp. 106–128 
248 Abadinsky, Howard, Organized Crime, Third Edition, Nelson-Hall, Chicago, 1990 
249 Allan Castle, ‘Transnational organized crime and international security’, Institute 
ofInternational Relations, University of British Columbia, Working Paper No. 19 
250 Frank E. Hagan,‘ “Organized Crime” and “organized crime”: indeterminate problems of 
definition’, in Trends in Organized Crime, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2006, 
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spread, their transition from local to national and even on international scale, are 
connected to the monopoly and the financial aristocracy. 251 
The defining of the organized crime, ie the organized criminal groups in the 
country, is performed by the Law on Police252 and the Law on Public Prosecution of the 
Republic Macedonia.253 
The geostrategic position of the Republic of Macedonia, as well as the social, 
the political, the security and the economic conditions allow the emergence and activity 
of organized criminal groups. Macedonia is located in the central part of the Balkan 
Peninsula, a crossroads of the main east-west and north-south resulting in increased 
flow and circulation of passengers, which in turn has an impact on transit and transport 
of illegal goods, mainly to drugs, in recent years, fueling hostilities in the Middle East 
and an increased number of refugees and migrants transiting through the country. 
The different levels of economic development in the neighboring countries and 
in general in the region, the non-compliance of the fiscal policy, the big differences in 
the prices of certain goods in the countries in the region, mostly in the neighboring 
countries, stimulates the smuggling of goods and the activities of organized criminal 
groups these regions. 
The second trait is the kinship, friendly, ethnic, labor and other ties with the 
Diaspora in the Western European countries facilitate the movement and actions of the 
members of the organized criminal groups, providing logistical and financial support 
from the countries of Western Europe as a destination. Such characteristics affect 
positively the modus operandi of organized criminal groups, facilitates crime and as a 
means of transport, places of storage, and cause unfair market competition. By avoiding 
paying taxes to the state, the members of the organized criminal groups lead to unfair 
competition in relation to goods brought into the country with all taxes paid. 
The unfavorable condition in the judicial system is also in favor of the action of 
the organized criminal groups. The incomplete implementation of the legislation by the 
judicial authorities especially by not implementing the measure of confiscation of 
property, when it is evident a disproportion between the current assets and legally 
revenues for those members of organized criminal groups, thus the members of 
                                                          
251 Milutinovic М. (1967). ,,Criminology,, Бeograd, 58 
252 Official Journal   Republic of Macedonia No.33/15 
253 Official Journal   Republic of Macedonia No.150/12 
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organized criminal groups and it provides easy to update the links in criminal circles 
and to continue with criminal activities. 
 
 
Organization, structure and modus operandi of the organized criminal 
groups in the Republic of Macedonia 
 
The reasons, the factors and the conditions for the emergence and 
development of the organized criminal groups in different countries are different, so 
from that perspective we can talk about specifics and difference in modus operandi of 
the organized criminal groups in different countries. Specifically for Macedonia, since its 
establishment as an independent and sovereign state today can be stated the following 
conditions for the emergence and development activity of organized criminal groups: 254 
- Non-established ethic elite that is condition sine quanon of the political elite in 
the democratic and legal state; 
- Inconsistent principle of separation of powers in the non unique system of the 
state government in Macedonia, where the absence of a system of legal 
mechanisms and procedures for mutual 'control and balance between the 
institutions responsible for law implementing. The consequences are lack of law 
governing manifested by halting or selective enforcement laws, failure of the 
legal institutions, which somehow skillfully used by members of the organized 
criminal groups to perform highly profitable s criminal acts of organized crime 
and corruption; 
- Lack of optimal independent institutions; 
- Poor legal framework; 
- Vague and inconsistent systems of the privatization process, public 
procurement, government concessions, financial management and control of 
the budget and public funds; 
- Too many laws and regulations which are inconsistent and contradictory 
governing administrative and legal matters, allowing too much discretion in 
deciding civil servants; 
                                                          
254 Labovic  М. Nikolovski  M „Organized crime and corruption“, Faculty of security –Skopje , 
2010, side. 45 
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- Low paid civil servants and served unprotected authorized persons responsible 
for detecting and proving the action of organized criminal groups. 
What characterizes the organized criminal groups in Macedonia is their 
involvement in several highly profitable forms of organized crime such as drug 
trafficking, migrant smuggling, violent and serious crime on a national and international 
level. From analyzes that have been made about the characteristics of organized 
criminal groups by the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia, they are the 
following features: 255 
- The organized criminal groups polycriminal and operating in more than one 
area of crime; 
- The connections between the members of the organized crime groups are often 
based on family or friendship relationship; 
- over 50% of organized criminal groups are of medium size which is comprised 
of 5-14 members; 
- the acquired funds from criminal activities are laundered through investments 
in financial markets, in legitimate businesses, movable and immovable 
property; 
- the dominant mode of operation using the corruption in their criminal activity, 
which is especially pronounced among officials in law enforcement from lower 
levels and influence in trials of their members to protect against criminal 
prosecution. 
 
 
Size of the organized criminal groups 
 
As for the size or the number of members of the organized criminal groups 
dominate small groups of 3 to 15-20 members. According to official reports of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, there are 6 groups out of ten with few members (from three 
to twenty people), while there are three groups consisting of 20 to 50 people and only 
one group that consists of 50 to 100 people. According to the size of the organized 
criminal group they are different from other countries especially ones where dominate 
                                                          
255 Threat Assessment of activities organized and serious crime, the Ministry of Interior of the 
Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 2016  
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organized criminal groups like mafia organized crime groups, where we talk about 
groups with greater numbers of members before, and other differences in the way of 
Figure 1: Size of the organized criminal groups 
 
structuring, action and so on. The mall organized criminal groups in Macedonian easily 
adapt to the new conditions primarily political, economic, security and infiltrate the 
system how through corruption fail to realize their criminal activities and thereby avoid 
being detected and sanctioned. 
 
Trans-sanction 
The level of cross-border operations, i.e. the trans-nationality of organized 
crime groups are medium-high, and half of the groups have operations in three or four 
countries, and the other half of the groups have operations in five or more countries, 
which means that these groups are quite active in the region and beyond. Given the 
fact that the criminal activity of members of organized crime groups prefer territory of 
more than one country, met the criteria for trans-sanction talk about organized crime. 
The location of the Republic of Macedonia as a central Balkan country where cross busy 
intersections of activity of organized criminal groups trans-sanction affect connectivity 
and support the criminal activities of the organized criminal groups from Macedonia 
and foremost neighboring countries. What is distinctive about the activity of the 
organized criminal groups in the Republic of Macedonia is the logistical support they 
receive in Western Europe through their family and friendly ties that live in these 
countries as a destination of the operation of the organized criminal groups. 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
742 
 
Figure 2: Level of the cross-border operations 
 
The dominant areas of the criminal activities are the illegal drug trade, the 
violent and serious crime, migrants smuggling (which is very often in the past years 
along with the intensified military actions in the Middle East especially in Syria). The 
founders of the organized criminal groups remain active within the groups and rarely 
are changed. Evident are that kind of organized crime groups that are based solely on 
short-criminal interests and have no continuity in carrying out criminal activities. 
Unlike the strong solidarity integrity of the organized criminal mafia-type who 
are characteristic in the other countries, the organized criminal groups in the Republic 
of Macedonia are characterized by loose association of members which is especially 
characteristic for the economic and financial crimes, the structure is characterized on 
the basis of family friendly basis and criminal interests, which is especially evident in 
the top of the structure for organized criminal groups that operate longer period. The 
criminal interest links the members of the group and provides continuity of the 
operation for extended periods of the organized criminal group. The most common form 
of organization are the criminal networks, in which the perpetrators have important 
individual roles, and they are often associated with a particular function or power. 
For the criminal activity of the organized criminal group to run without any 
particular difficulty, the members of the organized criminal group in its composition 
include individuals from the state institutions, primarily the police, the prosecution and 
the court. Such individuals in certain situations are "accomplices" and above "advisors" 
and help the organization in the way it should act with their authority and power act 
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and other primarily inspection services for not taking appropriate measures against 
members of certain organized criminal groups . These organized criminal groups have 
personal structure and professionalism and depending on the field of criminal act vary 
according to the number, the material condition, the specifics in the way of action. The 
organizer or leader of the organized criminal groups to devise and assigns roles 
responsible for the organization, finding tools and methods (finding connections with 
law executors). 
The identity of the organized criminal group is mainly connected to ethnic 
grounds or family basis and is organized by people from the same ethnic group. Thus, 6 
groups have been organized, while the remaining 4 groups are connected to the social 
base where people have close social interests and social status. 
The family relationship is found among those organized criminal groups 
involved in trafficking drugs, primarily heroin. The family relationship appears as an 
aggravating circumstance when it comes to discovering the most profitable form of 
organized crime. On the one hand it is almost impossible to select a face-member of 
the organized criminal group and to be convinced to work for the interest of the 
investigators, on the other hand it is also almost impossible to infiltrate undercover 
police spies into the composition of that type organized criminal groups. 
 
Figure 3: Identity 
 
The ethnic belonging of the members of the organized criminal group provides 
homogeneity of the group which is especially expressed among those organized 
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criminal groups that are specialized in executing acts connected to illicit drug 
trafficking (marihuana, heroin and cocaine). 
The level of violence among the organized criminal groups is very low, or eight 
of the groups do not practice or practice very little violence and there is one group that 
occasionally uses violence and one group that regularly uses violence in its criminal 
activities. So, it can be concluded that the organized criminal groups in the Republic of 
Macedonia are groups that mainly don’t want to attract attention and don’t use 
violence publically compared to Bulgaria, where organized criminal groups are also 
nonviolent according to Europol256 which means that act upon sophisticated and covert. 
Nonviolent action of organized criminal groups is particularly characteristic those 
organized crime groups involved in economic and financial crimes, which are 
represented in the country in a high percentage compared to other forms of organized 
crime.,   
 
Figure 4: The level of violence 
 
The entering in the legal economy of the organized criminal groups in the 
country according to the Ministry of Interior is relatively large. Only three groups have 
no activities or they are very small, while there are four groups that have made 
investments in the lawful activities and three groups repeatedly has tangled legal and 
illegal activities. 
                                                          
256 EUROPOL, OCTA 2009, EU Organised crime threat assessment : www.europol.europa.eu 
 
 
 
  
Securitydialogues
 
745 
 
Figure 5: Entering in the legal economy 
 
According to the type of the criminal areas that are involved257 in 43% of the 
organized criminal groups are involved in only one criminal area, 26% of the organized 
criminal groups are poly-criminal and act in more criminal areas, 20% are oriented to 
one are but in certain circumstances expand its criminal activity to other criminal 
activities, 11% have no identified areas of their criminal activity. 
 
 
Graphic display of the type of the criminal area of activity of the organized criminal 
groups 
 
After achieving greater amount of illegally gained capital that capital then is by 
laundering infiltrated in the  the legal financial system in many ways. In the first phase, 
                                                          
257 Threat Assessment of activities organized and serious crime, the Ministry of Interior of the 
Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 2016, pg.. 15 
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there is a switch of the huge financial resources to the of-shore regions and then these 
funds are returned as foreign investment in the country. Through individuals, foreign 
nationals, mostly from Cyprus (man-firm employee) that money occur as a foreign 
investment with redemption of dominant shares in the companies and thus become 
dominant owners. As foreign investment they are subsidized by the government 
institutions and certain tax breaks and actually work as members of organized criminal 
groups which money acquired illegally by running high-profitable forms of organized 
crime, so the dirty capital that previously was put forward in abroad, the same returns 
as foreign investment and carried its infiltration into legal businesses say in the legal 
financial flows of institutions. 
The legal business is just one of the ways, used for increasing of the 
financial power.  Most of the legal businesses opened by the members of the organized 
criminal groups usually are in the areas of transport, and they are used for smuggling 
illegal goods.  The organizers and the members of the organized criminal groups within 
the legal subjects act as founders and managers of many legal subjects through which 
is performed the payment of funds in order to be concealed the true origin and persons 
who are part of the management team with a dominant role in the decision-making .  
The goal is overflow of the capital from one to another legal business for acquiring 
capital.  The money they will earn from these kind of activities, especially on 
international level, allow the members of the organized criminal groups to become 
financially powerful. 
The most famous areas for investment of this money are real estate, 
investments in the of-shore zones, the establishment of phantom companies and 
industries. As examples of venture money are listed apartments, hotels, casinos, 
factories, sports clubs, and restaurants. 
However, that property usually does not take the name of the real owner, but 
some family members or close friends. The members of organized criminal groups get 
protection from the criminal activities provide direct meetings in concluding criminal 
acts import and use of methods of providing routes of transport for smuggling goods. 
What is massive in the modus operandi among the members of the organized criminal 
groups in this area is the use of dual citizenship or they have citizenship from the 
mother country Republic of Macedonia and citizenship from Bulgaria, which allows 
them free movement in the countries of West Europe, where they are registered as as 
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perpetrators of crimes and have been banned from entering the passport from the 
Republic of Macedonia. 
The control of the area of action is not a characteristic for most organized 
crime groups, but exceptions are those involved in drug trafficking and abuse of official 
position and authority. The organized criminal groups involved in drug trafficking as a 
form of organized crime, have a high control of the drug market, while those which are 
involved in crimes related to abuse of power and authority are active corruption 
offenses bribery and receiving rewards for issuing work permits and monopoly in the 
operation provides through political influence of the leaders. 
 
 
Field of activity of the organized criminal groups  
 
If we make an analysis of the data for the realized criminal acts from the area 
of the organized crime in the past few years, we can conclude that since few years ago 
the dominant form of acting of the organized criminal groups was the illicit drug trade.   
According to the Yearly report258 of the Ministry of interior for 2009 in the drug-
business the most frequent are the Albanian criminal groups from Macedonia 
connected to the criminal structures from Turkey from where they supplied heroin and 
criminal structures of the same ethnicity residing in Western Europe, which is 
confirmed by statistics, or out of 42 criminal suspects persons - citizens of the Republic 
of Macedonia, 38 persons were of Albanian ethnic origin. Activities in the area of 
combating illicit trafficking (HT) drug were aimed at gathering information on criminal 
groups from Macedonia who act in the area of North-West Macedonia and establish 
their links with the people of the Republic of Turkey, where the acquires drug heroin as 
well as their links with criminal structures of Western European countries, ie cutting 
the Balkan drugs route, which is crossed eight international channels NT heroin. 
In the last years a dominant form of acting of the organized criminal groups is 
the smuggling of migrants.  The intensity of the irregular migrations toward the west-
Balkan’s route in 2015 according to the previous years has changed and evolved 
according to the origin countries of the migrants, the number of registered migrants, 
                                                          
258 Annual report of the Ministry of Interior for  2009 y.. Public Security Bureau, Central Police 
Services Department for Organized Crime, Department of Criminal Intelligence Analysis, 2010 
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the structure of the persons transiting, and according the way of transiting countries.  
During 2015 the number of migrants transiting along the Western Balkan route has 
rapidly increased by economically migrants and migrants coming from the war areas.   
Such a state of new supply form of organized crime had its affection in the actions of 
the organized criminal groups in the region. They cooperated with organized criminal 
groups in the neighboring countries have frequent changes of members and their roles 
are formed and ad hoc criminal groups of mixed composition with nationals from 
countries in the region and members of the countries of origin of migrants and people 
with criminal background intermediaries and providers of various services. Of more 
frequent occurrence is registered to a part of the organized criminal groups in R. 
Macedonia is involved in the trafficking of migrants include nationals mainly from 
Greece, Bulgaria and Albania. 
For individual services the organized criminal groups use the local population 
in the border area (guides, drivers and other staff who are responsible for providing 
security and accommodation), engaged when needed and often changed.  In the 
executing of certain activities the members of the organized criminal groups include 
the migrants who don’t have enough financial means to pay the services.  The activities 
of the organized criminal groups are aimed toward organizing transfer and 
accommodation, providing falsified documents for entering the countries from the 
European Union.  For migrant’s transfer from Greece, through Macedonia to Serbia they 
charge from 300 to 1500 Euros per person according to the way of transport, the 
quality of the accommodation and other services.  The money are usually paid in 
advance to a person in one of the larger cities in Greece and sometimes directly to the 
driver or the legal entity which is a vanguard of the vehicle transporting migrants. 259 
The structure of the organized criminal groups is clearly hierarchical.  Those 
are homogenous groups that have strong and long-lasting core of key people 
surrounded with a circle of very few permanent members.  What connects them and 
makes the collaboration between the members of the organized criminal groups are the 
ethnic belonging, the friendship and the family ties, the lack of language barriers and 
most common the common criminal record from the past.  One of the common 
characteristics of the members of the organized criminal groups is their attempt to 
change the identity and use of forged documents, and the use of the benefits of dual 
                                                          
259 Regional threat of severe and organized crime, Skopje, 2015 
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citizenship as a means by which to facilitate the movement and execution of crimes in 
other countries.   
Typical for the work of the organized criminal groups is the occasional inclusion 
of people who have no criminal record, mainly for logistical needs, and individuals 
specialized in specific areas. To secure information exchange, the organized criminal 
groups use sophisticated means of communication, and more frequent and direct 
communication and transmission of messages through couriers. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Today we face a serious and organized crime which is constantly developing 
new forms of manifestation, primarily depending on the global change, the 
technological progress and the social development. One of the prerequisites for entry of 
the Republic of Macedonia in the European Union is undertaking complex activities and 
intensive work, which primarily takes place in the efficient fight against the serious and 
organized crime. 
The organized criminal groups in the country are and in the future will be a 
serious threat to the citizens' security. The structure of the organized criminal groups 
will continue to be changed in terms of its heterogeneous composition will include 
members from different nationalities as special mark thereon. A feature of the 
organized criminal groups in relation to the criminal matters is their poly-criminality 
which means they will be involving in areas of criminal activity that currently carries 
greater profits. 
In certain areas of criminal activity, the organized criminal groups strengthen 
their relationships internationally in order to facilitate criminal activities outside the 
Republic of Macedonia, especially in the area of drug trafficking and smuggling 
migrants, forms that dominate as a subject of interest in the past years. 
A feature of the organized criminal groups is their structuring and formation of 
smaller structures which are associated with similar criminal organizations from the 
region, so that the fight against the serious and organized crime cannot be reduced to 
national borders. Therefore, the process of gathering evidence needed to prosecute the 
members of the organized criminal groups who has committed such crimes as well as 
confiscation of property acquired through crime, is very complex. Certain organized 
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criminal groups perform their criminal activities exclusively outside of their domicile 
countries; therefore, it is necessary strengthening of the cooperation between the 
countries and the agencies of the European Union with the police and other law 
enforcement agencies in the region, in order to create space security in the whole 
region, and therefore the European Union. 
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Abstract 
 
Police as a state body is responsible for the protection of life, personal safety 
and property of citizens, maintaining a stable security situation, maintaining public law 
and order and law enforcement. Police, despite all the duties and powers by law also 
takes measures for protection of certain persons and facilities. 
The constant and rapid changes due to globalization lead to increased security 
risks and dangers and in that way the global security picture becomes complex. In 
connection to that critical infrastructure (vital state infrastructure facilities) gets new 
dimensions and increased importance at national and international level. Because 
critical infrastructure is an important segment of national security, its protection must 
be continually developed, and is one of the main security priorities of each country. 
Measures and activities for providing protection are taken by the police 
individually or in conjunction and cooperation with other authorities, organizations, 
legal entities and individuals, all within its competences and powers defined by the law. 
The emphasis should be put on the field of cooperation with private security, especially 
about the continuous exchange of data and information, which largely can improve 
identification and prevention of possible threats. 
The entities responsible for the protection of critical infrastructure need to 
constantly upgrade their facilities to monitor the situation and assess the level of 
safety of the facilities and the readiness of personnel protection and rapid response to 
deal with risks and dangers targeting critical infrastructure. The facilities will be safe if 
all the necessary measures in the area of prevention and early warning are taken timely. 
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The successful protection of critical infrastructure is possible only by increasing 
cooperation and by continuously enhancing the performance of the police and private 
security. 
 
Keywords: police, private security and critical infrastructure protection 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Police is part of the Ministry of Interior in which police affairs are performed by 
police officers. Police affairs are actions of police officers concerning the protection of 
life, personal safety and property of citizens.260 
This duty is contained in the provisions of the Law on Police and in by-laws in 
which security of persons and facilities are further defined such as a Regulation on the 
security for persons and the facilities, the types of measures and activities and levels of 
security.261 
Security of persons and objects in the sense of this means planning, 
organization, coordination and execution of operational-preventive and preventive-
technical, physical, health and other measures and actions aimed at providing security 
for: 
 The seats of state bodies and the space around them, as well as residential and 
representative buildings and the surrounding area that belongs to the state 
authorities of the Republic of Macedonia (Parliament, Government, ministries, 
residential and others); 
 Foreign diplomatic offices in Macedonia and their residences and international 
missions based in the Republic of Macedonia; 
 Facilities and spaces that are of particular importance and interest to the 
security and defense of the Republic of Macedonia (structures of the Ministry 
of interior and other buildings such as the State Archive of the Republic of 
                                                          
260 „Police Law", Official Gazette no. 114/06, Art.5 
261 „Regulation on the protection of persons and the facilities, the types of measures and 
activities and levels of security", Official Gazette no. 56/14 
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Macedonia, the Archive of the City of Skopje, the National Bank of Macedonia 
and other facilities of importance for security and stability of the country).262 
Measures and activities for providing police protection are undertaken alone or 
in conjunction and cooperation with other authorities, organizations, legal entities and 
individuals, all within its competences and powers defined by law. The police need to 
strengthen cooperation with the private security especially in the exchange of data and 
information. This multidisciplinary approach is the only way we can meet the challenges 
that every day we have the opportunity to observe and feel in the immediate and wider 
environment (terrorist acts and threats of terrorist attacks on soft targets). 
Although critical infrastructure in the country is a relatively new field, we can 
rightly say that the protection of buildings of special significance exists and is legally 
regulated before the Law on protecting people and property, then in the Law on private 
security. Namely, these laws provide that the Government determines which legal 
persons shall have the security of persons and property for their own needs, if the 
performance of their activity is associated with handling radioactive substances or other 
dangerous substances for people and the environment, objects and buildings of 
particular cultural and historical significance, and in other cases when it is in the 
interest of safety or defense of the Republic of Macedonia. 
Because critical infrastructure is an important segment of national security, its 
protection must continually evolve and improve and should represent a major security 
priority of each country. This became particularly evident after the terrorist attacks in 
the United States since September 11, 2001. 
The identification of risks and hazards and the timely response is an important 
factor for enhancing the security of critical infrastructure. A major component in the 
infrastructure security is the state's ability to detect, investigate and prevent security 
threats such as terrorism, organized crime, war, environmental, cyber and other types of 
threats. 
The emphasis should be put on the field of cooperation and continuous 
exchange of data and information that will greatly help to identify and prevent possible 
threats, especially in the context of the concept of collective security. 
                                                          
262 „Regulation on the protection  of persons  and the facilities, the types of measures and 
activities and levels of security", Official Gazette no. 56/14 art.23 
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The entities responsible for the protection of critical infrastructure need to 
constantly upgrade their capacities for surveillance and assessment of the level of 
safety of the facilities and the readiness of personnel protection and rapid response to 
deal with risks and dangers targeting critical infrastructure. 
No facility or object that falls within the critical infrastructure should not be 
considered immune from attack, because all objects (the ones owned by the state 
government and those privately owned) represent potential targets. 
The facilities will be more secure if all the necessary measures in the area of 
prevention and early warning are taken in timely manner. 
Rapid processes of globalization in the world, despite its main feature - the 
constant and rapid changes brought negative consequences, such as: increase in safety 
risks and hazards, among other things, and they can relate to the economy, transport, 
health, energy, communications systems, information networks or, simply, everything 
that falls within the so-called critical infrastructure. 
The term critical infrastructure usually refers to physical facilities / buildings, 
networks or organizations whose destruction or failure can cause partial or permanent 
damage to the social and economic life. 
Different authors and relevant authorities related to this issue identify a wide 
range of economic sectors that fall under this definition, namely: energy, water and 
food, management of waste/materials, key transport networks (airports, railways, 
highways), financial institutions, banks and savings banks, health services and public 
safety organizations.263 
Here, in Macedonia critical infrastructure is a relatively new concept and one 
that essentially means „value or set values and goods that are essential to the 
economy, state and society, often identified as a complex material and immaterial 
systems, whose disorder functioning or destruction could cause long-term harmful 
effects on the fundamental values of the economy, state and society in general."264 This 
determination corresponds conceptually with more established definitions of modern 
                                                          
263 Critical Infrastructure Security and Protection, The Public-Private Opportunity, White Paper 
and Guidelines by CoESS, December 2010, p.5 
264 „Legal framework for the provision of critical infrastructure, focusing on the provision of 
critical infrastructure in the country," Chamber of Macedonia's private security Stead graphics, 
Skopje 2016, p.9 
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states with more experience and expertise in the analyzed area. Thus, critical 
infrastructure provides:265 
- In the United States – „essential services which represent support for 
American society and serve as a backbone or a pillar of the national economy, 
safety and health"; 
- In Canada – „processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, goods and 
services vital to the health, security, safety and economic well-being of citizens 
and the effective functioning of government"; 
- In the UK – „funds, facilities, systems, networks or processes and essential 
workers who manage and maintain the same, where their loss or disruption in 
the operation may result in large, harmful impact on the availability, integrity 
and performance of essential services including the services whose integrity, in 
case it is damaged, it could result in substantial loss of life, i.e. victims taking 
into account the significant economic or social impact and/or significant 
impact on the national security, defense or functioning of the state "; 
- In Italy – „facilities, systems, networks and functions - physical or virtual, that 
are vital to the survival of the state, whose incapacitation or destruction would 
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, public health 
or safety, or any combination of these phenomena." 
Not just above mentioned, but a number of other countries, members of the 
European Union and those outside of it, have paid careful attention and developed 
many programs, policies and manuals, guidelines and procedures for the protection of 
critical infrastructure. Some of these directives or initiatives that fall within the scope 
of determining the legal framework for improving the security of critical infrastructure 
are the following:266 
- In 2008, the EU Directive on the identification and designation of European 
Critical Infrastructure and the assessment of the need for improvement of 
protection (applies to energy and transportation sectors, and provides 
owners/operators of critical infrastructure to prepare a security plan and 
appoint licensed security officer). 
                                                          
265 Ibid, p.10-12 
266 Ibid, p.24-25 
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- In 2012, the Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS), prepared a 
white paper titled „Protection and security of critical infrastructure - public-
private opportunities" (analyzed this issue in terms of private and public 
entities and suggests explicit division the roles and responsibilities). 
- In 2013, a document audit of the European Program for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (based on the practical implementation of activities such as 
prevention, preparedness and response). 
- In 2013, we designed portal "Network Information Warning Critical 
Infrastructure (CIWIN)", to raise awareness about the same. 
Our neighbor Serbia, has developed Guidelines for the methodology of 
assessing the threat of plans for protection and rescue of ten sectors of critical 
infrastructure. The essence of this Guide is based on the sources of danger and 
consequences which distortion and disruption of the functioning of the infrastructure 
might have on the economy and the environment.267 
In Macedonia, however, in the National Concept for Security and Defense, 
protection of vital infrastructure ranks as one of the vital interests that promote the 
security and that creates conditions for better life of citizens and the functioning of the 
state and society.268 However, it must be noted that public security sector is still in the 
phase of reforms, despite having already drawn up and having existing legislation in the 
area of critical infrastructure, further efforts for more comprehensive legal framework 
regulation of this issue must be taken and there is a need for existence of a clearly 
defined framework for defining, identifying and protecting it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
267 „Legal framework for the provision of critical infrastructure, focusing on the provision of 
critical infrastructure in the country," Chamber of Macedonia's private security Stead graphics, 
Skopje 2016, p,35 
268 „National Concept for Security and Defense,"  Official Gazette of RM no. 40/03, p.3 
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2. THE ROLE OF POLICE IN PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
2.1 Measures and activities for protection of persons and facilities 
 
Any natural disaster or outbreak, whether derived from nature as a dangerous 
condition or hazard that is created as a result of an action of the people and that 
threatens the security and reliability requires attention and appropriate action and 
reaction. Security issues are normally managed by the government institutions, 
administrative departments, NGOs and other professional associations, but recognizable 
and timely accountability of course is still in the hands of authorized officials. Police in 
this context, in modern democracies still transforms its role in the new environment 
and searches for the model of its essence. Recent habits for the view of the police 
expectations significantly affect both the communities and the police concepts, 
programs, organization and system. Police in our country accept modern standards, 
while at the same time consolidates and projects internal capacities, resources, 
programs and strategic priorities for action and more efficient operation, unburdened 
by political discourses. Since the ultimate goal of the police is to be aimed at all 
citizens and their protection, and the protection of national security, it shows about the 
complexity of the role of the police as well as the complexity in the relationship with 
other stakeholders responsible for national security. 
The current environment of globalization and unstoppable process of far-
reaching, geo-climate, socio-political, economic, social and other changes, causes 
concern in large-scale racial, religious, national, cultural, ethnic and other conflicts. 
They unfortunately, despite all the efforts for their eradication, continuously generate 
new forms of terrorism, violence and crime in all spheres of our daily living. 
Particularly disturbing are frequent and strong mutually logistical, and often 
operative or action based interconnection between various organized groups or 
organizations that connect together and provide firearms, explosives, counterfeit 
identification and accreditation documents and money, operationally relevant 
information and others. resources and services of skilled counterfeiters, arsonists, 
chemists, electronics experts, plastic surgeons, smugglers, hackers and others that 
allow the success of their criminal operations and survival of their organizations. 
On the other hand, each individual has a unique need for security and safety. 
These are objectives that weighs each country take care to protect their citizens and 
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property, whether it is a private property, or national good. Each state has actively 
taken measures and actions to prevent all phenomena of above listed modern forms of 
danger, from regulation of its legislation to act preventively, proactively and 
repressively towards the perpetrators of such acts. This segment of protection and 
security policy includes the judiciary, police, military, security, intelligence, customs 
inspections and the entire private protection sector. Series of measures and activities 
prescribed in the law are being taken regarding the protection and security of persons 
and facilities by authorized personnel engaged. They relate to the detection and 
prevention of illegal actions against persons and facilities provided, but also extend to 
ensuring the personal security of individuals and facilities, material goods and property 
is protected. 
These measures are taken in case individuals or groups and foreign intelligence 
services hostile directed against our country plan to endanger the safety of persons, 
property and material goods to be supplied or, in case such actions to be brought to 
endanger public safety of our highest government officials, foreign dignitaries, 
diplomatic and consular missions and international missions. 
Authorized officials take security measures and activities in cases of natural 
disasters (earthquakes, floods, fires and other natural and unpredictable forces) that 
can affect the damage to buildings and endangering the safety of persons and other 
persons present in buildings and the spaces provided. 
Measures and activities for securing persons and facilities consist of taking: 
- Operational and preventive measures and activities for protection of persons, 
objects and spaces; 
- Preventive technical measures and activities for protection covering 
mechanical, electronic, technical, anti-diversion, chemical-biological-radiation, 
sanitary and health, fire and other types of protection of persons and facilities; 
- Physical and traffic protection of facilities and persons; 
- Monitoring of the actions and activities of general measures and activities for 
providing the state authorities and other entities in the interest of the security 
and defense of the Republic of Macedonia managed by entities acting as legal 
entities, each within its jurisdiction and powers defined by law; 
- Other necessary measures and activities of interest and importance to 
protection of persons and facilities. 
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Of particular importance is the above measures to be taken based on planning 
and communication, dialogue and mutual trust between the entities responsible for the 
protection of critical infrastructure. 
 
2.2 Measures to strengthen the level of protection of facilities 
 
In order to strengthen the level of protection of objects it is necessary to 
continuously strengthen the capacities of entities responsible for their protection and 
in the area of monitoring and evaluation, planning, coordination and control of the 
measures taken. Many objects of critical infrastructure have been already covered by 
various systems of organization of physical and technical protection, but in the future 
you have to expect even more quality approach, every owner or manager of the facility 
of critical infrastructure will have among other things to make a safety plan that will be 
reviewed by the Ministry of interior. That plan would enable quick and appropriate 
response to any threat. Of course, one has to work on the preparation of training, which 
will be designed in a way to enable the persons responsible for providing rapid and 
appropriate response to the threat, (success in dealing with the threat depends on the 
initial response to the threat) or to demonstrate they have met organizational 
expectations. Finally, we should not forget the need for increased cooperation and 
support of all stakeholders involved in the protection of facilities of vital importance. 
That cooperation primarily relates to exchange and share information and concrete 
support in taking measures and activities in the provision of facilities. 
In the area of exchange of information, the planning of exchange of 
information is crucial. This will strengthen national and international mechanisms for 
the exchange of information, planning and operational coordination, which represents 
support security in the country (eg. aviation and border crossings, protection of the 
critical infrastructure), risk prevention, risk reduction, strengthening legislation and 
combined operations.269 
Mutual cooperation and support - protection of facilities of vital importance 
during a critical incident is an interagency and multidisciplinary. 
                                                          
269 NATO Workshop in Brussels, „Development plans for inter-institutional exchange of 
information security in the country", 2011-04-09, 
http://mail.cuk.gov.mk/index.php?arhiva=1&content=354, accessed 25.01.2016 year 
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Measures and activities for protection of the facilities, taken by the responsible 
persons, on which successful execution depends are: 
 Evacuation or shelter in a safe place; 
 Protections of the scene; 
 Access control of entrances and exits; 
 Providing seamless access and exit for vehicles for providing emergency 
medical assistance, fire fighting vehicles, etc.; 
 Coordinated occurrence and management; 
 Determination of a sufficient number of security personnel; 
 Establish an appropriate system for communication; 
 Exchange of information as a key segment in handling incidents. 
 
2.3 Jurisdiction of the police in the monitoring and supervision of private 
entities working in private security sector 
 
Authorized officials of the Ministry of Interior are responsible for supervising 
the implementation of the Law on Private Security and the regulations made under this 
Act. 
Minister of interior establishes a committee for supervising of the work of the 
Chamber and legal entities of private security which is composed of a president, three 
members and their deputies. The Commission is tasked to issue and revoke licenses for 
the operation of legal entities registered for performing private security activity and to 
control and supervise the work of these entities registered for private security in the 
form of providing services for their own needs. Commission acts upon written notices 
received from the Sector for internal affairs who concluded irregularities in the 
activities of legal entities registered for activities of private security in the form of 
providing services for their own needs270. 
Regular supervision over the work of the Chamber and legal persons of private 
security is done at least once per calendar year. Authorized officials of the Ministry 
                                                          
270 „Handbook for police officers - the role and responsibilities of the police in the performance 
of control and supervision of legal entities working in private security in accordance with the 
Law on Private Security“, Chamber of the Republic of Macedonia for private security, Skopje 
2014, p.5 
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perform the following activities to supervision: 1.determine whether and how to 
implement this Act and regulations adopted under this Act; 2.check records of 
contracts under Article 6 (1) of this Act; 3.check business premises, technical facilities 
and equipment and vehicles used in the pursuit of private security; 4.check the manner 
of keeping and carrying of firearms, as well as the capability for handling and use of 
firearms and 5.check the manner of applying the powers of workers for security. If 
necessary, the authorized officials of the Ministry take other measures and actions for 
supervision. For activities carried out in legal persons performing private security 
authorized officials of the Ministry compile a report. 
The responsible person in the legal person performing private security or a 
person authorized by him and the Chamber are obliged to enable the supervision, to 
make available the relevant documentation and to provide the necessary data and 
information. If during the supervision determine that the legal person performing 
private security or the Chamber does not comply with the provisions of this law, the 
Ministry shall issue a decision to remove the deficiencies within a period not longer 
than 60 days from the receipt of decision. 
Ministry will revoke the license if the legal person performing private security: 
1. not anymore eligible for a license according to the provision stipulated in this law and 
2. Do not remove the irregularities within the deadline set by the decision. The Ministry 
informs the Chamber and the Central Registry of the Republic of Macedonia for 
revocation of the license of legal entity after the finality of the decision. 
Ministry will deprive the public authorization of the Chamber established by 
this law, if not eliminate the deficiencies within the period specified in the decision. In 
case of depravation of public authorization of the Chamber, public authorization are 
performed by the Ministry until the removal of shortcomings by the Chamber. 
Against the decision to eliminate the shortcomings of the legal entity 
performing private security that Chamber, the decision to revoke the license for the 
provision of legal person performing private security and the decision to revoke the 
public authority of the Chamber, the legal entity or the Chamber are entitled to appeal 
to the State Commission for administrative procedures and employment in the second 
instance within 15 days of its submission. 
In the event of a violation of legal provisions by legal entities registered for 
performing activities for securing people and property in the form of provision of 
services and legal entities registered for performing activities for securing people and 
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property for their own needs, as well as by individuals performing work on securing 
people and property, in order to overcome the stated condition, police is required to 
undertake the following activities: 
  Police officers in the organizational units of the criminal police to plan 
measures for supervising the operation of legal entities registered to perform 
an activity for protecting people and property, in terms of respecting the 
requirements for the provision of persons and property, the fulfillment of their 
duties and keeping the required records under the Law on private security and 
surveillance in respect of compliance with the provisions of the Law on 
weapons in view of the importance of licenses for possession and carrying, 
storing and keeping of weapons and ammunition, etc. 
 Police officers in police stations and police departments to plan measures for 
supervising the work of individuals that perform the security of persons and 
property within the legal entities, in terms of respecting their obligations under 
the Law on Private providing (possession of a license, wearing identification 
card, wearing work clothes, submitting a written report on the use of force, 
etc.), and supervision with regard to compliance with the provisions of the Law 
on weapons (The way of carrying weapons, wearing a license to carry weapons, 
etc.). 
 Commission to implement the procedure for issuing work permit to legal 
entities for the business of protecting people and property, revocation of 
license of legal entities for the business of protecting people and property, 
deprivation of powers of the Chamber of Macedonia to secure people and 
property, supervising the work of legal entities operating in the security of 
persons and property, can include other relevant institutions in the supervision 
(IRS, labor inspectors, etc. 
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3. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION 
 
3.1 Origins and development of private security 
 
The first private security agencies in the country date back to 1994. Within two 
decades the private security sector is increasingly taking so far traditional police 
activities related to security and protection. The need of the society to protect itself 
from rising global threats and crises led to the founding and establishment of this 
sector for private protection that serves as an extended arm of the police activity in 
cases where it is impossible to provide constant monitoring, observation and monitoring 
by police officers of a certain place and a certain time. With the spread of the market, 
private protection and security in certain segments of life took part of police work, such 
as providing transportation of money, securing public meetings, sports and cultural 
events, providing facilities, direct protection of persons and so on. 
Great interest in rental services by private agencies nowadays stems from the 
rise in crime and the lack of resources within the capacity of the national level that are 
needed to meet the growing demands for protection. Of course, not every agency for 
private security guards have the same success and the same quality of work, which is 
due primarily to the reputation or professional image of the same, because it is not 
easy to gain confidence or belief that the selected agency has a staff capabilities and 
skills key into potential cases of endangering the safety of the client or his property. 
The prevailing opinion that the private security industry is a business 
expansion due to „high turnover of funds circulating in the industry, the large number 
of employees  that exceeds the total number of police officers, the rapid development 
of technological development in this area and different and a wide range of commercial 
security services."271 
The process of transformation of the state order, the release of the former 
Yugoslavia, the development of the capitalist economy, the emergence of a growing 
number of private economic operators and, in particular, emphasized social 
stratification factors demand additional security services, some of which were (and still 
                                                          
271 Vankovska B. „Security private sector in Macedonia: Between needs and public (non) trust", 
Skopje, 2016, p.17 
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are ) of questionable viability and more a kind of presentation of their own prestige or 
status (specific trend and fad - anyone who can financially withstand that can afford 
private security guard or bodyguard) . 
 
3.2 Analysis of the legal provisions on private security 
 
Provisions for protection of people and property were legally regulated by the 
Law on protection of people and property passed in 1999. Functioning again, the private 
legal entities that offer security services (supposed to be) contained in the Law on 
Private Security (Official. Gazette no. 80/99, 66/07 and 51/11). However, it should not 
overlook the fact that a period of ten years from the adoption of this law, there was no 
act that determine the specific legal entities, and in this respect the Government 
adopted the Decision on determining legal entities are required to have collateral of 
persons and property for their own needs (Fig. Gazette no. 166/10) under the Act, even 
in December 2010. 
Private security is the protection of persons and property is carried out by 
legal entities that are licensed for private security. Under the Act, private security is an 
activity of public interest which aims to prevent and detect harmful phenomena and 
illegal actions that threaten the physical integrity and dignity of the person and 
property that is protected. 
The law regulates the conditions for performing private security, private 
security for their own needs, mandatory private security powers of private security 
workers, work clothes and signs of private security workers. 
In this context, private security by legal entity can be performed as272: 
1. Security for their own needs based on the license for providing for their own 
needs, and 
2. Security using the services of legal persons performing private security in the 
form of provision of services, by law, on the basis of an agreement. 
Private security for their own needs are carried as physical security, physical 
protection and monitoring security. "Private security for their own needs may perform 
legal entity holding a license for private security for their own needs.273" 
                                                          
272 „Law on private security" Official Gazette no. 166/2012, 164/2013, 148/2015, 193/2015, 
55/2016, Art.8-10 
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Private security in the form of provision of services is carried out as physical 
and technical security. Physical security in turn, performed as: 1.physical protection 
2.monitoring, 3.Ensuring transport and transfer of money and other valuable items and 
4.Ensuring public gatherings and other events.274 "Private security in the form of 
provision of services can perform a legal entity that has registration in the Central 
Register of the Republic and if has a license for private security in the form of provision 
of services.275" 
„Private security may be performed by a person who holds a license and 
identification card issued by the Chamber."276 Training for physical and technical 
protection, organized by the Chamber, under the program and performed by the 
Commission to enable physical security and the Committee on training for technical 
training is established by the Minister of Interior. 
Cooperation between the Ministry of interior and legal entities regarding the 
provision of expert assistance is of a great importance, so that at the request of the 
legal person performing private security the Ministry provides expert assistance in 
organizing private security and conduct training.277 
Workers employed by private security agencies have the authority to: 
1. Perform authentication; 
2. Warning of persons to move away from the property that is provided; 
3. Not allowing entry of an unauthorized person, and prohibit unauthorized 
recording or adding equipment for the purpose of the property that provides; 
4. Retention and surrender to the police the persons caught committing a 
criminal offense prosecuted ex officio coming to the police; 
5. Inspection of persons, vehicles, and storage, and 
6. Use of Force (used if the purpose of treatment cannot be achieved 
otherwise)278. 
                                                                                                                                                    
273 Ibid art.10 
274 Ibid, art.8-10 
275 Ibid, art.10 
276 „Law on private security" Official Gazette no. 166/2012, 164/2013, 148/2015, 193/2015, 
55/2016, Art. 20 
277 Ibid art.26 
278 Ibid art.45 
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Legal entities who work on private security activities in the form of provision of 
services and legal entities that perform private security for their own needs come 
together in the Chamber of the Republic of Macedonia for private security. They join for 
the purposes of protection and promotion of expertise, professionalism and dealings 
and to protect the profession to join the Chamber.279 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
From the elaboration above it is evident that despite the fact that in our 
country we are working on improving the protection of critical infrastructure by the 
police and by the Chamber of private security, there are a number of steps, measures 
and activities in the process of providing safety to critical capabilities that have yet to 
be implemented or if they are in progress to be elevated to a higher level. 
In order to improve the protection of critical infrastructure the following is of 
utmost importance: 
First, to emphasize the importance of measures and activities for providing 
facilities to be planned and undertaken based on communication, dialogue and mutual 
trust between the entities responsible for the protection of critical infrastructure. 
Second, to establish standards for the planning of measures and activities in 
all stages of the protection of facilities (prevention, management and recovery), and 
preparing a list of critical infrastructure in the interest of the state. 
Third, the creation of appropriate national security concept to protect critical 
infrastructure, which will provide a coordinated approach to all subjects, with explicit 
division of roles and responsibilities in the provision of critical infrastructure. 
Fourth, to strengthen the level of protection of objects is necessary to 
continuously strengthen the capacities of entities responsible for the protection of 
critical infrastructure, in terms of training, equipment, monitoring and evaluation, 
exchange of information, planning, coordination and monitoring of measures . 
Fifth, the continuous strengthening of the capacities of the Ministry of Interior 
for supervising the work of the Chamber and legal persons registered for private 
business secured by providing services for their own needs. 
                                                          
279 Ibid art.59 
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Sixth, establish and improve legislation in this area and harmonization of laws 
and regulations with European legislation and regulations. 
From the above we can rightly conclude that the protection of critical 
infrastructure must be based on systematic education, training, optimum use of 
resources, planning and effective implementation of the necessary measures and 
activities by the entities responsible for the protection of critical infrastructure. 
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Abstract 
 
Western Balkan, given its multiethnicity, represent a constant challenge for 
democratic change in society. Security of society represents one of the indicators and 
factors of democracy. Safe society is a democratic society. Any form of deviations from 
the democratic achievements of factors finds roots in the security of society. In the 
modern societies, security has a safety function of the preferred, and in particular in the 
society such as are specific for the Western Balkan. Society in the Western Balkans are 
a striking example of "risk society". Safety achievements of these communities, in the 
future will have a major impact on the development of democracy. Risk society is 
basically a challenge to the development of democracy in the societies of the Western 
Balkans. Managing the security risk in the years to come, there is a possibility of 
preventing many negative events. Creating prerequisites, event management that can 
be triggers of negative effects of social events. 
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Key words: social safety, western Balkan, democracy. 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
The exercise of basic needs for a man from the beggining has been 
representing a top priority. Success in that achieving to a number of different factors, 
which are in different ways and with different consequences prevented the man with 
the intention of realizing their needs. The result of the operation of different forces is 
always the same, which means that man suffered. Starting from the natural disasters, 
which had not understood, by other people who wanted to take over his prey, the 
environment had becoming more and more dangerous. Breach certain values that the 
man felt he had to protect them. The value motives are simply justified by the need to 
protect fundamental values. With this approach, man is defined by his environment and 
suggested what are his intentions. From defined values man had defined his interests, 
respectively the way in which he sightings relative to environment. The circumstances 
in which a man works become more complicated and from an aspect of the number of 
factors and from the aspect of increasing the number of hazards. Similarity of defined 
interests among individuals caused the recognition of possibilities of association in 
order to achieve common goals. Joining the different groups brought certain 
advantages in the field of joint action against certain dangers, but also brought new 
conditions of living and the realization of life needs. In social groups there had been 
developing new relationships, which are run by then by unknown forces, which 
represented new threats. So, man had no particular problems, those had risen on the 
social level, and with it has increased the level of complexity of relationships between 
people. Simply, a need imposed to a man to protect his value, in order to achieve its 
purposes. To realize this, he had to create an environment in which there is no danger, 
and safe environment. On creation of such an environment influenced by many factors 
and forces in nature and community groups. 
The effects of various hazards, throughout history, not only had a simple 
explanation for the simple consequences, although the writers of history have shown. 
The consequences were local but also much broader character. For all that he could not 
explain, man was attributed to "higher powers". Informations about the accidents could 
not be far away to hear, because there was no way to communicate. Today, through the 
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Internet in a few seconds the information arrives anywhere in the world. It is sometimes 
sufficient condition to protect people from the impending danger. Regardless of the 
technological possibilities, today those with power try to sell only information that are 
important to them, regardless of how much it will have secondary effects on people, 
property and the environment. Precisely, the destructive capacity of the danger, 
determine its importance to society, and not the opinion and attitude of those in 
charge. 
The consequences, regardless of whether they are designed or real, implied the 
suffering for the people. Suffering exerts its effect on society as much as on an 
individual. However, society is in a position to always implement specific mechanisms 
for their protection, while an individual does not have that privilege, because in many 
cases depends on the society. Precisely, because of the necessity of agreement holders, 
about the attitude that you need to act in a certain situation, individuals are deprived 
of help, at least for a while. Dangers that have long-term consequences, affecting a part 
or the whole society, the disruption of the normal functioning of society, cause a special 
state of society, in other words the crisis. In emergency situations, security is gaining in 
importance. Security becomes the priority activity. Society becomes more susceptible to 
the effects of various hazards and wants to protect from them. 
 
 
1. ORIGIN AND SOCIAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF SAFETY 
 
Good and evil have always had the attributes of interesting questions for the 
man in terms of the impact on its safe life and work. These issues, and their impact on 
humans, represented a kind of philosophical consciousness, which was aimed at 
determining the cause of evil. 
The first data on reflections on the causes of harm to humans date back to 
ancient times. Culture such as Chinese, Indian, Phoenician develop original ethical 
considerations about the causes of evil. Basically, the drivers of the evil events found in 
the man or his egoism. The point is that a person does not submit their personal goals 
to a society or group. Driver of human behavior characterized by negative event is 
avoiding pain and create prosperity. In doing all to live in prosperity a man does not 
choose the means, which causing causing negative events. Such considerations went 
even so far that good and evil was set as a dialectical unity, the unity of opposites. 
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However, there were also more advanced thinkings, focused on the structural 
conditionality collective social evil forms. Rulers and the administrations of the then 
country kept the people in constant tension, making the bad things that had people 
ready for war and the realization of their goals. Such methods had been awakening 
consciousness in an individual or a group, which has led to the organizations of various 
protection from such behavior. (Kekovic, 2009) 
The development of society brought new ideas on security considerations. In 
ancient times, there is the question of justice. Considering that statesmen must find 
ways to govern justly, without tyranny with the aspiration to rule, that will allow 
avoiding negative events. The idea of preventive combating evil, creates a basis to think 
about the interconnection of people to achieve security. 
Medieval thought, with the Roman Empire at the head, promotes the ideas of 
universality, based on linking the spiritual and secular authorities, and therefore the 
termination of the reason for the existence of discontent among the people. This idea 
did not survive, but is separated spiritual and secular authority, and the idea of 
universality led to the national interests of different countries. 
In the new century is developed the universalistic idea of establishing a new 
and just international order, where ethics were above the power and oppression, and 
the power of arms replaced the power of public opinion. 
Today the idea of universality is a platform for the theory of globalization. 
 
1.1 Danger as aprerequisite for security 
 
What is dangerous and how to behave in the formation of risks are the 
questions which man seeks for a response from its inception. Human history is rich in 
events, with dramatic and destructive effects, due to which a man suffered by negative 
consequences. Situations and events that jeopardized the survival of man occurred in 
different forms, with different intensity and characteristics. In such a situation, in their 
evolution and socio-cultural development, man has tried in various ways, in his 
environment, to combat dangers by restricting and hampering the realization of their 
needs. Various events have acted in different ways, but one thing was in common, a 
man suffered pain and was obstructed to meet all his needs. The troubles that had 
afflicted man were unpredictable, multi-dimensional, without time and space 
limitations, and the effects were devastating. There were various attempts for events 
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with negative effects to prevent or at least to reduce, resulted in various measures 
undertaken by the people in order to achieve a certain degree of protection. Although 
scientific achievements are at a very high level of development, man is still threaten by 
the same or similar hazards, whose effects are larger in terms of capacity increase due 
to the danger of technological development and the increasing number of residents per 
business unit. Events that are potentially hazardous to a man and the surrounding area, 
with the epithet destructiveness can be classified into: 
- events due to normal operation (fire, floods, volcanic eruptions, disease) 
- events that cause human error (fires, accidents, chemical accidents) and 
- events technical and technological origin (nuclear and radiation accidents, 
fires and explosions, spills of hazardous substances). 
Therefore, all of the above events have the capacity to inflict man and his 
environment some damage and therefore to pose a risk to humans. Analyzing the 
causes of the events listed can conclude that a man is the central figure of causality by 
many dangers. 
It remains an open question how to behave when certain risks incurre. In the 
modern world, this question becomes topical because of the destructive effects of 
increasing the capacity of individual risk. The mere fact that the consequences of 
modern danger of increased manifold inevitably implies the development of an 
appropriate protection measures. Increased destructive capacity of modern threats, in 
addition to consequences for people, property and the environment, causes and 
consequences of long-term and multidimensional character, which social groups bring 
into a special state, when there must make decisions about care in terms of lack of 
time, the deficit of information and resources. The effectiveness of protective measures 
requires the answers to several problems: (Geneva: UN International strategy for 
Disaster reduction) 
-the earliest detection of the causes of hazards; 
-the possibility of preventive planning and operation during negative events; 
-the existence of the current power response; 
-way of engaging all the capacity of society; 
-type and mode of application of the measures upon termination of danger. 
Mentioned facts imply the human need for existence in an environment where 
there is no risk or are so weak that they do not restrict the exercise of basic needs. 
Environment without the presence of danger is called a safe environment. The safe 
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state of the environment includes the two most important areas of social existence: the 
area of physical existence and material well-being. 
In addition to the substantive definition of danger it is necessary to take into 
account also the elements that are in touch of the possibility of protection when it 
comes to the realization of danger. The resulting need to protect society and its 
inability, and / or the ability to provide a certain level of protection, shows the security 
conditions at the given time (Figure 1). The relation between two named conditions is 
disproportional which indicates the level of security. Namely, if the needs are big and 
possibilities are small, the security is low and vice versa if the needs are small and 
possibilities are big, safety is at a solid level. (Byme and Baden, 1995) 
Finally, the basic characteristics of the danger, which is also the central figure 
of the social interests in the struggle for a safe environment, are the consequences. The 
consequences are the effect of causing a danger to society and its values. Negative 
consequences are primarily interesting for a society. Total deliberation and action of 
society is directed to finding measures with which can effectively operate in a risk to 
rebate or reduce consequences. 
 
1.2 Endangering as a social phenomenon 
 
Various forms of dangers with the portfolio of consequences, besides other 
factors influencing by human existence, were directed by individuals to association. 
People quickly realized the benefits and benefits of grouping and association, in terms 
of providing easier protection. Thus, danger and endangerment was not the thing of an 
individual, but of a group or a society. The question that arises is why the threat was 
premature to society. Since the threat represents a series of related phenomena, 
processes, interactions, and their source of origin, it can be concluded that it has an 
impact on all flows and processes in society and in all social groups. So, endangering 
represents a social phenomenon in the form of a particular event or behavior of lasting 
character which in social life causes a negative consequence. (Dragisic, 2007) 
For a fuller consideration of the impact of the danger, the threats, the society, 
it is necessary to determine the nature, character and content endangering. 
The central place, in the process endangering society, takes the value of the 
company that is trying to maintain. The values of society are the very essence of human 
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struggle for a safe environment, and can be in terms of social life related to moral and 
social achievements, culture, property, etc. 
Social character of threats is represented by the fact that the society is 
deteriorated due to different threats, for example: of other groups, natural disasters, its 
own technical and technological progress, and so on. Diversity compromising implies 
also a diversity of measures which must be undertaken because of protection. An 
individual does not have the capacity to undertake more global rate, but society has. 
The development of society has caused the need for a systematic approach to the 
development of measures to protect the values of society and mechanisms grouped in 
various specialized areas. (Kekovic, 2009) 
Important role in defining threats to society occupies the cause of 
endangerment. The fact is that the endangerment occurs when conditions are 
necessary and sufficient which produced the danger or represent a source of hazard. 
From the above it can be concluded that all processes and events in society and its 
environment are not by themselves a danger that they do not have primary 
compromising character. This feature, talk that a variety of causes determines the 
character of compromising, so, it occurs like a natural, social or psychic phenomena. 
(Kovacevic, 1996) Endangering caused by natural phenomena refers to natural and 
other disasters, and social phenomena on different types of wars, terrorist acts and the 
like. Mental element in the phenomena of compromising consists in the fact that they 
mainly express consciously of individuals or social groups, in order to achieve a specific 
goal. Respectively, consciousness of a specific goal, in certain circumstances, can be a 
cause of contaminating. 
A special place in the interpretation of the concept of threat in social 
phenomena takes up the question of threat. Subject compromising is closely linked with 
the values of society. The content of the values of society, as a subject of compromising, 
is determined by the goals and tasks of the society. Depending on the social goals, in 
defining the scope of protection there are included Institutional forms of society, such 
as political system, territory, human lives, and the like. In this way, at the same time 
there are also concretization phenomena of endangering society, because there is no 
threat to you on the subject of a social value. (Kekovic, 2009). 
Development of social relations has implicated also a development of the way 
of thinking about possibilities of threatening in sociality. Those reflections brought to a 
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conclusion that is not enough only to protect basic value of society, human life. It is 
created a need for protection of material goods, social institutions, environment. 
Modern society, due to the high degree of technological progress, has reached 
a high level of development measures and the system of protection of social values 
from compromising. The phenomena that threaten society today is not uncommon, but 
their contents are known to some extent. In the majority of the phenomena threatening 
character as mystery remains during implementation. 
 
1.3 Social safety as a presupposition of democracy 
 
Security concept is designed for a long time relative to military threats. 
However, the progress and development of technical and technological possibilities of 
the modern world, in addition to improving military threats have reached a level at 
which they increased and non-military threats to security. So that, security is no longer 
representing a primary understanding the nature of the threat, but also understanding 
in which way is shaped and manifested a security threat. This approach arose from the 
need to respond to the increasing number of threats in the sphere of security. Due to 
the great political and economic changes in the late 20th century, a growing number of 
non-military threats to security, the security focus shifted from state-centric focus on 
the individual and society. (Hajnsmas, 2006) There was a holistic approach in 
understanding and reflection of the concept of security. It is about the state of the vital 
interests of the individual, society and state from internal and external threats and 
risks of different nature and character, both globally and locally. 
The variety of social, political and economic factors in the new social context, 
cast a shadow on the primary character of social security, due to the inevitability of 
appearance of its technical aspects. This fact indicates a more dimensional perception 
of security, arising precisely from the need to interpret that security is not only 
assuming fulfillment of basic function and survival and functioning of an individual or 
group. 
New approaches to observing the security phenomena indicate the existence of 
a need for security behavior within develop and maintain security attitudes of 
individuals and groups, with the aim of raising awareness of their necessity. 
The long-term reference object of security - the country is slowly moving from 
the central framework of security and his place is taken by an individual. Changing 
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considerations referent object of security, there is a change of meaning of many terms 
related to safety. Among these terms there is a culture of security, which appears in a 
new light in consideration of security, and points to the behavior in the context of 
security. However, this phrase had its foundation in the past, but now receives its full 
meaning by placing the individual at the pedestal of the idea of security. (Nye, 2003) 
The unstoppable and permanent transformation process safety is reflected in the 
change in perceptions of the concept of security. Thus, the state is no longer the main 
subject of interest to study the science of safety. The primary place of the country took 
the transnational and international organizations, nations, national minorities, 
professional and marginalized groups as the most numerous safety factors - individuals. 
(Nye, 2003) 
As the number of reference objects of security increases, also and interest in 
safety culture increases. Also, by extending the list of reference objects of security, 
sense of the term safety culture is becoming more complex. It is no longer the main 
issue of safety culture how to educate and bring up a nation in the area of security, but 
how to do this with each individual separately. Thus, in terms of security, with education 
and upbringing there should be the beginning from the '' bottom '', where the goal is 
individuals, but also the '' top '', where the goal is society at the local level, regional and 
international levels. 
In the way of attempts and intention of defining the content of the concept of 
security, there were created the phrase challenges, risks and threats. Justification 
occurrence of those phrases is rooted in the complexity and multidimensionality of 
security as a phenomenon, but also the state and society as a complex mechanism. 
Efforts to be registered and meet all the causes that lead to the appearance of 
danger to the values of society, led to the creation of security challenges. With good 
reason, because the causes of hazards are associated with the emergence of threats to 
the same values which are located in the economic, environmental, politic and other 
phenomena. The correlation between the challenges and threats to the values of society 
there exist, but the challenges are more general term, which according to the above 
applies to all phenomena, regardless of whether they have a threatening character or 
not. The perception of phenomena that pose challenges to the moment that determines 
whether a phenomenon to get the title of compromising, depending on factors, causes 
and possible effects. Challenge as an occurrence represents a value-term, up to the 
point of establishing a correlation between the occurrence of event, which are subject 
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to security considerations, the possible adverse context. Value-neutrality of this 
concept is contained also in ignorance of its probability events. 
Since the security challenges directly depend on the type and characteristics of 
the phenomenon that define them and exhibit, it may be concluded that the 
characteristics and mode of operation of the original phenomena determines the 
character and intensity of the challenges of the security of society. On the forms and 
ways of endangering society affect two groups of factors: the first are those who 
generate them, enable and develop the other are those who prevent them, limit and 
prevent. (Kekovic, 2009) The fact is that these groups of factors on the phenomena act 
divergent, or indicate that the phenomenon can have positive and negative character. 
Positive character is reflected in the absence of danger, and negative in its presence. 
Such status, with elements of uncertainty, talks about the possibility that the 
outcome of the event is positive or negative in given circumstances. Such a possibility 
is based on uncertainty, to which we can achieve a certain effect, called a risk. From the 
above, it is evident that the risk has elements that indicate the course of events aimed 
at maintaining or increasing safety but also to a lack of security and the existence of 
compromising. Thus, the risk cannot be used in the celebration of the negative context 
of security phenomena. In this context, the risk can be defined as a possibility, a certain 
degree of probability of occurrence of an event with adverse consequences. If the risk 
has unacceptable character for the projected level of security in relation to the 
observed phenomena, it represents a characteristic phenomenon which acquired the 
status of threats to the values of society. So, the threat is the same phenomenon that 
was a challenge, a value-neutral phenomenon, which now has the capacity and the 
likelihood to exert negative effects on the values of society, characterized by an 
unacceptable risk. The threat may be broadly understood as a kind of pressure from a 
position of strength, which the opposite side is wanted to be intimidated and 
exhausted, in order to compel certain concessions. (Military lexicon, 1981) The threat is 
characterized by well-known probability of occurrence. The measure of probability of 
realization depends on the threat identified and of a determined risk, the present and 
the defined through an analysis of the legality, and the events and the development of 
certain phenomena. 
The relation between the challenges, risks and threats, has its foundation in 
the triangle which consists of the conditions which are specific contrary, the intention 
of the determined risk and the force in order to carry a threat. 
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The special status, in modern science security, is consideration of the 
relationship of security and freedom. Specifically, the question is how much freedom a 
man is willing to give up for security and vice versa. (Kekovic, 2009) Great controversy 
in the development of future relations in the modern world represents a harmonization 
of the relationship between security and freedom. Precisely, the freedom of man as the 
supreme value is the ideal on which is based today's neoliberal conception of 
development of world society and which has served for the degradation of the 
communist system, which did not leave room for a maximum emancipation of human 
freedom. If freedom represents the absence of limitations and life without the ban, it is 
necessary to identify all forms of freedom that are dangerous and determine ways to 
protect themselves from them. That is, we come to the crucial moment, as well as how 
to create enough security to enjoy maximum freedom. The question is whether a 
democracy and freedom? 
 
 
2. SOCIAL SECURITY THREAT IN THE WESTERN BALKAN 
 
The Western Balkan is a recent term, and in the security and political terms 
means space of Albania and the former republics of Yugoslavia, without Slovenia. The 
geopolitical significance of the Western Balkan, in fact, reflects the essential 
characteristics of the Balkans as well as the wider region and the "Balkanization" as a 
process of disintegrating and conflict among the people. The geopolitical situation of 
the Western Balkan distinguished locations in strategically important area Rimland - 
the coastal zone between the Mediterranean sea and Hartland - Eurasian continental 
core. From this position, arise two basic determinants of the Western Balkan: transition 
and heterogeneity. Both determinants are often the cause of the bloodiest conflicts of 
the Balkan nations. (Sretenovic, 2010) 
 
2.1 Characteristics of social security in the Western Balkan 
 
Understanding the social security in the Western Balkans is not possible 
without analysis and understanding of conflicts in communities. Conflicts arise between 
communities for the exercise of the fundamental basic needs, food, shelter, energy, 
territory, etc. This fact speaks about the existence and security of a formal association 
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in state creation. Inevitably there were various reasons that one community has more 
land or livestock, which was reason enough for the development of inequality and the 
emergence of conflict. Clashes were directed towards violent seizure of material things 
but also the territory, followed by a large number of casualties and material 
destruction. Stronger communities have obeyed the weaker members and turned them 
into their slaves. (Simic, 2002) The new reality of a combination of generation according 
to calamitous events, conscious and unconscious gesture and events give rise to the 
creation of social relations. In order to conclude that social relations created in the 
function of satisfying social needs. Social relations, now as a process are in the form of 
connecting people in which they enter into definite relations. Social relations are 
divided into malleable and situational, by determining whether caused by the will of a 
human or independent thereof, by the nature of the dynamics of the process and the 
cooperation of the conflict, according to its effects on the process of creation and 
destruction. (Fiamengo, 1974) From the above it can be concluded that social processes 
are multidimensional and complex processes. From such processes occur social 
formations also, with the same character. Since there is a necessary and unavoidable 
needs that enabling social environment without risk to the values of society, it can be 
concluded that the safety is a complex social phenomenon. And based on this fact we 
are developing various security systems as a social creation. 
The Western Balkan has passed several times through various integration 
processes and disintegration. In addition to all these major processes, today's schedule 
of state creations, is created by conflicts. This is why they can indicate damage or 
interference to the consolidation of democracy in the Western Balkan may be in the 
next period to cause further conflicts. This damage can occur only with the kindling of 
the conflict by various political currents in the maelstrom of external interests. The 
sight will also be a state of political normality (law and order). Completely new question 
arises if enrolled lineup, the scenario according to which a country falls into an even 
deeper crisis, or if any of them directly close the dissolution or disappearance. (Hadzic, 
2009) 
Security as a social phenomenon and the process was created as a response to 
the problem of meeting the needs of society for a safe environment to live and work. 
Effects and directions of social processes generate phenomena of creation (progress) 
and the occurrence of destruction (compromising). Constant fluctuations by social 
relations lead to the formation of both phenomena. Security as a phenomenon, the 
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administration had a duty to find ways to define social space to restrict or prevent the 
occurrence of endangering the progress of society. 
 
2.2 The Company risk-based social security in the Western Balkan 
 
The last two centuries represent the time of intensive advancement and 
progress in technical and technological, economic and demographic terms. Such 
progress has many theoreticians and practitioners put in doubt and questions whether 
such progress s positive, what are the effects of it and whether it makes sense. The 
reason for that is realistic and based on the observation of the fact that along with the 
progress of developing and increasing the dangers that threaten the destruction of man 
and the planet. The world is sharply divided in a subject (human) and the object (nature, 
society, technique). Philosophical postulates of the unity of man and nature are 
forgotten and lost their meaning. The man reached for the complete mastery and 
heartless exploitation of nature, the environment and other man, with the intention to 
do so and with the universe. In addition to other powers, and science itself is partly 
used as a means of instrumentalization of mind. Special contribution was given ideology 
excessive spending that has intensified and indifference towards nature and towards 
other people. Therefore, it is only certain that the future is 'more uncertain than ever 
before. (Beck, 1992) 
This way of development and progress of human society in general and the 
Balkan region shows that it is increasingly vulnerable. The vulnerability is reflected in 
the different examples: a growing number of devastating natural phenomena, poverty, 
the gap between rich and poor, the collapse of national economies, and so on. Thus, 
social activity contributes to the main driver for the emergence and development of the 
growing danger to our own existence. Big question mark is standing over the current 
ways and directions of development of societies in the Balkan, the whole social function 
of science and technology and enforceable forms of culture. 
The highlight progress and development is not only reflected in the technical 
and technological development, which is the initiator of many other processes, but also 
in the field of consciousness and culture, then the economy and security. Certain 
advanced society, the neoliberal orientation, contributed to the creation of a special and 
unique idea of uniting the world into a global village, and the idea of globalization. 
Globalization as a process is one of the products of technological progress. Founded on 
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the capitalist economy, global awareness, global social system and military order of 
globalization tend to delete national characteristics and their subordination to global 
interests. (Stojanovic, 2009) Global interests project the interests of the most powerful 
countries in the world and represent their national interests. Such a performance by the 
most powerful countries does not lead to the creation and development of world peace, 
but on the contrary, to deepen differences and create fertile ground for conflict. 
Contrary to the idea that the multi-polar nature of international relations and more 
intense connection of communities will reduce the chance for major traditional armed 
conflicts in the world is dominated by the deepening instability. The modern world is 
increasingly presents itself as a space of global tumult and turmoil uproar, dominated 
time of insecurity is more than ever a doubt in peacetime growth prospects of the 
world. (Stojanovic, 2009) From the standpoint of security, progress is a kind of history 
of risk and contradictory process between freedom of human choice and objective limits 
of this choice given that the man is always risky before a final choice between the 
reality and the infinite possibilities, a safe present and an uncertain future. (Beck, 1992) 
This state of security of society is interwoven with a large number of hazards 
and risks of them in all variations, it does not mean that the community in the Balkan 
is struggled and surrendered to the evil fate. On the contrary, properly introduced to 
risk, their presence and destructive capabilities, and reconcile themselves with the fact 
that they have to live in an environment where risks are immanent phenomena. The 
fact is that these hazards that exist permanently increase and build up the capacity of 
which can seriously harm social systems have serious consequences is essentially a 
problem of social security in the Balkan. It is one of the effects of globalization - the 
globalization of threats and risks. 
Properly introduced above facts, science, by putting the need for progress and 
preserve peace in the foreground, examines the causes of hazards and take measures to 
reduce or neutralize their effects. It became clear that only a deeper danger, the 
circumstances under which they occur, causes and ways of manifesting his power, can 
effectively respond to the destructive operation. 
Contemporary challenges pose a potential threat to the security of society in 
general, and can, in a negative connotation, gain the attributes of growing risk events 
and threats, as well as direct and obvious indicators of compromising the existing 
security situation. Challenges, risks and threats begin where stops confidence and 
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security and include all phenomena of the modern world that can become a potential 
threat for the democratic process of the Western Balkan. 
Contemporary social relations engendered the new security challenges, risks 
and threats, internal and external character caused primarily non-military events and 
phenomena with asymmetrical features. The internal challenges and threats have 
increased. And they are expressed through the presence of weapons of mass 
destruction, terrorist acts, acts of various nationalist and separatist movements, bad 
economics, and so on. Internal challenges have a negative operating direction of the 
attributes of destructive capacity. The risk of these events is increased by the fact that 
modern societies have no or poor protection mechanisms. The internal challenges and 
threats are not limited to the territory of a particular country, but exert negative effects 
on the environment, but also interact with external challenges and threats. 
The external challenges and threats are also a wide array of events and 
phenomena with destructive capacity, for example: terrorism, energy dependence, 
migration, hunger, achieving a common feature, especially negative impact on the 
individual state and society. Together, the internal and external challenges and threats, 
cause political and economic disruption, with short-term or long-term consequences. 
On this factual is known theorist Ulrich Beck, launched the phrase "Risk 
society", signaling the consequences of progress and technical and technological 
development that the sum of the dangers and risks of a range which is not easy to 
predict. 
The theory of risk society has at least opened the box knowledge of the risk 
and the light of day performed its social dimension. It is obvious that the dangers and 
their consequences do not leave the same impression on all communities of the 
Western Balkan. 
Said condition implies a serious issue, which is the way out of the 'age of 
uncertainty'- whether in the setting Enlightenment - rationalist understood progress or 
build a society that is based on a different paradigm, which postulates take into 
account the need for progress and more comfortable life but also the fact that there 
are limitations in whose framework progress must move. 
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2.3 The impact of social security on the development of democracy in the 
countries of the Western Balkan 
 
After the wars that led to the breakup of SFR Yugoslavia, the question of 
security problems prevailing in the Western Balkan at the beginning of XXI century. On 
the internal level, the problem is the nature of each country. Western Balkan countries 
are still faced with many problems that prevent democratization. One of the primary 
problems is a lack of consensus on the basic principles, values and priorities of the 
political and economic systems, as well as the city of the future in Euro-Atlantic 
integration. Company are, and further, the core is divided, which is an obstacle to 
democratic consolidation, as well as normal operation of an institution. Religious and 
ethnic heterogeneity affect the economic development of these countries, especially 
those with complex religious structure, primarily Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Serbia, Montenegro. Civil society is underdeveloped and almost complete monopoly of 
political parties in political organization and presentation. Media freedom is threatened, 
both by government and by powerful economic and political groups, which in this way 
are trying to complete the process of "hijacking" or subjugation of the country. (Hadzic, 
2012) 
Political, legal and economic institutions are not at the level of modern 
normality where weight. I do not perform well their basic function and one gets the 
impression that the public office and state assets which have exploited as a source of 
power and protection. This supports a number of international security issues such as 
organized crime and corruption, which, increasingly, are becoming a major obstacle to 
economic development when the probability of military conflict decreased. These 
anomalies threaten to nullify all the positive effects of "unfinished peace." Associations 
of crime and state structures operate regardless of borders, which is why this threat 
has a regional character. (Sretenovic, 2006) Western Balkan countries are both 
expensive, and inefficient and weak, or unable to provide the citizens is not the most 
important public good. One of the most important public good is the rule of law, which 
is chronically lacking in the Western Balkan. Parliaments are slow in making good laws, 
governments in their implementation, and the judiciary is still largely unreformed and a 
far cry from the projected independence from the other branches of government and 
powerful non-state actors. Different sectors are sources of securitization, or prevalent 
social, because questions of national identity are becoming the most common 
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organizational factor of struggle and fear. (Kegljir and Vitkof, 2006) Resurface religion, 
which represents and sets a line of demarcation (Croat / Serb, three entities in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo Albanian / Kosovo Serb Orthodox Macedonians / Albanians), 
but it is not securitized as such, but the most important element in defining the 
national identity. 
In the Western Balkans, political and ethnic ground has not stopped trembling, 
because, in contrast to other parts of Europe, believes that the processes are not 
completed construction of nation states run the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia. 
The international community and local actors securitize increasingly 
transnational nature of criminal phenomena, such as illegal drug trafficking, trafficking 
(prostitution - often in the form of slave-like and organized illegal migration to the 
West), weapons and, of course, organized crime in general. These challenges are 
supported and reinforced by said above conflicts, weak state structures and numerous 
fissures and conflicts within societies. (Yenigun, 2010) 
When the state leadership and the citizens of the long-term face a crisis (as is 
the case in the Western Balkan), often prevalent belief that it is insoluble or that the 
proposed solution will bring significantly higher costs and losses than gains, which 
favors the development of political and other forms of extremism. Extremism, in turn, 
causes the appearance of the vicious circle of violence being committed through 
organized crime and terrorism. (Laszlo, 2007) Although violence is primarily an integral 
part of terrorism, it is also an aid organized crime, which provides financial, political, 
social and other support to terrorism. Terrorism, on the other hand, provides a wider 
space for the development of organized crime. In such an interdependent area, 
everything is possible and anyone can become a victim and a target. Accordingly, in 
analyzing the activities aimed at combating terrorism and organized crime, it is 
necessary to recognize their relationship but also causes of connectivity. Special 
attention deserves and gains upon fanaticized people willing to die for an idea, money 
or other of them a distinct value. It is important to note that a number of reasons, 
primarily because of the political and socio-economic situation, most of the Western 
Balkan countries would be fertile ground for terrorism in the post-socialist period. 
(Islami, 2007) 
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According to Sheehan in his doctoral thesis, the factors supporting the 
preceding paragraph are as follows (Sheehan, 2000): 
- The growth of extreme nationalism as a key factor in the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia. Although the degree of nationalism in the region culminated in the 
early nineties of the last century, two decades after the conflict has not been 
yet completely sidelined from the political discourse. Hate speech is still 
spreading in some media, the absence of a sizeable step towards reconciliation 
and the accountability for crimes committed during the wars, with the 
exception of the Hague tribunal, contributes to the further existence of 
extreme nationalism in the Western Balkan. 
- In the countries formed after the breakup of SFR Yugoslavia immediately arose 
authoritarian regimes, which were unable to establish full control over state 
functions, which caused extreme corruption and nepotism and therefore the 
decrease in the efficiency of state bodies. Weak states have not been able to 
establish civilian control over the security system or to redirect irregular 
activities in the economic and political decision-making, the legal and 
institutional flows. Unstable coalition governments and internal conflicts in 
many countries still further weaken the effectiveness of the government and 
the mechanisms of their control. Political elites are deeply divided, and ad hoc 
coalitions established out of necessity, are composed mainly of various 
partners whose relationship is based largely on mutual conditionality. 
- The rule of law is still in most countries of the Western Balkan has not reached 
full swing, which is reflected in a significant rate of organized crime and 
corruption. 
- The difficult economic and social situation is a major source of political 
instability, and thus the opportunities for the development of extremism and 
the use of violence (terrorism). Decades of descent of the national economy are 
large part of the population in the region plummeted into poverty, wherein 
employment is prospected in minimum. The absence of significant investments 
and low living standard of the population is a source of political instability and 
social discontent, which could easily spill over into support for radical political 
options. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Changed security constellation of the world, the disappearance of the bipolar 
confront not yielded the expected results, i.e., increasing security and creating 
conditions for undisturbed progress. On the contrary, the idea of social justice, the 
single market and culture remained positive ideas with positive effects in rich countries, 
while poor countries expanded range of problems. The increased hiatus lost between 
the rich and the poor, population growth especially in poor countries, the weakened 
economies of many countries, dizzying technological development especially in the field 
of nuclear energy and information technology increases the number of hazards, lack of 
food and energy resources, an increase in the number of terrorist acts increased the 
number of natural and other disasters, and so on. These problems are not just a local 
issue, tied to the nation-state. All the above features are readily evident in the Western 
Balkan. Spatial and temporal dimensions of modern threats has become negligible, 
considering that any of these hazards, does not depend on the physical boundaries of a 
state, but equally threatens both rich and poor countries. Difference creates only the 
existence of capacity to protect or prevent negative effects. The consequences to 
people, property and the environment are such that they have long-term effects 
affecting a larger number of actors, creating fear and panic, disrupt the normal 
functioning of society. 
Security of the state and society is uncertain. Modern universal aspirations to 
security, designed to globalization, show results, projected through domination and 
especially monopolistic exploitation of the world's natural resources by mega-
corporations. Mechanisms global dominance, powerful states, are realized through the 
imposition of dependent modernization and neo, by reducing the territorial 
sovereignties, cultural imperialism, causing internal conflicts and military force in order 
to achieve their own political interest. For countries that want to preserve their national 
identity, but also to exist in a fair international community, the current development of 
globalization is an extension of the range of challenges at national levels. Democratic 
processes in the countries of the Western Balkan are subject to these changes in terms 
of security. The development of social consciousness in all areas of social development 
of the countries of the Western Balkan, not accompanied by the need to react to 
changes on a global scale. This discrepancy leads to poor development of social security 
in each country, and in the region, too. 
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